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Understanding involves inference that is not only
occasionally defeasible:We almost always fail.
Yet we almost always nearly succeed:
This is the paradox of communication.
William J. Rapaport
(2003, p. 402; lightly edited)
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ABSTRACT
Dialogue is an interactive endeavour in which participants jointly pursue the goal of
reaching understanding. Since participants enter the interaction with their individual
conceptualisation of the world and their idiosyncratic way of using language, under-
standing cannot, in general, be reached by exchanging messages that are encoded
when speaking and decoded when listening. Instead, speakers need to design their
communicative acts in such a way that listeners are likely able to infer what is meant.
Listeners, in turn, need to provide evidence of their understanding in such a way that
speakers can infer whether their communicative acts were successful. This is often
an interactive and iterative process in which speakers and listeners work towards
understanding by jointly coordinating their communicative acts through feedback
and adaptation. Taking part in this interactive process requires dialogue participants
to have ‘interactional intelligence’.
This conceptualisation of dialogue is rather uncommon in formal or technical
approaches to dialogue modelling. This thesis argues that it may, nevertheless, be a
promising research direction for these fields, because it de-emphasises raw language
processing performance and focusses on fundamental interaction skills. Interaction-
ally intelligent artificial conversational agents may thus be able to reach understanding
with their interlocutors by drawing upon such competences. This will likely make
them more robust, more understandable, more helpful, more effective, and more
human-like.
This thesis develops conceptual and computational models of interactional intelli-
gence for artificial conversational agents that are limited to (1) the speaking role, and
(2) evidence of understanding in form of communicative listener feedback (short but
expressive verbal/vocal signals, such as ‘okay’, ‘mhm’ and ‘huh’, head gestures, and
gaze). This thesis argues that such ‘attentive speaker agents’ need to be able (1) to
probabilistically reason about, infer, and represent their interlocutors’ listening re-
lated mental states (e.g., their degree of understanding), based on their interlocutors’
feedback behaviour; (2) to interactively adapt their language and behaviour such that
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their interlocutors’ needs, derived from the attributed mental states, are taken into
account; and (3) to decide when they need feedback from their interlocutors and how
they can elicit it using behavioural cues. This thesis describes computational models
for these three processes, their integration in an incremental behaviour generation
architecture for embodied conversational agents, and a semi-autonomous interaction
study in which the resulting attentive speaker agent is evaluated.
The evaluation finds that the computational models of attentive speaking de-
veloped in this thesis enable conversational agents to interactively reach understand-
ing with their human interlocutors (through feedback and adaptation) and that these
interlocutors are willing to provide natural communicative listener feedback to such an
attentive speaker agent. The thesis shows that computationally modelling interactional
intelligence is generally feasible, and thereby raises many new research questions and
engineering problems in the interdisciplinary fields of dialogue and artificial conver-
sational agents.
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PRELIMINARY REMARKS
Speakers and listeners Speaking and listening roles in dialogue are neither fixed
nor clearly discriminable. Just a moment ago Lieselotte had the role of the ‘speaker’,
and now the turn has already changed and she is the ‘listener’, attending to and
trying to make sense of what Simon has to say. While he is speaking, Lieselotte is
neither inactive nor silent, but continues contributing to the dialogue. She is following
Simon’s gaze, nodding when she understands his words, and displaying a puzzled face
when she finds an argument inconclusive. She is uttering uh-huhs, okays, or huh?s,
throwing in a word or phrase here and there, and making short remarks. Simon, while
being the speaker, is paying attention to what Lieselotte does, immediately assessing
the consequences of her actions and adapting his language and speech. In dialogue,
listeners listen and speak, and speakers speak and listen.
This observation is a central theme in this thesis and it makes writing about
persons who temporarily occupy one of the roles complicated. In the course of this
thesis I often write about communicative acts whose ‘sender’ is seen as a listener
and whose ‘receiver’ is seen as a speaker. To avoid confusion, I sometimes introduce
abstract persons (speakers and listeners) with random names, such as Simon and
Lieselotte in the example above. The names of a speaker always start with letter ‘S’ and
the names of a listener with letter ‘L’.
Previously published material and co-authorship Parts of the work presented in
this thesis have already been published as peer reviewed workshop, conference, or
journal papers. Use of such material is indicated at chapter (or sometimes section)
beginnings in special footnotes marked ‘☆’.
All publications are co-authored by my doctoral advisor Stefan Kopp, whoses co-
authorship is not further indicated. When presenting work published with additional
co-authors, it is described which parts were contributed by me.
Usually co-authorship meant that individual authors were responsible for writing
specific parts of a text. There was, however, a liberal policy on editing. All authors
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were allowed—even encouraged— to edit any part of the text. Consequently parts
that lay in my responsibility may have been altered in ways that are difficult or even
impossible to unravel.
In addition, some research was done and some texts were written in a highly
collaborative style—multiple authors being co-present in a room with a whiteboard
and a computer. These ideas and texts are the result of ‘distributed cognition’ (Gureckis
and Goldstone 2006), to which traditional concepts of authorship cannot be applied.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
We begin by briefly introducing the essential background of this dissertation. Simul-
taneously we make a case— rooted in research on conversational interaction in the
fields of conversation analysis, linguistics, philosophy, and psychology— for a shift of
focus in artificial conversational agent research: from natural language processing to
interactional intelligence. Following this, we describe the objective and scope of this
thesis and provide an overview of the text.
1.1 CONTEXT AND MOTIVATION
Artificial conversational agents— such as spoken dialogue systems (McTear 2002),
embodied conversational agents (Cassell et al. 2000), or sociable robots (Fong et
al. 2003)—are computational artifacts that apply natural language processing and
artificial intelligence (AI) techniques in order to be able to interact with humans using
spoken language (possibly accompanied by non-verbal communicative acts). The
abilities of these agents range from reacting to a limited set of spoken commands to
taking part in face-to-face dialogues— in restricted domains— that may result in
fairly coherent discourses.
With automatic speech recognition now performing as good as humans in recog-
nising conversational speech (Xiong et al. 2017), it may seem that scaling artificial
conversational agents to operate in larger, possibly open ended, domains is mainly
a question of improving natural language processing techniques. Natural language
processing, however, is commonly thought to be an ‘AI-complete’ problem1. Under-
standing and generating natural language requires linguistic knowledge on all levels of
1. AI-complete problems are, rather informally, defined as requiring an artificial general intelligence
(‘the synthesis of a human-level intelligence’, [Raymond 2003, ll. 4734–4751]), perhaps even ‘strong’ artificial
intelligence— the attainability of which is questionable (cf. Russell and Norvig 2010, § 26.2).
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language processing (phonetic, morphological, lexical, syntactic, prosodic, semantic,
and basic pragmatic knowledge), it requires computational models (algorithms and
representations) for these processes, as well as, and perhaps most importantly, ex-
tensive world knowledge. All this makes it unlikely that a general solution to natural
language processing will be found in the foreseeable future (Jurafsky andMartin 2000,
pp. 702–703).
An additional problem for artificial conversational agents is that ‘speaker meaning’
(what the speaker intents to communicate; Grice 1957; 1975) does not, in general, cor-
respond to the ‘literal meaning’ of communicative acts. Relying on syntax, semantics,
and basic pragmatics does not get listeners far in understanding what the speaker
means. ‘Code models’ of communication (e.g., Shannon’s [1948] mathematical model
of communication)—often implicitly assumed in modelling artificial conversational
agents—do not even consider this. The only explanation they offer for problems
in communication is a ‘noisy channel’. Reasons for the difference between speaker
meaning and literal meaning, however, are that the former is only implicated, that
communicative acts contain multiple intentions (a communicative intention and an
informative intention; Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, §§ 1.11, 1.12), and that dialogue
participants are individuals with private beliefs and subjective conceptions of language
and the world— that is, ultimately they do not share ‘the code’. In comparison, the
problem of the noisy channel seems almost negligible.
Using lexical semantics, syntax, and discourse relations to derive the semantics of
an utterance, or to classify its speech/dialogue act (these are core natural language
processing tasks) plays an important role in deriving speaker meaning (i.e., ‘under-
standing’ the speaker). Yet, it yields merely one source of information among several
(the context, such as common ground, discourse context, situation, expectations,
beliefs about the interlocutor, and others). Deriving speaker meaning from commu-
nicative acts using a variety of sources of information is called ‘pragmatic reasoning’.
It is based on the principle that interlocutors in conversation are fundamentally co-
operative (Grice 1975) and it relies on ostension2—on the side of the speaker— and
inference—on side of the addressee— (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, § 1.10).
Yet, in order for interlocutors to ‘understand’ each other, abilities even beyond
natural language processing and pragmatic reasoning are needed. An inferential
process based on a multitude of information sources—which are not completely
shared among interlocutors— is basically guaranteed to draw wrong conclusions, i.e.,
to come to an interpretation of a communicative act that differs from what the speaker
2. With ostensive behaviour (a technical term from relevance theory; Sperber andWilson 1986/1995, p. 49),
communicators go beyond ‘making manifest’ what they intent to communicate (the informative intention),
by simultaneously making manifest that they want to communicate (the communicative intention).
1.1 CONTEXT ANDMOTIVATION 3
meant. This is why ‘understanding involves inference [that] is not only occasionally
defeasible’ and directly leads to the ‘paradox of communication’ (Rapaport 2003, p. 402;
see this thesis’ epigraph on page iii): In trying to establish understanding, interlocutors
in dialogue
[. . . ] almost always fail [. . . ]. Yet [they] almost always nearly succeed.
It is paradoxical that although it should theoretically be highly improbably for in-
terlocutors to understand each other, our everyday experience actually suggests the
opposite. Participants in conversation commonly seem to understand what the other
‘means’. As a resolution Rapaport proposes that:
Misunderstandings, if small enough, can be ignored. And those that
cannot be ignored can be minimized through negotiation.
In order for pragmatic reasoning to draw conclusions that are ‘less wrong’, the
information sources that the speaker uses to produce ostensive actions and the in-
formation sources that underlie the listener’s inference process should be as similar
as possible. This is the reason why interlocutors in conversation are, to a large ex-
tent, concerned with establishing ‘common ground’ (Clark 1996) and making beliefs
shared.
Conversation is an ‘interactive’ endeavour in which interlocutors ‘coordinate’ the
information sources underlying ostensive–inferential communication. Such coordina-
tion happens onmultiple levels. Dialogue participants coordinate their behaviour,3 but
also their beliefs and attitudes (Kopp 2010)— relying, to some extent, on the results
of behaviour coordination. Beliefs and attitudes are subjective mental states of inter-
locutors which, even though they are not directly observable, are crucial information
sources for ostensive–inferential communication. For communication to be possible
and efficient, interlocutors thus need to represent the beliefs and attitudes that their
dialogue partners are likely holding. Coordination happens via communication itself,
in an activity that can be compared to a negotiation (Rapaport 2003), or to ‘hypothesis
testing’ (Brennan 1990). It involves multiple interacting processes within and among
dialogue participants:
3. Coordination mechanisms on the level of behaviour provide the basic infrastructure for interaction to
be possible. These include, inter alia, establishing and maintaining contact, turn taking (i.e., who speaks
when), regulating the flow of information (e.g., with backchannel-feedback), assessing and establishing
gaze-based attention (focus, shared attention, joint attention), as well as ‘alignment’ (Pickering and Garrod
2004) of surface structure (e.g., words, syntactic structures) and non-verbal behaviours (e.g., speech-
accompanying gesture).
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– Forming a representation of others’ beliefs and attitudes and updating them
given new information (the general ability of ‘mentalising’ [Frith and Frith
2006]).
– Providing meta-communicative information about one’s own beliefs and atti-
tudes (for example by providing communicative feedback [Allwood et al. 1992],
by requesting clarification [Purver 2004], or by producing a relevant response).
– Designing communicative acts against the background of the addressees’ likely
hold beliefs and attitudes, thereby increasing the probability that they will be
able to infer speaker meaning (through ‘audience/recipient design’ [Clark and
Marshall 1981; Clark and Brennan 1991] or ‘monitoring and adjustment’ [Horton
and Keysar 1996]).
Coordination, using these processes, may result in meaning to be communicated
iteratively over multiple turns. A speaker produces a communicative act, the listener
responds, for example, by providing feedback of non-understanding, thereby reveal-
ing to the speaker that some of the act’s presuppositions on common ground are
not satisfied. The speaker refines his model of the listener’s beliefs and attitudes by
incorporating her feedback, and attempts a new (or adapted) communicative act, the
design of which takes the updated representation into account. This loop of feedback
and interactive adaptation continues, with the listener’s success in inferring speaker
meaning (i.e., understanding) gradually improving, until, at some point, both dialogue
partners mutually believe that an understanding ‘sufficient for current purposes’ has
been reached (Clark and Schaefer 1989).
The actual amount of coordination that is needed depends on many factors, e.g.,
on the complexity of the meaning that a speaker intends to communicate, on the
extent of common ground between dialogue partners, and on the accuracy of the
participants’ partner models. Simple and highly conventionalised meaning, especially
in situations where it can be expected, may not require much coordination as speaker
meaning is derived easily. In general, however, conversation is a highly dynamic
coordination process that involves both dialogue partners and requires that they are
willing to jointly work towards understanding (Clark 1996).
This shows that in addition to being able to process natural language, having
knowledge about language and the world, and being able to reason pragmatically,
artificial conversational agents need tomaster these interactive coordination processes
that are at work in conversational interaction. They need ‘interactional intelligence’4
4. Levinson (2006) postulates an ‘interaction engine’ which serves as the universal cognitive and behavi-
oural foundation for interaction, including conversation. Recent theories of language evolution argue con-
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(Levinson 1995), which consists of two general abilities (ibid., pp. 254–255) that were
basically described above, namely, being able ‘to attribute intention to other agents’
actions [. . . ], and to respond appropriately in interdigitated sequences of actions’. Not
only is interactional intelligence necessary for being able to engage in conversation,
in some cases it may even be sufficient. This is supported by the fact that successful
(albeit less smooth and efficient) dialogical interaction is possible even in the absence
of language, for example between people not sharing a common language, or between
parents and infants (Levinson 2006, pp. 40–42).
Research on artificial conversational agents should therefore strive to focus more
strongly on computational models of pragmatic reasoning5 and interactional intelli-
gence. Agents endowed with such skills will, potentially, be better communicators.
Being able to engage in interactive and ostensive–inferential communication, they
would likely be more robust in understanding others’ communicative acts (especially
in unplanned domains and situations), and also more effective in making their own
communicative acts understood by others. When reaching the limits of their natural
language processing capabilities, interactional intelligence would allow artificial con-
versational agents to try to establish understanding using interactive means such as
the ones described above. Consequently, the natural language processing components
of such agents need not be perfect, circumventing the problem of AI-completeness of
natural language processing.
1.2 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE
The general objective of this dissertation is to investigate how interactional intelligence
can be modelled computationally for artificial conversational agents.
We approach this research question by focussing on a specific, seemingly small, but
ubiquitous interactional phenomenon in dialogue: ‘communicative listener feedback’.
In this thesis we use this term to encompass short verbal/vocal expressions (such as
mhm, yeah, or huh?; often called ‘back-channels’ elsewhere) as well as non-verbal,
embodied signals (head gestures, facial expression, and gaze). Listeners in conversation
produce communicative feedback in response to (and often in overlap with) utterances
produced by their interaction partners in order to communicate—not necessarily
vincingly that interactional intelligence has served as the basis for the development of ostensive–inferential
communication, which has then enabled the development of conventional signals and, based on that,
combinatorial communication, i.e., language (Scott-Phillips 2015).
5. Computational models of pragmatic reasoning were a topic in artificial intelligence and computational
linguistics in the 1980s and 90s— then termed ‘plan recognition’, see, e.g., Cohen et al.’s (1990) edited
collection ‘Intentions in communication’.
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intentionally—whether they are in contact and whether they are willing and able to
perceive, understand, accept, and agree (Allwood et al. 1992).
The interactional relevance of feedback in conversation can be considered well-
established in conversation analysis, linguistics, and psycholinguistics.6 Research
carried out in these fields has revealed that feedback is a nuanced, multi-dimensional
mechanism that operates on all levels of dialogue coordination and serves important
interactional functions.
Over the past two decades listener feedback has also been an active research topic
in artificial conversational agents.7 The majority of the computational work focusses
on the generation of feedback behaviours in response to human speech: when is it
appropriate to produce feedback, which form should it take, how does the interlocutor
perceive the agent and its behaviour, etc. Endowing agents with feedback generation
models is mainly seen as a means to make themmore human-like (Edlund et al. 2008)
and believable interaction partners that are pleasant to interact with, as well as to make
them appear attentive, thus encouraging their interlocutors to continue. Interactional
functions that exceed the level of behaviour coordination are usually not considered
in these models.
The research we present in this thesis is different in that it aims to conceptually
and computationally model the processes that play a role in interactive feedback-
based coordination on the levels of belief and attitude. We focus on these aspects
of communicative listener feedback in order to use it as an interactional means for
efficiently establishing understanding and evaluating acceptance and agreement in
conversational interaction.
In contrast to most of the computational work on feedback in dialogue, which
develops models that make artificial conversational agents come across as ‘attentive
listeners’, the work in this thesis models the processes that are in operation when
artificial conversational agents hold the turn, that is, models for ‘attentive speaking’.
An ‘attentive speaker agent’8 is an artificial conversational agent that has the ‘desire’ to
6. For example, Stolz and Tannenbaum (1963), Yngve (1970), Kraut et al. (1982), Schegloff (1982), Heritage
(1984), Ehlich (1986), Goodwin (1986), Allwood et al. (1992), Clark (1996), Bavelas et al. (2000), and Bunt
(2012).
7. For example, Novick and Sutton (1994), Cassell and Thórisson (1999), Ward and Tsukahara (2000),
Cathcart et al. (2003), Heylen et al. (2004), Gratch et al. (2006), Kopp et al. (2008), Bevacqua (2009),
Morency et al. (2010), Wrede et al. (2010), Gravano and Hirschberg (2011), Poppe et al. (2011), Reidsma
et al. (2011), Schröder et al. (2012), Inden et al. (2013), de Kok (2013), Neiberg et al. (2013), Skantze et al.
(2014), and Oertel et al. (2016).
8. A term simultaneously developed by Reidsma et al. (2011), who investigated communicative listener
feedback from the perspective of a speaker as well.
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be understood9 by its interlocutors. This desire translates to a general willingness to
work towards being understood (sufficiently well for current purposes), and to make
extra efforts— if necessary— to achieve this. This dissertation spells out conceptually
and computationally the implications of this in terms of three interacting processes:
Listener state attribution An attentive speaker agent should theorise about the
dynamic mental states of understanding (and other listening-related mental states,
namely contact, perception, acceptance, and agreement) of its interlocutors. To achieve
this, the agent should engage in probabilistic inferential attribution of these states (so
called mentalising), based on evidence in form of communicative feedback signals
provided concurrently by the interlocutors in response to the agent’s ongoing beha-
viour. Importantly, the attribution process should factor in the agent’s utterance and
its representation of dialogue context, thus embodying a ‘probabilistic pragmatics’
approach (Goodman and Frank 2016; Franke and Jäger 2016) to the problem of what
received feedback signals mean.
Interactive adaptation An attentive speaker agent should make efforts to commu-
nicate its meaning as effectively as possible until it is sufficiently well understood by
its interlocutors. To achieve this, the agent should adapt its natural language produc-
tion processes, on different levels of processing (e.g., dialogue management, natural
language generation, speech synthesis), with the goal of generating communicative
acts specifically designed in the light of the listening-related mental states currently
attributed to its interlocutors. Adaptations should not be limited to reacting to prob-
lems in understanding, but also include the ability to spare efforts if understanding is
achieved without problems.
Feedback elicitation An attentive speaker agent should make efforts to lead its
interlocutors to provide as much communicative feedback as is needed to be well
informed about their listening-related mental states. To achieve this, the agent should
be able to decide when and to know how to produce behavioural cues that elicit
communicative feedback.
9. Attentive speaker agents are also interested in their interlocutors’ attitudes towards what was meant
and understood. Does the interlocutor accept what the agent meant? Does the interlocutor agree with the
agent? Artificial attentive speakers agents do not try to persuade their interlocutors of their proposals or
opinions, though. (They prefer to leave such delicate activities to humans.)
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In the formdescribed above, the three processes encompass the two abilities claimed to
underlie interactional intelligence (Levinson 1995, pp. 254–255): attribution of mental
states (here based on listener feedback), and responding appropriately (here through
interactively adapted behaviour). Our research hypothesis thus is that attentive speaker
agents endowed with computational models of these processes will be able to engage
in a simple10 and effective form of interactive coordination—Rapaport’s (2003) ‘nego-
tiation’—on the levels of belief and attitude. Measurable correlates of this hypothesis,
to be evaluated in interactions between an attentive speaker agent and a human
interlocutor, should be:
– The attentive speaker agent and its interlocutors iteratively establish under-
standing (and evaluate acceptance and agreement) in a loop of feedback and
continuous adaptation of the agent’s communicative behaviours.
– Interlocutors notice that the attentive speaker agent is interested in, and able to,
infer their mental state of listening and responds appropriately.
– Interactions with an attentive speaker agent will be better than interactions
with non-attentive speakers in that higher understanding will be reached, in a
more efficient way.
As is often the case when developing embodied conversational agents, implementing
a system that humans can interact with is a challenging engineering task that spans
multiple disciplines (Isbister and Doyle 2004).
As outlined above, communicative listener feedback is a topic in conversation
analysis and various areas of linguistics (phonetics, semantics, pragmatics, dialogue,
psycholinguistics). The inference-based mentalising processes of the attentive speaker
agent fall into the fields of cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Adaptive natural
language production on multiple levels falls into different areas of computational
linguistics (dialogue systems, natural language generation, speech synthesis), as does
the principle of ‘incremental processing’—which is applied throughout the agent in
order to enable timely reactions to interlocutor feedback and to allow adaptations to
ongoing utterances. The generation of multimodal behaviour for the attentive speaker
agent falls into the field of intelligent virtual agents.
In developing conceptual and computational models of the processes that play
a role in interactive feedback-based coordination and in implementing them in an
attentive speaker agent, this dissertation makes an interdisciplinary contribution and
cuts across the boundaries of the fields mentioned above. The venues in which parts
of the research have already been published and the thesis’ bibliography reflect this.
10. Because it is restricted by the expressiveness of feedback which is limited in contrast to language itself.
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1.3 OVERVIEW
Having described the aims and scope of the research described in this dissertation,
we now continue with an overview of its structure.
This thesis consists of three parts. Following this introductory chapter, part I,
‘Dialogue Coordination in the Human and the Machine’ provides the theoretical,
cognitive, and computational background.
Chapter 2, ‘Communication, Dialogue, andCoordination’, deepens the perspective
on communication in dialogue for three aspects that are key to this thesis: under-
standing in dialogue, common ground and grounding, and adaptation in language
production.
Following this, chapter 3, ‘Communicative Feedback’, introduces communicative
listener feedback by describing the origins of the theoretical concept of feedback and
how it relates to the dialogue phenomenon. It then illustrates the rich form of feedback
signals, their pragmatic functions, and the timing of feedback signals, closing with a
review of computational models of feedback processing in artificial conversational
agents.
Part II, ‘A Computational Model of Attentive Speaking’, describes the conceptual
modelling of the three computational processes that are at work within the attentive
speaker agent.
Chapter 4, ‘Interactional Intelligence for Attentive Speaking’, introduces the second
part of the thesis and argues, given the background, that attentive speaking is a subset
of the processes of general interactional intelligence for artificial conversational agents
that is both interesting and feasible to model.
Following this, chapter 5, ‘Mental State Attribution Based on Communicative
Listener Feedback’, develops the probabilistic inferential computational model for
feedback interpretation based on attribution of listening-related mental states.
Chapter 6, ‘Interactive Adaptation’, then describes levels and mechanisms for
adaptation of speech, and develops models for incremental and adaptive natural
language generation that takes the representation of attributed listener state into
account when making adaptive generation decisions.
Following this, chapter 7, ‘Feedback Elicitation’, develops a model for feedback
elicitation based on a concept of the agent’s information needs with regard to the
attributed listener state.
Part III, ‘Evaluation’, describes the implementation and evaluation of the attentive
speaker agent.
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Chapter 8, ‘Bringing it Together: An Attentive Speaker Agent’, describes the iu-
model for incremental processing in dialogue and discusses limitations that standard
approaches to behaviour generation face when producing incremental real-time ad-
aptive behaviour. Following this, the chapter then describes the implementation and
integration of the models developed in part II of this thesis in a novel incremental
behaviour generation architecture for artificial conversational agents.
Chapter 9, ‘Evaluation of the Attentive Speaker Agent’, then develops an evaluation
strategy for the attentive speaker agent. It describes the study (which uses a semi-
autonomous Wizard-of-Oz paradigm) and analyses and discusses the results.
Finally, chapter 10, ‘Conclusion’, concludes this thesis by briefly summarising its
results, discussing its contributions and their implications, as well as its limitations
and future research directions.
The conclusion chapter is followed by two appendices. Appendix A, ‘Model Para-
metrisation from Implicit Representation’, describes the approach and algorithm
underlying the Attributed Listener State model developed in chapter 5. Appendix B,
‘Study Materials’, contains material used in the evaluation study, namely the written as
well as one exemplary oral instruction given to participants.
The back matter contains, in addition to the Bibliography, a list of Accompanying
Resources (e.g., model parameters published in form of data publications, software
packages).
PART I
DIALOGUE COORDINATION
IN THE HUMAN AND THE MACHINE

CHAPTER 2
COMMUNICATION, DIALOGUE, AND
COORDINATION
In this chapter we further develop the perspective on communication in dialogue11and
conversation that we sketched in section 1.1 of the introduction. We will elaborate
on three aspects that are particularly relevant in the context of this thesis: the notion
of understanding and its opposites misunderstanding and non-understanding, the
importance of common ground as a shared basis for understanding and how it comes
about, and different approaches to adaptation in dialogical interaction. We then
analyse how far these concepts have been integrated into artificial conversational
agents.
2.1 UNDERSTANDING, MISUNDERSTANDING, AND
NON-UNDERSTANDING
The central goal of conversation and dialogue is ‘understanding’. Speakers producing
an utterance, a communicative act, want to achieve a communicative effect in their
addressees. They want them to understand the ‘speaker’s meaning’ (Grice 1957; 1975).
Addressees, on the other hand, have a ‘duty of understanding’ (Dascal and Berenstein
1987), i.e., they are obliged to ‘[find] out [. . . ] what is the speaker’s meaning’ (ibid.,
p. 140).
Focussing on the conversation, speakers want to make themselves understood
more generally. Telling a story, they want their addressees to follow. In an argument,
11. In this dissertation we generally consider ‘dialogue’ to be a dyadic, primarily language-based, face-
to-face interaction between situated individual agents. Using the term dialogue in its ‘concrete, empirical
sense’ (Linell 2009, p. 4). That the focus is on dyadic interactions is a pragmatic and not a principled choice.
Theories and models developed for dialogues with two participants may—with some adjustments— very
well scale to polyadic dialogues involving more participants.
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they might want to convince their addressees of their position, or at least make their
position clear to them. In a negotiation, speakers may want to reach a compromise
that both parties can live with or make a joint decision of some sort. All this involves
understanding on the utterance, the sub-utterance, and the super-utterance level. This
raises the questions of what understanding means in principle, i.e., when a listener
can be considered having understood.
2.1.1 UNDERSTANDING
Since antiquity, ‘understanding’ in language and communication has been thought
of as extracting exactly the ‘message’ from an utterance that the speaker intends to
convey (see Taylor 1986).12 As Schlesinger and Hurvitz (2008, p. 569) put it, a listener
l understands the message of a speaker s, if
msg(s,Xs) ∧msg(l,Xl) ∧ Xl = Xs, (2.1)
where Xs is assigned the message intended to be conveyed by the speaker and Xl is
assigned the message extracted by the listener. According to this view, understanding
thus means that the listener recovers exactly the intended message that the speaker
conveyed.
Starting from this, Schlesinger and Hurvitz broaden the definition to include
cases in which speakers intend to be misunderstood, which listeners may notice or
not. A speaker may, for example, have a ‘speaker’s-intention’ s.int(s,msg(l,Xs.int))
that the listener extracts a message from the utterance that differs from the message
msg(s,Xs) that she actually intends her utterance to convey—with Xs.int ≠ Xs. This
is for example possible when the utterance is ambiguous, or contains an implicature
that is achieved by leaving something unsaid. From a listener’s perspective, this in-
tended misunderstanding l.persp(msg(s,Xs), s.int(s,msg(l,Xs.int))) is either noticed,
i.e., Xs ≠ Xs.int , or not, i.e., Xs = Xs.int . Furthermore, the listener may falsely attribute
an ‘intention to be misunderstood’ to the speaker.
With this in mind, Schlesinger and Hurvitz define ‘understanding’ in terms of
three properties (ibid., p. 577):
1. ‘The message recovered by the [listener] is identical to the one the speaker
intended the utterance to convey’, see eq. (2.1).
12. In the code model of communication—which combines information theory, the conduit metaphor of
communication, and de Saussure’s speech circuit (Blackburn 2007)— this concept is still very prominent
today, both in linguistics as well as in dialogue system research.
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2. ‘The [speaker’s intention] does not differ from what the [listener] actually
recovered’:
s.int(s,msg(l,Xs.int)) ∧msg(l,Xl) ∧ Xs.int = Xl (2.2)
3. ‘There is no discrepancy between the [listener perspective] and the correspond-
ing’ message the speaker intended to convey and the speaker’s intention:
l.persp(msg(s,Xs), s.int(s,msg(l,Xs.int)))∧
msg(s,Xs) ∧ s.int(s,msg(l,Xs.int)) ∧ Xs = Xs.int (2.3)
Schlesinger and Hurvitz argue that these properties are jointly necessary and
sufficient to say that a listener understands a speaker’s utterance. If one or more of
these properties do not hold in a communicative interchange between a speaker and
a listener the result is a ‘misunderstanding’ (ibid., p. 577).
2.1.2 STRONG ANDWEAK CONCEPTS OF UNDERSTANDING
The classic view reflected in Schlesinger andHurvitz’s definition is what we want to call
‘strong’ understanding13, a theoretic ideal that most possibly can never be achieved in
actual communication between humans. Taylor (1986; 1992) shows that the ‘utopian’
nature of the concept of strong understanding was already recognised by Locke
(1690/1979), who sees ideal communication as ‘telementation’— the flawless transfer
of ‘ideas and thoughts’ from the speaker’s mind to the listener’s mind (Taylor 1986,
p. 171). Telementation supports a strong concept of understanding such as presented
in eq. (2.1). Examining the implications of a strong concept of understanding for
successful language-based human communication, Locke (1690/1979, pp. III, ix, 6)
notes that
To make words serviceable to the end of communication, it is necessary
[. . .] that they excite in the hearer exactly the same idea they stand for
in the mind of the speaker. Without this, men fill one another’s heads
with noise and sounds; but convey not thereby their thoughts, and lay
not before one another their ideas [. . .].
13. Based on the distinction between the strong (machines can— in principle— think) and weak (ma-
chines can only behave intelligently) artificial intelligence hypotheses (Russell and Norvig 2010, pp. 1020–
1033).
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As an empiricist, Locke is, however, aware that language-based communication has
a severe limitation: the ‘imperfection of words’. According to Locke, words signify
‘private’ ideas and it cannot be taken for granted that the private idea a speaker signifies
with a certain word (or utterance) evokes the same—or a qualitatively indistinguish-
able— idea in the listener (though Locke claims that it is not impossible per se; Taylor
1992, pp. 33–36).
When analysed further, the imperfection of words consists of two independent sub-
problems: the ‘conformity of representation’ and the ‘conformity of intersubjectivity’
(ibid., p. 28). According to the conformity of representation, people commonly assume
that the concepts they hold are adequate—objective— representations of the things
they are concepts of. Concepts are, however, shaped through the experiences an
individual makes in life (e.g. Rosch 1978; Barsalou 1999; Hampton 1999), that is, highly
subjective and private. Hence, identity, sameness, or qualitative indistinguishableness
of concepts across individuals are not plausible requirements for understanding. The
conformity of intersubjectivity takes on the link between words and the concepts they
are linked to. Again, people commonly hold the assumption that the concepts they
and others signify with certain words correspond. As is the case in the formation of
concepts, these associations, the lexical semantics, are, formed through language use
and experience of the individual speaker (Tomasello 2003), which means that they
are subjective as well.
The imperfection of words poses a fundamental problem for strong understanding
and Locke’s conclusion therefore is that language as a means of communication is
insufficient for precisely conveying ideas and thoughts from a speaker to a listener.
In particular, Locke thinks that communicators ‘are mistaken to take for granted the
belief that [they] ordinarily understand each other’ (Taylor 1992, p. 36).
It should be noted that Locke (1690/1979), carrying out a general investigation
into the nature of human knowledge, was primarily concerned with communication
among ‘philosophers’ and less with ‘civil and common conversation’. His writing
suggests that such ordinary uses of language consist mostly of reference to objects
and that a precise understanding of invisible properties of objects is, in general, not
needed (ibid., pp. III, ix, 15).
For Locke, a ‘weaker’ form of understanding— in which the insufficiency of lan-
guage does not pose an insurmountable problem— seems to be sufficient in everyday
communication. Revisiting the description of the conformities of representation and
intersubjectivity above, some concessions can be made. Even though concepts are
subjective, they are acquired in a common natural and cultural environment. It can
therefore be assumed that individuals acquire concepts that have some similarity to the
concepts acquired by others. Although this similarity of concepts across individuals
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may be inadequate for achieving strong understanding among communicators— the
concepts are not the same or qualitatively indistinguishable— it might be sufficient
for a weaker form of understanding to be principally possible.
The same holds for the conformity of intersubjectivity. According to the socio-
pragmatic theory of word learning (Tomasello 2003, § 3.3.3), meanings are learned
through language use in social interaction, in which interlocutors share joint frames of
attention. During these activities, which often follow certain interaction patterns and
are repeated over and over, associations between words and concepts are established.14
In this way, conventions of word meanings in a linguistic community are spread
and acquired, as well as (implicitly) negotiated and established (Lewis 1969/2002). A
conformity of the intersubjectivity of word–concept associations cannot be guaranteed
of course, but it can nevertheless be assumed that these associations are sufficiently
similar across individuals for a weak form of understanding.
These concessions to the imperfection of words do not change its nature as a funda-
mental problem for strong understanding. Strong understanding remains impossible,
or at least highly unlikely. But the concessions made above weaken the premises of
strong understanding and clear the way for a weaker concept of understanding. In
parallel to eq. (2.1), we can say that a speaker s weakly understands a listener l, if
msg(s,Xs) ∧msg(l,Xl) ∧ Xl ≈ Xs, (2.4)
that is, if the message msg(l,Xl) that l extracts from the utterance is similar to the
messagemsg(s,Xs) that s intended the utterance to convey. In a similar way the two
properties in eqs. (2.2) and (2.3) can be adapted to represent weak understanding.
2.1.3 NON-UNDERSTANDING AND MISUNDERSTANDING
Having considered the different reasons for problems in understanding as well as the
fact that understanding is subjective, we can identify two different types of problems
in understanding. The distinction is based on the listener’s awareness of problems in
understanding (Weigand 1999; Schlesinger and Hurvitz 2008).
If a listener identifies a problem, she beliefs that she does not understand (or
has difficulties understanding) the speaker for a specific reason, e.g., because she did
not perceive one of the words, does not know the meaning of this word, or cannot
infer the pragmatic meaning of the utterance. These are cases of ‘non-understanding’
and, depending on how acute the understanding problem is, we can either speak of
14. Although conceived for language acquisition in children, it can be assumed that similar mechanisms
are at work over the whole span of life. Language use relies on patterns and repetitions as well.
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‘partial’ or ‘total non-understanding’. Total non-understanding is rare (Schlesinger
and Hurvitz 2008) and needs clarification. Partial non-understanding can often be
recovered—with some effort on the side of the listener that does not involve the
speaker—by taking the context into account. If such a recovery is not possible, the
listenermay initiate repair on the side of the speaker (Schegloff et al. 1977), for example,
by providing feedback (Allwood et al. 1992) or by requesting clarification (Purver
2004; Schlangen 2004).
If, on the other hand, the listener is not (immediately) aware that she only partially
understands (or even does not understand at all), we speak of a ‘misunderstanding’
(Weigand 1999). In these cases the listener is confident that she understood what the
speaker meant and it may (if at all) only become apparent later on in the dialogue
that this assumption was false. Misunderstandings can be detected by the speaker,
who can explicitly point them out to the listener or provide information so that the
listener becomes aware of the misunderstanding herself. Listeners may also discover—
coincidentally— that a misunderstanding occurred, e.g., when further information,
which seems incompatible with her model of the discourse, becomes available. In
such cases it becomes a mere non-understanding and the listener may then either
revise her discourse model (DeVault 2008)—not necessarily making the temporarily
present misunderstanding public—or may, again, initiate repair.
Depending on the severity of an unresolved misunderstanding it may cause a se-
quence of inconsistencies in the discoursemodels of both interlocutors and subsequent
occurrences of non-understanding. This may lead to a discovery of themisunderstand-
ing. The important point here is that misunderstandings may persist over extended
periods of time until they are finally noticed and identified. If not crucial for the
ongoing dialogue, misunderstandings may even remain undetected (though Weigand
[1999, p. 770] claims that they are usually resolved over the course of the dialogue), in
which case we can speak of ‘miscommunication’.
2.1.4 WAYS OUT: APPROACHING UNDERSTANDING
As an intermediate conclusion, we can say that for both dialogue participants it is
uncertain whether a listener understands— even weakly— a speaker. As we have seen,
the reasons for this are manifold, but hinge on the central problem of subjectivity
and privateness of ideas and thoughts. Only an omniscient observer would be able to
determine with certainty whether strong understanding is present or not. For actual
interlocutors in a dialogue (as well as for people in other listener roles such as bystand-
ers, overhearers, or researchers) this information is out of reach. The uncertainty
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Figure 2.1: Non-understanding and strong understanding define the opposite extremes
of an understanding continuum, with various (possibly infinite) degrees of weak
understanding in between.
whether understanding is present or not cannot even be completely eliminated for
weak concepts of understanding. Interlocutors can only try to quantify and reduce it.
Quantification of understanding is, in principle, possible as the conceptual distinc-
tion between strong andweak understanding and the possibility of non-understanding
readily suggest that understanding can be seen as a gradual quality (Bazzanella and
Damiano 1999). Given this view, non-understanding and strong understanding form
the extreme ends of an understanding continuum. Grades of weak understanding—
being measurable due to the use of similarity instead of equality in its definition
eq. (2.4)—occupy the space in between (fig. 2.1 illustrates this continuum of under-
standing).
Weigand (1999, p. 765) proposes to see misunderstanding as ‘the standard case’ in
communication, that is, not to
regard cases of misunderstanding or miscommunication as deviant[, but
to consider] language use as inherently problematic, and miscommunica-
tion not as a failure but as part and parcel of the act of communication.
Here Weigand takes Locke’s (1690/1979) insight that interlocutors should not take
understanding for granted (see section 2.1.2) and derives a strong premise for commu-
nication from it: interlocutors expect non-understanding and misunderstanding to
be inevitable. Weigand argues that linguistic interaction in dialogue is not, in the first
place, about the cognitive state of ‘understanding’, but about the process of ‘coming
to an understanding’ (Weigand 1999, p. 769). Interlocutors allow the occurrence of
non-understandings and misunderstandings to happen because they can be confid-
ent that these problems will be detected and corrected through socially interactive
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means. Language-based communication works well not despite, but due to the fact
that problems arise frequently. Since participants expect nothing more than to eventu-
ally come to an understanding at some point in the future and know that difficulties
will likely arise on the way, dialogical interaction is inherently robust. If dialogue
would be more similar to telementation, as code models of communication basically
suggest, the occurrence of an understanding problem would result in a breakdown of
communication.
In the following two sections we will describe the process of coming to an under-
standing.
2.2 COMMON GROUND AND GROUNDING
Coming to an understanding—even communication in general— is impossible
without something which both dialogue partners have a conceptualisation of and can
relate to. They need some prior ‘shared basis’ which gives rise to ‘common ground’
(Clark 1996, p. 92; Stalnaker 2002, p. 701).
Humans, for example, fundamentally share their humanness, i.e., they share the
same basic needs (for food, sleep, shelter, etc.), and the same basic experiences from
their ontogenesis (such as being cared for, interacting with other humans and objects).
They also have similar bodies, which they can control, and similar sensory systems
with which they perceive their environment. Such a minimal shared basis is enough
to bootstrap communication. Humans do not even need to speak the same language
or have a similar cultural background for being able to share, at least some, meaning
(Levinson 2006, pp. 254–255)— although this helps of course.
A shared basis, regardless of its characteristics, can be considered a necessary
condition for communication. It is, however, not a sufficient one. Even if a shared basis
is ‘objectively present’— i.e., a hypothetical omniscient observer is able to identify a set
of relevant beliefs that are present in all agents involved in an interaction— individual
agents might be ignorant of its presence (cf. DeVault and Stone 2006, p. 141). In this
case the shared basis is of no use for communication. It is important that interacting
agents are also ‘subjectively aware’ of this shared basis (Clark 1996), i.e., that they have
good reasons to belief that a certain belief is also held by their interaction partners and
that the interaction partners are aware of this as well. Based on Lewis (1969/2002, p. 56),
Clark (1996, p. 94–96; here in an adapted form) develops a definition of ‘common
ground’, in which ‘a proposition p is common ground [for two agents S and L] if and
only if:
1. [S and L] have information that basis b holds;
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2. b indicates to [S and L that both] have information that b holds;
3. b indicates to [S and L] that p.’
Clark includes the joint situation of the two agents as an important aspect of the shared
basis. Both agents need to be aware of their shared basis b. Common ground, once
established, can serve as a shared basis in the process of establishing new common
ground as well.
2.2.1 GROUNDING
The process of updating the common ground (for example by adding propositions)
is called ‘grounding’ (Clark and Brennan 1991; Clark and Schaefer 1989; Clark 1996,
p. 221) and is achieved by dialogue partners by making ‘contributions’ to the discourse
(Clark and Schaefer 1989). The central property of contributing to discourse is that
contributions are not actions of an individual interlocutor, but joint actions of both
dialogue partners. A contribution consists of two phases: a ‘presentation phase’ and an
‘acceptance phase’ (ibid., p. 265–266). In the presentation phase, one of the interlocutors
(S) makes an utterance in which she makes an attempt of presenting the content that
she intends to contribute. In the acceptance phase, the dialogue partner (L) is then
supposed to provide evidence of understanding of the presentation. When making
her presentation, S does not know whether L is able to understand (or not) what
she means and therefore needs to wait for L to provide evidence of understanding.
Similarly, L knows that he needs to provide this evidence of his understanding in
order for S to belief that he understands what she meant.
Strictly speaking, the act of accepting a presentation by providing evidence of
understanding is a presentation phase itself, the content of which is the evidence that
is provided. This presentation then needs to be accepted by the interlocutor, which,
again, is a presentation phase, and so on. The question thus is how strong the evidence
of understanding needs to be such that a contribution can be considered completed.
Clark and Schaefer (ibid., p. 262) propose that this is the case when the ‘ground-
ing criterion’ is reached, which is specified such that it dynamically adjusts to the
current situation and needs of the interlocutors. A contribution can be considered
grounded when both S and L share the belief that L has ‘has understood what [S]
meant to a criterion sufficient for current purposes’ (emphasis added). The strength
of this definition of the grounding criterion is that it is sensitive to different aspects
that play a role in a dialogue (Clark and Brennan 1991). When it is crucial that the
content of the presentation phase is understood—e.g., because the information is
very important— the grounding criterion could be set high. When the content is
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likely easy to understand and somewhat expected, the grounding criterion can be set
to a rather low level. When the situation in which the dialogue takes place is difficult—
e.g., when the environment is noisy— the grounding criterion should take this into
account as well.
Importantly, this definition of the grounding criterion explains why not every
acceptance phase needs to be accepted itself. The grounding criterion for presentations
of evidence of understanding (i.e., of acceptance) is lower than for presentations of
actual content. For acceptance phases it is often low enough such that no evidence of
understanding is needed at all (the ‘strength of evidence principle’; Clark and Schaefer
1989, p. 268). Nevertheless, in contrast to other theories of discourse, in which a lack of
evidence of non-understanding is sufficient for updating common ground, the theory
of grounding put forward by Clark and his colleagues generally requires evidence of
understanding (see Clark 1996, p. 228).
Another question is what can be considered ‘evidence of understanding’ and how
it varies in strength. According to Clark and Schaefer (1989, p. 267) there are five ways
of giving evidence of understanding. A listener can (i) continue to attend, (ii) make a
relevant next contribution, (iii) acknowledge the presentation (by providing commu-
nicative listener ‘feedback’; see chapter 3), (iv) demonstrate that the presentation has
been understood, or (v) display (verbatim) that the presentation has been understood.
These are roughly ordered from weakest to strongest and also from least costly to
most costly. Depending on the presentation and the grounding criterion, different
ways of providing evidence of understanding may be appropriate. Sometimes it is
enough if a listener simply continues to attend, sometimes a listener needs to actually
demonstrate his understanding. It is generally the case that strategies that are weak
in strength are often the preferred way to provide evidence as they are less costly to
produce (see Clark and Brennan [1991, pp. 230–231] for an overview of costs that play
a role contributing to discourse). The strength of evidence of understanding that is
sought by speakers and the way this evidence is provided by listeners is determined
collaboratively guided by a principle according to which they try to reduce the collab-
orative effort spend on contributing and grounding (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs 1986;
Clark and Brennan 1991). Often it is sufficient when listeners provide communicative
feedback as evidence of understanding (Clark and Brennan 1991, p. 224), which seems
to be a trade off between strength of evidence and production costs and thus satisfies
speakers and listeners alike.
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2.2.2 COMPUTATIONAL THEORIES OF GROUNDING
The relevance of Clark and colleagues’ grounding theory for modelling artificial
conversational agents was recognised early on, with a first computational model of
grounding for task-oriented dialogue developed by Traum (1994). In the following,
we present a number of computational approaches to grounding.
The central idea in Traum’smodel is that grounding adheres to a ‘protocol’ and that
this protocol can be modelled as a finite-state automaton. Drawing upon Clark and
Schaefer’s (1989) contribution model, Traum notes that it is impossible for an agent
to decide when its interaction partner has ended its presentation phase— it might
continue after a pause, be interwoven with practical actions, etc.— and thus difficult
to recognise the current state of the contribution and which action to take next. As an
alternative to contributions, Traum therefore proposes ‘discourse units’ as the central
building-blocks of dialogue. These are similar to contributions in that they comprise
presentation of new information as well as grounding of this information. In contrast
to contributions, however, they do not consist of a nested sequence of unspecific
presentation–acceptance phases that are alternately produced by the interacting agents,
but of a sequence of specific ‘grounding acts.’
Traum distinguishes seven different types of these grounding acts. Each discourse
unit begins with an act of the type initiate. New information is added with continue
acts. Acknowledgement (ack) acts signal understanding of what was said before,
reqAck acts request an acknowledgement from an interaction partner. Problems in
understanding are communicated in reqRepair acts and are addressed in repair acts.
Finally, a cancel act may abandon the current discourse unit without grounding what
was communicated.
Each utterance in a discourse unit can be classified in terms of grounding acts. This
information and the sequence of grounding acts that occurred up to this point of the
discourse unit can then be used to determine the grounding status of the information
presented in the discourse unit. That is, whether a discourse unit can be regarded as
being grounded or not depends on the sequence of grounding acts performed so far.
Traum proposes—based on insights from a corpus of task-oriented dialogues—
that a finite state automaton, with states representing the status of a discourse unit, is
an adequate model to describe ‘valid’ sequences of grounding acts.15 In the model, the
15. Knowing that repairs may form their own ‘sub’-discourse units, which may be in need of repair
themselves, Traum initially proposes to use a more expressive formalism, pushdown automata, for the
model. As it is unclear whether recursion beyond a certain depth occurs in dialogue and, in particular,
whether humans keep track of it and properly ‘unwind’ it, he opts for the simpler and more efficient finite
state automata (Traum 1994, pp. 36–37)— even though these cannot explain, for example, occurrence of
multiple acknowledgements in a discourse unit (ibid., pp. 36–37).
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Table 2.1: Discourse unit transition table of the finite-state automaton central to
Traum’s (1994) computational theory of grounding.
In state
Next act S 1 2 3 4 F D
initiateI 1
continueI 1 4
continueR 2 3
repairI 1 1 1 4 1
repairR 3 2 3 3 3
reqRepairI 4 4 4 4
reqRepairR 2 2 2 2 2
ackI F 1 F
ackR F F F
reqAckI 1 1
reqAckR 3 3
cancelI D D D D D
cancelR 1 1 D
Note: S is the initial, F the final, and D a ‘dead’ state. Acts marked with an I are performed by
the initiator of a discourse unit, those marked with an R by the responder. Source: Reprinted
with minor modification from Traum (1994, p. 41, tbl. 3.1).
seven types of grounding acts (additionally individuated by participant) are used as
the automaton’s input alphabet. If a discourse unit’s sequence of grounding acts up to
a point is accepted by the automaton— i.e., if starting from the initial state S the input
leads to the final state F—the discourse unit is assumed to be grounded. If the input
sequence ends in one of the intermediate states 1, 2, 3, or 4 the discourse unit is not yet
grounded and additional action is required by the participants. If the sequence leads
into the failure state D, the discourse unit is abandoned and will remain ungrounded.
See Table 2.1 for the automaton’s state transition table (reprinted from Traum 1994,
p. 41, tbl. 3.1).
Several properties of Traum’s grounding model are worth highlighting in the con-
text of this thesis. (1)Themodel primarily embodies a subjective theory of grounding16
that an individual conversational agent may possess. Estimation of groundedness
16. Theory of grounding in the sense of theory of mind.
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is based on introspection of the agent’s own behaviour and based on observed sur-
face behaviour of the interlocutor. This makes the model cognitively plausible as
no omniscient perspective is taken. (2) The model is role-independent. It is valid
and useful for the initiator of a discourse unit as well as for the responder. (3) The
model processes the conversational actions of dialogue participants incrementally (a
property shared with the bigger theoretical framework in which it operates; cf. Poesio
and Traum 1997). While unfolding over time, utterances are segmented into units of
the size of intonation phrases (‘utterance units’; ibid., p. 317). An identified utterance
unit is immediately classified into one of the seven types of grounding acts and then
given as input to the finite state automaton. Information on the state (grounded or
not grounded) of a developing discourse unit is thus constantly being updated and
available at all times. (4) Discourse units are either grounded or not grounded. Finer
grades of common ground—as suggested by degrees of ‘strength of evidence’ (Clark
and Schaefer 1989) or the findings of Brown-Schmidt (2012)— can neither be com-
puted nor represented. Traum (1994) briefly mentions the possibility of ‘degrees of
groundedness’ and ‘confidence’ of common ground in the context of the discussion
of the problem of multiple acknowledgements (ibid., p. 49; see fn. 15), but does not
develop the idea further at that point.
The binary nature of common ground status in Traum’s model is an obvious
simplification of reality. The distinction between knowledge and belief alone suggest
at least a quaternary nature of common ground (believed to be in the common ground
or not, known to be in the common ground or not). Similarly, Clark and Marshall
(1981, p. 58, emphasis added), concerning the concept of mutual knowledge, note
[w]hich propositional attitude is appropriate— knowledge, belief, assump-
tion, supposition, or even some other term—depends on the evidence
[an interlocutor] possesses and other factors
thereby already suggesting a number of different degrees of common ground. In an
annotated collection of his papers, Clark (1992, p. 6, emphasis added) emphasises this
point again
[. . . ] people hold mutual beliefs with greater or lesser conviction. How
strongly they hold a mutual belief depends on the evidence and assump-
tions it is based on
this time, however, without explicitly linking strength of common ground to categor-
ical propositional attitudes. And even later, he (Clark 1996, p. 98; emphasis added)
writes that
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[p]eople tacitly evaluate shared bases for quality, recognizing that pieces
of common ground range in likelihood from 0 to nearly 1,
implying a continuous nature of common ground that may even be represented
probabilistically.
Roque and Traum (2008) take up the idea of ‘degrees of groundedness’ mentioned
in Traum (1994) and develop them into a computational model of grounding. Similar
to the approach in Traum’s model, utterance units are mapped onto grounding acts
(that— following Clark and Schaefer [1989]—Roque and Traum [2008] call ‘evidence
of understanding’). Also similar to Traum’s (1994) approach, while a discourse unit
unfolds utterance unit by utterance unit, the status of the discourse unit is updated,
this time however not just from not-grounded to grounded, but with interpretable
intermediate steps.
The model defines nine degrees of groundedness. A discourse unit is yet unknown
as long as its first utterance unit has not been produced. After that the status of the
discourse unit is misunderstood (if a repair is requested), accessible, or, when there is
a lack of response by the interlocutor, unacknowledged. If acknowledgement happens,
the discourse unit is either agreed-signal, or, when additional evidence is present,
agreed-signal+. If concrete content level evidence of understanding has been provided,
the degree of groundedness is agreed-content or agreed-content+. If common ground
can be assumed for other reasons, the discourse unit has the status assumed. The nine
degrees form an ordinal scale with unknown being the least grounded and assumed
the most grounded.
When developing the model, Roque and Traum were especially concerned with
deciding on a set of degrees of groundedness ‘worth modelling’ (Roque and Traum
2008, p. 58). They are aware that they left out a great number of potential degrees
such as the one that models double acknowledgement in contrast to single acknow-
ledgement (see fn. 15). Their specific choice of degrees is empirically motivated, and
reflects their particular dialogue domain (radio-communication), which is highly
structured, uses a specific vocabulary, and is limited in the channel. Hence, the model
in its concrete form is most probably not directly applicable to more natural forms of
conversation such as face-to-face dialogue.
Roque and Traum also see the various degrees of groundedness they define as an
operationalisation of Clark and Schaefer’s (1989) grounding criterion. Which degree
is ‘sufficient for current purposes’ (ibid., p. 291) may vary depending on the utterance
and its context. In some situations, it may be sufficient if agreed-signal is reached,
other situations may require a higher degree such as agreed-content.
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DeVault and Stone (2006) propose a model of common ground that allows for
uncertainty on the side of dialogue participants but evades the necessity to define
graded shared belief in terms of probabilities. According to DeVault (2008, pp. 30–33),
a probabilistic representation of common ground ismethodologically difficult, because
(i) it requires an adequate data base from which the necessary probabilities can be
learned (which does not exist), (ii) it is difficult to estimate when something between
two interlocutors is common ground, and (iii) a sound definition of probabilistic
shared belief is difficult.
DeVault and Stone (2006) develop the view that common ground is ‘objective’
and ‘normative’. Although interlocutors in dialogue might still try to achieve shared
belief in their actions, it is not necessary that they actually represent shared belief
with its many problems. Instead— this is the normative aspect— interlocutors try
to represent the common ground as it is objectively the case. The implication of this
view on common ground is that each agent maintains its own subjective (‘private’
in DeVault and Stone’s terms) grounding status, together with an estimation of the
probability of this being the objective context.
Agents in dialogue therefore may have periods of ‘transient uncertainty’ (DeVault
2008, p. 33) about what is meant by the interlocutor. If this uncertainty is high and
in need of clarification, the agent may take action, otherwise it might track several
hypotheses and drop those that become unlikely over the course of the next utter-
ances. Many coordination problems, for example concerning targets of ambiguous
referring expressions, will solve themselves sooner or later either because alternative
hypotheses do not make sense as soon as more information is produced or because
the agent’s own actions communicate their uncertainty and the interlocutor notices
that understanding is not (yet) present.
Visser et al. (2014) present an incremental model of grounding.While an utterance
unfolds, partials of this utterance, as well as overlapping verbal or non-verbal acts
of an interlocutor, are classified in terms of the grounding acts defined in Traum’s
(1994) model. In this model, however, common ground units do not need to span
complete utterances. One part of an utterance can be seen as already grounded, while
the following part is still in the in the process of being grounded (state 1–4). In
general, the model is able to account for interactive utterance production and is
capable of dealing with utterances that contain multiple repairs as well as parts that are
considered ungrounded and cancelled.Themodel is used for incrementally generating
overlapping grounding behaviour of a conversational agent (that reflect its state of
natural language processing) in response to an ongoing utterance of the interlocutor.
Li et al. (2006) present a grounding model that uses an augmented push-down
automaton (instead of Traum’s [1994] finite state automaton) in order to account for
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nested discourse structures. In this model, grounding acts do not need to relate to the
immediate preceding act of the interlocutor. Ungrounded contributions are pushed
onto the stack and taken from the stack once they are considered grounded.
Paek and Horvitz (2000b) present a decision theoretic model of Clark and Schae-
fer’s (1989) grounding criterion. Based on the expected utility of grounding-related
actions of dialogue participants, the model formalises situation specific thresholds p∗L
for sufficiency of understanding (from a listener’s perspective) and p∗S for a sufficiently
high degree of belief in a listener’s understanding (from a speaker’s perspective). If p∗L
is exceeded, speakers should move on, if p∗L is not reached, listeners should initiate
repair (and vice versa). Thus a proposition is considered to be a shared belief (i.e., in
the common ground) if the evidence of understanding an utterance, or increment, that
communicates this proposition, exceeds both thresholds. This model is used in the
‘Quartet’ architecture for spoken dialogue systems (Paek and Horvitz 2000a) which
models inference and decision making in dialogue as reasoning under uncertainty
and pursues the objective to reduce uncertainty on multiple levels of processing. An-
other system, by Skantze (2007), uses the model in order to decided when to produce
grounding actions, but instead of using a handcrafted parameters, learns the costs of
actions from a corpus of actual interactions.
We argued that a shared basis as well as common ground is a prerequisite for con-
versation and we saw how—while the conversation unfolds—dialogue participant
ground their utterances and the content that is communicated by seeking and showing
evidence of understanding from and to their interlocutors. In the following section,
we describe how dialogue participants, when producing utterances, make use of
the information in the common ground. We discuss this in the broader context of
adaptation to and coordination of dialogue partners.
2.3 ALIGNMENT, ADAPTATION, AND COORDINATION
It is accepted by researchers that adaptation between interlocutors in dialogue takes
place. Still, discussions about adaptation in dialogue revolve around underlying mech-
anisms and their demand of cognitive resources. Perspectives differ on whether adapt-
ation leads to an ‘alignment’ of underlying representations, and on how much effort
interlocutors can actually spend on adaptations that happen concurrently to speech
and behaviour production.
Over the course of an interaction, participants ‘adapt’ their behaviour to each
other, that is, their behaviour patterns become similar and synchronous (Burgoon et al.
1995, p. 4). In dialogue or conversational interaction, their speech features (‘amplitude,
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pitch, rate of articulation, pause structure, phonological features, and response latency
before initiating a conversational turn’ [Oviatt et al. 2004, p. 303]) becomemore similar,
the levels of the rhythmic prosodic hierarchy become synchronised (Wagner et al.
2013), they use the same lexical items and referring expressions (e.g., Garrod and
Anderson 1987; Brennan and Clark 1996), they tend to adopt each other’s syntactic
structures (e.g., Branigan et al. 2000; Reitter and Moore 2014—but see Healey et al.
2014), and they use similar speech accompanying gestures (e.g., Bergmann and Kopp
2012; Mol et al. 2012) as well as other non-verbal behaviours (e.g., facial expressions,
posture; see Chartrand and Bargh 1999). If such adaptations go beyond behaviour,
that is, if the underlying mental representations of the interaction partners become
similar, the effect of such an adaptation is called ‘alignment’ (Pickering and Garrod
2004, p. 172).
In addition to behaviour becoming more similar, adaptation in dialogue can also
be seen from the perspective of ‘recipient design’ or ‘audience design’ (Clark and
Carlson 1982). According to this view speakers adapt their speech in order to make
themselves better understood to the interaction partner, e.g., by taking the common
ground into account, but also by making choices on the level of discourse that take
the interaction partners’ needs into account.
These perspectives on adaptation are not incompatible, quite the contrary, they
interact. Automatic adaptation on the behavioural level may also results in audience
design, and audience design often results in behaviour becoming similar to the inter-
action partners’. This is captured in the concept of coordination on different levels of
processing and awareness (Kopp 2010, see section 1.3). In the following, we present
different theories of adaptive speech production, but start with a description of the
interactive nature of adaptation.
2.3.1 INTERACTIVE ADAPTATION
Adaptations in language production can take place at virtually any point of time, even
mid-utterance. The cognitive processes of speech production operate ‘incrementally’
on all levels of processing: articulation, formulation, and conceptualisation (Kempen
and Hoenkamp 1987; Levelt 1989), see chapter 6 for further discussion.
Already at the lowest level of speech production—articulation— speakers adapt
their speech to the situation and environment. In noisy environments, for example,
the acoustic parameters of speech are adapted in order to increase speech intelligibility.
This is achieved by increasing intensity, raising the fundamental frequency, shifting
the spectrum, enhancing voiced sounds, and re-allocating energy in the sound spec-
trum (Cooke et al. 2014, § 4.1). This results in so-called ‘Lombard speech’. Similar
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changes are also made in order to accommodate to interaction partners with known or
assumed limitations in perception, e.g., hearing impaired persons, infants, or artificial
conversational agents (Cooke et al. 2014, § 3.1).
On the level of utterance production, Clark andKrych (2004) showed that speakers
actively monitor their addressees (especially for behaviours that pertain to groun-
dedness) and incrementally take these insights into account. They observed, in a
task-oriented setting, that speakers’ and addressees’ behaviour is highly coordinated
and that speakers rapidly and interactively change the course of their actions depend-
ing on the addressees’ verbal and nonverbal behaviours. The results of this interactive
adaptation is that utterances that speakers produce are co-constructed by their ad-
dressees. Contrasting dialogues in which such interactive adaptation is possible with
dialogues in which speakers and addressees could only coordinate to a lesser degree
(due to limited visibility)—or not at all—Clark and Krych (ibid., pp. 67–69) showed
that tasks were solved faster, more efficiently (using fewer words), and that fewer errors
were made. They (ibid., pp. 76–78) conclude that (i) common ground is updated con-
tinuously and not just after turns are finished, (ii) increments of speech production are
constructed jointly by speakers and addressees, (iii) addressees provide multimodal
evidence of their understanding as soon as possible, (iv) speakers and addressees
interact all the time, and (v) speakers plan their utterances opportunistically, i.e., they
assume that repair will be necessary (see section 2.1.4).
Interactive adaptation to the interaction partner does not only happen on the
level of utterance construction but is shaping the overall conversation. This might be
regarded as trivial given that each interaction partner can, in general, propose topic
shifts, but it also happens when one interaction partner is mostly listening and may
only provide feedback. Bavelas et al. (2000) showed that speakers have difficulties
telling stories (stories were told less well) when they face a lower number of a certain
type of listener feedback responses by their interlocutors—which was the result of
them not being fully attentive due to an experimental manipulation. The degradation
in evidence of understanding left speakers uncertain about common ground and their
feeling for the comprehensibility of their utterances. From this Bavelas et al. (ibid.)
concluded that even when just listening and providing feedback, listeners ‘co-narrate’
the stories that speakers tell.
In the following we present models of adaptation in speech production that are
generally compatible with the concept of interactive adaptation. They are continuously
active and can immediately shape speech production when new information (e.g.,
evidence of understanding or changes in the environment) becomes manifest.
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2.3.2 INTERACTIVE ALIGNMENT
Based on the findings about adaptation, on an assumption of parity between produc-
tion and comprehension, and on an assumption that both of these processes rely on
the same underlying linguistic representations, Pickering and Garrod (2004) present
an ‘interactive alignment’ theory of dialogue, in which adaptation phenomena are
explained by low-level ‘priming’ of the underlying linguistic representations. Perceiv-
ing a referring expression from an interlocutor, for example, primes and activates
its lexical representations in a listener, which, in turn, makes it more readily access-
ible in speech production and increases the likelihood of using the same expression.
Moreover, the interactive alignment model claims that activation of representations
on one level activates representations on other levels, percolating through phonetic,
phonological, lexical, syntactic, and semantic representations to the level of ‘situation
models’ (Zwaan and Radvansky 1998)—an alignment of which leads to dialogue
success.17
Instead of explicitly representing shared beliefs or common ground, the interactive
alignment model posits that information that is present in the aligned representations
of interlocutors serves as an ‘implicit common ground’ (Pickering and Garrod 2004,
p. 178). Reaching understanding among interlocutors and adapting to each other is
thus an automatic process which does not— in general— involve reasoning about
common ground or planning adjustments to the interlocutor’s needs. According to
Pickering and Garrod it would be too computationally expensive if such coordination
processes were continuously active. Explicit common ground only needs to be con-
sidered, and adaptations designed for the interlocutor only need to be planned when
repair is needed because a certain amount of mis-alignment has been detected (ibid.,
p. 179).
Pickering and Garrod’s main motivation for the interactive alignment account is
that speech and language processingwithout a high degree of automaticity would be far
to effortful. Although researchers mostly agree that priming plays a role in adaptation
phenomena, the interactive alignmentmodel’s strong claims about dialogue processing
being mechanistic, as well as its aspiration to be a general theory of communication,
have raised criticism (see, e.g., the peer commentary in Pickering and Garrod [ibid.,
pp. 190–211] and the contributions in the collection edited byWachsmuth et al. [2013]).
17. Situation models are cognitive representations of speakers and listeners which reconstruct the content
of an utterance or a discourse (Zwaan and Radvansky 1998). According to the interactive alignment model
(Pickering and Garrod 2004, pp. 172–173) interlocutors in dialogue understand each other when their
situation models are aligned, that is, when they have constructed situation models that are sufficiently
similar. Reitter and Moore (2014) found evidence for this in a corpus of task-oriented dialogue.
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2.3.3 FULL COMMON GROUND
The proclaimed effortlessness of the interactive alignment account of adaptation in
dialogue is in strong opposition to models of dialogue in which meaning making
and understanding assume a collaborative effort of the interlocutors (e.g., Clark
1996). According to this perspective, utterances are ‘designed’ for the recipient (or
an audience; Clark and Carlson 1982, pp. 10–11), take common ground into account
(Clark and Marshall 1981; Clark and Brennan 1991), and are additionally shaped by
interlocutor feedback that is received while they are produced.
A metaphor for dialogue processing that Brennan (1990, pp. 30–33) uses is one of
‘hypothesis testing’. The assumption is that in order to reach its intended effect, an ut-
terance needs to be tailored to its addressee— for example by taking into account what
is in the interlocutor’s common ground. As common ground is inherently uncertain
(see page 25 above), however, it is not necessarily foreseeable whether an utterance
will be understood. Utterances can thus be regarded as hypotheses about the inter-
locutor’s common ground that a speaker tests by producing them. The interlocutor’s
responses to such utterances then serve as evidence for (or against) the hypotheses.
If an interlocutor’s response suggests that a hypothesis embodied in an utterance is
false, the speaker needs to revise her hypothesis and test anew. This can either be
done by producing a new utterance that embodies the revised hypothesis, or—when
the interlocutor responds while the utterance is being produced— through marked
‘self repair’ (Schegloff et al. 1977), or changes to the plan and course of the continuing
utterance (which will go unnoticed because what has already been articulated is not
affected by the change).
When processing utterances, addressees are engaged in hypothesis testing as well.
While an utterance is unfolding they hypothesise what the speaker could mean. If
sufficiently certain of their hypothesis, they provide evidence of understanding or
even act early, thus making the interaction more efficient. If uncertain, they have to
revise their hypothesis or, if they cannot come up with a good hypothesis, can provide
evidence of non-understanding or request clarification.
This makes dialogue a process of collaborative hypothesis testing in which in-
terlocutors ‘continually seek and provide evidence of mutual understanding, and
[. . . ] collaborate in testing and revising their complementary hypotheses until the
difference between them is too small to matter’ (Brennan 1990, p. 33).
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2.3.4 MONITORING AND ADJUSTMENT
The interactive alignment model and the full common ground model of language
use and partner-specific adaptation in dialogue lie at opposite ends of the scale of
processing effort during language use. In addition to concerns about the efficiency
of the use of full common ground in online language processing, concerns about
its parsimony were raised and it was proposed that experiments need to take the
possibility into account that a model subsumed by the full common ground model
would explain the observed adaptation phenomena equally well, or even better (Keysar
1997).
The ‘monitoring and adjustment’model for speech production (Horton andKeysar
1996) and the ‘perspective adjustment’ model for comprehension (Keysar et al. 1998)
are more parsimonious and lie in between the two extremes. Both claim that language
processing in dialogue is, initially, egocentric and does not take common ground
into account. This is unproblematic when the interlocutors’ perspectives are already
aligned. If not, however, it may lead to production and comprehension errors, which
are addressed in a second process. Here common ground becomes relevant and
adjustments to the utterance or interpretation are made.
It was shown that under certain conditions— for example time pressure18 (Horton
and Keysar 1996)— speakers do not take common ground into account, whereas they
do when these conditions do not hold. The adjustment process does not necessarily
need feedback from listeners to take place. Through monitoring common ground
violations in their initial utterance plan, speakers can become aware of (potential)
problems of not taking common ground into account themselves and adjust before
articulation even starts. In certain conditions there may, however, not be enough
resources for such adjustments to take place before articulation. When and if this is
the case is not just a result of certain conditions but also of the speaker’s familiarity
with certain types of interactions (Horton and Gerrig 2002).
On the comprehension side listeners initially act egocentrically as well. They
process definite references according to their own perspective and only adjust their
perspective if a later monitoring-stage detects common ground violations in their
interpretation, in which case referent resolution is delayed (Keysar et al. 1998).
18. Time pressure of varying degree is a natural factor in speech production. When articulation finishes
producing currently planned units, speech planning (conceptualisation and formulation) need to have
subsequent units ready for articulation. In dialogue settings, when intending to make relevant and coherent
contributions to an ongoing discourse, speakers need to be ready to start speaking instantaneously when the
preceding turn ends. If not, other participants may take the turn. Even though there are other mechanisms
to mitigate time pressure in these cases (e.g., filled pauses such as uh and uhm, Clark 2002; Clark and
Fox Tree 2002) these are only tolerated by interlocutors to some degree.
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The difference of these adjustment models to the full common ground model
is that common ground reasoning in language processing is not needed by default.
Common ground assumptions only come into play if subsequent monitoring detects
their violation. As many utterances need not be tailored for addressees, e.g., because
they can be fully understood by relying on conventions and shared context,monitoring
and adjustment is more efficient than partner specific production and comprehension
that fully rely on common ground. The model can also explain grounding violations
under conditions such as time pressure. The parsimony of the model can however
be disputed as it proposes two-stage processes in production and comprehension
(Brennan and Hanna 2009, pp. 284–286).
The adjustment models also differ from the interactive alignment model (which
is sometimes called a two-stage model as well, ibid.) in that they acknowledge explicit
common ground as a factor in speech production and comprehension even without
listener-initiated repair or clarification requests.
2.3.5 MINIMAL PARTNER MODELS
Brennan and Hanna (ibid., pp. 284–286) reject the proposal of two-stage adjustment
models because the timings for initial and later stages processing that were measured
in various studies differ widely. They also refute the claim that these models are more
parsimonious than integrated models. Brennan and colleagues (Brennan and Hanna
2009; Galati and Brennan 2010), however, generally acknowledge the concerns about
processing effort that would be needed when taking full common ground into account.
At the same time, Galati and Brennan (2010) find evidence for partner specific ad-
aptation in articulation, which, among many other parts of an utterance, is attenuated
in repeated interactions with the same interlocutor, but not in interaction with new in-
terlocutors. This indicates that speakers do not simply attenuate information for their
own benefit, but for the addressees’. Their explanation of why this is possible even in
highly automatised low-level processes such as articulation is twofold: the addressee’s
needs are (i) clearly indicated through available ‘cues’ and ‘salient knowledge’, and
(ii) can be represented in a simple way (ibid., p. 47). Galati and Brennan propose that
adaptation of utterances to addressees is based on a simple—almost stereotypical—
model of the addressee. Each dimension of such a ‘most minimal model’ consists of
only ‘one-bit’ of information (ibid., p. 47), such as, for example, the binary knowledge
of whether interlocutors talk about something for the first time, or not.
To illustrate their proposal, Brennan et al. (2010, p. 324) list several dimensions of
most minimal partner models identified in experimental studies (references to which
are omitted here):
2.3 ALIGNMENT, ADAPTATION, ANDCOORDINATION 35
my partner can see what I’m doing, or not [. . . ];my partner can reach the
object she’s talking about, or not [. . . ]; my partner has a picture of what
we’re discussing, or not [. . . ]; my partner and I have spoken about this
before, or not (Galati and Brennan 2010; [. . . ]); my partner is currently
gazing at this object, or not [. . . ]; my partner needs to distinguish this
referent from a competitor, or not [. . . ]; my partner is a young child, as
opposed to older [. . . ]; or my partner is a native speaker of English, or not
[. . . ].
It should be noted that this model can be informed by examining the context in
which an interaction takes place and/or by making (mostly static) inferences about
the addressee. Brennan et al. (2010) suggest that ‘a “partner model” need not entail
a detailed record of all of the knowledge one partner has about what the other is
likely to know [. . . ] as well as what the other does not know’ (ibid., p. 324). Instead,
speakers using such a minimal model ‘represent relevant aspects of common ground
in a simple, clear way’ (Galati and Brennan 2010, p. 47). Nevertheless, even such
minimal models potentially encompass many dimensions19 and are likely compiled
and updated dynamically, depending, inter alia, on the dialogue situation, the visual
context, the interlocutor, and the interlocutor’s feedback.Thus even suchmostminimal
models can be complex and powerful.
The question whether binary representations are sufficient to account for real
world adaptation phenomena is left open (ibid., p. 47). It is certainly plausible to
assume that some of the dimensions have richer, gradient representations. Brown-
Schmidt (2012), for example, finds evidence that speech production is influenced by
the strength of groundedness of information (as already suggested by Clark and his
colleagues, see section 2.2.1). Similarly, dimensions that are informed from multiple
cues and/or sources are likely to contain uncertainty. In both cases the dimensions in
the most minimal model could be probabilistic, i.e., represented as values between 0
(impossible) and 1 (certain). A speaker could for example be fairly certain (0.83) that
her ‘partner is currently gazing at this object’ (see above). Even such richer models
retain the advantage of being relatively simple in their representation. Each dimensions
coarsely models a certain aspect of the interlocutor which is relevant for adaptation—
and is derived from various cues and knowledge.
19. Brennan et al.’s (2010) proposal is underspecified in that they do not provide criteria for when a
variable should be part of their model.
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2.3.6 INTERMEDIATE SUMMARY
How and when adaptation in language processing takes place is not only relevant
for psycholinguistic modelling, but for the design and implementation of artificial
conversational agents, too. We think that each of the models discussed in the previous
sections—despite being antagonistic from a theoretical point of view—contains
ideas that are useful for modelling the processes of interactive and adaptive natural
language generation for conversational agents.20
The interactive alignment model suggests itself as a lightweight (i.e., priming-
based) mechanism for automatic adaptation of an agents utterances’ surface form to
the human interlocutor (e.g., Buschmeier et al. 2010; Isard et al. 2006; de Jong et al.
2008).
The full common ground model can be used as a principal framework for making
decisions in generation that take into account the objects that are assumed to be part of
the common ground (e.g., Stone et al. 2003; DeVault 2008)—which are typically rather
few in dialogues between artificial conversational agents and human interlocutors.
The monitoring and adjustment model on the other hand suggests a strategy for
situations where an agent’s resources are limited (e.g., because the system needs to
start speaking at a certain point in time in order to be able to take the turn) or when
there is too much uncertainty in the representation of common ground (e.g., DeVault
2008).
Finally, minimal models of the partner may be useful when the dimensions (i.e.,
the bits) that they represent directly map to the adaptation capabilities that a natural
language generation component possesses (e.g., Walker et al. 2007; Mairesse and
Walker 2010). As will be shown later on (section 8.3.4), they may also be useful for
making decisions that shape the course of the interaction—on the level of dialogue
management.
Ideas from the alignment account can be seen as a way of coordinating on the
level of behaviour (Kopp 2010). In contrast to this, ideas taken from the full common
ground and monitoring and adjustment models, seem to address coordination on
the levels of belief (and attitude). The ideas taken from the minimal partner model
approach seem to be useful for all levels of coordination as well as for shaping the
interaction.
20. As can be seen, some of the ideas are already part of current natural language generation systems.
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2.4 REACHING UNDERSTANDINGWITH ARTIFICIAL
CONVERSATIONAL AGENTS
In the following we will review in how far current approaches to artificial conversa-
tional agents take the properties of dialogue that are described in this chapter into
account.
Artificial conversational agents are computational artifacts that use natural lan-
guage processing and artificial intelligence in order to be able to interact with human
interlocutors using natural language. Examples for such agents are purely speech-based
interfaces such as spoken dialogue systems (McTear 2002), embodied conversational
agents (Cassell et al. 2000), which are virtually embodied and can thus produce verbal
and non-verbal acts (e.g., gestures, facial displays, gaze), or sociable robots (Fong
et al. 2003), which have a physical presence and may even be able to manipulate the
physical environment they share with their interlocutors.
Early on, natural language-based communication with artificial conversational
agents has been seen as an important problem in artificial intelligence. In proposing
that a computer program should be regarded as ‘intelligent’ if it can convince human
interlocutors that they talk to a human and not to an artificial conversational agent,21
Turing (1950) suggested that conversational interaction is a task that needs human-like
abilities to be solved.
Early progress on artificial conversational agents, beginning with the program
eliza (Weizenbaum 1966), however, has shown that intelligence is not necessary for
a computer program to be an engaging and somewhat believable dialogue partner.
eliza certainly has no chance passing a Turing test, since it simply consists of a set of
rules that define its behaviour in reaction to its interlocutors (it can neither understand
their communicative acts nor its own ones). Nevertheless, Weizenbaum demonstrated
that conversational agents can get a long way without pragmatic inference and interac-
tional intelligence. Especially application-oriented artificial conversational agents (e.g.,
telephone-based dialogue systems)—but also research-oriented systems in which the
research focus does not lie on dialogue (e.g., sociable robots)—benefitted from this.
Yet, some research on conversational agents takes a more interaction-oriented
approach to dialogue, resulting in conversations that show some of the characteristics
of interactional intelligence. Although even the most basic dialogue management
approaches, e.g., traversing a finite state automaton (McTear 2002, § 5.1) or filling
a frame (ibid., pp. 5.2) can be used to model simple forms of interactive processes
21. The original formulation of the task in this, so called, ‘Turing test’ is somewhat more intricate in that
participants do not even suspect to be talking to a computer (Turing 1950, pp. 433–434).
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in dialogue, interaction is neither a central nor a general principle for them. In the
following we describe approaches in which interaction is central.
Heeman and Hirst (1995) present a plan-based computational model for inter-
actively solving a single, but central, problem in dialogue: reference. Their model
of collaborative reference (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs 1986) is able to account for the
generation and understanding of reference and involves proposing an expression,
judging and potentially clarifying it, rephrasing it, and, eventually, accepting and
adopting it.
Poesio and Traum (1997) present a formal discourse theory (ptt) that uses a uni-
fying representation of context to be able to account for various discourse phenomena
(here interactively generating a referring expression is just a special case). Central to
this theory is that dialogues are constructed from ‘micro conversational events’, which
allows the model to capture interactivity in discourse even on the sub-utterance level,
which is important to model grounding and other phenomena. Simplified versions of
ptt have been applied in a number of dialogue systems that use the ‘information-state
update’ model for dialogue management (Larsson and Traum 2000, § 4), as well as
for in-depth analysis of real dialogues (Poesio and Rieser 2010), where it is able to
account for the coordination phenomena that occur.
Regarding more practical dialogue systems, Skantze (2008), presents a compu-
tational discourse model that keeps track of the grounding status of the concepts
(instead of utterances) that are present in the discourse, which is then used for error
detection and interactive error handling with situation-specific strategies.
Skantze and Schlangen (2009) describe a dialogue system in a micro-domain that
can incrementally display and ensure its understanding of telephone numbers— that
its users can dictate in a conversational manner (e.g., in prosodically marked ‘install-
ments’ [Clark 1996, p. 236])—by producing human-like clarification and grounding
acts.
Hough and Schlangen (2016) present an incremental dialogue system that models
grounding in a task-oriented human–robot dialogue (where the human instructs the
robot) by tracking the dialogue state in two parallel, but interacting, state-machines
(based on statecharts [Harel 1987]), one for its own state and one for the estimated state
of its human interlocutor. These state machines model an interactive repair process. A
goal is considered to be grounded (‘publicly manifest’) between the dialogue partners
when the interlocutors commit themselves to the goal, which they only do when the
robot displays enough commitment towards this goal (e.g., through actions). The
grounding and repair process is guided by globally set thresholds for the strength of
evidence for individual goals. Lowering these thresholds allows for a higher level of
incrementality in the system.
2.5 SUMMARY ANDCONCLUSION 39
Yaghoubzadeh, Pitsch et al. (2015) describe a dialogue system for elderly users and
users with cognitive impairments. In order to ensure that users and system mutually
understand each other correctly, the system’s dialogue management approach employs
a flexible grounding strategy. Depending on howwell a user can likely process multiple
pieces of information in one utterance, the system can either explicitly ensure the
understanding of every slot of information that the user provided individually or only
do so if it suspects that the information for a slot might be wrong (based on the clarity
of the results from automatic speech recognition).
All of these systems try to reach understanding by modelling the grounding process.
They can detect problems in understanding (either their own or their interlocutors’
understanding) and most are able to adapt their communicative actions, e.g., by
engaging in clarification and repair or by choosing specific presentation strategies.
Some of these system even account for the incremental nature of interactive grounding.
2.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this chapter we elaborated on three aspects of dialogical interaction that were
already mentioned in the introduction. We first debated what it means when inter-
locutors in dialogue understand each other and came to the conclusion that a strong
notion of understanding—which causes the paradox discussed in the introduction
(Rapaport 2003)— is practically irrelevant. Similar to the solution that Rapaport offers,
we concluded that interlocutors in dialogue can attain a weak form of understand-
ing, which can be reached and improved upon interactively, until understanding is
sufficient.
Following this, we described the concept of common ground, a resource that is
shared between interlocutors and upon which understanding is build. Somewhat
paradoxically, the common ground is itself expanded when interlocutors reach under-
standing about things that were not yet in their common ground and publicly share
this achievement with one another—by providing evidence of understanding. We
described this grounding process and reviewed computational models of grounding
which deal with the problems of recognising whether an artificial conversational agent
can regard an utterance to be grounded as well as how and when an agent should
provide evidence of its understanding.
We then turned the discussion to another capability that is important for inter-
actively reaching understanding and establishing common ground, namely being
able to make oneself understood by taking the common ground and needs of the
interlocutors into account during language production. We illustrated the interactive
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nature of this process and the effects of adaptation on various levels of the speech
production process. We reviewed psycholinguistic models of (adaptive) language pro-
duction—which vary in their requirements of cognitive resources and their approach
to adaptation—and suggested how ideas from these models could be combined to
make an artificial conversational agent adaptive, and enable it to coordinate with its
interlocutor on different levels of processing (Kopp 2010).
In light of the information presented in this chapter we can draw the conclusion
that being a successful participant in conversation and dialogue hinges on the ability
to interactively make oneself understood, i.e., it requires ‘interactional intelligence’
(Levinson 1995). The review of dialogue models for artificial conversational agents
illustrates that the relevance of grounding and common ground as well as adaptation
has been recognised in these research fields early on (and is still an ongoing research
topic). The interactional nature of these processes is already embodied in some of
these systems, but usually not as the guiding principle in their design.
CHAPTER 3
COMMUNICATIVE FEEDBACK
In this chapter we introduce the dialogue phenomenon ‘communicative listener feed-
back’ as a mechanism for belief and attitude coordination in dialogical interaction. We
begin by exploring the origins of the concept of feedback in cybernetics and analyse
whether the underlying ideas are of relevance to communicative feedback. We then
compare this term to the terminology that is in use for the phenomenon. Following
this introduction, we describe the phenomenon itself: we look at the form of feedback
(both verbal, prosodic and non-verbal) as well as the functions and meaning of feed-
back signals. These descriptions are based on reviews of the literature as well as on
our own research on German listener feedback in the alico-corpus. Following this,
we review the literature on timing and placement of feedback, and on how feedback
phenomena have been modelled in artificial conversational agents.
3.1 ON THE ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT OF FEEDBACK IN
COMMUNICATION
The term ‘feedback’ has its roots in 18th century engineering. It describes the principle
of automatically regulating mechanical apparatuses to adhere to a certain state.22 Well
known examples are ‘centrifugal governors’ (Maxwell 1867, see fig. 3.1) as used, for
example, in Boulton andWatt’s 1788 steam engine to maintain a constant speed under
☆ The alico-corpus, that we use in this chapter to illustrate various aspects of feedback, was collected
and analysed in collaboration with Zofia Malisz, Marcin Włodarczak, and Petra Wagner from Bielefeld
University’s Phonetics and Phonology Group, with contributions from Joanna Skubisz. Analyses of various
aspects of feedback in the alico-corpus have been published in Buschmeier et al. (2011), Malisz et al.
(2012), Włodarczak et al. (2012), Buschmeier et al. (2014) and Malisz et al. (2016).
22. Self-regulating mechanical constructions were invented much earlier. In a study of constructions and
machines from antiquity to modernity, Mayr (1970, pp. 11–16) identifies a water clock from the third century
bce—constructed by the Hellenistic mechanician Ktesibios from Alexandria— as the first (known) device
using a feedback mechanism.
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Figure 3.1: Schematic drawing of a centrifugal governor that keeps the rotational
speed of a steam engine constant under varying load conditions based on feedback
principles. Changes in engine speed cause the centrifugal pendulum (a) to swing in-
or outward mechanically moving a lever (b) which opens or closes the inlet valve for
steam (c) thus regulating the amount of steam getting into the engine (Mayr 1970,
pp. 2–3, 109–113).
varying load conditions. This is achieved by ‘feeding back’ a signal of the effect of a
machine (e.g., rotational speed) to the controller of its action (e.g., a steam valve). The
controller regulates the action, which changes the effect (e.g., a change in the amount
of steam changes the rotational speed). Feeding back this information (the feedback)
creates a closed signalling-loop between two parts of a machine which then affect
each other and results in a ‘circularity of actions’— the defining criterion for feedback
(Ashby 1956, p. 53).
The study of self-regulating machines was later taken up in the field of cybernetics,
which promoted feedback as a first principle for the study of general ‘systems’, i.e.,
declaring it to be the prominent mechanism at work in ‘the animal and the machine’
(Wiener 1948/1961). As systems theory is all-encompassing in its aspiration (everything
is a system), it was natural to not only think of the mechanisms at work within a single
entity— e.g., a human being— in terms of being feedback controlled, but to apply
this thinking to the interaction processes taking place between multiple entities, even
whole societies (Ashby 1956, p. 5). From there on, it did not take long until the concept
of feedback control was used in theories of human communication.
Using a simple communication experiment (in which speakers described geo-
metric patterns to groups of listeners who had to draw them), Leavitt and Mueller
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(1951) compared interactions in which listeners were prohibited from giving feedback
with interactions in which listeners could speak freely.23 It was found that allowing
listener feedback resulted in drawings that were more accurate and made speakers
and listeners more confident in their own performance.24
In similar experiments, Maclay and Newman (1960), Stolz and Tannenbaum
(1963), and Krauss and Weinheimer (1966) analysed the specific effects that listener
feedback has on speakers’ speech production and found that the length of phrases
(ibid.), total quantity of speech, word and phrase selection (Maclay and Newman
1960), speech encoding time, utterance duration, and speech rate as well as hesitation
phenomena such as quantity of filled pauses, false starts, and repetitions (Stolz and
Tannenbaum 1963) are affected. The studies of Maclay and Newman (1960) and Stolz
and Tannenbaum (1963) also analysed the effect of different types of feedback (positive
and negative) in comparison to a no feedback condition. It was found that negative
feedback has an effect on speaker behaviour, whereas a difference between no feedback
and positive feedback cannot be shown in their data. Stolz and Tannenbaum (ibid.)
further suggest that speakers react to negative feedback by actively trying to alter their
speech production, i.e., stopping, replanning, and restarting their utterance.
All four studies explicitly use the term feedback and refer to its concept. In contrast
to cybernetics, however, they use it in a rather informal way, which leaves its status
unclear. Is it really feedback in the cybernetic sense? Krauss and Weinheimer (1966)
think that a feedback-controlled system is, at least, a good analogy for
the model of a speaker as intent upon effecting some end state in his
listener, monitoring the listener’s behaviour for indications of change,
and adjusting his subsequent output on the basis of this information
(ibid., pp. 343–344).
Analysing Leavitt and Mueller’s (1951) study for the appropriate use of the term, it
can be seen that they regard the dyad of dialogue partners, a speaker and a listener, as
their system. These two interlocutors then form the two parts of the closed signalling-
loop. The quality of the speaker’s description affects the listener’s ability to reproduce a
geometric pattern. The listener provides information about her ability to do so, which
then allows the speaker to change his description, which in turn might change the
23. It should be noted that Leavitt and Mueller’s (1951) concept of feedback is a broad one. Listeners in the
feedback condition were allowed to ask questions and to interrupt the speaker. In stark contrast to this, the
no-feedback condition even prevented visual contact between listeners and speakers.
24. A different experiment that additionally included two less disparate conditions—visibility; listeners
were allowed to respond with ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to speaker questions— supports the finding, but did not yield
statistically significant results (ibid., experiment 1).
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Figure 3.2: Allwood’s application of the cybernetic concept of feedback to speech-
based communication. Two levels of feedback are suggested. Intra-individual feed-
back—Levelt’s (1989) self-monitoring—comprises an internal (covert) and an ex-
ternal (overt) feedback loop. Inter-individual feedback flows from the listener to the
speaker. Redrawn and translated from Allwood (1988, p. 91, fig. 1).
listener’s ability to reproduce the pattern, and so on. From this it can be said that a
circularity of actions within the system is clearly present so that the use of the term
feedback for the information that the listener provides to the speaker is warranted—
despite a lack of formal rigour that is present in cybernetics and engineering.
A study that makes an explicit reference to Wiener (1948/1961), even featuring a
schema that explicates the ‘control flow’ in communication in form of a block diagram
(see fig. 3.2), is Allwood’s (1988) work on the system for Swedish linguistic feedback.
Allwood sees multiple feedback loops at work in speaker–listener dyads: intra- and
inter-individual feedback. Intra-individual feedback occurs within speakers (and also
within listeners) via the two self-monitoring loops (covert and overt) present in the
human speech production system (see, e.g., Levelt 1989, fig. 1.1, pp. 13–14). This feed-
back loop is used to notice and repair deficiencies in planned and not yet articulated
(covert), or articulated (overt) speech, respectively. Inter-individual feedback flows
from listeners to speakers. This is the concurrent listener feedback that the four studies
presented above focus on—although Allwood (1988) limits its scope to small, quickly
produced signals (which he calls ‘interjections’, see below). Speakers use this kind of
feedback in order to adapt their speech production process to the listeners’ needs.
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Sharing Allwood’s concept of intra- and inter-individual feedback, Allen and Guy
(1974, pp. 25–26), taking a conversation analyst perspective, apply the term feedback
more broadly and identified two further feedback loops. Their third loop is feedback
that occurs after the turn changes (i.e., speaker and listener switching roles). Turns, in
coherent discourse, add to the representation of the interaction that individual parti-
cipants hold, which is an important basis for subsequent turn formulation. According
to Allen and Guy, it is this feedback loop that closes the circle of communication. Their
fourth and final loop of feedback comprises the outcomes of the interaction which
lead to ‘behavioural and conceptual reorientations of [the participants] toward the
other’ (ibid., p. 26). The four loops run on increasing time scales. The intra-individual
loop spans the time of syllables, words up to an utterance, the inter-individual loop
the time of one or two utterances, the third loop spans two turns, and the fourth loop
extends beyond the interaction.
But there are also critical views on the feedback analogy. Stolz and Tannenbaum
(1963), despite using it, believe that
feedback [in human communication systems] is not a unitary factor
with unitary consequences. Its effect on further encoding behaviour is
probably a function of several variables— the kind of feedback, its source,
its focus, and so forth (ibid., p. 225).
Feedback in human communication is more complex than the feedback in self-
regulating apparatuses that are typically studied in engineering. This can be seen
as a problem. Ashby (1956) warns that
the concept of ‘feedback’, so simple and natural in certain elementary
cases, becomes artificial and of little use when the interconnections
between the parts become more complex (ibid., p. 54).
This is the case because
[s]uch complex systems cannot be treated as an interlaced set of more or
less independent feedback circuits, but only as a whole (ibid., p. 54),
which makes a formal treatment, in mathematical terms, difficult.
Commenting on the application of the concept of feedback in the social sciences
in general, but equally relevant for its applicability to communication as well, Spink
and Saracevic (1998) raise the point that the view of feedback as a simple control signal,
even though it works well in engineering, is ‘devoid of any cognitive and situational
references, interpretations, and processes’ (ibid., p. 251), which, as we seen have in
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chapter 4, are central in communication and dialogue. They further note that the
feedback analogy puts too much ‘emphasis on the loops between intervening variables
[and hence] de-emphasizes the study of the variables themselves’ (Spink and Saracevic
1998, p. 251), that is, the interacting agents and their cognitive processes.
Both strands of criticism suggest that the cybernetic feedback analogy, though
it may certainly be helpful when thinking about the general processes, is much too
simplistic for describing or modelling the actual interaction that takes place in human
conversation. The feedback analogy may— similar to the view of code models of
communication (Shannon 1948; Blackburn 2007)—be helpful in thinking about the
phenomena at hand, but falls short of the complex and rich inferential processes
actually taking place, or may even be misleading.
3.2 TERMINOLOGY
Despite the above criticism we, nevertheless, think that ‘communicative listener feed-
back’ (or simply ‘feedback)’ is an appropriate general term (and analogy) for thinking
about the phenomena related to the inter-individual concurrent information flow
from listeners to speakers, their effects on the speakers’ speech production and the
dynamics and outcomes of interactions that we focus on in this thesis.
The communicative acts that serve as communicative listener feedback in dialogue
received a large number of different names in the literature. A handbook chapter on
‘listener responses’ (Xudong 2009) lists a number of terms that are and were in use:
[. . .] ‘signals of continued attention’, ‘recognition’, ‘concurrent feedback’,
‘accompaniment signals’, ‘listener responses’, ‘assent terms’, ‘back channel’
or ‘backchannel responses’, ‘encourager’, ‘continuers’, ‘limited feedback’,
‘responsive listener cues’, ‘minimal responses’, ‘reactive tokens’, ‘acknow-
ledgment tokens’, ‘receipt tokens’, ‘response tokens’, and ‘project markers’
(ibid., p. 104; citations omitted)
This list is far from complete. Fujimoto (2007), in a critique of the terminology of
the widely used term ‘backchannel’, lists further terms and we have additionally en-
countered the names ‘non-lexical speech sounds’, ‘conversational grunts’ (Ward 2000),
‘listener vocalisations’ (Pammi 2011), ‘(affirmative) cue words’ (Lai 2010; Gravano et al.
2012), ‘interjections’ (Ehlich 1986), and ‘discourse particles’ (Siegert et al. 2013).
The diversity in terminology has various reasons. It can, for example, be seen as
evidence that the phenomenon has received attention from various research fields
and research traditions. Communicative listener feedback has been investigated in
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sociology, psychology, linguistics, computer science and cognitive science. Evenwithin
these fields, various sub-fields created their own terminology based on established
terms or due to traditional preference for coining terms. Some of the terms also reflect
the specific research question and focus that investigators had in mind.
The diversity in terminology could be seen as valuable for mapping the phe-
nomenon. Splitting up the different terms above into their individual components
allows us tomake a first characterisation of feedback in dialogue. Feedback is produced
by ‘listeners’, in ‘response’ or as a ‘reaction’ to utterances by a speaker. It is produced
‘concurrently’ and in ‘accompaniment’ to the speaker’s actions, and uses a ‘back chan-
nel’—not the main ‘channel’—of communication. Although instances of feedback
may actually be words (e.g., exclamations, interjections, discourse markers) research-
ers do not primarily see them as words, but rather as ‘cues’, ‘markers’, ‘responses’ or
‘signals’. This choice in terminology is suggestive of their usage in dialogical interaction,
especially of the fact that they are being produced for the interaction partner. In their
form they are ‘tokens’ or ‘terms’, which suggests a certain compactness. Its extent is
characterised as being ‘limited’ and ‘minimal’ in contrast to normal utterances in
dialogues. Feedback communicates ‘continued attention’, ‘recognition’, affirmation
and ‘assent’ of the listener and it ‘acknowledges’ a speaker’s actions. Furthermore, it is
used to ‘encourage’ the speaker to continue. Feedback is often a ‘non-lexical’ ‘sound’
or ‘vocalisation’ that is sometimes even characterised as ‘grunt’-like.
Where the terms ‘continuer’ and ‘encourager’ suggest that a listener wants the
speaker to continue, ‘signal of continued attention’, ‘recognition’, ‘assent term’, ‘acknow-
ledgement token’, and ‘receipt token’ imply that listeners communicate their inner
state. The terms ‘accompaniment signals’, ‘backchannel’, and ‘concurrent feedback’
highlight the aspect that they do not take centre stage in communication but rather
occur in the background. ‘Limited feedback’ and ‘minimal responses’ characterise
their form, namely that they are short. Finally, ‘reactive tokens’, ‘response tokens’, and
‘responsive listener cues’ highlight the fact that feedback may be given in response to
something that occurred.
Not all of these terms operate on the same level and they all capture different
aspects of the phenomenon. ‘Interjections’ or ‘discoursemarkers’ are broader linguistic
concepts that can be produced by listeners and speakers alike and also play a role
in written language. In contrast to this, terms such as ‘continuer’ or ‘affirmative cue
word’ imply a very specific feedback function and, therefore, exclude feedback that
may communicate different functions. ‘Concurrent feedback’ and ‘listener responses’
are terms that fall in between these two extremes. They do not imply any specific
function, yet they have been created specifically for the phenomenon at hand. The
widely used term ‘back-channel’, which originally focussed on the observation that
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listeners produce short ‘messages’ on a second ‘channel’—which operates in parallel
to themain channel of communication (Yngve 1970)— is now often used as a similarly
broad term, but usually limited to the verbal/vocal modalities. Fujimoto (2007) rejects
the term backchannel for its broadness—which she thinks makes it meaningless—
and especially because it belittles the role that listeners and their feedback play in
shaping a conversation. She therefore suggest usage of the neutral term ‘listener
response’, as do Xudong (2009), and de Kok (2013).
We share Fujimoto’s (2007) criticism of the term backchannel, but in addition to
her points, we also criticise the term for its endorsement of a channel-like model of
communication (Shannon 1948), which neglects important aspects of human conver-
sation. Instead we prefer the term ‘feedback signal’ when referring to communicative
feedback produced by listeners in dialogue. In contrast to the neutral term ‘listener
response’, it alludes to its potential effects (causing change in a speaker’s behaviour) but
is still general enough to encompass the diversity of properties that will be described
in the upcoming sections of this chapter. We begin with describing the form and
structure of feedback signals.
3.3 FORM AND STRUCTURE OF FEEDBACK SIGNALS
Communicative feedback is an inconspicuous phenomenon that does not take centre-
stage but is secluded in the background. Feedback takes place in the ‘back channel’
(Yngve 1970, p. 568), on ‘track 2’ (Clark 1996, p. 241). One of its defining features is
that it does not adhere to—nor interferes with— the systematics of turn-taking. It
does not occupy a turn, but may be placed with relatively few restrictions in parallel
to an ongoing turn (see section 3.5). To be unobtrusive, feedback signals are generally
(i) short (i.e., consist of minimal verbal/vocal expressions),25 (ii) locally adapted to
their prosodic context (i.e., the speaker’s utterance) by being more similar in pitch to
their immediate surrounding than regular utterances (Heldner et al. 2010), or (iii) tak-
ing place in the visual modality, for example as head gestures or facial expressions
(Allwood and Cerrato 2003; Allwood, Kopp et al. 2007).
In the following sections we analyse the form properties of short verbal/vocal
feedback expressions and non-verbal embodied feedback in detail.
25. Longer forms of verbal feedback are possible as well, even normal utterances may be characterised as
feedback that listeners produce for their interaction partners. In this thesis, however, we focus solely on
short feedback expressions.
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3.3.1 SHORT VERBAL/VOCAL FEEDBACK
Following Allwood and Cerrato (2003), we consider feedback ‘verbal/vocal’, if it is
spoken, i.e., produced as a speech sound in the vocal tract of a listener. Examples of
such feedback found in the alico-corpus (Malisz et al. 2016) are genau (‘exactly’), ja
(‘yes’),mhm (‘uh-huh’), andm.
Genau and ja are regular German words. Genau is an adverb that is used in the
same way as its English counterpart exactly. Ja is a particle, that can be used in the
same way as the English yes, e.g., to affirmatively answer a polar question. Both words
are lexical in the classic sense: they can be found in a German dictionary (such as
Duden [2013]), and they have conventionalised forms, pronunciations, and meanings.
Mhm andm are somewhat different from genau and ja.Mhm is listed in the Duden
as well, as a discourse particle.26m27, however, is not listed there, although it is more
frequent in the alico-corpus (there are 346 occurrences ofm and 191 occurrences of
mhm). This suggests thatmhm is a borderline case of a lexical entry and, indeed, verbal
feedback expressions such asmhm,m, and the like are considered to be non-lexical in
nature, and sometimes categorised as ‘conversational grunts’ (Ward 2000; Ward 2006;
Neiberg and Gustafson 2010).
The differences in the surface form of these four feedback expressions is that genau
is verbal, whereasmhm andm are considered interjections, inter alia because of the
variability in their phonetic-phonological structure (Pompino-Marschall 2004) and
intonational structure (Ehlich 1986, § 3.3.1). Because of this, Allwood and Cerrato
(2003) call them ‘vocal’. Ja lies somewhere in between. It is lexical, but also carries
the property of many non-lexical vocal feedback expressions in that it is simple in its
basic structure and can be easily modified prosodically since it is sonorant in form
(Stocksmeier et al. 2007). Ja can also be used as an interjection.
Allwood (1988), in an analysis of Swedish feedback, makes a similar observation
and distinguishes two groups of ‘feedback morphemes’28: primary and secondary29.
Primary feedback morphemes mainly express the basic communicative functions of
feedback. In contrast to this, secondary feedback morphemes additionally express
more specific functions and can often be used predicatively, attributively, and ad-
26. The two meanings ofmhm that Duden (2013) provides are (1) ‘drückt (zögernde) Zustimmung aus’
(expresses [hesitant] affirmation) or (2) ‘drückt Nachdenklichkeit aus’ (expresses thoughtfulness).
27. Following the Chicago Manual of Style (2010, § 7.30) ‘for [interjections] not found in the dictionary—
or where a different emphasis is required—plausible spellings should be sought in literature or invented.’
28. Allwood does not use term morpheme in its strict sense.
29. This distinction parallels the one commonly made for interjections: primary interjections are con-
sidered to be those words and non-words which exclusively belong to the part-of-speech class interjection.
And secondary interjections are words that belong to other part-of-speech classes that can be used as
interjections as well (e.g., Ameka 1992, p. 105).
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verbially. Allwood acknowledges that the distinction between primary and secondary
feedback morphemes is one of degree rather than clear cut. Examples for primary
single feedback morphemes of Swedish that Allwood identified are ja (‘yes’), nej (‘no’),
okej (‘okay’), jo (similar to German doch; there is no equivalent word in English), and
also sounds like m, n and more (Allwood 1988, p. 95). As examples for secondary
single feedback morphemes Allwood provides bra (‘good’), precis (‘exactly’), or aldrig
(‘never’) and also exclamations such as aj (‘ouch’) or usch (‘ugh’).
From these single feedback morphemes, a large number of feedback expressions
can be build by applying linguistic (prosodic, phonologic, morphologic and syntactic)
operations. For Swedish, Allwood (ibid., pp. 96–98) names the following operations:
changing intonation and voice quality (prosodic operations, see section 3.3.2); length-
ening/shortening, omission of initial consonant, reduplication, repetition, reduplica-
tion with glottal stop, reduplication with h, omission of reduplicated prefix, addition
of vowel, and breathiness (phonologic operations); reduplication, repetition, deriva-
tion, and composition (morphologic operations); and creating two word expressions
(syntactic operation).
These operations are also constructive for communicative feedback expressions
in German. As mentioned above, ja can be modified prosodically (Stocksmeier et al.
2007), but is also subject to morphological changes, e.g., through reduplication (jaja
Golato and Fagyal 2008). Similarly,m,mhm, and hm—and other combinations of
these sound—are constructed through these operations (Ehlich 1979; 1986). Analyses
of feedback expressions in American English come to similar findings (e.g., Ward
2006). This suggests that modification of feedback expressions are a cross-linguistic
phenomenon.30 Table 3.1 shows examples of communicative feedback expressions
that are subject to these operations in these three languages.
3.3.2 PROSODY AND INTONATION OF FEEDBACK
Whereas the phonological, morphological and syntactical operations on short verbal/-
vocal feedback signals expand the discrete space of potential feedback signals combin-
atorially, prosodical operations add further dimensions that are rather continuous in
nature.
Prosody encompasses acoustic features such as ‘the perceived F0 pattern’ (inton-
ation) as well as ‘pauses, relative loudness, voice quality, duration, and segmental
phenomena related to varying strengthening of the speech organs’ (Vaissière 2005,
p. 238). Prosody serves multiple (pragmatic) functions (ibid., tbl. 1), an analysis of what
30. English, German and Swedish are closely related languages, but modification of feedback expressions
occur in non-Germanic languages as well, e.g., in French (Prévot et al. 2016) or Japanese (Den et al. 2012).
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contributes to the perception of these, however, is difficult since (i) usually multiple
acoustic features occur simultaneously (Vaissière 2005, tbl. 239), and (ii) perception
of function interacts heavily with discourse context (ibid., p. 242).
Remarkably, the prosody and intonation of feedback signals (and interjections
in general) is similar to the prosody and intonation of complete utterances (Ehlich
1986, pp. 36–37). Prosody plays an important role in feedback form, as its modifies
feedback functions and meaning (see section 3.4) and may transport further subtle
cues of listeners’ mental states.
For German, for example, the intonation of the feedback expressions and discourse
particles hm,m,mhm (and further variants) have been researched quite extensively.
As early as 1913, Hermann described the wide variety inmeaning—he lists 17—which
different forms of these vocalisation have (Hermann 1913, pp. 27–29). Ehlich (1986,
pp. 36–44) compared the effect that the intonation of hm has on its meaning to the tone
systems of languages such as Chinese. He identified four intonation contours with dif-
ferent meanings (convergence, divergence, pre-divergence, and complex divergence)
which, however, were stable (with subtle variation) across different phonological and
morphological forms, such as for example hm` and hmhm` (ibid., p. 54; tbl. IV). Schmidt
(2001, p. 25; tbl. 3) defined seven prototypical form-meaning mappings of intonation
for hm, some of which serve further communication management functions such as
turn-taking, closing, and feedback elicitation.
Building on the intonation contours identified by Ehlich (1986), Stocksmeier
et al. (2007) synthesised twelve different variants of the German feedback signal ja
and let them rate on seven semantic differentials: happy— sad, brave—anxious, cer-
tain—hesitant, agreeing— rejecting, pushing—not pushing, surprised—bored, and
angry—balanced. Three clear clusters emerged—agreeing, boredom, and hesita-
tion—and almost all properties from the differentials received high rating for some
of the synthesised signals.
In Malisz et al. (2012), we analysed 24 acoustic features of three German feedback
expressions (ja,m, andmhm) in the alico-corpus and identified prosodic correlates
of listeners’ attentiveness (in contrast to distraction), as well as of the level of feedback
functions. Attentiveness, for example, could be predicted through higher mean in-
tensity, higher energy variability, and higher pitch variability. For feedback function
the results were less clear since prosody often interacted with the segmental structure
of the different feedback expressions.
Similar analyses were also carried out for American English. Ward (2004, tbl. 2)
identified a range of prosodic features of feedback signals—namely ‘syllabification,
duration, loudness, pitch height, pitch downslope/upslope, [and] creaky voice’— as
meaning bearing. He assigned each feature a vague meaning continuum with which it
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is supposed to covary (e.g., pitch height with listeners’ degree of interest; pitch slope
with her degree of understanding—or lack thereof).
More concretely, Gravano et al. (2012) showed that the pragmatic functions of
a range of American English affirmative cue words (as either a back-channel or an
acknowledgement/agreement signal) can be distinguished by their prosodic features.
Beňuš (2012) showed that similar distinctions can be found for the polysemous dis-
course marker no in Slovak, too.
Lai (2008), on the other hand found that simple prosodic features (intonation,
duration, and intensity) are not sufficient to distinguish between the plain back-
channel function and a back-channel question function of the feedback expression
really. In later work, when trying to distinguish between a surprise and question
function of really and right, Lai (2009) found that prosodic features interact with the
semantics of these expressions. In further investigation of such interactions, Lai also
showed this for uncertainty, the presence of which was rather reflected in the choice of
a feedback expression and not so much through (rising) intonation of the expression,
as was expected. Rising intonation in a feedback signal, however, was indicative of
listeners’ problems in understanding speakers’ utterances (Lai 2010).
In contrast to these complex relationships of prosody, semantics, and feedback
function and meaning, van Zyl and Hanekom (2012) found that prosodic cues can
be used to identify when a listener expresses a state of reluctance with the feedback
expression okay, with the simple feature of duration to be the best predictor. Neiberg
et al. (2013) came to similar conclusions when investigating the acoustic correlates of
Swedish feedback expressions. They found that although feedback expressions have
inherent meaning, different prosodic realisations have different functions.
Abstracting from concrete feedback tokens and analysing different realisations of
a generic feedback-like vocalisation (na), Philippsen et al. (2013) were able to classify,
based only on prosodic features, whether positive or negative polarity is expressed.The
classifier could also be applied, with reasonable results, on natural German feedback
signals.
Recently, Lotz et al. (2016), using the alico-corpus could distinguish two of
Schmidt’s (2001) seven functional meanings of hm using pitch contour only.
3.3.3 EMBODIED, NON-VERBAL FEEDBACK
Human feedback is not limited to the verbal/vocal modality. As is generally the case
in human face-to-face communication, nonverbal modalities are important, too, and
feedback can be expressed, e.g., through head gestures, facial expressions, gaze, or
manual gestures. This has the advantage that it happens in the visual modality and
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interferes even less with the interlocutors’ speech signal when produced concurrently
to an ongoing utterance.
As in verbal/vocal feedback, non-verbal feedback signals combine discrete and
continuous features (Allwood, Kopp et al. 2007, § 1.1.2), whichmakes them comparable
in their expressiveness. Head movements, for example, can be categorised into a small
set of discrete gestures— such as nods, shakes, tilts— each describable with simple
rotation- and/or translation-based movement patterns (Wagner et al. 2014, § 2.2; fig. 1).
Head gesture units can be comprised of such a single head movement, but can also
form phrases that combinemultiple suchmovements (Heylen 2008, p. 252)— either of
the same or of different movement types (or combinations thereof). In the former case,
the head gesture is polycyclic, but ‘simple’, in the latter case polycyclic and ‘complex’
(Malisz et al. 2016, § 5). In alico, for example, more than 70% of listeners’ head
gestures were polycyclic, 23.1 % of which were complex (ibid., tbls. 8, 9).
Compositionality allows for a very large number of different head gesture units.
In alico, for example, 20 listeners produced head gesture units with 303 different
discrete forms—71% of which occur only once and 88% less then five times. In
contrast to this, the five most frequent head gestures units, all of them simple nod
units with different cyclicity, make up 60% of all observed head gestures.
In addition to these variations in a head gesture unit’s discrete form, the kinematics
of themovement is variable as well (Heylen 2008, § 5), making continuous adjustments
possible: listeners can for example influence the amount of energy that is put into a
head gesture unit by varying the amplitude of the individual movements, or by varying
the duration of the complete head gesture unit (or its individual constituents).
Both aspects of listener head gestures have an influence on the meaning and
function that can be derived from a feedback signal. Even in isolation, e.g., when
not accompanying verbal/vocal feedback, some head gestures units are associated
with certain meanings: nods are generally considered to be positive and to signal
agreement (e.g., Poggi et al. 2010a; Poggi et al. 2010b), shakes transport negativity
(e.g., Kendon 2002, pp. 151–152), and jerks transport surprisal and understanding (e.g.,
Allwood and Cerrato 2003, § 3.2). Analysing these coarse meanings in greater detail,
however reveals that each gesture can actually fulfil different functions. Analysing
rather different feedback functions of head nods (confirmation, taking note, and
agreement), Poggi et al. (2010b) found differences in form features. The variation is,
however, rather subtle such that discourse context needs to be taken into account as
well in order to differentiate between functions. They also found that, in combination
with other facial displays, nods may actually express disagreement or display ongoing
processing.
Similar to how the perceived meaning of short verbal/vocal feedback expressions
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changes with prosodic realisation, head gestures were found to interact with verbal/
vocal feedback as well. When accompanying verbal/vocal feedback, the perceived
meaning of head gesture units containing a single head movement was found to be
mainly determined by the function of the co-occurring verbal/vocal feedback signals
(Allwood and Cerrato 2003, § 3.2). Complex head gestures, on the other hand, were
found to modify the function of the verbal/vocal feedback expression (they may, for
example reinforce, enforce, weaken, or contradict the function [ibid., § 2.3]).
Similar observations can be made about other non-verbal feedback mechanism,
especially facial expressions, which may convey listeners’ mental states such as uncer-
tainty (Krahmer and Swerts 2005), emotional stance (Kaukomaa et al. 2015), or the
cognitive effort of a listener (van Amelsvoort et al. 2013). Heylen et al. (2007), for ex-
ample, evaluated the feedback function of 21 non-verbal signals (various head gestures,
facial expressions, and combinations thereof) synthesised with an embodied conver-
sational agent and identified prototypical expressions for ten out of twelve functions
that were analysed: accept— refuse, agree—disagree, like—dislike, understand—
not understand, disbelief, and not interested (ibid., § 2.1).
Gaze, on the other hand, is quite a different signal. Gaze is often merely indic-
ative of listeners’ cognitive processes and states (e.g., scanning the environment for
referents, looking at the object being referred to [Tanenhaus and Brown-Schmidt
2008; Garoufi et al. 2016]). Gazing at specific points or targets can thus be evidence
of understanding—or non-understanding—at least when talking about things that
are part of the physical situation in which the interaction takes place. But gaze can
also be used by listeners as a feedback signal, e.g., to show that they are in contact or
that they are ready to hear more. Nakano et al. (2003, p. 555–556) found that speakers
use listener gaze cues of both sorts (indicated and signalled) as feedback and adapt
their dialogue behaviour accordingly (e.g., by either elaborating the current topic or
continuing with the next one). Clark and Krych (2004, p. 76) found that speakers
actively monitor their interaction partners’ gaze behaviour, use it as evidence, and, if
necessary, adapt their behaviour immediately. Garoufi et al. (2016) actually utilised
listener gaze as feedback in an interactive natural language generation system and
improved the system’s task performance.
Referring to the research program of ‘embodied cognition’ (Wilson and Foglia
2015), Allwood, Kopp et al. (2007) and Kopp et al. (2008) argue that non-verbal feed-
back is ‘embodied’, i.e., directly caused by biological and/or cognitive processes in the
listeners’ bodies. This, they argue enables the kind of expressiveness in feedback that
is difficult to capture with classic approaches to semantics. Speakers—having embod-
iments similar to listeners— can, however, ‘ground perception and understanding of
physical expressions of the other in own bodily experiences’ (ibid., p. 22), which en-
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ables them to interpret their interaction partners’ multidimensional and multilayered
feedback signals.
3.3.4 INTERMEDIATE SUMMARY: FORM
In summary we can say that communicative listener feedback signals, even though
they are seemingly small and produced unobtrusively, are very rich in their form. The
set of basic signals— those to which a form of conventionalised meaning could be
ascribed (ja,mhm, etc.; nod and shake head gestures, certain facial expressions)— is
rather small in comparison to the total number of words that natural languages have.
As it is possible to modify the form of these basic unimodal signals through various
operations and by the possibility to formmultimodal combinations, the actual space of
feedback signals that can be produced is extensive though. This abundance of possible
signals is used by listeners when producing feedback as it allows them to express
rather subtle differences in meaning, e.g., they cannot just express understanding, but
can modulate how certain (or uncertain) they are of their understanding onto the
signal.
3.4 MEANING AND FUNCTION OF LISTENER FEEDBACK
The analysis of the origins of the concept of feedback (section 3.1) and of the different
terms used to describe the phenomenon (section 3.2) has already shown some of
the roles and functions that communicative listener feedback fulfils in dialogical
interaction. The discussion of feedback form (section 3.3) has shown that the relation
between form andmeaning is complex and that subtle differences inmeaning, difficult
to capture in traditional approaches to semantics, can be expressed.
Feedback signals can be assigned functions on various levels of granularity. The
simplest approach is to assign them the dialogue act ‘backchannel’ or see them as
having the interactional function to show continuous attention. The field of conversa-
tion analysis distinguishes between feedback signals that are continuers and feedback
signals that are assessments (e.g., Goodwin 1986), and/or feedback that signals changes-
of-state (e.g., Heritage 1984). Although conversation analysts are aware of the richness
of feedback— see for example Heritage (ibid., p. 335)— they analyse the interactional
functions of individual feedback signals (e.g., oh) one by one.
A different perspective is to distinguish between ‘generic’ and ‘specific’ feedback
signals (Bavelas et al. 2000, tbl. 1), where generic signals are appropriate in many situ-
ations and specific signals are appropriate specifically in the situations in which they
are produced— i.e., they relate to the content of the interaction partners’ utterances.
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A different approach is taken by Allwood et al. (1992), who aim at modelling a
broader spectrum of feedback meaning. They concentrate on three semantic and
pragmatic dimensions of feedback signals: their communicative function, polarity,
and communicative status. These aspects will be discussed in the following:
Allwood and colleagues hold the view that communicative feedback is a ‘linguistic
[mechanism] which enable[s] the participants of a conversation to exchange inform-
ation about four basic communicative functions’ (ibid., pp. 2–3), namely ‘contact’,
‘perception’, ‘understanding’, and ‘attitudinal reactions’. This list has been expanded
with the functions ‘acceptance’ (Allwood, Cerrato et al. 2007) and ‘agreement’ (Busch-
meier and Kopp 2012b).
Allwood et al. derive these functions directly from fundamental properties of
communication. For example, communication is impossible when the potential com-
municators are not in contact. Being in contact requires co-presence in time (delays
in transmission are acceptable as long as they are expected) and space (in an abstract
sense, possibly mediated), and the ability to transmit and receive information. Fur-
thermore, contact between two communicators is only established when both have
the desire to communicate. Feedback fulfilling the function contact thus expresses
whether communicators are ‘able’ and ‘willing’ to communicate (Allwood et al. 1992).
Similarly, communication requires the ability and willingness of communicators
to perceive and understand each other. When co-presence in time and space is es-
tablished, perception can be impaired for several reasons. One possibility is that the
‘communication channel’ is ‘noisy’ (Shannon 1948). This is the case when interfering
noise is present in the environment, but also when communication is interrupted
for other, e.g., technical, reasons. Perception can also be impaired when the commu-
nicators have problems with articulation or the ability to hear. When perception is
possible, the next barrier to successful communication are problems in understanding
(see section 2.1). These may emerge for several reasons and on different stages of
language comprehension. Interlocutors might speak different languages, or be on
different levels of proficiency, or use different (regional) dialects of the same language.
In general, listeners might not know the meaning of a word that the other interlocutor
uses, or they might not be able to infer the speaker’s meaning from the utterance,
or integrate the content that is expressed into the dialogue context (e.g., they may
not be able to resolve an anaphora or a referring expression), or follow a line of argu-
ments (e.g., because they missed a cue word of a rhetorical relation). The reasons for
this are manifold, but once a listener has detected a problem, she can express it via
communicative feedback.
Once understanding is possible and depending on the content of the utterance
communicative listener feedback may communicate a listener’s willingness and ability
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Table 3.2: Hierarchies of communicative functions according to Allwood et al. (1992)
and Allwood (2000), Clark (1996), and Bunt (2011). A level L i is lower than a level
L i+1.
Level Allwood et al. Clark DIT++ (Bunt)
L5 execution
L4 reaction to evocative in-
tention
consideration/uptake evaluation
L3 understanding understanding understanding
L2 perception identification perception
L1 contact attention attention
to ‘accept’ the speaker’s utterance (e.g. a claim, or a proposal) or the listener’s willing-
ness and ability to ‘agree’ with the speaker (e.g., to an expressed opinion). Listeners
may also express their attitude towards utterances of their interaction partner, e.g.,
based on the listener’s affective state (e.g., being surprised, liking what was said, etc.).
In general, feedback signals that communicate the basic functions contact, per-
ception and understanding are ‘process related’, whereas feedback communicating
acceptance, agreement and attitudinal reactions is ‘content related’ (Allwood, Cerrato
et al. 2007, p. 276).
In contrast to the interactional functions that are assigned to feedback in the field
of conversation analysis, the communicative functions of Allwood et al. (1992; 2007;
2008) are rooted in the listeners’ cognitive state (Kopp et al. 2008, p. 29).
3.4.1 HIERARCHICAL RELATIONS
The basic communicative functions of feedback are neither independent nor on the
same level. They are related to each other, forming a hierarchy with contact at its
lowest end, followed by perception, understanding, and ending in acceptance and
agreement at the top, see table 3.2.
The hierarchy is based on the assumption of ‘upward completion’ (Clark 1996,
p. 147), meaning that, a lower level of processing L i31 needs to be successful for a
31. Let L = {L⊥, . . . , L i , . . . , L⊤} be a (partially) ordered set of levels of processing, with L⊥ being a
minimal and L⊤ a maximal level. For two levels L i and L j , we write L i ≺ L j if L i precedes L j , L i ≻ L j if L i
succeeds L j , and L i  L j if they are on the same level of processing.
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higher level of processing L i+1 to be in reach. There is no perception without con-
tact, no understanding without perception, and no acceptance or agreement without
understanding.
Upward completion in combination with the assumption that interlocutors adhere
to the cooperative principle (Grice 1975) allows for semantic and pragmatic inferences
to be drawn (Bunt 2011, pp. 237–238). Explicit feedback of positive polarity on a level
L i (e.g., understanding),
(1) entails positive feedback on all preceding levels L i−1, . . . , L⊥ (e.g., perception
and contact), and
(2) implicates negative feedback on the succeeding level L i+1 (e.g., acceptance or
agreement).
Explicit feedback of negative polarity on this level, however,
(3) entails negative feedback on all succeeding levels L i+1, . . . , L⊤ (e.g., acceptance
or agreement), and
(4) implicates positive feedback on the preceding level L i−1 (e.g., perception).
See fig. 3.3 for a visualisation of these relationships.
Entailments (1) and (3) directly follow from the upward completion assumption.
L i being positive would not be possible if preceding levels were not positive as well.
Negative feedback on L i blocks upward completion and hence subsequent levels need
to be negative. The cognitive reality of the assumption is questionable though. Al-
though understanding, in general, requires perception, it is easy to imagine situations
in which it does not, e.g., when dialogue context provides sufficient information for
understanding to be possible. Similarly for the other levels. Allwood (2000, pp. 72–74)
therefore assumes a weaker form of upward completion in which the entailment
relations between levels of processing, as proclaimed by Bunt (2011), is a ‘default chain
of implications’, that is, the entailment is defeasible.
Consequences (2) and (4), on the other hand, are ‘upper-bounding implicata’
(Horn 2004, p. 13) generated by the cooperative principle.32 A rational, cooperative
interlocutor provides an optimal amount of information. An ideal listener would
have no reason to provide feedback of positive polarity on a level of processing L i
if she could as well provide feedback of positive polarity on the subsequent level of
32. Upper-bounding implicata are chiefly due to Grice’s (1975, p. 45) first sub-maxim of quantity— ‘Make
your contribution as informative as required (for the current purposes of the exchange)’—but see the
discussion in Horn (2004, pp. 12–14).
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L⊥ ≺ . . . ≺ Li−1 ≺ Li ≺ Li+1 ≺ . . . ≺ L⊤
+
−
+
−. . . . . .
entails implicates
Figure 3.3: Pragmatic relations among feedback functions of different levels of pro-
cessing L i as described in Bunt (2011, tbl. 5). When receiving feedback of positive
polarity (+) on level L i , positive feedback on all preceding levels L i−1 to L⊥ is entailed
and negative feedback on the directly succeeding level L i+1 is implicated. When receiv-
ing feedback of negative polarity (−) on level L i , negative feedback on all succeeding
levels L i+1 to L⊤ is entailed and positive feedback on the directly preceding level L i−1
is implicated.
processing L i+1. Consequentially, the optimal level Lh for providing positive feedback
is the highest level of processing that is successful
Lh = max
i
{L i ∈ L ⋃︀ L i = success}.
It follows that no positive feedback could be provided on the subsequent level Lh+1
and thus feedback of positive polarity on level Lh implicates a problem on level Lh+1.
Conversely, an ideal listener would have no reason to provide feedback of negative
polarity on a level of processing L i if she could as well provide feedback of negative
polarity on the preceding level of processing L i−1. Consequentially, the optimal level
L l for providing negative feedback is the lowest level of processing on which a problem
occurred
L l = mini {L i ∈ L ⋃︀ L i = problem}.
It follows that no negative feedback could be provided on the previous level L l−1 and
thus feedback of negative polarity on level L l implicates successful processing on level
L l−1.
It is apparent that Lh directly precedes L l (and that L l directly succeeds Lh). As
feedback of positive polarity on level Lh implicates a problem on L l and feedback
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of negative polarity on level L l implicates success on level Lh , one implicates the
other. It may look as if there is virtually no difference between feedback of negative
polarity on level L l and feedback of positive polarity on level Lh . Actual listeners
(providing feedback), however, cannot rely on speakers to infer what they implicated
and, conversely, speakers cannot rely on listeners actually meaning what seems to be
implicated in their feedback (Bach 2006, p. 23).33
3.4.2 POLARITY
By choosing to either provide positive or negative feedback, a listener makes a state-
ment about a specific level of processing.
Borrowing the terminology from cybernetics, feedback can be either negative
or positive. Whereas in cybernetics negative and positive feedback are principled
ways in which a system is controlled— classically negative feedback leads to stability,
positive feedback leads to instability and growth (Krippendorff 1986, pp. 22–23, 30)— ,
manifestation of polarity in communicative feedback is usually interpreted differently:
negative feedback tells the speaker that a problem occurred and that something needs
improvement. With positive feedback, on the other hand, listeners communicate that
everything is alright and that speakers can continue as is—or even reduce their effort.
It is important to note though that the polarity of a feedback signal is, in general,
not directly observable from its basic form. To be able to interpret a feedback signal,
it needs to be analysed in its dialogue context. Allwood et al. (1992, pp. 8–10) make
the case that—depending on the context in form of the preceding speech/dialogue
act— an inherently negative no can actually be positive feedback of acceptance and
an inherently positive yes can serve as a signal of rejection.
3.4.3 AWARENESS AND INTENTIONALITY
Feedback in dialogue can be produced on different levels of awareness and inten-
tionality. For communicated information in general Allwood et al. (ibid.) state that
gradual differences in awareness exist but, for simplicity, make three such levels expli-
cit. Communicated information, and therefore feedback, may be ‘indicated’, ‘displayed’,
or ‘signalled’.
Indicated feedback is produced on the lowest level of awareness. Listener’s are
not necessarily aware of and possibly not in control of it. An example of indicated
communicative feedback would be a listener blushing when her interlocutor makes an
utterance that embarrasses her. As she is not in control of the blood flow into her face,
33. One could argue that these implicatures are conventional in nature.
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her reaction cannot be considered intentional, but is causal to her internal mental
state. She may, however, feel the warmth and can be aware of it.
Displayed feedback is produced intentionally. The listener displays information and
intends the speaker to see it—but does not expect, or even want, it to be recognised
as being intentional. An example of displayed communicative feedback would be if a
listener pretends to be happy about what her interlocutor says and displays this with a
smile. If the smile is done right (a ‘Duchenne’ smile), it looks involuntary and suggests
a genuine pleasure to the interlocutor, who is not able to recognise that there is an
intention behind it. For him it appears to be indexical.
Signalled feedback is produced intentionally as well, but in contrast to displayed
feedback, a listener also intents the speaker to recognise that it is displayed. An ex-
ample of signalled feedback would be a listener that intends to communicate to her
interlocutor that she understood and accepts a suggestion made by him by uttering
a straight ‘yes, okay’. This expressions of feedback displays understanding and ac-
ceptance linguistically, which makes it a signal by convention as ‘ordinary linguistic
expressions (verbal symbols) [are] signals by convention’ (Allwood et al. 1992, p. 6).
For the interlocutor, it is thus clear that the listener is intending him to recognise that
she displays him understanding and acceptance.
In general, it may be difficult for a speaker who encounters listener feedback to
recognise whether it is purely indicative, or displayed, or signalled by the listener.
The same behaviour occurring in very similar situations can arise from different
levels of intentionality and awareness. Consider the following example, set in a noisy
environment such as a crowded bar, where, say, Stanisław addresses Lydia and where
she does not react at all to his address (i.e., gives negative contact feedback).
If Lydia is not aware of the fact that she is being addressed by Stanisław (she
neither hears nor sees him) she is also not aware and in control of the negative contact
feedback she provides to him. Consequently, Lydia’s feedback is indicative and the
situation is a good example of Watzlawick et al.’s (1967, p. 51) insight that ‘one cannot
not communicate’.
Now imagine that Lydia is aware of Stanisław’s address (she hears him), but pre-
tends not to have noticed. Her behaviour is now intentional— she displays not being
in contact—but at the same time she does not want him to recognise her intention.
From Stanisław’s perspective this situation does not differ from the one above and it
is basically impossible for him to see whether Lydia’s behaviour is purely indexical or
a display.
Finally, imagine a slightly different situation in which it is virtually impossible for
Lydia to miss Stanisław’s address (he is in her line of sight, and clearly audible) but
she is not willing to talk to him and ignores his address in the same way as above (she
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Table 3.3: Allwood et al.’s (1992) levels of awareness and intentionality. Listener feed-
back can be purely indicative, or displayed, or signalled. For speakers it may be difficult
to differentiate between displayed and indicated as well as indicated and signalled
feedback.
listener speaker
level aware intentional detect intention confusion
indicate possibly ○ — display
display ● ● ○ indicate/signal
signal ● ● ● —
does not react). In this case she signals her non-willingness to interact as she cannot
expect him not to detect and recognise the intention behind her feedback.
In the first two situations, if Stanisław, for whatever reasons, suspects that Lydia
might ignore him, he might falsely attribute an intention to her (although the feedback
is purely indexical) or recognise that she is displaying ignorance. He might even think
that her ignorance of his address is a signal for him. In the third situation, Stanisław,
not suspecting that Lydia would ignore him, may even falsely interpret her signal as
being purely indexical.
Of these three levels of awareness and intentionality of feedback, displayed feed-
back posesmost problems to speakers. Differentiating between indicated and signalled
feedback is most probably possible in most situations. Displayed feedback, however,
can be used ambiguously and may be confused with indicated or (if acted poorly)
signalled feedback. An overview of the properties of the levels of awareness and
intentionality for the listener and the speaker is given in table 3.3.
From the speaker’s perspective, amore useful distinction is to differentiate between
two dimensions of feedback: ‘intentionality’ and ‘veridicality’ (Nivre 1995). On the
intentional dimension, speakers perceive feedback as being produced on a spectrum
from intentionally to involuntary. Linguistic feedback is clearly produced intention-
ally, while indexical feedback is produced involuntarily. On the veridical dimension,
feedback is either a truthful representation of the inner state of the listener or not. In
general, non-intentional feedback is most likely veridical (cf. the blushing example
above), whereas intentional feedback may be veridical or not.
Non-veridical intentional feedback does not necessarily imply a deceptive inten-
tion, nor does it mean that the listener does not want to be cooperative. A listener
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might, for example, intentionally signal understanding without even knowing that
she has no real basis for claiming understanding (see section 2.1). She might truthfully
think that she understands what is being explained to her and only later find out that in
fact she did not. She might also intentionally non-veridically signal understanding for
social reasons, for example, because she is confident that she will be able to understand
in a while.
3.5 PLACEMENT AND TIMING
In general, ‘[n]o location restrictions are placed on the occurrence of back-channel
signals’ (Duncan and Fiske 1977, p. 202), that is, listeners may provide feedback at
any point of time during a speaker’s turn. Some points of time, however, seem to be
more appropriate for feedback placement than others (e.g., de Kok 2013, pp. 31–34),
that is, the probability that a feedback response can be observed at such a point is
higher than at other points. These points, or perhaps intervals, of time can be seen as
‘feedback opportunities’ (ibid., p. 13) or ‘feedback relevance spaces’, ‘intervals where
it is relevant for another speaker to produce a backchannel’ (Heldner et al. 2013,
p. 137)—paralleling Sacks et al.’s (1974) notion of ‘transition relevance places’ at which
turn-changes may take place.
As a surface phenomenon, feedback placement and timing has been researched
extensively, often in combination with turn-taking. Based on the assumption that
feedback is not timed randomly, but placed systematically, one particularly influential
idea (due to Duncan 1974) has been that listeners place feedback (or take the turn)
after the speaker displays a signal (a ‘speaker within-turn signal’ for feedback and a
‘speaker turn-signal’ for turn-taking) and that such signals are realised as observable
‘behavioural cues’. Duncan found that two behavioural cues were good predictors
for listener feedback that occurs between units of analysis (phonemic clauses that
are multimodally marked; ibid., p. 164), or shortly after the subsequent unit begins:
‘completion of a grammatical clause’, and ‘turning of the [. . .] head towards the [listener]’
(ibid., p. 172). Using both cues simultaneously increased the probability of them being
followed by feedback, and both cues preceded verbal/vocal and non-verbal feedback
alike. No cues, however, could be identified for feedback that occurred within a unit
of analysis (ibid., p. 173).
Duncan’s analysis was grounded in only two recorded dialogues. Subsequent
research on feedback placement built on his methodology and tried to identify beha-
vioural cues preceding feedback on a larger scale, using more data, automatic feature
(i.e., potential elicitation cue) extraction, and more powerful statistical methods. Such
an approach was especially appealing to researchers in the field of spoken dialogue
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systems who hoped to be able to automatically identify cues in the speech of a human
user and respond with appropriately placed feedback (seesection 3.6).
Koiso et al. (1998) use syntactic (part-of-speech) and prosodic features immediately
preceding a feedback signal to predict feedback placement in a corpus of eight task-
oriented dialogues in Japanese. They constructed a decision tree using prosody as a
filter on the syntactic features—prosodic features need to be consulted when syntax
is a potential cue, but syntactic features are often sufficient to rule out a cue. Their
conclusion is that both prosodic as well as syntactic features are important cues for
feedback placement. The constructed decision tree further suggests that looking at
individual prosodic features is insufficient and feature combinations need to be taken
into account (ibid., tbl. 8).
A systematic analysis of intonational cues was carried out by Ward and Tsukahara
(2000) on eight conversations in American English and 18 conversations in Japanese.
They identified a simple ‘low pitch cue’ to be a reliable predictor for feedback in both
languages, and were able to formulate a precise rule of when feedback is produced:
Upon detection of (P1) a region of pitch less than the 26th-percentile pitch
level and (P2) continuing for at least 110 milliseconds, (P3) coming after
at least 700 milliseconds of speech, (P4) providing you have not output
back-channel feedback within the preceding 800 milliseconds, (P5) after
700 milliseconds wait, you should produce back-channel feedback (ibid.,
pp. 1186)
In contrast to Duncan (1974) and Koiso et al. (1998), Ward and Tsukahara did not use
a fixed unit of analysis, but examined the signal quasi-continuously (in 10ms steps).
Hence, they did not need to make the assumption that cues are only produced at the
end of certain units (Ward and Tsukahara 2000, p. 1202).
Ward and Tsukahara already intended their model to be used in an ‘automated
listener’, a conversational agent that is able to provide feedback in response to the
speech of a human user. Also working on the side of spoken dialogue systems, Cathcart
et al. (2003) devised a model suitable for online-use based on pause duration in
combination with an n-gram part-of-speech model (with n = 3), which outperformed
Ward and Tsukahara’s model by a factor of two (ibid., p. 57).
Morency et al. (2010) used sequential probabilistic models (Hidden Markov Mod-
els and Conditional Random Fields) to predict feedback placement in human com-
puter interaction. This required them to use only features that can be derived in
real-time from the users’ multimodal behaviour (speech and gaze). During the train-
ing process of their model, they automatically selected the best features from a set of
prosodic features (e.g., the individual parts of Ward and Tsukahara’s low pitch cue,
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pauses, lengthening or emphasising of words), lexical features (e.g., word unigrams
in contrast to Cathcart et al.’s part-of-speech trigrams, fillers, incomplete words), as
well as one multimodal feature (whether the speaker is gazing at the listener). Each of
these features was additionally encoded in multiple ways in order to model different
relationships between a feature and feedback behaviour (strength of the trigger, delay
of subsequent feedback). As a result of the training and feature selection process on
50 short dialogues, three features were chosen: occurrence of a pause, use of the word
and, as well as the gaze feature encoded in two ways (Morency et al. 2010, p. 81).
One problem with all the above approaches is that they only identify those cues
and places, where listeners actually responded with feedback. However, feedback
elicitation cues do not necessarily impose a strict obligation on listeners to respond. A
different person might have responded differently in the same situation. Consequently,
if the person that happened to be the interaction partner in a dialogue did not respond
to a feedback elicitation cue of the speaker, this behaviour will not be identified as a
cue and missed in subsequent analyses.
This problem was identified and addressed by Huang et al. (2010) and de Kok and
Heylen (2012), who explored ways to have different people act as listeners in the same
dialogue situation. Huang et al. (2010) let multiple persons do a ‘parasocial interaction’
with a video recording of a speaker taken from a dialogue where the original listener
is cut out. The parasocial-listeners are then instructed to put themselves into the
dialogue situation and respond to the speaker by pressing a button every time they
would give feedback. De Kok and Heylen used a more ecologically valid—but less
scalable—approach that made three listeners believe that they are in a one-on-one
interaction with a speaker (only one of them was, the other two were maintaining an
illusion). Collecting data from multiple listeners has several benefits. First of all, it
increases the number of cues that are revealed as individual listeners might respond
to cues that the others do not respond to. Secondly, cues that are responded to by
multiple listeners might be seen as more prominent or important cues than cues that
get fewer responses. Thirdly, cues by multiple listeners that occur in proximity to each
other can be used to measure out intervals that constitute response opportunities or
feedback relevance spaces (de Kok 2013; Heldner et al. 2013).
As mentioned above, one reason for some feedback elicitation cues to be perceived
as more prominent or important than others might be that multiple cues are produced
simultaneously (Duncan 1974, p. 172), This was confirmed in a systematic analysis of
prosodic and syntactic features at the boundary of units preceding feedback signals
in American English, where Gravano and Hirschberg (2011, § 5.2) found a quadratic
relationship between the number of simultaneous cues (up to six) and the likelihood
that a feedback signal is produced.
3.5 PLACEMENTANDTIMING 67
The approaches to feedback-timing and placement discussed above focus on elicit-
ation cues. They provide good insight into the form of potential cues and even provide
mechanism to detect feedback opportunities in audiovisual signals. The perspective
on feedback that these approaches hold is one of feedback as stimulus–response beha-
viour. Speakers provide elicitation cues (the stimuli) and listeners respond to these
cues. Whether missed opportunities result from listeners’ non-detection or voluntary
ignorance of a cue is a question that these approaches do not address.
A different perspective on feedback placement focusses on the interactional func-
tions it fulfils in dialogue. According to this view, listeners may, of course, respond to
speakers’ feedback elicitation cues (because they are cooperative dialogue partners
and recognise a speaker’s need of information), but listeners may as well provide
feedback because they feel a need to communicate their state of understanding or
their attitude. This may be the case for different reasons. In the case of difficulties in
understanding, feedback that expresses such a state signals to the interlocutor that
there is a problem. It can therefore be considered an attempt of the listener to initiate
repair (i.e., ‘other-initiated repair’, Schegloff et al. 197734). Similarly, the organisation
of dialogue in terms of contributions (Clark and Schaefer 1989) necessitates a form of
closure (see section 2.2.1).
Eshghi et al. (2015) model communicative feedback placement specifically in
terms of its grounding function. Operating in the incremental syntactic and semantic
framework ds-ttr—a combination of Dynamic Syntax (Kempson et al. 2001) and
Type Theory with Records (Cooper 2005)— they see feedback as a mechanism to
synchronise the grounding state between interlocutors. This state is represented as
two pointers, a ‘self ’ and an ‘other’ pointer, in the parser and generation context
graph, which is maintained by each interlocutor. From the speaker’s perspective, the
self-pointer incrementally proceeds with each word uttered, while the other-pointer
remains behind, at the latest position that is considered grounded. As soon as the
speaker encounters—positive— feedback (‘backchannels’; Eshghi et al. 2015) from the
listener, the other-pointer is moved to the frontmost position in the graph. Feedback is
furthermore associatedwith ds-ttr’s computational action ‘completion’, which is only
applicable at points of semantic completion (which accounts for appropriate feedback
placement). In addition, the point where listener feedback occurs may clarify which
of several possible interpretations a listener adopted (those that are complete at that
point of time) and thus helps to consolidate the graph of possible parses. Alternatively,
34. Interestingly, Schegloff (1982, p. 87f), discussing ‘“uh-huh” and other things that come in between
sentences’, states that such feedback signals, being of the type continuer, signal to the speaker that no repair
of the preceding ‘unit of talk’ is needed. Specific paralinguistically enriched realisations of these tokens,
however, can actually signal the need for repair (see, for example, the analysis in Uematsu [2000]).
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it shows that the listener is predicting an upcoming semantic completion (if feedback
occurs right before the completing words are uttered). In Eshghi and colleagues’ model,
whether and when to provide feedback is entirely decided by listeners, based on their
processing of the speaker’s speech and the conventionalised conversational function
of feedback that is assumed in the model.
Ideas from elicitation-cue driven models and listener-intention driven models
are combined in the dual-route feedback production model developed by Kopp et
al. (2008), see fig. 3.4. This model consists of a ‘deliberative’ route that analyses the
speaker’s language and multimodal behaviour, evaluates whether it can perceive and
understand what is said andmeant, maintains the result of this evaluation in a ‘listener
state’, and plans, generates, and produces feedback signals from the generic–specific
continuum (see the discussion of Bavelas et al. [2000] in section 3.4). Generic feedback
is produced in response to elicitation cues and does not necessarily take information
from the listener state into account. In contrast to this, specific feedback can also be
produced without an elicitation cue, e.g., when a problem in understanding arises.
Concurrently, the ‘reactive’ route of the model produces feedback signals that are on
lower levels of awareness (e.g., smiling, blushing; see section 3.4.3). The form of these
signals results from the listener’s emotional state (which is updated by appraisal of
events such as her interlocutor’s behaviour and the situation).
3.6 COMMUNICATIVE FEEDBACK IN ARTIFICIAL
CONVERSATIONAL AGENTS
Communicative listener feedback has been a topic in computational sciences such as
computational linguistics, artificial intelligence, and human–computer interaction.
Most research has been carried out on the question of how feedback behaviour can be
generated, i.e., in applications where the computer, in form of an artificial conversa-
tional agent, was supposed to produce communicative listener feedback in response
to users speaking to it. Within this broad topic, most work has focussed on timing of
feedback signals, as described in the previous section, but some work has focussed on
the form of feedback signals that the agent should produce.
Nakano et al. (1999) describe a dialogue system that incrementally translates user
utterances into a frame-based representation and produces feedback of different type
depending on the state of this representation.
Wang et al. (2013) present a model for the production of multimodal communicat-
ive feedback behaviour that is able to generate both generic as well as specific feedback
and takes into account the conversational agent’s role in the dialogue (e.g., is it the
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Figure 3.4: Dual-route architecture of the ‘feedback system’ for embodied conversa-
tional agents developed by Kopp et al. (2008, fig. 2, simplified). Using the ‘deliberate’
route (white arrows on dark grey background), the system plans, generates, and pro-
duces generic and specific feedback signals based on feedback elicitation cues as well
as its current ‘listening-related mental state’ (LS). Using the ‘reactive’ route (black
arrows on light grey background) the system concurrently produces feedback on a
low level of awareness, mainly based on its current emotional state (EMO), possibly
triggered by feedback elicitation cues.
addressee or merely a side participant) and its confidence in being able to understand
the ongoing utterance.
Bevacqua (2009) and Schröder et al. (2012) describe a variety of ‘sensitive artificial
listeners’ (SAL) with different personalities, that could provide multimodal feedback
in response to the spoken language and multimodal behaviours of their human inter-
locutors. The SAL-agents were able to detect multimodal feedback elicitation cues of
the user, based on which they then chose when to product feedback. The feedback
generation model was capable of producing feedback signals on different levels of
awareness, either purely reactive and neutral backchannel feedback or responsive
feedback with a communicative function (similar to those defined by Allwood et al.
[1992] and Kopp et al. [2008]). Which type of feedback got produced depended on
whether the agents’ model of mental state contained information that it deemed worth
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communicating to the interlocutor.
Mukai et al. (1999)model feedback production for a virtual conversational agent as
a dynamic system that describes a changing ‘desire’ for inserting feedback. Placement
and choice of modality (head gesture or verbal feedback expression) are decided upon
based on the agent’s internal desire level.
These systems take the artificial conversational agent’s cognitive or emotional state
into account when choosing feedback form. In contrast to this, Kawahara et al. (2016)
describe a model that makes choices based on features derived from the preceding
utterance of the interaction partner. They found in a corpus study that boundary
type as well as syntactic complexity of an utterance are predictors for specific types of
feedback expressions (e.g., complex syntax increases the likelihood of reduplication of
an expression) and learn a model that is rated more naturally than a random baseline
in a subjective evaluation study.
We now look at work that takes the opposite perspective on feedback processing:
artificial conversational agents that recognise and interpret communicative listener
feedback of their human interlocutors and react to it.
Dohsaka and Shimazu (1997) present an agent that generates utterances increment-
ally while simultaneously attending to interlocutor utterances, enabling immediate
reaction by re-planning output (changing the content of explanation), if necessary.
Nakano et al. (2003) present a simple probabilistic model for estimating groundedness
of its utterances based on verbal and non-verbal feedback acts of the interaction
partner, and for deciding how to proceed given this information (continue, elaborate,
or repeat). Reidsma et al. (2011) explore various aspects of conversational agents that
are able to produce feedback elicitation cues from their interlocutors, interpret their
interlocutors’ feedback, and adapt the timing of their communicative actions based
on this feedback.
A slightly different approach is taken by Garoufi et al. (2016), who present a
system that interactively takes its interaction partners’ gaze behaviour andmovements
into account when generating referring expressions and instructions for a direction-
giving task in a virtual environment. They could show that their adaptive system
outperformed a non-adaptive system and was able to avoid confusion of the human
interlocutor. The adaptive system was better in generating successful references and
could generate adaptations earlier. The type of feedback that this system processes is
different than in the agents described above because it is non-communicative (i.e.,
purely indicative). The focus of this work is on adaptive generation though, the model
of which is more complex than in the adaptation mechanisms in the three models
described above.
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There has, apparently, not been much work on feedback-adaptive artificial com-
putational agents. On the one hand this is surprising as the underlying ideas are not
new. Maclay and Newman (1960, p. 226), e.g., write
The differences in response to feedback are of considerable general in-
terest. Effective communication, in addition to requiring an accurate
perception of what the hearer is likely to understand, must involve a sens-
itivity to feedback. Is the speaker willing and able to alter his approach in
the face of failure to communicate?
Similarly, Krauss and Weinheimer (1966, pp. 343–344) state that
[. . . ] the model of a speaker as intent upon effecting some end state in
his listener, monitoring the listener’s behavior for indications of change
and adjusting his subsequent output on the basis of this information is
plausible [. . . ].
On the other hand, even though the models and agents described above are able to
establish a feedback loop (they perceive interlocutor feedback and react to it), they
are, scientifically, still at an early stage of modelling the problem (which the authors
acknowledge). On the interpretation side, the recognisers are not sophisticated enough
to be able to deal with the richness of the feedback phenomenon, which, given the
complexity of the recognition and classification task, is hardly surprising. More basic
research is need here. On the generation side, the adaptation choices of the agents
described above are limited to a small set of (usually fixed) alternatives—Garoufi
et al. (2016) is the exception. As will be discussed later on (section 6.2), some work on
adaptive natural language generation exists (usually quite application-driven), but the
general problem is also not yet understood well enough. Hence, more basic research
is needed here as well.
3.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Communicative feedback is a mechanism that listeners can use to provide ‘evidence
of understanding’ (Clark 1996) in dialogical interaction. In this chapter, we argued
that some properties of communicative feedback make it particularly suitable for this
task.
As described in section 3.3, listeners do not need to have or take the turn in order
to provide feedback. They can provide it any time, as soon as they consider it useful
or necessary. Similarly, speakers can quickly elicit feedback from their interaction
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partners without interrupting their speech or yielding the turn. Because of this, the
mechanism of communicative feedback is fast and allows speakers to incrementally
adapt their ongoing utterance.
We saw that this is possible because feedback is relatively unobtrusive: (i) it makes
extensive use of the non-verbal modalities, namely head gestures, facial expressions,
and gaze. It thus does not interfere with speakers’ linguistic processing. (ii) Verbal/vo-
cal feedback expressions, that may interfere with speech processing, are often non-lex-
ical, short, and prosodically similar to the speech context in which they occur. Because
of this, speakers are less likely to take feedback signals from their interlocutors as turn
taking attempts. Feedback does not just happen in the back channel conceptually, it is
literally kept away from the main track of communication.
In this chapter we argued that, despite being short and unobtrusive in form,
feedback signals are very expressive. This is the case because feedback signals are
– productive (a large number of discrete forms can be produced from a relatively
small set of base forms),
– multimodal (feedback signals often consist of coordinated behaviours on differ-
ent modalities),
– continuous (prosodic variation of feedback signals—verbal and non-verbal
alike— allow for the expression of qualitative and gradual differences), and
– contextually embedded (feedback signals interact with the dialogue context).
Because of these properties, the meaning of feedback signals (the speaker inten-
tion) is mostly non-conventionalised. A plain yeah or even an uh-huh—in a typical
back-channel position—might be regarded as conventional and can be processed
routinely. The ‘speaker meaning’ that the listener has in mind when producing a
complex multimodal feedback signal, one which is qualitatively loaded due to its
prosodic realisation, however, can only be understood using pragmatic reasoning and
may rely on embodied cognition.
Finally, we argued that communicative feedback is reflective of listeners’ mental
state with respect to language and dialogue processing. It indicates (or is used to signal)
whether listeners are in contact with speakers, whether they are able and willing to
perceive or understand what is being or has been said, whether they are able and
willing to accept the message, to agree with it, and what their attitude is towards it
(Allwood et al. 1992; Allwood, Cerrato et al. 2007). Furthermore, depending on its
prosodic realisation, its placement, or its timing, feedback may also be indicative of
the listeners’ uncertainty about their own mental state, their urgency for providing
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feedback, the importance of this feedback item, and more such qualifiers to its basic
communicative functions (Petukhova and Bunt 2010).
Because of these properties, listener feedback is a viable basis for estimating
groundedness and common ground. Since the communicative functions of listener
feedback reflect the interlocutor’s internal state, a somewhat detailed picture of the
interlocutor (and hence the dialogue) can be formed based on it. Especially the
latter two properties suggest that feedback facilitates a form of mentalising about the
cognitive state of the dialogue partner that goes beyond what is usually considered
groundedness.
Work on computational models of feedback interpretation, as well as models of
what to do with communicative listener feedback provided by human interlocutors
in human–agent dialogue, is sparse. And the approaches that exist are at a relatively
early stage of modelling the phenomenon and its role in dialogue.

PART II
A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
OF ATTENTIVE SPEAKING

CHAPTER 4
INTERACTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
FOR ATTENTIVE SPEAKING
In the introduction (section 1.2) we declared this thesis’ general objective to be an
investigation of how ‘interactional intelligence’ (Levinson 1995) can be modelled
computationally for artificial conversational agents and chose communicative listener
feedback as the specific subject of this research. Given the two preceding chapters 2
and 3 as background for this investigation, we will argue in this short chapter that
feedback is indeed an interesting and feasible choice for investigating interactional
intelligence.
The most fundamental insight we gained so far is that interlocutors in conversation
make meaning and establish joint understanding through interaction. New mean-
ing cannot be simply encoded in and decoded from an utterance, but needs to be
constructed through interaction. Consider the following example:
Starting from the established common ground between them, Susanne can con-
tribute new information by making an attempt to present it in such a way that Lothar
is likely able to understand and accept it. Lothar tries to infer what Susanne meant. If
he is certain that he understood Susanne, he can accept her presentation by providing
evidence of his understanding. Both can then update their common ground with this
contribution. If not, he signals that he has problems understanding her presentation,
(which itself is a presentation). Susanne then needs to understand Lothar’s presenta-
tion in order to infer which aspect of her presentation might have caused the problem.
She updates her representation of their common ground accordingly and can make a
new attempt in communicating the meaning she wants to contribute, making a new
presentation that is adapted in such a way Lothar is now likely able to understand and
☆ This chapter contains material previously published in Buschmeier and Kopp (2011).
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accept it. They engage in this collaborative interaction until Lothar can finally accept
Susanne’s presentation.
Through this process, their individual representations of their common ground
become more accurate, making it easier to contribute to the discourse in the future.
Interactional intelligence is needed at various points in such collaborativemeaning
making. In the speaking role, dialogue participants need to be able to (i) produce
utterances tailored to their addressees, (ii) interpret evidence of understanding from
their addressees, (iii) update their individual representation of the common ground,
and (iv) produce adapted utterances that take the updated common ground and/or
addressees’ evidence of understanding—or clarifying presentation— into account.
In the listening role/as an addressee, dialogue participants need to be able to (v) inter-
pret utterances from the speaker, (vi) update their individual representation of the
common ground, and (vii) produce helpful evidence of understanding, or clarific-
ation, to the speaker. We believe that the interactional intelligence that an artificial
conversational agent would need in order to be able to engage in such conversational
interactions is not yet feasible from a scientific and technical point of view, e.g., be-
cause some fundamental aspects of the process are not yet understood well enough to
be computationally modelled in sufficient detail.
We do belief, however, that we can conceptually and computationally model the
processes of interactional intelligence that are needed for an artificial conversational
agent that is limited to the role of the speaker, and limited to evidence of understanding
in the form of communicative listener feedback (in contrast to unrestricted utterances
that addressees can produce as acceptance, or clarifying presentation).
As argued in section 2.2.1, communicative listener feedback is a way of providing
evidence of understanding that is often sufficient in strength (Clark and Brennan 1991,
p. 224), but quickly produced because it is short and not subject to turn taking. The
timeliness with which feedback can be produced can give it an accuracy in pointing
out the source of a problem that may otherwise be difficult to articulate for listeners.
Feedback thus occupies a middle ground between expressiveness and costs of produc-
tion and interpretation of evidence of understanding, a property that benefits both
listeners and speakers.
Here, we argue that the meaning of feedback, though rich and expressive, is much
simpler to interpret than the meaning that unrestricted natural language utterances
can bear. It is certainly different from interpreting unrestricted utterances in that
it relies less on convention and compositional semantics and more on qualitative
properties. Similar to natural language, feedback meaning interacts with context—
and understanding feedback likely requires inference that takes context into account.
The important difference, however, is that the context for feedback interpretation is
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only the dialogue itself—perhaps even just the preceding (or ongoing) utterance it
refers to— , while the context for interpreting unrestricted natural language utterances
is, additionally, the extensive world knowledge of dialogue participants.This difference
makes utterance interpretation AI-complete (section 1.1) and, as we would argue,
feedback interpretation feasible.
Limiting our model of interactional intelligence to the speaker role is also a useful
simplification because the artificial conversational agent will have direct control over
the dialogue and can thus define the direction that it takes itself.35
Limiting evidence of understanding to communicative listener feedback also
makes the processes for updating the conversational agent’s representation of common
ground, and for adaptive language generation, more feasible from a conceptual and
computational point of view.
More concretely, the objective of this thesis is to model processes needed for an ability
that we name ‘attentive speaking’. In addition to being able to produce natural language
utterances, artificial conversational agents endowed with such processes, we call them
‘attentive speaker agents’,36 should be able to
(1) interpret communicative listener feedback from their human interlocutors,
taking the dialogue context into account, and
(2) adapt their ongoing and/or subsequent natural language utterances, paying
heed to their interlocutors’ needs—as inferred in (1).
In the introduction to this thesis (section 1.2), we already mentioned an addi-
tional property that specifically makes such agents ‘attentive’, namely a desire to be
understood by their interlocutors. This means that attentive speaker agents should
be willing to work towards being understood (sufficiently well for current purposes),
and to make extra efforts— if necessary— to achieve this. This desire plays a role in
(1) and (2), and additionally requires attentive speaker agents to
(3) invite feedback from their interlocutors by providing opportunities, or produ-
cing feedback elicitation cues, when needed.
35. This is probably the main reason why computational models of feedback production are often limited
to feedback timing. Producing meaningful feedback—which, in addition to timing, includes an informa-
tional intention, and the choice of an appropriate feedback form— in response to utterances of a human
interlocutor requires the ability to understand (possibly unrestricted) natural language.
36. The term was used by Reidsma et al. (2011), too.
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This part of the thesis, spells out, conceptually and computationally, three processes,
that address the requirements (1)–(3) for attentive speaker agents.
In chapter 5, we develop the process for interpreting evidence of understanding
(and other listening-relatedmental states, namely contact, perception, acceptance, and
agreement) in the form of communicative listener feedback provided concurrently
by the interlocutors in response to an agent’s ongoing behaviour. We frame this as
mentalising, or mental state attribution, a process in which the attentive speaker
agent theorises—using probabilistic inference— about the dynamic mental states of
understanding of its interlocutors. This process is a ‘minimal’ approach to mentalising
in that the resulting representation is simple and lightweight, yet more expressive
than the one-bit variables in the ‘minimal partner model’ theory (Galati and Brennan
2010; Brennan et al. 2010, see section 2.3.5). Since the model takes the agent’s dialogue
context into account, it embodies a computational probabilistic pragmatics approach
(Goodman and Frank 2016; Franke and Jäger 2016) to speaker (or rather listener)
meaning.
In chapter 6 we then develop the process for adaptive language generation on
different levels of processing (dialogue management, natural language generation,
speech synthesis) that takes the attributedmental state— and local common ground—
into account when making generation decisions.
Finally, in chapter 7, we develop a model of feedback elicitation based on the
attentive speaker agent’s needs. Based on this model, the agent can decide when and
how to produce behavioural cues that elicit communicative feedback.
How thesemodels are integrated into an actual attentive speaker agent is described
and evaluated later, in chapters 8 and 9 in part III of this thesis.
CHAPTER 5
MENTAL STATE ATTRIBUTION BASED ON
COMMUNICATIVE LISTENER FEEDBACK
In this chapter we develop a model for interpreting evidence of understanding (and
other listening-related mental states, namely contact, perception, acceptance, and
agreement) in the form of communicative listener feedback provided concurrently
by interlocutors in response to the ongoing behaviour of a speaker. We begin by
introducing the concepts of mental states and mentalising and, based on this, develop
a conceptual and computationalmodel.We first illustrate the feedback loop in dialogue
and describe it in terms of a causal model. We then develop a formal representation
of variables that correspond to listeners’ listening-related mental states (an ‘attributed
listener state’) and probabilistically model the interactions among these variables in a
Bayesian network. Following this, we extend the model, step-by-step, by modelling
the influences that properties of the feedback signal, information in the dialogue
context, and the temporal dimension of the dialogue exert on the attributed listener
state. We also show how the model can be used as a context-aware grounding criterion
in a computational theory of grounding. We finish the chapter by discussing the
theoretical merits, as well as limitations of our approach to interpreting andmodelling
communicative listener feedback.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The central idea pursued in this thesis is that processing of communicative feedback
in dialogue can be modelled as a form of ‘mentalising’. Mentalising is an important
concept in social cognition, defined to be a process for making inferences about
the mental states of other agents (Frith and Frith 2006, p. 531). A prerequisite for
☆ This chapter contains material previously published in Buschmeier and Kopp (2011; 2012; 2013; 2014).
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mentalising is that an agent has a ‘theory of mind’ (Premack and Woodruff 1978), that
is, the agent introspectively perceives that it possesses mental states itself and hence
believes that other agents, at least those that are similar, e.g., conspecifics, must possess
mental states as well. Based on its empirical insight into the relationship between its
own mental states and actions the agent can theorise about the mental states of other
agents, and, based on their actions, ‘attribute’ mental states to them. How exactly the
attribution and inference processes work in human cognition is a topic of ongoing
research and depends, inter alia, on the ‘category’ of mental state that is to be inferred.
Mental states are generally thought to fall into two types (Boghossian 2009):
There are ‘propositional attitudes’, such as beliefs, knowledge, intentions, fears, doubts,
etc., that refer to or are about something (i.e., they have content). And there are
‘phenomenal’ states, such as pain, thirst, sadness, uncertainty, perception of the colour
red, etc., that are identical to the quality of experiencing them, but are not about
something. Hybrids of the two types of mental states are possible as well (Pitt 2013,
§ 3). Propositional attitudes can be about mental states of the phenomenal type (Mary
believes that she sees a red rose) and mental states of the phenomenal type can be
caused by propositional attitudes (Mary experiences a feeling of certainty because she
knows that she knows everything about the colour red).
The most basic—perhaps trivial— assumption underlying the mentalising-based
approach to feedback processing that we develop in this chapter is that listeners
in dialogue have mental states that are specifically related to their task of listening.
Consider the following example. Talking about their afternoon plans, Ludwig perceives
that Sybille makes an utterance, he understands that she wants to visit the botanical
gardens and he agrees that it will be nice looking at some exemplars of Cephalanthera
damasonium.
Listening-related mental states are not limited to propositional attitudes, but can
be phenomenal (and hybrid) as well. Ludwig may for example have a feeling of non-
understanding that is the result of him not knowingwhat aCephalanthera damasonium
might be.37He may also feel generally positive as he usually enjoys afternoon activities
with Sybille, or he may be hesitant accepting Sybille’s suggestion as he does not like to
go outside when it is too warm.
It suggests itself that these listening-related mental states play a role in listeners’
feedback behaviours.38When Ludwig understands that Sybille is suggesting to visit the
37. Cephalanthera damasonium is the orchid species of the year 2017, chosen by the German ‘Arbeitskreise
Heimische Orchideen’.
38. Kopp et al.’s (2008) computational model of feedback generation for virtual agents (see section 3.5
and fig. 3.4) is based on this assumption. An agent’s capability to deal with a user utterance (is the agent
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botanical gardens, hemay signal his understanding with a head nod and his agreement
with an enthusiastic yeah. In this case Ludwigs’ feedback signals have an underlying
communicative intention. Being a cooperative interlocutor, he wants to inform Sybille
about his listening-related mental states. In other cases his feedback signals might
be purely indicative. A lengthened yeah could indicate that he is hesitant to accept
the suggestion and a puzzled facial expression could unwillingly indicate his non-
understanding of the term Spiranthes aestivalis. Here Ludwig’s listening-relatedmental
states become manifest in his behaviour even though he might not have intended to
communicate them.
Given this background, we propose that speakers, when perceiving conversational
feedback, reason about the listeners’ listening-related mental states that caused them
to produce their feedback behaviour. A computational model of this process will be
described in the following sections.
5.2 A CAUSAL MODEL OF THE INTERACTION
We set out by illustrating one iteration of the feedback loop between speaker and
listener in dialogue, see fig. 5.1, describing the model in the ‘causal network’ formalism
(Jensen and Nielsen 2007, pp. 22–27)39. Causal networks allow us to describe the
information flow (from cause to effect) in the model and are a subset of the formalism
that will later be used for the actual model—Bayesian networks.
Let us revisit the dialogue between Sybille and Ludwig described above. Sybille, the
speaker, produces an utterance in the presence of Ludwig, the listener, and is interested
in what Ludwig’s listening-related mental state towards her utterance turns out to be,
e.g., whether Ludwig is in contact, has perceived, understood, and accepts or agrees
with her utterance. As it is impossible for Sybille to directly observe Ludwig’s mental
states, she pays attention to his feedback behaviours and uses them as evidence in her
mentalising processes, inferring Ludwig’s mental states in a mental representation of
her own, which we call ‘attributed listener state’ (ALS).
When modelling this interaction in a causal network, we have to take, for the
moment, an observer perspective (instead of an agent-centric perspective). This per-
familiar with the words used? can it generate a coherent answer?) is mapped onto a simple representation
of ‘listener state’. This representation then informs the choices that are made in generating the agent’s
embodied feedback behaviours.
39. In a causal network, variables represent causes, effects or both, and directed links between variables
represent causality (Jensen and Nielsen 2007, pp. 22–27, 32–35). Consider, for example, a simple network
A → B → C. The directed link from variable A to variable B models that A is a cause for B, and that B
is an effect of A. The second directed link from B to the third variable C, makes B the cause of C. Being
intermediate, it is possible that B is both an effect (of A) and a cause (of C).
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Figure 5.1: Causal network of the feedback loop between speaker S and listener L in
dialogue. S’s utterances gives rise to specific listening-related mental states in L. These
cause L to provide feedback signals, which S uses as evidence when attributing mental
states to L.
spective unites both agents in a single network (variables and links unobservable to
Sybille are drawn with grey dashed lines in fig. 5.1).
The information flow in the network is as follows40: Sybille produces an utterance.
Ludwig perceives and processes this utterance, taking his current dialogue informa-
tion state (ISt , Larsson and Traum 2000), his expectations, and the communicative
situation into account. His speech and language understanding processes give rise
to specific listening-related mental states, which may subsequently be indicated, dis-
played, and signalled in his behaviour and actions. Sybille perceives these feedback
signals of Ludwig and forms hypotheses about listening-related mental states that
might have caused these behaviours. These hypotheses are represented in her attrib-
uted listener state, which she uses to update her dialogue information state (ISt+1) and
to formulate a subsequent utterance that may take Ludwig’s feedback into account.
This utterance closes the loop and creates the circularity of actions that is needed in a
feedback driven system (Ashby 1956), see section 3.1.
40. The temporal ordering of actions, as presented in the next paragraphs, is greatly simplified. As listener
feedback is produced concurrently to a speaker’s ongoing utterance the information needs to flow incre-
mentally (see e.g., section 8.4).
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This observer model can easily be reduced to an agent-centric model for Sybille
which consists of only those influences that she can observe directly (drawn with
black solid lines in fig. 5.1). Despite the resulting ‘gap’ in the causal chain, variables
retain their roles as causes and/or effects.
This causal model will provide the scaffolding of a more detailed model to be
presented next. Each variable is a mere place-holder for a complex network structure.
These sub-networks are constructed according to information that is available and
useful to model feedback processing in a speaker.
5.3 THE ATTRIBUTED LISTENER STATE (ALS)
Recall from section 3.4 that Allwood et al. (1992) hold the view that feedback in
dialogue is used to ‘exchange information about [a limited number of] basic com-
municative functions’ (ibid., pp. 2–3). They specify these to be contact, perception,
understanding, and attitudinal reactions. Kopp et al. (2008) extend this set by adding
acceptance/agreement (previously considered an attitudinal reaction) and by regard-
ing expressions of emotion as attitudinal reactions.
For our model we make the assumption that the type of listening-related mental
states of a listener in dialogue correspond (one-to-one) to the basic communicative
functions expressed through feedback. Feedback that communicates information
about the basic communicative function ‘understanding’, for example41, is grounded
in a listener’s mental state of being willing and able to ‘understand’. Assuming a hybrid
mental state that combines the propositional attitude ‘belief ’ with the phenomenal
state ‘understanding’, we can express this in modal epistemic logic42 as
BL(u),
whereB is the belief operator, L is the agent, andu an atomic formula, here representing
the phenomenal mental state understanding, that the agent believes it is in.
A listener may, however, not just be in either a state of full understanding or
complete non-understanding. Understanding is not bipolar, but a gradual quality. It
41. In development of the model, we will, at first, focus on the basic communicative function and mental
state ‘understanding’ only. The other functions and listening-related mental states (contact, perception,
acceptance, and agreement) are modelled analogously, but omitted for clarity of presentation.
42. The syntax of modal epistemic logic for reasoning about knowledge and belief simply extends the
syntax of propositional logic with modal operators for knowledge (K) and belief (B) and adds the syntactic
rule that if φ is a formula, then Kφ and Bφ are formulae as well (Halpern 2003, pp. 244–245, 291). In systems
of multiple agents— such as a listener and a speaker— , a subscript on a modal operator indicates which
agent it refers to, e.g., B iφ is read as ‘agent i believes that φ’.
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can lie in between the two extremes. Feedback is rich enough in its form to express such
qualifying information (see section 3.7; Petukhova and Bunt [2010]). In our model,
we support this qualification by allowing atomic formulae of the form U = u, where
U is a variable representing the listener’s mental state of understanding and Val(U)
the finite, non-empty set of values U can take (Milch and Koller 2000), e.g., grades of
understanding (see section 2.1.4 and fig. 2.1). If, e.g., Val(U) = {low,medium,high}
and a listener L believes her grade of understanding to be high, we write
BL(U = high).
For practical reasons, we have chosen ternary grading (low—medium— high) for
our model, but models with more grades (e.g., quinary grading with additional grades
medium-low andmedium-high), or continuous grading (q ∈ (︀0 . . 1⌋︀) would have been
possible as well. Importantly, we do not imply that a human listener’s phenomenal
state of understanding is ternary.
The ‘attributed listener state’ is a representation of a speaker’s reconstruction of a
listener’s representation of her listening-related mental states. It is therefore identically
structured, that is, it represents the same categories of mental states43. If the speaker
inferred from a listener’s feedback behaviour that her understanding is high, we can
say that the speaker believes that the listener believes that her understanding is high,
i.e.,
BS(BL(U = high)). (5.1)
The mental state attribution process of the speaker is not a direct mapping from
signal to meaning and neither is the feedback production process in the listener.
Feedback signals are not symbolic or well defined, and, as described in section 3.7,
they are conventionalised to a much lesser degree than other parts of speech, both on
the form and function/meaning side. A reason for this is that they are very expressive.
The abilities of feedback to convey graduation and uncertainty further contribute to
this. It is thus clear that the mental state attribution process of the speaker has to deal
with uncertainty.
Under uncertainty, a belief of the speaker concerning the mental state of the
listener, such as the belief that the listener believes that her understanding is high (eq.
[5.1]), becomes a matter of ‘degree’. Such a subjective ‘degree of belief ’ (or ‘credence’)
43. We primarily make the assumption that the speaker’s ALS and the listener’s listening-related mental
states have an identical structure for practical reasons. But even from a theoretical perspective this decision
does not seem implausible. Presuming that theory of mind develops (ontogenetically) by introspectively
discovering the possession of mental states and then forming the belief that other agents must have mental
states as well it seems reasonable that agents expect others to have identical—or at least very similar—
categories of mental states. The content of these mental states is very likely not identical, though.
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can be regarded as the confidence that an agent has in an object of belief being true at
a certain point of time (Huber 2009, pp. 1–2).
Degrees of belief are predominantly modelled as subjective probabilities that can
be formalised in the mathematical framework of probability theory (ibid., p. 4). If an
agent is certain about the truth of an object of belief, it assigns a subjective probability
of θ = 1 to it. Conversely, an object of belief that the agent considers to be false is
assigned a subjective probability of θ = 0. If an agent is uncertain about the truth of
an object of belief, i.e., when it only beliefs in its truth to a certain degree, it assigns
a probability of θ ∈ (︀0 . . 1⌋︀. The specific subjective probability that agents assign to
an object of belief 44 is based on the evidence in favour (and/or against) its truth that
they have encountered, possibly in combination with a priori information.
We adopt a subjective probability-based degree of belief approach for modelling
a speaker’s uncertain belief in the listener’s belief in her level of understanding. In
this framework, we denote the speaker’s belief that the listener believes that her
understanding is high (eq. [5.1]) as
bS(BL(U = high)) = θ
with θ ∈ (︀0 . . 1⌋︀ being the subjective probability assigned to the specific object of
belief (note the use of lower case bS instead of BS to indicate a belief of a belief).
To have a proper probability theoretic model, we define BL(U) to be a discrete
random variable that returns a listener’s belief in having a certain categorial level45 of
understanding (u ∈ Val(BL(U))). We can then get the probability θ of a specific level
44. In theory— assuming rational agents— the degree of belief/subjective probability is objectively meas-
urable with a ‘betting analysis’ (Hájek 2012, § 3.3.2):
[An agent’s] degree of belief in [an object of belief] E is p iff p units of utility is the price at
which [it] would buy or sell a bet that pays 1 unit of utility if E, 0 if not E.
45. Given a discrete probability space (Ω,Pr), a discrete random variable X is a function from the sample
space Ω to a set of values X. Its range {X(ω) ⋃︀ ω ∈ Ω} is named XX (Krengel 2005, p. 42). In general, X is
often defined to be R or a countable subset thereof. For the current purpose, however, it is most useful to use
a finite set of named categorial states (e.g., Val(X) = {low,medium, high}). ¶When needed, an underlying
mapping from the elements of this set to real numbers, such as (low,medium, high)T ↦ (−1, 0, 1)T , can
easily be created.
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(e.g., BL(U = high)) from its probability distribution46 PrBL(U).
θ = bS(BL(U = high)) = PrBL(U)(high) (5.2)
Above, on page 86, we argued for a graded representation of the listener’s mental
state, e.g., that she believes her level of understanding to be either low,medium, or
high. We take these three levels to be the values of the random variable BL(U), i.e.,
Val(BL(U)). It is important to note that this model of the listener’s mental state
implies that her belief to be in a specific level of understanding is certain and crisp.
Uncertainty about the listener’s belief is only modelled on the side of the speaker. The
listener’s uncertainty, as perceived by the speaker, is modelled in a separate variable
(see section 5.4) and is incorporated into the attribution process.
The speaker’s belief state— the representation of his degree of belief in all possible
worlds (Russell and Norvig 2010, p. 480)— about the listener’s mental state of under-
standing is therefore the marginal distribution PrBL(U)(u), with u = (low,medium,
high)T and ∑u∈u PrBL(U)(u) = 1. A distribution of, e.g., PrBL(U)(u) = (0.052, 0.418,
0.53)T , where almost all probability mass is distributed across themedium and high
levels of understanding, means that the speaker is fairly certain that the listener’s level
of understanding is either high ormedium, with a low subjective probability that the
listener’s level of understanding is low.
When a coarser view on the speaker’s belief state is sufficient, we can look at the
skewness47 of the distribution. If the probability distribution is skewed towards high,
that is, its skewness is γ1 < 0, we can simply say that the speaker beliefs BL(U) is high.
Similarly for a distribution skewed towards low (γ1 > 0).
As stated in fn. 41, a speaker’s belief state of the listener’s belief in being in the
other phenomenal listening-relatedmental states (contact, perception, acceptance, and
agreement) is modelled analogously to understanding. Thus, the speaker’s complete
46. The distribution of a discrete random variable X specifies the probabilities of specific values x ∈ XX . It
corresponds to the probability measure function PrX : XX → (︀0 . . 1⌋︀, which is defined in terms of the sum
of the probability masses Pr(ω), ω ∈ Ω, that X maps to x (Krengel 2005, p. 42):
PrX(x) = Pr(X = x) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) = x}) = ∑{ω∈Ω⋃︀X(ω)=x}Pr(ω).
47. The skewness γ1 of a discrete random variable X is defined as
γ1 = EPr(︀(X − EPr(︀X⌋︀)3⌋︀⌈︂
VarPr(︀X⌋︀3 ,
with expectation EPr(︀X⌋︀ = ∑x x ⋅ PrX(x) and variance VarPr(︀X⌋︀ = EPr(︀X2⌋︀ − (EPr(︀X⌋︀)2 . See fn. 45
concerning numerical values of x (needed for the computation of expectation) when dealing with discrete
categorial random variables.
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Figure 5.2: Example of the attributed listener state (data from the third worked example
presented in Buschmeier and Kopp [2012b, fig. 3]). Each facet shows a comb plot of
the belief state of one of the variables X ∈ ALS, i.e., the distribution of subjective
probability PrBL(X) over its values low (+ / ),medium (- / ), and high (/ / ).
representation of attributed listener state ALS is modelled as a set of five discrete
random variables
ALS = {C, P,U ,AC,AG} (5.3)
representing the graded ‘beliefs’ of a speaker that a listener beliefs to be in con-
tact (BL(C)), whether a listener is willing and able to perceive (BL(P)), understand
(BL(U)), accept (BL(AC)), and agree (BL(AG)). For brevity of notation, we write U
instead of BL(U), P instead of BL(P), and so forth.
Notably the model implies that speakers simultaneously maintain beliefs about
all five of the listener’s listening-related mental states at any point in time. Figure 5.2
visualises the distributions over the individual variables of a concrete attributed listener
state (taken from Buschmeier and Kopp [2012b]). In this state, the distribution of the
speaker’s degrees of belief in the listener’s understanding are PrBL(U)(u) = (0.01, 0.49,
0.5)T , which means that the speaker is uncertain whether the listener’s understanding
is medium or high, but certain that it is not low. At the same time, the degrees of
belief concerning the listener’s mental state of perception—PrBL(P)(p) = (0.01, 0.29,
0.7)T —clearly peaks on perception being high. The other three variables can be
interpreted similarly.
This way of modelling a speaker’s belief state provides amulti-layered and nuanced
view on a listener’s listening-related mental states.
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The basic communicative functions of feedback are neither independent nor on the
same level. They are related to each other, forming a hierarchy with contact at its lowest
end, followed by perception, understanding, and ending in acceptance and agreement
at the top. From a theoretical perspective, these relationships are governed by two
major factors: the property of upward completion (Clark 1996)48 and the cooperative
principle (Grice 1957)— see section 3.4. As illustrated in fig. 3.3 (page 60), positive
feedback on a level L i entails successful processing on lower levels L i−1 to L⊥ and
implicates a problem in the next higher level L i+1. Conversely, negative feedback on a
level L i entails problems in processing on all higher levels L i+1 to L⊤ and implicates
successful processing on the preceding lower level L i−1.
Based on the argument that feedback functions correspond to underlying mental
states, we assume such a relation to be present among the variables of the attributed
listener state as well. Accordingly, receiving feedback of high understanding should—
in addition to influencing ALS-variable U —also have an influence on ALS-variables
corresponding to lower levels of processing, namely P and C and on the variables
of the next higher level, AC and AG. Assuming strong upward completion, high
understanding feedback would result—due to the entailment relationship— in the
definite belief of perception and contact being high as well, i.e., the ALS-variables
P and C would have the degenerate distribution PrP(p) = PrC(c) = (0, 0, 1)T . The
more plausible assumption of weak upward completion, and an uncertain entailment
relationship, would result in distributions of degrees of belief of perception and contact
that are skewed towards high.
As the implicatures of feedback are uncertain per se49 feedback of high under-
standing would result in distributions of degrees of belief of acceptance and agreement
that are skewed towards low.
One way to capture these relationships between the random variables of the ALS
would be to define— i.e., specify by hand or learn from data— their joint probability
distribution
PrALS(C, P,U ,AC,AG),
which, in general, is not feasible for more than a few variables.50 A more compact
representation of the relationships between variables makes use of independence
48. From a cognitive point of view, Clark’s (1996) property of upward completion is likely too strong.
In section 3.4 we argued for a weaker form of upward completion in which the resulting entailment
relationships are merely default implications (Allwood 2000) and therefore uncertain and defeasible.
49. A speaker cannot be sure that a listener means what is implicated and a listener cannot be sure that a
speaker infers what is implicated (Bach 2006, p. 23).
50. The discrete joint probability distribution for a set X of random variables consists of∏X∈X ⋃︀Val(X)⋃︀
parameters. This number grows exponentially with the number of variables described. ¶With five variables
and three values each PrALS has ⋃︀Val(C)⋃︀ ⋅ ⋃︀Val(P)⋃︀ ⋅ ⋃︀Val(U)⋃︀ ⋅ ⋃︀Val(AC)⋃︀ ⋅ ⋃︀Val(AG)⋃︀ = 35 = 243
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properties, especially conditional independence51.
We identify such independencies among the ALS-variables on theoretical grounds.
According to the property of upward completion—and the entailment relationships
that follow from it— a variable representing a level of processing L i depends on the
variables representing its immediate neighbouring levels. Given positive feedback it
influences its predecessor L i−1. Given negative feedback it influences its successor L i+1.
It also influences its next but one neighbours L i−2 and L i+2 . This influence, however,
is not direct but conditioned on its immediate neighbours. Based on this, we assume
that a variable on level L i is conditionally independent of all other variables given the
variables on its immediate neighbour levels L i−1 and L i+1:(L i upmodels L⊥ upmodels . . . upmodels L i−2 upmodels L i+2 upmodels . . . upmodels L⊤ ⋃︀ L i−1, L i+1). (5.4)
This includes that, when multiple variables L ia , . . . , L ik exist on the same level of
processing, these are conditionally independent from each other given a variable on
the preceding level L i−152 (L i j upmodels L i1 , . . . , L ik ⋃︀ L i−1). (5.5)
We assume that the five ALS-variables lie on four levels of processing. C is on
the first level, P on the second level, U on the third level, and AC and AG are both
on the fourth level. Applying eqs. (5.4) and (5.5) to the ALS-variables yields a set of
independence assertions
IALS = { (C upmodels U ,AC,AG ⋃︀ P), (5.6a)(P upmodels AC,AG ⋃︀ U), (5.6b)(U upmodels C ⋃︀ P), (5.6c)(AC upmodels C, P,AG ⋃︀ U), (5.6d)(AG upmodels C, P,AC ⋃︀ U) }. (5.6e)
parameters. Even if defining values for these parameters might still be considered feasible, it becomes
virtually impossible once more variables are added to the model (see below, especially section 5.5, and
appendix A).
51. Random variables X1 , . . . , Xn are ‘marginally independent’, iff Pr(X1 = x1 , . . . , Xn = xn) =∏ni=1 Pr(X i = x i), for all (x1 , . . . , xn) ∈ Val(X1) × . . . ×Val(Xn). We write (X1 upmodels . . . upmodels Xn). ¶ They are
‘conditionally independent’ of a random variable Y , iff Pr(X1 = x1 , . . . , Xn = xn ⋃︀ Y = y) =∏ni=1 Pr(X i =
x i ⋃︀Y = y), for all (x1 , . . . , xn , y) ∈ Val(X1)× . . .×Val(Xn)×Val(Y). We write (X1 upmodels . . . upmodels Xn ⋃︀ Y). Note
that marginal and conditional independence is a symmetric property, i.e., (X1 upmodels X2)⇔ (X2 upmodels X1) and(X1 upmodels X2 ⋃︀ Y)⇔ (X2 upmodels X1 ⋃︀ Y).
52. This is the only case relevant here. In general, independence assertions are more complex with multiple
variables on a level (see Koller and Friedman 2009, pp. 70–71), especially when there is a subsequent level
L i+1 , or when multiple variables exist on neighbouring levels, too.
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These independence assertions can now be used to find a more compact repres-
entation of the joint probability distribution of the attributed listener state model.
Using the chain rule of conditional probabilities53, PrALS(C, P,U ,AC,AG) can be
decomposed into a product of conditional probabilities, for example,
PrALS(C, P,U ,AC,AG) = Pr(C) ⋅ Pr(P ⋃︀ C) ⋅
Pr(U ⋃︀ C, P) ⋅ Pr(AC ⋃︀ C, P,U) ⋅ Pr(AG ⋃︀ C, P,U ,AC), (5.7)
which can be further simplified by considering the asserted independencies IALS.
Applying the independence assertion eq. (5.6c) to the factor Pr(U ⋃︀ C, P) in eq. (5.7)
yields Pr(U ⋃︀ P). Similarly, applying eq. (5.6d) to Pr(AC ⋃︀ C, P,U) yields Pr(AC ⋃︀ U),
and an application of eq. (5.6e) to Pr(AG ⋃︀ C, P,U ,AC) yields Pr(AG ⋃︀ U). The
joint probability distribution can thus be expressed as a product of five conditional
probability distributions
PrALS(C, P,U ,AC,AG) = Pr(C) ⋅ Pr(P ⋃︀ C) ⋅
Pr(U ⋃︀ P) ⋅ Pr(AC ⋃︀ U) ⋅ Pr(AG ⋃︀ U), (5.8)
one for each of the random variables in the ALS model. This factorised model is much
easier to specify. The probability distribution of each ALS-variable is only conditioned
on the variable of its preceding level and it consists of much fewer parameters than
the full joint probability distribution54.
In order to be able to reason computationally with the ALS-model, we can repres-
ent it in form of a graphical probabilistic model, a declarative representation which
provides data structures and allows for the application of various reasoning algorithms
to these data structures. The specific model developed above can be represented as a
Bayesian Network55 (Pearl 1988; Koller and Friedman 2009) with the graph structure
shown in fig. 5.3.
53. Following the ‘chain rule’ of conditional probabilities, any joint probability distribution Pr(X1 , . . . , Xn)
can be decomposed into a product of conditional probabilities as follows:
Pr(X1 , . . . , Xn) = Pr(X1) ⋅ Pr(X2 ⋃︀ X1) ⋅ . . . ⋅ Pr(Xn ⋃︀ X1 , . . . , Xn−1).
It should be noted that different decompositions—all valid— follow depending on the ordering of the
random variables X1 , . . . , Xn .
54. As joint probability distributions, conditional probability distributions Pr(X1 ⋃︀X2 . . . , Xn) for a set X
of random variables consist of∏X∈X ⋃︀Val(X)⋃︀ parameters. Since conditional probability distributions are
independent, the number of parameters of a factored probability distribution is the sum of parameters of
its factors. ¶ Our specific factorisation of the model of the relationships among ALS-variables reduces the
number of parameters to 31 + 32 + 32 + 32 + 32 = 39 (from 243 for the unfactorised model, see fn. 50).
55. A Bayesian Network is a directed acyclic graph whose structure encodes the dependencies and in-
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Figure 5.3: Bayesian network representation of the ALS-model (BNALS). The net-
work encodes the set of independence assertions IALS, eq. (5.6), and the factorised
distribution PrALS(C, P,U ,AC,AG), eq. (5.8).
Could the result of the derivation above have been a Bayesian network with a
different graph structure, e.g., one where the edges point in the opposite direction,
BN ′ALS : C ← P ← U ← (︀AC,AG⌋︀? The set of independence assertions IALS,
eq. (5.6), is consistent with the structure C ← P ← U , given a different decomposition
of PrALS(C, P,U ,AC,AG) according to the chain rule. AC and AG, however, were
connected to U in the ‘v-structure’ AC → U ← AG (they have U as a common effect),
which makes them marginally independent, or conditionally dependent given U
(see fn. 52). Because of this v-structureBN ′ALS lies in a different ‘I-equivalence class’
(Koller and Friedman 2009, pp. 77–78, def. 3.9, thm. 3.7) thanBNALS. It is thus not
possible, given IALS, to factorise PrALS(C, P,U ,AC,AG) in such a way that local
probabilistic models for Pr(AC) and Pr(AG) result.
The networkBN ′′ALS : C ← P ← U → (︀AC,AG⌋︀, however, would be an alternative
I-equivalent structure and the question is of course whether this network structure
would make a difference for the actual ALS-model. As Bayesian networks with I-
equivalent structures can represent the same probability distribution, there is no
principal difference between BNALS and BN ′′ALS, i.e., the directionality of edges
in I-equivalent Bayesian networks does not matter (ibid., p. 77)— at least for their
expressiveness. The difference is rather one of consistency—why should the direction
of edges differ between L2 and L3, and L3 and L4?— and of the perspective on the
dependencies of a probability distribution Pr. The nodes of the graph represent the random variables of
the distribution. The structure of the graph is such that each node X i is conditionally independent of its
non-descendant nodes NdX i given its parent nodes PaX i , i.e., (X i upmodels NdX i ⋃︀ PaX i ) (Koller and Friedman
2009, def. 3.1, p. 57). Each node X i has an associated local probabilistic model Pr(X i ⋃︀ PaX i ) which is one
of the conditional probability distributions of the factorised distribution.
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problem at hand that themodel embodies.BNALS takes a ‘causal’ perspective whereas
BN ′′ALS would partially take an ‘evidential’ perspective (Koller and Friedman 2009,
pp. 69–70).
The interpretation of the network’s interaction according to the causal view are
that the degree of successful processing on higher levels is an effect of the degree
of successful processing on lower levels. This view explains upward entailment of
negative feedback well (problems in perception cause, i.e., likely result in, problems in
understanding). According to the evidential view, on the other hand, the interpretation
is that the degree of successful processing on higher levels is evidence for the degree
of successful processing on lower levels.
We now analyse an example parametrisation of the attributed listener state network
BNALS56 with the following, manually created, local probabilistic models, in form of
tabular conditional probability distributions (‘conditional probability tables, CPTs’)57
Pr(C) = ⎨⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎪
1⁄3
1⁄3
1⁄3
⎬⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎮ , Pr(P ⋃︀ C) = Pr(U ⋃︀ P) =
⎨⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎪
0.8 0.2 0.1
0.15 0.7 0.3
0.05 0.1 0.6
⎬⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎮ ,
Pr(AC ⋃︀ U) = Pr(AG ⋃︀ U) = ⎨⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎪
0.8 0.2 1⁄3
0.15 0.6 1⁄3
0.05 0.2 1⁄3
⎬⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎮ .
(5.9)
The local probabilistic model for variable C is chosen so that the speaker’s belief state
of the listener’s grade of contact Pr(C) is uniformly distributed58. The model for
variable U , Pr(U ⋃︀ P), is chosen so that if P is believed to be low, the distribution of
U is heavily skewed towards low. This is weak upward completion. If P is believed to
be medium, the distribution of U is centred on medium with a slight skew towards
low. If P is believed to be high, the distribution of U is skewed toward high but less
so than is the case if P = low. The motivation for these two choices is that, from a
causal perspective, lower grades of success of P have a stronger and more certain
effect upward than higher grades of success (whose upward effect is more uncertain).
The same model holds for Pr(P ⋃︀ C), but not for Pr(AC ⋃︀ U) and Pr(AG ⋃︀ U) as
acceptance and agreement are rather evaluative than processing-related. Given that
U is believed to be low, the distribution of AC/AG is skewed towards low as in the
56. A machine readable specification of the example model, in ‘Bayesian network interchange format’
(XBIF, Cozman et al. 1998), is archived and available at doi: 10.6084/m9.figshare.3827277 .
57. With a ij = Pr(X = Val(X)i ⋃︀ Y = Val(Y) j) for each element a ij in the tabular representation of the
conditional probability distribution Pr(X ⋃︀ Y). ¶ Given that Val(U) = Val(P) = {low,medium, high},
Pr(U ⋃︀ P)31 = 0.05 in eq. (5.9) is the conditional probability Pr(U = high ⋃︀ P = low).
58. The reason for this choice is that the model is in a stage where no feedback has been presented as
evidence to the model yet.
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Figure 5.4: Influence of P on the belief states of the other ALS-variables C,U ,AC,AG.
Given a Bayesian network as in fig. 5.3 with the example conditional probability
distributions from eq. (5.9), posteriormarginals are computed in four settings: In (i) no
evidence is specified, in (ii)–(iv) P is asserted to be low,medium, or high, respectively
(marked ). Facets show the degree of belief in one value— low (+ / ),medium (- / ),
and high (/ / )—of one ALS-variable.
models above. Acceptance and agreement presuppose understanding and are very
likely low given problems in understanding. If U is believed to bemedium, or high,
however, it remains more uncertain what AC and AG could be.
Figure 5.4 shows how relations between variables play out in the example model
in four settings. Evidence is set and the marginal distributions of all ALS-variables
are computed59. In setting (i), which serves as a reference, only variable C contains
59. Bayesian network inference in this thesis is based on the joint-tree algorithm using elimination trees,
as described in Darwiche (2009, §§ 7.1–7.6). Inference is done with the primo package for probabilistic
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evidence (its initial marginal distribution). Being uniformly distributed, the belief
state for C is maximally uncertain. The other variables are skewed towards low.
In settings (ii)–(iv) hard ‘evidence’ for variable P is specified.60 An immediate
observation is that all variables are correlated with each other. In setting (ii), where P
is set to low, i.e., Pr(P)↤ (1, 0, 0), the belief in the other variables being low as well
is dominant. Similarly in settings (iii) and (iv). When P is set tomedium or high, the
subjectively most probable beliefs for the other variables aremedium or high as well.61
BNALS captures weak upward completion based entailment, but overgeneralises
into both directions, where, depending on the polarity of perceived feedback, upper-
bounding implicata of the feedback signal, which result from the cooperative principle
(see section 3.4 and fig. 3.3), should fence off variables from one of the directions.
The relationship among the five ALS-variables is, however, not the right place to
model the influence of these potential implicata. The variables represent a speaker’s
multidimensional attributed mental state and not a specific feedback signal that was
perceived and caused the speaker to attribute this mental state in the first place. Once
a feedback signal has been received and has informed the attributed mental state, this
state might become subject to inferential processes of its own, that is, independent
from feedback signals (for example inferences concerning the temporal dynamics of
the listeners mental state in the absence of feedback, see section 5.7.3).
Having presented the general ideas andmodelling decisions underlying theBayesian
network model of attributed listener state, we will turn to the effect of perceived feed-
back signals on the five variables inBNALS in the next section.
5.4 FEEDBACK AND ATTRIBUTED LISTENER STATE
Feedback signals carry information about the listener’s mental state and are the source
of evidence in the attribution process. They constitute the interface between the
listener’s listening-related mental state and the five variables of the speaker’s attributed
listener state. This interfacing point is the place where it makes sense to model the
upper-bounding implicata of a perceived feedback signal.
inference (available at https://purl.org/scs/PRIMO).
60. The purpose of this is purely illustrative. The five ALS-variables do not represent directly observable
events but are the reconstruction of an interlocutor’s hidden state. In the actual model they will not be set
to definite values.
61. The degree values among variables differ though. This is mainly due to the specific local probabilistic
models of the variables, but, importantly, also due to their distance to P. The effect of a belief on one level
of processing on a variable on a different level of processing gets weaker depending on their distance (in
levels).
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We design the interface as a random variable FB that extendsBNALS and repres-
ents a perceived feedback signal in terms of its communicative function62 (contact
perception, understanding, acceptance, agreement) and polarity (positive, negative).
Each combination of function and polarity is one value FB can take63:
Val(FB) = {c−, c+, p−, p+,u−,u+, ac−, ac+, ag−, ag+}. (5.10)
It is obvious that the five core variables of the attributed listener state are dependent
on the type of feedback perceived. This changes the independence structure IALS,
eq. (5.6), to
IALS′ = { (C upmodels U ,AC,AG ⋃︀ P,FB),(P upmodels AC,AG ⋃︀ U ,FB),(U upmodels C ⋃︀ P,FB), (5.11)(AC upmodels C, P,AG ⋃︀ U ,FB),(AG upmodels C, P,AC ⋃︀ U ,FB) },
— the only difference is that the variable FB is added as a dependency to each local
probabilistic model—with the help of which we can derive the factorised probability
distribution
PrALS′(C, P,U ,AC,AG,FB) = Pr(FB) ⋅ Pr(C ⋃︀ FB) ⋅ Pr(P ⋃︀ C,FB) ⋅
Pr(U ⋃︀ P,FB) ⋅ Pr(AC ⋃︀ U ,FB) ⋅ Pr(AG ⋃︀ U ,FB), (5.12)
which translates to the Bayesian networkBNALS′ with the graph structure shown in
fig. 5.5.
The local probabilistic models for the variables, e.g., the model for Pr(U ⋃︀ P,FB)
for the variableU , nowmodel both the interactionwith the variable P on the preceding
level of processing as well as the interaction with the perceived feedback signal.
62. This modelling decision assumes that raw feedback signals can be reliably classified according to their
communicative function even before they enter the attribution process, ideally based only on acoustic and
lexical properties (and comparable properties for non-verbal feedback signals) that are objectively measur-
able. This, however, is currently not possible. Such classification/annotation tasks are quite challenging to
do reliably even for human observers, even if trained, and even if communicative context is available to
them (Geertzen et al. 2008; Malisz et al. 2016). In a significant effort Neiberg et al. (2013) could identify
prosodic features in productive feedback expressions that correlate with some communicative functions of
feedback (in Swedish). It is, however, unclear whether their research, based on careful manual analysis, can
be easily implemented as a pattern recognition system.
63. Exactly one of these values is presented as evidence to the model at a time. The hierarchical relations
among these values are specified in the local probabilistic models.
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Figure 5.5: Bayesian network representation of the ALS-model with feedback influence
(BNALS′). This model extendsBNALS (fig. 5.3, on page 93) with a random variable
FB that represents the perceived feedback signal in terms of its function and polarity.
The network encodes the set of independence assertions IALS′ , eq. (5.11), and the
factorised distribution PrALS′(C, P,U ,AC,AG,FB), eq. (5.12).
This makes specifying the local probabilistic models of this Bayesian network
more difficult than specifying the models of the core ALS networkBNALS (as in, e.g.,
eq. [5.9]). As the graph has a higher density and the added variable FB is ten-valued,
the resulting factorised conditional probability distribution consists of 400 (instead
of 39, see fn. 54) parameters, a more than ten-fold increase.
Unfortunately, the models ofBNALS cannot be easily reused and extended for
BNALS′ . For example, each entry in the conditional probability table Pr(U ⋃︀ P)—
that is, each individual probability Pr(U = Val(P)i ⋃︀ P = Val(P) j)—is subdivided
into ten probabilities in Pr(U ⋃︀ P,FB), one for each element in Val(FB). The way
they are subdivided differs depending on the assignment of values to U and P. This
makes the conditional probability tables-based representations non-modular so that
all parameters need to be specified anew. Due to the large number of parameters, it is
difficult not to lose track of the big picture and to make consistent choices such that
they are replicable and explainable— that is, not arbitrary.
We approach this problem by specifying ‘implicit representations’ (Koller and
Friedman 2009, p. 158) of the local probabilistic models from which the tabular condi-
tional probability distributions can be generated algorithmically64. This allows for a
64. Appendix A, section A.2, describes the approach, representation, and algorithm in detail. Section A.3
contains an example of the implicit representation and generation of the local probabilistic model and
conditional probability table Pr(U ⋃︀ P,FB).
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Table 5.1: One-dimensional influence vectors δX(FBi) for each Val(FB) and each
local probabilistic model inBNALS′ , eq. (5.12). The assignment of δP(FBu−) = 0.7 for
the local probabilistic model Pr(P ⋃︀ C,FB), for example, means that receiving negative
feedback of understanding has a positive influence of strength 0.7 (δ ∈ (︀−1 . . 1⌋︀) on the
variable P. That is, negative feedback of understanding has the effect that perception
is believed to be positive (or skewed towards high).
Level L1 L2 L3 L4
Val(FB) = c− c+ p− p+ u− u+ ac− ac+ ag− ag+
L1 δC(FBi) −1 .9 .8 .95 .8 .95 .8 .95 .8 .95
L2 δP(FBi) −.9 −.5 −1 .7 .7 .8 .7 .8 .7 .8
L3 δU(FBi) −1 −.8 −.9 −.8 −1 .7 .7 .8 .8 .8
L4 δAC(FBi) −.9 −.6 −.8 −.9 −.1 −.9 −1 1 −.5 .5
δAG(FBi) −.9 −.9 −.9 −.8 −.9 −.3 −.5 .3 −1 1
specification of the models with much fewer parameters— and in a modular way.
Table 5.1 shows part of the implicit representationBNALS′ , namely the specific-
ation of the values δX(FBi) which model the influence that the variable FB exerts
on the ALS-variables X ∈ PrALS′ .65 The values in the table are specified such that a
variable X on the level of processing L j is positively influenced by feedback signals of
a communicative function that is of either positive polarity and on the same level L j ,
or of any polarity and on a higher levels Lk (with k > j). X is influenced negatively
when the perceived feedback signal is on a lower level L i (with i < j).
As an example, U is influenced positively if feedback of positive understanding
or any feedback on higher levels (e.g., positive acceptance, negative agreement) is
received and negatively if feedback of negative understanding or lower (e.g., positive
perception, negative contact) is received.
Table 5.1 can also be interpreted column-wise. Feedback of a communicative
function on a level L j influences all variables on lower levels of processing L i (with
i < j) positively and all variables on higher levels of processing Lk (with k > j)
negatively. If polarity of the feedback signal is positive, variables on the level L i are
influenced positively, and negatively if it is of negative polarity. As an example, positive
understanding feedback influences the variables C, P and U positively and AC and
65. See section A.2, step G1.2, in the appendix for an explanation of the δ-values.
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AG negatively. Negative feedback of understanding influences only the variables C
and P positively and U ,AC, and AG negatively.
The parametrisation of the local probabilistic models ofBNALS′ , generated from
the specification of the implicit representation (partly displayed in table 5.166), thus
models both the upper-bounding implicata resulting from Grice’s (1975) cooperative
principles, as well as the weak upward completion based entailment.
The entailment relationships are now modelled twice in the local probabilistic
models of BNALS′ . Once in the connections FB → (C, P,U ,AC,AG), and once in
the connections C → P → U → (AC,AG) among the ALS-variables. This can be
seen as an unnecessary redundancy in the modelBNALS′ and it could be argued that
the connections among the ALS-variables could be dropped. When dialogue context
is part of the attribution process (see section 5.5), however, these redundancies are
important.
Figure 5.6 shows a comparison of the posterior marginal subjective probability
distributions over the ALS-variables (C is omitted for clarity of presentation) given
different values for the variable FB. As can be seen, the intended quality of relationships
among the variables of the network is reflected in its output.
The representation of feedback as a simple combination of communicative function
and polarity, as in the variable FB above, does not meet the characterisation of feed-
back signals as a multimodal, multidimensional, rich, and nuanced way of expressing
a listening-relatedmental state that we provided in chapter 3. And if it were, a Bayesian
network based model of feedback interpretation as inBNALS′ would be overly com-
plex to model the phenomenon at hand. But even under the assumption that much of
the nuances are used to mark the communicative function and polarity, other prop-
erties of feedback signals can be fed into the model as well, using the same modular
approach of implicit representation.
As an example we pick the certainty/uncertainty that a listener might express,
perhaps unwillingly, in her feedback signals— in their timing, their prosody (Pon-
Barry 2008; Skantze et al. 2014), via her facial expression (Krahmer and Swerts 2005),
head movement (Heylen 2006), and gaze behaviour (Skantze et al. 2014). The cer-
tainty/uncertainty can be seen as a modulating factor for the feedback signal. If a
listener expresses positive feedback of understanding, and simultaneously indicates
uncertainty, the attribution process should come to a different conclusion than if the
feedback signal was produced with certainty. As mentioned in section 5.3 (page 88),
66. The model BNALS′ (and code to generate and query it) is archived and available at doi:
10.6084/m9.figshare.3851475 .
5.4 FEEDBACKANDATTRIBUTED LISTENER STATE 101
0.0
0.5
1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
- +p - +u - +ac - +ag - +p - +u - +ac - +ag - +p - +u - +ac - +ag - +p - +u - +ac - +ag
P U AC AG
BNALS′
Figure 5.6: Influence of feedback (FB) on the belief states of the other ALS-variables
P,U ,AC, and AG (C is omitted for clarity of presentation). Posterior marginal dis-
tributions are computed for each value in Val(FB) (see eq. [5.10]). Facets show the
degree of belief in one value— low (+ / ), medium (- / ), and high (/ / )—of one
ALS-variable.
the uncertainty in the five ALS-variables represents the speaker’s uncertainty in the
attribution of the listener’s listening related mental state, not a potential uncertainty
on the side of the listener.
The suggestion thus is to model a listener’s expressed uncertainty in a Bayesian net-
workBNALS′′ which has an additional random variable UC with a range Val(UC) ={low,medium,high}67 that influences the ALS-variables P,U ,AC andAG (see fig. 5.7).
The influence of the perceived uncertainty is difficult to model with the implicit repres-
entation based generation of local probabilistic models. The influence of uncertainty
67. Ternary grading was chosen, again, for practical reasons and implies no claims of cognitive reality.
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Figure 5.7: Bayesian network representation of the ALS-modelBNALS′′ . This model
extendsBNALS′ (fig. 5.5, on page 98) with a random variable UC that represents the
listener’s perceived certainty/uncertainty.
interacts with the polarity of the perceived feedback signal. Feedback of positive po-
larity with a high uncertainty should influence the ALS-variables negatively. It should
shift probability mass of the ALS-variables from high towardsmedium and low (i.e.,
make the shape of the probability distribution flatter). Feedback of positive polarity
with low uncertainty should have a positive influence. It shifts further probability
mass towards high (i.e., skew the probability distribution towards high). For feedback
of negative polarity, however, the influence is in the opposite direction. In this case,
high uncertainty should shift probability mass from low towards medium and high,
and low uncertainty should shift further probability mass towards low.
Due to themodularity of our approach to implicit representation, such interactions
between values of variables cannot be directly modelled. Processing the uncertainty
accompanying feedback signals of positive polarity would need a setting of, e.g.,
δX(UC) = (1.0, 0.0,−1.0), whereas for feedback signals of negative polarity a setting
of, e.g., δX(UC) = (−1.0, 0.0, 1.0) would be needed. There are several ways this could
be addressed, for example by using two uncertainty variables, or by using a six-valued
uncertainty variable. In our model, we have chosen a pragmatic solution to this prob-
lem. When processing feedback of positive polarity, we let the variable UC represent
the listener’s expressed uncertainty.When processing feedback of negative polarity, we
simply inverse the variable’s meaning (we writeUC−1) and let it represent the listener’s
expressed certainty. See fig. 5.8 for a comparison of the influences of UC−1/UC on the
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Figure 5.8: Comparison of the influence of the perceived certainty/uncertainty of a
feedback signal on the belief states of the ALS-variables P,U ,AC, and AG inBNALS′′
given either negative or positive feedback of understanding (u−/u+). The polarity
determines whether the variable UC represents the listener’s certainty (UC−1, if it is
negative) or uncertainty (if it is positive)— see text. Facets show the degree of belief
in one value— low (+ / ),medium (- / ), and high (/ / )—of one ALS-variable.
ALS-variables given negative/positive feedback of understanding68.
Other properties of a listener’s feedback behaviour can be integrated into the
Bayesian network model for feedback processing in similar ways. The network used in
the evaluation study (chapter 9), for example, integrated one variable that represents
the listener’s gaze behaviour and one that represents the listener’s head gestures.
68. The model BNALS′′ (and code to generate and query it) is archived and available at doi:
10.6084/m9.figshare.3971712 .
104 MENTAL STATE ATTRIBUTIONBASEDONCOMMUNICATIVE LISTENER FEEDBACK
5.5 INTERPRETING LISTENER FEEDBACK IN CONTEXT
Properties of the perceived feedback signals of a listener are not the only influencing
factors on the attributed listener state though, consider the following example:
Meeting, as usual, in a café to discuss the latest development in the coffee world,
Sigrid and Linus eventually come to the same old themes, exchanging the arguments
both agree with and have already heard numerous times. Sigrid does not even have to
unfold an argument in full because Linus already knows what to expect. Listening
to Sigrid, Linus nods from time to time but does not produce specific feedback of
the communicative function understanding or show his acceptance, and agreement.
Given the dialogue context— the usual setting, expectable utterances, a lot of com-
mon ground between the interlocutors—Sigrid should nevertheless attribute high
understanding, acceptance and agreement to Levi. Would Linus show the exact same
behaviour in a different situation, however— e.g., when Sigrid presents a novel and
complex argument to him—she should come to different conclusions. That he does
not pay attention, that he has problems understanding her argument, or that he does
not accept one of its premises.
The same perceived feedback behaviour can originate from different listening
related mental states and may thus result in different belief states of the attributed
listener state variables. In this example, the factors which determine how the listener’s
feedback behaviour influences the attributed listener state lie in the wider discourse
context: expectable utterances with a low novelty factor due to previous interactions.
But contextual factors can also be tied to the speaker’s utterance or the immediate
situation. Does the speaker explain something complicated, does she use a concept
for the first time, does she choose a lexical item or expression with a low frequency,
does she use a word that can be misperceived for another word that is plausible in
this situation as well, is the environment of the interaction noisy, does the speaker
speak loud enough, and so on. This illustrates that the contextual factors that can play
a role in feedback interpretation are unique to each dialogue situation and that their
number is potentially infinite.
Many contextual factors can only be factored in through deep inferences that
often rely on knowledge. They cannot be uncovered with simple, general models
such as the one described here. But due to their importance for the interpretation of
listener feedback as described in the example above, contextual factors should not be
neglected completely during feedback interpretation. We argue that it is possible and
useful to model some generally applicable contextual influences in our computational
model. Especially speaking related contextual factors are often available in artificial
conversational agents, which makes their integration into the model relatively easy.
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Figure 5.9: Grouping related variables representing contextual factors or feedback
properties in a hierarchical Bayesian network. (A) variables L,N , . . . (length and
novelty of the speaker’s utterance, further related variables) each influence the ALS-
variables P and U . (B) variables L,N , . . . form a separate model of utterance difficulty,
hidden behind/in the abstract variables DI, which influences the ALS-variables P and
U . The complexity of the model is invisible to the ALS-variables, greatly simplifying
their local probabilistic models.
Contextual factors can be modelled in the same way as the properties of feedback
described in the preceding section. They, and contextual factors in general, are added
as a new variable to the network and the parameters of the influence they exert on
the ALS-variables are specified in the implicit representation of the local probabilistic
model of the ALS-variables.
One contextual factor—modelled as part of the attentive speakger agent de-
scribed in chapters 8 and 9—could be the estimated difficulty of the produced
utterances. If the system produces an utterance of high difficulty, the feedback its
interlocutor produces in response to this utterance has a smaller influence on the
subjective probability of the beliefs that understanding is high, conversely for ut-
terances of low difficulty. The estimated difficulty of a speaker’s utterance is integ-
rated into the model by extending it with a random variable DI that, again, has a
ternary grading (i.e., Val(DI) = {low,medium,high}) and influences P and U with
δP⇑U(DI) = (1.0, 0.0,−1.0).
Contextual factors are often complex concepts. What makes an utterance ‘difficult’
to process is a research question on its own, but, as stated above, can certainly be
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reduced to a number of individual components such as the difficulty of the words
it is comprised of, its syntactic complexity, its length, the concepts that it describes,
its novelty, how much is left implicit, how many presuppositions it assumes, and
many things more. Each of these components could be modelled as an individual
contextual influence— i.e., a variable in the mental state attribution network—on
the ALS-variables (see fig. 5.9A). This, however, would increase the complexity and
size of the ALS-variables’ local probabilistic models substantially.
Alternatively, we can create a separate Bayesian network that models the complex
contextual factor in terms of its components and let it interface, via a single node
(its ‘anchor’) with the ALS-variables. The resulting network is a hierarchical Bayesian
network (Gyftodimos and Flach 2002) that consists of atomic types (Bayesian network
nodes) and composite types (sub-networks that are connected to the overall network
through their anchor node).69 Figure 5.9B shows a hierarchical Bayesian network
model of the influence of the estimated difficulty of the speaker’s utterance on the
ALS-variables. The variable DI is the anchor node of the sub network that models the
complex concept difficulty. It is shared between the networks and shields off—via
conditional independence— the ALS-variables from the components of the difficulty
model.
Modelling the influence of contextual factors in such a hierarchical way has the
advantage of making the overall mental state attribution model simpler (even though
an additional variable is introduced) and thus easier to understand. The hierarchical
model is also more modular as sub-networks can be expanded or changed without
affecting the part of the network it interfaces with (ibid., p. 25). A disadvantage can
be that the hierarchical representation may result in influences being less precise
since the individual influence of each component might be slightly different from the
combined influence of the anchor variable.
All evidence variables in themental state attributionmodel can be seen as potential
composite types. The variable FB, representing the influence of the feedback function,
could for example be replaced by a Bayesian networkmodel that estimates the feedback
function from low-level features of the feedback signal. The influence that FB has on
the ALS-variables could remain as it is.
69. A similar concept are ‘object-oriented’ Bayesian networks (Koller and Pfeffer 1997; Koller and Friedman
2009, § 5.6), in which sub-networks— that are allowed to have several input and output nodes—define
‘encapsulated’ conditional probability distributions.
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5.6 FEEDBACK AND GROUNDING
After modelling various influences on the ALS-variables, we will now turn to the
question of how the inferred beliefs represented in these variables can be used. Given
that one important role of communicative listener feedback is to provide ‘evidence of
understanding’ (see section 2.2.1), a relevant question is how the ALS-model is related
to grounding and common ground.
Here, we sketch a computational model of grounding in which the speaker’s beliefs
about her listener’s listening-related mental state, as captured in the ALS-variables,
is the basis for deciding whether her representation of common ground should be
updated. The fundamental idea for this model is that if the evidence of understanding
(together with evidence of contact, perception, acceptance, and agreement) provided
by the listener causes the speaker to infer a belief state of the ALS-variables that
is ‘sufficiently’ high (Clark and Schaefer 1989), she can regard the communicative
acts (and their content) in response to which the listener provided the feedback as
grounded.
A way to model this would be the Bayesian networkBNALS′′′ (fig. 5.10), which,
in addition toBNALS′ (fig. 5.5), has an additional random variable GR with a range
Val(GR) = {low,medium,high} that is influenced by each of the five ALS-variables
C, P,U ,AC and AG).70 GR represents the speaker’s belief state of the degree of groun-
dedness that, based on the listener’s attributed mental state, can be assumed for a
communicative act.
Each of the ALS-variables influences the groundedness variable to a different
degree. Believing that the listener is in full contact but neither perceives nor under-
stands what the speaker is saying, for example, should lead to a low degree of belief
in the groundedness of the object. In contrast, assuming the listener to have at least
some understanding might be enough to consider information to be grounded. Fig-
ure 5.11 shows how the groundedness variable GR varies in a simple model of GR
given feedback of different functions.
In contrast to the computational models of grounding presented in section 2.2.2—
in which the grounding process advances in a specific way when certain grounding
acts are encountered (e.g., Traum 1994; Roque and Traum 2008; Visser et al. 2014)—
ALS-based grounding is more flexible.
First of all, instead of a set of specific grounding acts, the ALS-based grounding
model can deal with a large variety of feedback-based grounding acts, which may
be multimodal and can express subtle differences in meaning and function. This
70. The model BNALS′′′ (and code to generate and query it) is archived and available at doi:
10.6084/m9.figshare.4980743 .
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Figure 5.10: Bayesian network representation of the ALS-modelBNALS′′′ . This model
extends BNALS′ (fig. 5.5, on page 98) with a random variable GR that represents
the speaker’s belief state of the degree of groundedness that, based on the listener’s
attributed mental state, is assumed for a communicative act.
p− p+ u− u+ag−ac+ag−ag+ p− p+ u− u+ac−ac+ag−ag+ p− p+ u− u+ac−ac+ag−ag+
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BNALS′′′
Figure 5.11: Influence of feedback (FB) on the belief state of variable GR. Posterior
marginal distributions are computed for each value in Val(FB). Facets show the degree
of belief in one value— low (+ / ),medium (- / ), and high (/ / ) of the variable GR.
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simplifies the interface between listeners’ grounding acts and the operationalisation
of groundedness. At the same time, qualifying information of feedback (Petukhova
and Bunt 2010), is not lost during inference, but still reflected in the speaker’s belief
state of the ALS-variables, as well as in the variable GR.
Similar to the model of Roque and Traum (2008), the ALS-based model of ground-
ing captures the grounding status with a finite set of ‘degrees of groundedness’ (here:
low, medium, high), but represents them probabilistically in terms of degrees of be-
lief. This adds a further dimension to groundedness, enables the model to deal with
uncertainty and removes the need to prematurely commit to a specific degree of
grounding.
Another advantage is that a flexible ‘grounding criterion’ (Clark and Schaefer
1989) is easily operationalised in the ALS-model of grounding because inference
about the belief state of groundedness is conditionally independent from the many
possible influences. This is a property that reduces the grounding model’s complexity
significantly. Depending on contextual factors, e.g., the perceived difficulty of the
speaker’s utterance, the content of a speaker’s utterance may be sufficiently grounded
even if feedback is absent. In a different context though, even positive feedback of
understanding may not be sufficient to consider the content of the utterance to be
grounded. The operationalisation of the grounding criterion is context-aware simply
because mental state attribution in the ALS model is context-aware. In this regard,
it goes beyond Paek and Horvitz’s (2000b) decision theoretic formalisation of the
grounding criterion.
As the flexibility of the grounding criterion is part of the ALS-based model itself,
the decision of whether a belief state is regarded ‘sufficient for current purposes’ can
be modelled as a threshold that should be relatively stable (e.g., within interactions). If
the threshold is exceeded, the information can be added to the speaker’s representation
of common ground. Otherwise, the grounding process needs to continue, e.g., by
producing an adapted utterance that provides additional information (see chapter 6).
5.7 INTERPRETING LISTENER FEEDBACK IN AN EVOLVING
CONTEXT
The Bayesian network model of attributed listener state developed so far models pro-
cessing of individual—possibly multimodal— feedback signals in their immediate
dialogue context. Up until now, it has no notion of the past and thus disregards the
temporal nature of dialogue. Dialogue context, however, is constructed incrementally
while the discourse unfolds over time (Poesio and Traum 1997; Asher and Lascarides
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2003; DeVault 2008; Ginzburg 2012) and utterances are produced against the com-
mon ground established so far (Clark 1996). It is obvious that dialogue participants’
listening-related mental states also develop alongside the dialogue. A dialogue part-
ner that believes that her understanding is low may experience, after an additional
explanation, a change of her mental state of understanding after which she believes
that her understanding is high. She might communicate this development of her
listening-related mental state in a sequence of feedback signals—or even by produ-
cing a feedback signal that explicitly marks such a ‘change-of-state’, e.g., oh (Heritage
1984) and, in German, also ach and achso (Golato and Betz 2008; Golato 2012).
One crucial question from the speaker’s perspective is how listener feedback
signals can be interpreted in the dialogue context, and how they relate to what has
been or is being said. Listeners can, in principle, produce feedback signals at any point
in time in a dialogue—without having to take the turn. There is also no restriction on
the number of feedback signals that can be placed within a dialogue segment, whether
it is a turn, an utterance, a pause or a combination of these. Consider the following
dialogue fragment:
(5.13) kds-1, U01 (9:46–9:58)71,72
(a) S1: genau=
(b) =allerdings ist Badminton da wieder verschoben=
(c) =[weiß nicht] ob das jetzt dauerhaft ist (.)
U1: [mhm ]
71. Excerpt from the calendar assistant domain corpus kds-1 (Buschmeier and Yaghoubzadeh 2011).
Overlapping talk is marked with aligned square brackets. The transcription follows the ‘gat 2’ system
(Selting et al. 2011).
72. English translation of example 5.13:
(a) S1: precisely=
(b) =but badminton has been moved again=
(c) =[don't know] if that’s now permanently so (.)
U1: [mhm ]
(d) S1: [but for the two] weeks=
U1: [okay ]
(e) S1: =it’s what I have in
U1: yeah
(f) S1: that it’s again=
(g) =um from 8 to 10 [pm]
U1: [ok]ay (0.34)
(h) yes,=
(i) =then um I’ll go there nevertheless (.) . . .
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(d) S1: [aber die zwei] Wochen=
U1: [okay ]
(e) S1: =hab ich's jetzt so drin
U1: ja
(f) S1: das is wieder von=
(g) =ehm acht bis zweiundzwanzig U[hr]
U1: [ok]ay (0.34)
(h) ja,=
(i) =dann ehm geh ich da trotzdem hin (.) . . .
Speaker S1 explains to her interlocutor U1 that the regular badminton training
has (again) been moved to a different time, and now takes place from 8 to 10 p.m.
She also says that she does not know whether this change is permanent, but that it is
scheduled like this for the next two weeks. During S1’s nine seconds short turn (5.13a)
to (5.13g), U1 provides four instances of communicative feedback. Firstly, she signals
understanding withmhm, simultaneously producing a single head nod and looking
at S1 (5.13c). After that, she signals acceptance of the speaker’s ignorance concerning
the permanency of the time change with an okay that is accompanied by a head nod
(5.13d). Thirdly, she signals understanding, producing a short and prosodically flat ja,
‘yeah’, (5.13e). And finally, with S1 gazing at her, she signals understanding of the new
time with an okay and a head nod (5.13g). After a pause, U1 then takes the turn and
continues.
When multiple feedback instances occur in sequence, as in the dialogue fragment
in example (5.13), the question arises how their interpretations affect each other, and
how they relate to what has been and is being said.
In the series of Bayesian networkmodels for reasoning about the listener’s listening-
related mental state developed above (BNALS toBNALS′′′), a concept for the tem-
poral dynamics—which would make the evolution of the ALS coherent and continu-
ous, and enable the models to deal with sequences of feedback, such as in the dialogue
fragment in example (5.13)— is absent. In the following, we extend these ‘atemporal
models’ with a temporal dimension that accounts for the incremental and dynamic
nature of dialogue. Such a ‘dynamic model’ of mentalising can naturally deal with
multiple instances of feedback by updating its representation— taking the immediate
dialogue history into account as well—when the dialogue proceeds and feedback
occurs.
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5.7.1 DYNAMIC MINIMAL MENTALISING
We regard an unfolding dialogue as a sequence of segments (︀s0, s1, . . . st , . . . sN⌋︀, each
consisting of an ‘utterance unit’ of the speaker (Traum and Heeman 1997; Poesio
and Traum 1997, p. 317), together with any feedback responses of the listener. The
atemporal models treat each of these segments st independently and thus only reason
about the listener’s listening-related mental state during one single segment. When
attributing the listener state for the next segment, information from the preceding
segments is not taken into account at all. To overcome this limitation, i.e., to account
for the evolution of the listener’s mental state over time, we need to give the model of
the listener a temporal dimension.
As Bayesian networks are, in general, not limited in the number of edges and
nodes, it would be possible to capture a whole dialogue—or at least a self contained
and coherent fragment of a dialogue— in one large network that consists of connec-
ted sub-networksBNALSt —each corresponding to one network such asBNALS′′′
in fig. 5.11—one for each ‘segment’ st . The variables in the sub-networks would be
uniquely named and the network’s evidence variables would be instantiated from the
listener’s feedback behaviour as well as the dialogue context of segment st . Further-
more, the variables between the sub-networks could be arbitrarily connected to model
any desirable interaction between feedback and context across segments.
Theoretically, this approach could even work in an incremental framework. With
each new dialogue segment st+1, a new sub-networkBNALSt+1 would be added and
connected to the network and Bayesian network inference would be carried out. How-
ever, even though there is, in principle, no limit in the size of a Bayesian network, the
computational costs are rising polynomially with the number of nodes, and may even
become intractable if the nodes are unfavourably connected (Koller and Friedman
2009, § 9.7). This makes this ‘growing network approach’ unsuitable for practical
applications.
A slightly more constrained approach is to make a first-order Markov assumption,
i.e., to assume that variables Xt+1 of a sub-network BNALSt+1 are only dependent
on variables Xt of the sub-network BNALSt that directly precedes it. This can be
achieved efficiently in the framework of ‘dynamic Bayesian networks’. In contrast to a
constantly growing network approach, the flavour of the dynamic Bayesian network
approach we choose here consists of a maximum of two sub-networks (‘time-slices’)
at any point of time. In such a ‘two time-slice Bayesian network’ (ibid., defs. 6.3,6.4),
one time slice BNALSt represents the current dialogue segment st , the other time
sliceBNALSt+1 the next segment st+1. As in the growing network approach, temporal
influences among dialogue units are modelled by connecting some of the variables
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Figure 5.12: Illustration of a dynamic two time-slice Bayesian networkmodel unrolling
over three steps in time, each corresponding to one dialogue segment. Dashed arrows
are disregarded during inference in subsequent time-slices, i.e., variables from time
slice BNALSt−1 and evidence variables in time slice BNALSt have no influence on
variables in time slice BNALSt+1 . The posterior distributions of attributed listener
state variables (C, P,U ,AC,AG) as well as the groundedness variable GR in time slice
BNALSt are taken as prior distributions at time t + 1 and influence the variables they
are connected to in time sliceBNALSt+1 . For reasons of simplicity, we only we only
show an abstract form of the influences that properties of feedback and dialogue
context have.
between the time-slices. Connections further back in time are, however, not possible.
In such a network, evolution over time is done by unrolling the network (see
fig. 5.12). Bayesian network inference is carried out on time-slice BNALSt and the
resulting marginal posterior probabilities of those variables Xt that have a connection
with variables X′t+1 in the next time-slice are computed. These posteriors are then used
as ‘prior feedback’ (Robert 1993), i.e., they are interpreted as prior distributions of those
variables Xt that are used as evidence variables to variables X′t+1 in the subsequent
time slice. Due to the first order Markov assumption, previous time slicesBNALS0 to
BNALSt−1 are not taken into account any more and all connections to them, as well as
to all variables Xt that have no influence into the future, can be disregarded (dashed
lines in fig. 5.12). The complete history is thus implicitly contained, in accumulated
form, in time sliceBNALSt .
In the model in fig. 5.12, the ALS-variables C, P,U ,AC, and AG, as well as the
groundedness variable GR, are the ones that carry over information between time
slices. Understanding at time t, for example, influences understanding at time t + 1
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(consequently, variableUt+1 is not only influenced by Pt+1,Feedbackt+1, andContextt+1,
but additionally byUt). This is based on the assumption that listener state evolution—
and attribution— is usually a gradual process.
5.7.2 WORKED EXAMPLE
Figure 5.13 shows the results of simulating the dialogue fragment in example (5.13)
on page 111 using the (dynamic) Bayesian network DBNALS in two contrasting
conditions:73 (A) Without temporal influences between dialogue segments st and
st+1, i.e., modelled with an atemporal network (only theBNALS0 slice ofDBNALS),
and (B) with temporal influences between dialogue segments, i.e., modelled with the
full dynamic Bayesian networkDBNALS. Each set of graphs shows how speaker S1’s
belief state of the ALS-variables P,U , and AC, as well as the groundedness variable
GR evolve over time. Nine time-steps (a, b, . . . , i) are shown, each corresponding to
one segment of the dialogue fragment (5.13a, 5.13b, . . . , 5.13i).
In time step c, positive feedback with the function understanding (u+), alongside
the information that the listener gazed at the speaker and produced a head nod,
is provided. In time step d positive feedback with the function acceptance (ac+) is
provided together with the information that the listener produced a head nod. In
time steps e and g, positive feedback of understanding (u+) is provided (in addition
to information that the listener produced a head nod, in step g).
In fig. 5.13A, each feedback event is treated in isolation and independently from
the dialogue history. This results in a belief state state that does not change in the
beginning, when no feedback is provided by listener U1 (from a to b). When U1
provides feedback (from c to e and at g), S1’s belief state changes abruptly, jumping
between rather distant degrees of belief, and returning to the idle state for a brief
period of time when no feedback is present (at f ).
In contrast to this, the dynamic model in fig. 5.13B, leads to a gradually evolving
attributed listener state. In the beginning, when no feedback is provided by U1 (from
a to b), the belief state shifts towards low perception, understanding, acceptance, and
groundedness. This changes, cautiously, as soon as feedback is provided at c and grows
towardsmedium to high with each subsequent feedback signal provided by U1 (at d, e,
and g). Notably, at f, the belief state does not jump to the initial state, but degrades
only slightly while U1 does not provide feedback.
73. The two-time-slice Bayesian network modelDBNALS —specifically the two networksBNALS0 and
BNALS→ —is archived and available at doi: 10.6084/m9.figshare.4981823 . This is the network that was
used in the implemented attentive speaker agent described in chapter 8 and evaluated in chapter 9.
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Figure 5.13: Simulated belief state evolution for example dialogue (5.13) on page 111.
The graphs show how speaker S1’s degrees of belief in the attributed listener state
variables P,U and AC, as well as the groundedness variable GR change over time,
given the feedback provided by listener U1 at c, d, e, and g. Two conditions are contras-
ted: (A) without temporal influences between dialogue segments, simulated with an
atemporal version of the model (BNALS0 ); and (B) with temporal influences between
dialogue segments, simulated with the two time-slice dynamic Bayesian network
model (fig. 5.12). Lines colour encodes the values of the variables as follows: ( low,
medium, and high.
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This example illustrates that the dynamicmodel ofmentalising about attributed listener
state produces more coherently evolving belief states. This is a desirable property since
it is implausible that a temporary lack of feedback for one utterance unit (e.g., at f )
is an immediate sign that an interlocutor’s mental state of listening has significantly
degraded. The dynamic model can easily bridge such stretches of dialogue in which
feedback is absent. In a similar vein, the example also shows that the dynamic model
can integrate sequences of feedback signals (or lack thereof). Multiple feedback signals
with similar function will reinforce each other. Considering that an attentive speaker
agent should quickly adapt its behaviour based on these variables, we can expect that
the coherence in evolution will thus lead to more coherent adaptation behaviour of
the agent.
A disadvantage of this rather slow evolution of the belief states is that when listener
feedback indicates radical changes in an interlocutor’smental state (e.g., change of state
feedback such as oh), it takes longer for these changes to be reflected in the attributed
listener state. This could, however, be mitigated by treating such feedback signals
(which are likely marked in some way) differently, e.g., by boosting their influence
while simultaneously decreasing the influence of the preceding dialogue context.
5.7.3 DISCOURSE STRUCTURE AND BELIEF STATE EVOLUTION
Aquestion that needs to be addressed is how the attributed listener state in the dynamic
model should develop over time, i.e., to what extent and how the belief stateBNALSt
influences its successor stateBNALSt+1 . For the example, in fig. 5.13b, the transitions
were assumed to be fixed, that is, the influence Pr(Xt+1 ⋃︀ Xt) of each of the variables
Xt ∈ {Ct , . . . ,GRt} on its successor Xt+1 ∈ {Ct+1, . . . ,GRt+1} was the same for each
transition between dialogue segments st ∈ {sa , . . . , s i}.
This assumption is certainly simplified. As Muller and Prévot (2003) argue, feed-
back is deeply embedded in the discourse and its relation to the discourse structure
is one of its pivotal features. As an example, consider a situation in which at time
t + 1 either the topic changes, or the narration simply continues. Intuitively, the influ-
ence of the speaker’s attributed listener stateBNALSt on the attributed listener state
BNALSt+1 is different in the two situations.
Given a topic change, there is, e.g., little reason to believe that understanding or ac-
ceptance as estimated inBNALSt has much to contribute— i.e., is a good predictor—
to understanding and acceptance in BNALSt+1 (arguably this also depends on the
relatedness of the two topics). In contrast to this, understanding and acceptance as
estimated inBNALSt seems to be very relevant forBNALSt+1 in the case where the
narration simply continues.
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This simple example indicates that the type of relation between discourse seg-
ments— a rhetorical or discourse relation (Asher and Lascarides 2003)—plays a role
in the development of attributed listener state over time (a similar argument is made
by Stone and Lascarides [2010], see section 5.8).
As a first approach, we propose that the dynamic model of the listener takes the
discourse relation between two consecutive discourse segments into account by simply
varying the strength of the influence that a variable Xt has on a variable Xt+1 in the
next time-slice. This strength is defined in terms of a weight w that the temporal
influence has in relation to the influences of feedback, dialogue context, and other
ALS-variables. A weight of w = 0.5, for example, results in the influence of Xt on Xt+1
being the same as the influence that all non-temporal variables combined have on
Xt+1. A weight of 0 ≤ w < 0.5 results in temporal influence that is smaller than the
influences of the non temporal variables and larger for a weight of 0.5 < w ≤ 1.
In practical terms, this approach involves (i) having different dynamic Bayesian
network models for each of the discourse relation types, and (ii) switching the net-
works— carrying over the variable assignments and distributions—when proceeding
fromdialogue segment to dialogue segment. Concrete weights for individual discourse
relations need to be determined empirically.
5.8 RELATEDWORK
Bayesian networks have already been used to model grounding and dialogue be-
haviour in artificial conversational agents. Paek and Horvitz (2000a), for example,
use Bayesian networks to manage the uncertainties, among other things, in a model
of grounding behaviour in spoken dialogue systems. Stone and Lascarides (2010)
propose to combine dynamic Bayesian networks with the logic based Segmented
Discourse Representation Theory (sdrt; Asher and Lascarides [2003]) for a theory of
grounding in dialogue that is both rational (in the utility theoretic sense) and coherent
(by assigning discourse relations a prominent role in making sense of utterances).
This approach, which can build upon a detailed model of the discourse structure, is
purely theoretical so far.
In contrast to these approaches, but in line with our perspective on attentive
speaking and the way we model inference about the mental states of interlocutors,
Schäfer et al. (1997) present a dynamic Bayesian network for modelling the cognitive
limitations of users in a spoken dialogue system. Their model takes into account
properties of the conversational agent’s utterance and combines these with properties
of the task and the interaction partner, such as time-pressure, or temporary limitations
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in working memory. The model itself is then used for planning the dialogue and
choosing utterances with the interlocutor’s resources in mind.
5.9 DISCUSSION
Our approach to interpreting communicative listener feedback is quite different to
previous work on the problem, which usually focussed on lower level aspects, using
classification-based approaches that map feedback signals to their functions (e.g.,
Reidsma et al. 2011; Gravano et al. 2012; Neiberg et al. 2013; Philippsen et al. 2013;
Lotz et al. 2016, see sections 3.3.2 and 3.6). In contrast to this, we focus on the higher
level processes and require a feedback function and a description of other relevant
properties of feedback signals (e.g., prosody) as input.
The listener state attribution process can take subtle properties of the signal (e.g.,
qualifying information such as uncertainty) as well as high-level interactions between
feedback signals and dialogue context into account. Realising this model in a prob-
abilistic framework makes it possible (i) that the result of the attribution process—
the belief states of the ALS-variables and the groundedness variable— still reflect the
uncertainties of the input, thereby preserving information from the signals as long
as possible, and (ii) that information from different sources can be integrated in a
unified and well understood framework.
Our perspective on feedback interpretation can be characterised as cognitive and
inferential. It is cognitive in that it models, on a computational level, a process of
mentalising, i.e., reasoning about the mental states of others (the interlocutor). At the
same time, the model is kept ‘minimal’ in that it does not attempt to represent the
interlocutor’s mental state in all details (Butterfill and Apperly 2013), but limits itself to
a small set of variables that capture rather abstract hybrid mental states that combine
the propositional attitude ‘belief ’ with a phenomenal state (such as understanding).
This minimal form of mentalising is what makes the ALS-model a good match to
the ‘minimal partner model’ theory (Galati and Brennan 2010; Brennan and Hanna
2009) for partner specific adaptation in dialogue (see section 2.3.5). This theory
suggests that adaptation in dialogue takes its bearing from a lightweight variable-
based representation, instead of making adaptation decisions based on full common
ground or based on a monitoring and adjustment approach. We suggest that the ALS-
variables can be thought of as further dimensions in such a minimal partner model,
but offer a more expressive gradient representation for the variables, which allows for
more fine-grained, but still lightweight, adaptation. It should be noted that the ALS-
based grounding model (see section 5.6) is nevertheless able to inform the grounding
process and can contribute to a representation of full common ground—even to
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one that is gradual (Brown-Schmidt 2012). This can be used as a fall-back should
the minimal model be insufficient or for specific production/generation choices that
require such detailed information about common ground.
Furthermore, our perspective on feedback interpretation is inferential in that it
does not implement a code model of feedback meaning, but a computational and
probabilistic pragmatics approach (Goodman and Frank 2016; Franke and Jäger
2016). This is what enables the dynamic, context-specific inference of the attributed
listener state, and has the potential to be able to process unseen feedback signals (once
the model interfaces with automatic methods for describing their features) in novel
dialogue contexts.
A limitations of the attributed listener state approach to feedback interpretation
presented here is that the probabilistic models are manually created, mostly based
on theoretical considerations. This limitation is not a general one though. It is, in
principle, possible to learn the parameters of Bayesian networks— even given a pre-
specified structure— from relatively small data sets. A difficulty for this, however,
is the acquisition of data that contains reliable information on human mental states
underlying observed feedback behaviour. A possible solution to this problemwould be
to use an approach that learns the model in interaction with human interlocutors that
make their listening-relatedmental states explicit upon request.The use of hierarchical
Bayesian networks further allows for an independent formulation or learning of sub-
networks. Whether a manually created model creates problems when using it in an
attentive speaker agent is unknown. In general, it is not uncommon to specify Bayesian
network models by hand (Koller and Friedman 2009, box 3.C, pp. 64–67,)— even for
conversational agents (e.g., Paek and Horvitz 2000a). Koller and Friedman (2009,
p. 95) state that ‘even fairly significant changes to network parameters cause only small
degradations in performance, except when the changes relate to extreme parameters—
those very close to 0 and 1’. This finding suggests that our approach, via implicit
representations, seems to be suitable, as the rather coarse control it provides may be
sufficient. A data driven model would have the advantage of an empirical, rather than
theoretical, grounding, though. Learning-based formulation of ALS-models will not
be addressed in this thesis but should be explored in future work.
It should be noted that this chapter does not aim to present a definitive model
of attributed listener state and its relevant contextual factors. The objective pursued
in this chapter is to introduce attributed listener state modelling as a conceptual
framework for inferential, context-aware and mentalising-based reasoning about the
semantics and pragmatics of feedback signals.
Similarly, the visualisation of the belief states of attributed listener state variables
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given various input configuration provided throughout this chapter should not be
regarded as an evaluation of the model. Their purpose is to illustrate which kinds of
interactions can be modelled. The model will be evaluated as part of the implemented
attentive speaker agent in chapter 9.
5.10 SUMMARY
In this chapter we developed a framework for computationally modelling feedback
interpretation for attentive speaker agents. It frames the process as one of reasoning
about the human interlocutors’ listening-related mental state. Inference is carried out
using a Bayesian network model of the attributed listener state that we extended, step-
by-step, with various influencing factors that need to be considered in the attribution
process, for example, properties of feedback signals or the dynamic dialogue context
in which a feedback signal occurs. Due to the properties of Bayesian networks and
in combination with the use of implicit representations, the complex interactions
between these factors can be expressed in a compact manner.
The model can be thought of as a dynamic minimal interlocutor model for inter-
active adaptation in natural language generation using mechanisms based on the the
minimal partner model theory. At the same time, the ALS-model can also be used as
a way to model a context-aware grounding criterion for reasoning about grounding
and common ground, given feedback-based evidence of understanding.
How adaptations can be carried out interactively and incrementally based on
the inferred variables from the attributed listener state will be described in the next
chapter.
CHAPTER 6
INTERACTIVE ADAPTATION
In this chapter we develop a component for attentive speaker agents that incrementally
and interactively generates natural language in a way that takes the interlocutors’
needs—based on the attributed listener state— into account. We begin with a review
of adaptationmechanisms on various levels of language production. Following this, we
describe, in detail, the incremental and adaptive natural language generation system
spudia. We do this in four steps and start with a general introduction to adaptive
natural language generation in which we make a case for the use of incremental
processing. This is followed by a description of the spudmicroplanning framework—
and its variant spudcoref —on which the systems developed here are based. In the
third step, we describe our incremental variant spudinc, illustrate how it incrementally
generates an utterance, and discuss the overall concept. Following this we describe
the adaptive variant spudia and the available adaptation mechanism. Finally, before
concluding this chapter, we briefly describe our work on adaptive speech synthesis.
6.1 LEVELS AND MECHANISMS OF ADAPTATION
Based on the the dynamic minimal mentalising model of attributed listener state,
speakers may decide if it is necessary or helpful to adapt to the listeners by changing
aspects of their language production behaviour. This section describes mechanisms
of adaptation based on findings in the literature.
☆ This chapter contains material previously published in Buschmeier et al. (2012) and Buschmeier and
Kopp (2012; 2013). The incremental and adaptive natural language generation system ‘spudia ’, described in
section 6.2, is based on DeVault’s (2008) spud implementation ‘spudcoref ’. The initial version of spudia
was developed in aMaster’s thesis (Dosch 2011) supervised by the author of this thesis. ¶ In Buschmeier et al.
(2012), the author of this thesis was responsible for the part on (incremental) natural language generation
and the subjective evaluation of the integrated system. Timo Baumann was responsible for the part on
(incremental) speech synthesis and the objective evaluation. The integration was done jointly.
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Table 6.1: Levels of adaptation, from the lowest level ‘realisation’ to the highest level
‘perspective’.
Levels Mechanisms
Perspective perspective-change
provide missing information
Rhetorical structure elaboration
explanation
repetition
summary
pragmatic explicitness
Surface form verbosity
redundancy
focus/stress/prominence
vocabulary
Realisation hyper- and hypo-articulation
Lombard speech
speech rate
volume
The different needs of a listener need to be addressed on different levels of language
production and using different adaptation mechanisms. A problem in perception
might, for example, be resolved by simply repeating the utterance or the problematic
phrase or word. If a speaker notices, however, that the listener has built up a com-
pletely different situation model and is stuck in this incorrect conceptualisation of
what the speaker means (detection of a misunderstanding), starting anew from a
different perspective might be the right way for the speaker to resolve the problem.
Table 6.1 provides an overview of different levels of adaptation along with a choice of
mechanisms that operate on each level.
The lowest level of adaptation is the realisation level, i.e., how an utterance is
articulated and presented. Adaptation on this level might happen automatically during
articulation along the hyper–hypo continuum (Lindblom 1990). A speaker might
choose to hyper-articulate when the listener has difficulties perceiving the speaker’s
speech (e.g., due to noise in the environment, hearing impairment, importance of
the message or possible ambiguities). If, on the other hand, the listener perceives well
and the message is not overly important, speakers might choose to conserve energy
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through hypo-articulation. The realisation level is also where speakers may choose to
adapt their speech rate, the volume of their voice, and other acoustic features. These
low-level adaptations are often automatic (e.g., Lombard adaptation of speech. [Cooke
et al. 2014]).
If adapting the realisation is insufficient to accommodate the listener’s needs, the
utterance’s content itself can be adapted. This is possible on all of the higher adaptation
levels. The simplest way of adapting utterance content is to change the surface form,
keeping the utterance’s semantic content fixed. A speaker may choose to be more
‘verbose’, i.e., usemorewords to communicate the same semantic content. Although the
additional words and phrases might not add semantic content, they can nevertheless
serve important communicative functions. Using signpost language and other cue
phrases for example helps in drawing the listener’s attention to a specific aspect of
an utterance. It might also be used to make the speaker’s underlying intentions more
explicit and to reveal the rhetorical structure of the speaker’s argument (Grosz and
Sidner 1986). Verbosity also has the simple property of giving listeners more time to
process the important meaning-bearing parts of an utterance.
Speakers may also use different degrees of redundancy to adapt surface form. Sim-
ilarly to verbosity, redundancy usually does not introduce novel semantic objects, but
highlights important information and increases the probability of the message being
understood (Reiter and Sripada 2002). Redundancy is also a frequent mechanism
used to repair misunderstanding (Baker et al. 2008).
Another mechanism that operates on the surface structure is stress and focus. The
speaker might put stress (or more general ‘prominence’) on the important parts of an
utterance with the help of prosodic cues as well as by using different syntactic con-
structions that distribute weight differently (e.g. active vs. passive voice). Furthermore,
the speaker can choose a different vocabulary, thereby accommodating the listener’s
level of expertise (Janarthanam and Lemon 2014).
Adaptation at higher levels requires more than a change of packaging for semantic
content, producing instead a different message. ‘Rhetorical structure’ is the level
of adaptation most easily identified and often found in the analysis of our corpus.
Speakers often adapt to listener feedback by changing the amount of information they
provide. They commonly elaborate on an utterance by providing more information
or giving explanations. Another is to repeat the previous utterance or to summarise
several utterances. On this level, speakers also adapt by making previously implicit
information pragmatically explicit.
Finally, when speakers notice that the listener’s conceptualisation of the dialogue
topic deviates from their own, they may adapt on the level of ‘perspective’. They adjust
their own perspective to be closer to that of the listener, or track back to a point in
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the dialogue where they assume the conceptualisation to have still been consistent.
Speakers might also provide further background information that they had previously
assumed was already a part of common ground.
It should be noted that adaptation can take place at multiple levels simultaneously.
A speaker might very well choose to communicate more clearly by combining several
mechanisms. Furthermore, the function of adaptation is not limited to accommodat-
ing for the listener’s problems in perception, understanding, and so forth. It also serves
to modify dialogue when communication is going ‘too well’. For example, if a speaker
notices that a listener is already ahead in her thinking, he might skip planned parts of
his utterance. Similarly, if there are no problems in perception and understanding,
the speaker can be more relaxed in his or her articulation.
In the following we focus on the level of surface form, specifically on adapta-
tion in natural language generation. Structural adaptation, on the level of dialogue
management, will be described in section 8.3.4.
6.2 ADAPTIVE NATURAL LANGUAGE GENERATION
Traditionally, natural language generation (nlg) is defined as the field ‘that focuses
on computer systems that can produce understandable texts in [. . . ] human languages’
(Reiter and Dale 2000, p. 1; emphasis added), typically from data that has a non-
linguistic representation. A natural language generation system for a conversational
agent, however, does not produce text, but utterances for use in conversation, which
is a fundamentally different setting of language use (Clark 1996, pp. 4–11). Where text
is produced at one point and read (or perhaps listened to) at a later point, utterances
are produced extemporaneously, in real-time, for an interaction partner who listens
to them instantaneously, while they are spoken. Whereas the readers of a text are
often unknown when it is written, the addressees of an utterance in conversation are
co-present. Where text is static and cannot be changed post writing, utterances are
dynamic and subject to change and adaptation while unfolding (see section 2.3), and
can be stopped at almost any point (Tydgat et al. 2011).
Because of these properties of spoken language, especially instantaneity and extem-
poraneity, natural language generation systems for text and utterance generation in
conversational agents have different requirements. Whereas a text generating system
is allowed to take its time to produce a text that will be read eventually, an utterance
generating system needs to be able to produce at least some words as soon as the
conversational agent gets the turn. Whereas a text generating system knows up front
what, in general, constitutes a ‘good’ text in its domain (often from corpora and user
evaluation, Reiter and Dale [2000, §§ 2.3 and 2.4]), an utterance generating system
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can get direct feedback about the quality of its output from its interaction partner
and could— in principle—optimise its output in a timely manner, by adapting it
interactively to the interlocutor’s needs.
Thus, a fundamental requirement for a natural language generation system that
generates utterances in real-time and can adapt its utterances while still producing
them, is incremental processing. Guhe (2007, p. 70), extending Levelt (1989, p. 26),
defines this to be the case when
each processing component [is] triggered into activity by a minimal
amount of its characteristic input and produces characteristic output as
soon as a minimal amount of output is available.
Psycholinguistic research has identified incrementality as an important property of
human language production early on and it has been incorporated into several models
of human speech production (e.g., Kempen and Hoenkamp 1987; Levelt 1989). Natural
language generation systems that support incremental processing are rare, however.
A notable exception is the in-depth analysis of requirements for and properties of
incremental natural language generation by Kilger and Finkler (1995), who describe an
ltag-based incremental sentence generator (‘vm-gen’). vm-gen takes incremental
input (lemmata and their semantic relations, basically a ‘preverbal message’ in Levelt’s
[1989] terms), processes it and produces output as soon as at least a prefix of the final
sentence is syntactically complete. If vm-gen notices that it committed itself to a
prefix too early, it can initiate an overt self-repair.
Guhe (2007) presents a computational model of incremental conceptualisation in
natural language generation (‘inC’), which incrementally builds conceptual repres-
entations from perceived domain objects, selects them for verbalisation, linearises
them, and produces a ‘preverbal message’. This output of inC can then be used for
sentence planning in subsequent generation stages, which, however, are not part of
Guhe’s model.
Both vm-gen and inC focus on specific parts of the natural language generation
process.74 In contrast to this, Skantze and Hjalmarsson (2013) present a system that
performs incremental generation in the context of a spoken dialogue system and thus
needs to cover the whole generation process in interaction with speech input from a
user.This system can already start to produce output when the user has not yet finished
74. Natural language generation is usually seen as a process that involves three consecutive stages: docu-
ment planning, microplanning/sentence planning, and surface realisation (Reiter and Dale 2000, p. 49,
table 3.1). This ‘consensus architecture’ of nlg-systems (Reiter 1994) is similar to Levelt’s (1989) psycholin-
guistic model of speech production which consists of the three stages conceptualisation, formulation and
articulation.
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speaking and only a preliminary interpretation exists. By flexibly changing what to say
and by being able to make self-repairs the system can recover from situations where it
selected and committed on an inadequate speech plan.
None of these incremental natural language generation systems, however, is able to
flexibly adapt the language that it generates to changing requirements due to changes
in the situation or changing needs on the side of the user.
Natural language generation systems that are able to adapt their output signific-
antly— e.g., stylistically (e.g., Walker et al. 2007; Mairesse andWalker 2010), based on
the interlocutors’ estimated level of competence (e.g., Janarthanam and Lemon 2014),
to the lexical and syntactic structures that the interlocutors use (e.g., Buschmeier
et al. 2010; Isard et al. 2006), to the interlocutors’ level of politeness (e.g., de Jong
et al. 2008), or to the interlocutors’ gaze behaviour Garoufi et al. (2016)—do not
work incrementally and cannot adapt to their interaction partners on the fly and in
real-time. The following sections present an incremental natural language generation
system that is able to adapt its utterance while it is still being articulated.
6.2.1 THE SPUD MICROPLANNING FRAMEWORK
The incremental and adaptive natural language generation system described here,
‘spudia’, is based on the non-incremental and non-adaptivemicroplanning framework
‘spud’ (an acronym for ‘sentence planning using descriptions’, Stone et al. 2003), more
specifically on the variant ‘spudcoref ’ developed and implemented by DeVault (2008,
‘spudcoref ’), see fig. 6.1 for an overview of spud-based NLG-systems.
The spudcoref generator constitutes one part in a more general conversational
agent architecture (ibid., pp. 77, 129). It possesses a set of linguistic resources and
maintains a model of its domain knowledge, its interlocutor, and the discourse context
(Stone et al. 2003, p. 347). Within its model of discourse context, it represents the
information status of its knowledge: it distinguishes knowledge that it considers to be
shared between itself and its interlocutor (basically a representation of their common
ground) from knowledge that it considers to be private.
spudcoref ’s model of language— its linguistic resources— is specified in the
feature-based tree-rewriting grammar formalism taglet75 (Stone 2002, app. A).
As in construction grammars, each linguistic resource (a taglet element) in spud
75. taglet is inspired by the lexicalised tree-adjoining grammar formalism ltag, (Joshi and Schabes
1997), which is especially well suited for natural language generation (Joshi 1987) and used in spud. taglet
retains properties of ltag—e.g., ‘enabling use of grammar in high-level [planning] tasks’ (Stone 2002,
p. 79)—but is merely context-free in expressive power and therefore computationally more lightweight
than ltag, which is mildly context sensitive.
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SPUD
(Stone et al. 2003)
SPUD lite
(Stone 2002)
SPUDprime
(Buschmeier et al. 2010)
SPUDcoref
(DeVault 2008)
SPUD ia
(Buschmeier et al. 2012)
CRISP
(Koller and Stone 2007) . . .. . .
STRUCT
(McKinley and Ray 2014)
Figure 6.1: Family tree of natural language generation systems build on the ideas of the
spudmicroplanning framework (Stone et al. 2003). Connections indicate inheritance
of ideas, arrows indicate inheritance of source code (from the pointed-to system).
combines lexical, syntactic, and semantic76 information. Surface form, syntax, and
semantics of a communicative action are thus constructed simultaneously— through
the syntactic operations substitution, pre-, and post-modification, and unification of
its features structures—during generation.
In spud, a microplanning task is not a specification of the semantics of a sentence
(the semantics of the sentence— its interpretation— is constructed during genera-
tion), but a specification of the communicative effects (in form of a list of logical
formulae, or ‘updates’) that the final sentence should have. Once the utterance has
been verbalised, and assuming understanding on the side of the interlocutor, these
updates can then be added to the representation of common ground. If some of the
formulae in the specified communicative effects are already part of its representation
of common ground, spud can presuppose them in the generation process and only
needs to assert those formulae that it still considers private. Pragmatic choices—
adhering, e.g., to Grice’s (1975) maxim of quantity— are thus made automatically.
spud frames microplanning as an AI search problem.77 It carries out deliberate
goal-directed actions towards finding an optimal solution to all sub-tasks in sentence
76. spud uses a ‘flat’ approach to semantics in which the meaning of a derivation (a derived tree in which
all leaf nodes are non-terminals) is simply a conjunction of the parametrised meanings of its elements
(Stone and Doran 1997).
77. How the search problem is approached differs in the various implementations of spud. It was originally
formulated as a constraint satisfaction problem (Stone et al. 2003; Stone 2002), later as an automatic planning
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generation— lexical and syntactic choice, referring expression generation, aggrega-
tion (Reiter and Dale 2000)—at once. The state space of the search problem is the
(potentially) infinite set of sentences that can be generated from spud’s linguistic
resources. The search starts from an initial state: an elementary tree that will become
the root node of the derived tree, and the shared and private knowledge relevant in
the generation task (Stone et al. 2003, p. 347).
Using an informed search strategy, spud attempts to make progress towards a
syntactically and semantically complete and valid derived tree whose communicative
intent satisfies the specified communicative effects given the representation of dis-
course context, that is, ‘the generator’s communicative intent must provide a complete
sentence [. . . ] that says what is needed [. . . ] in a way the hearer will understand’ (ibid.,
p. 348–49). In each step, the search algorithm expands the ‘provisional’ utterance
(basically the search state) by adding the linguistic resource (using one of the syntactic
operations, unifying its features) that maximally reduces the estimated distance78 to
the final utterance.
6.2.2 INCREMENTAL GENERATIONWITH SPUDINC
spud constructs utterances incrementally in the sense that the communicative intent
of the provisional utterance progresses towards the communicative intent of the
final utterance with every expansion of the search state. This, however, does not
mean that the surface structure of provisional utterances is generated incrementally
(i.e., from left to right) as well, which would require special considerations in its
formal foundations. Such considerations are addressed in a variant of ltag that is
‘psycholinguistically motivated’ (pltag Demberg et al. 2013), but has, so far, only been
used for incremental parsing, not generation. Full word-by-word incrementality in
natural language microplanning is thus not within reach for the spud framework as
is.
From an empirical perspective, it has long been established that different levels of
speech production (‘from intention to articulation’, Levelt 1989) operate on different
increment sizes. What the increments on each level look like, however, is still a topic
of debate. Message planning, being relevant to incremental natural language genera-
tion—and at the interface to microplanning—has been found to be a continuous
process (utterances are not fully planned in advance) that allows for updating of the
message, even after articulation begins, while maintaining fluency (Brown-Schmidt
problem (Koller and Stone 2007), and most recently as probabilistic decision making (McKinley and Ray
2014).
78. The heuristic function for the distance measure varies with the actual implementation of spud.
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and Konopka 2014), especially in conversational settings. It has also been found that
message planning works hierarchically in the sense that ‘evidence of downstream plan-
ning, several words in advance’, was found before speech onset and during articulation
(Lee et al. 2013, p. 556). This indicates that although utterances are, trivially, articulated
word-by-word, message planning and microplanning work on larger increments. Lee
et al. conclude that the scope of pre-planning is likely variable, depending on many
factors including, situation, syntactic construction, and the speaker itself.
With this in mind, we take a more coarse-grained approach to incremental lan-
guage generation. Instead of words, we choose ‘utterance units’ (roughly the size of
‘intonation phrases’, see Poesio and Traum [1997, pp. 317–318] and Traum and Hee-
man [1997]), as our incremental output units. We think that this is a good choice of
increment size for multiple reasons. Firstly, the utterance unit corresponds to Lee
et al.’s (2013) finding that message planning takes grammatical scope into account,
this makes it a plausible choice. Secondly, the utterance unit is similar to the inton-
ation phrase, which is a prosodic unit with coherent intonation (Selting et al. 2011,
§ 3.3.1) that is often semantically complete. This is relevant for the actual realisation
of incrementally produced discourse units in speech, as the prosody of individually
synthesised utterance units will be natural— to a certain extent— even if speech
synthesis is non-incremental (see, for example, the visualisation of the intonation
contour of a discourse unit synthesised with different degrees of incrementality in
Baumann and Schlangen [2012b, fig. 3]). Finally, the utterance unit is the typical unit
that is grounded in dialogue (Traum and Heeman 1997; Poesio and Traum 1997), that
is, a unit we might expect to receive feedback for from dialogue partners.
As in spud, the task-specification of spudinc, the incremental version of spud,
is a set of communicative effects that the utterance to be generated is supposed to
achieve. spudinc also has access to the model of discourse context and thus knows
which information is considered to be shared and which is considered to be private.
In contrast to spud, generation in spudinc is a hierarchical process comprising
two levels:micro-content-planning (mcp), andmicroplanning-proper (mpp). On the
mcp-level a high-level specification of a communicative goal that can be verbalised
within a discourse unit (Poesio and Traum 1997, pp. 317–318)—a speech act, e.g.,
to inform about a number of events, or about a scheduling conflict between two
events— is used to incrementally plan the structure of individual utterance units (of
the discourse unit). On the mpp-level a low-level specification of the communicative
effects of an utterance unit— e.g., mention the start time of an event such that it
can be understood by the interlocutor— is used to non-incrementally construct the
communicative intent and surface structure of each utterance unit.
The communicative goal for the mcp-level is specified in form of an outline of a
130 INTERACTIVE ADAPTATION
discourse unit. It consists of the set of desired updates (all communicative effects that
the discourse unit should achieve), the set of presupposed/shared knowledge, and the
set of private knowledge of the speaker agent. Importantly, the outline describes how
the communicative goal can be decomposed into ‘incremental microplanning tasks’
(impt) for the mpp-level. Each impt consists of (i) a subset of the communicative
goal’s desired updates that belong together and fit into one utterance unit, and (ii) the
presupposed and private knowledge needed to generate this utterance unit. On the
mpp-level, the impt is provided to the spud-algorithm, which generates the utterance
unit’s surface form and communicative intent as described in section 6.2.1.
The overall generation process in spudinc is centrally controlled. impts are incre-
mentally requested from the mcp-level and passed on to the mcp-level. Based on the
representation of communicative intent of the generated utterance units, the achieved
communicative effects are then added to the agent’s discourse context and removed
from its private knowledge.
Both discourse unit planning on the mcp-level and utterance unit generation on
the mpp-level have access to the representation of discourse context. Thus the spud-
algorithm is aware if a desired update of an impt has already been communicated in a
previous utterance unit and can take this information into account during generation.
Despite the individual generation of utterance units, the overall discourse unit can
thus adhere to pragmatic principles and be coherent.
Generation example The following example illustrates the incremental generation
of a discourse unit with the communicative effect of making two upcoming events
later in the same week known to the interlocutor.
The first event is the class ‘CS 533 Computational Linguistics’ which takes place
on 27 March 2002, a Wednesday, from 11:30 to 13:20. The information that describes
this event is specified as follows:
e1 : subject(e1, ‘CS 533’), on(e1, t1), from(e1, t1), to(e1, t2),until(e1, t2),
t1 : day(t1, ‘27’),month(t1, ‘mar’), time(t1, ‘11’, ‘30’),dow(t1, ‘wed’), (6.1)
t2 : day(t2, ‘27’),month(t2, ‘mar’), time(t2, ‘13’, ‘20’),dow(t1, ‘wed’).
The second event, ‘Lunch’, takes place on the same day, from 13:20 to 14:00:
e2 : subject(e2, ‘Lunch’), on(e2, t3), from(e1, t3), to(e2, t4),until(e2, t4),
t3 : day(t3, ‘27’),month(t3, ‘mar’), time(t3, ‘13’, ‘20’),dow(t3, ‘wed’), (6.2)
t4 : day(t4, ‘27’),month(t4, ‘mar’), time(t4, ‘14’, ‘00’),dow(t4, ‘wed’),
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The information about the two events eqs. (6.1) and (6.2), together with the inform-
ation that they should be announced, is provided as the set of desired communicative
effects to the mcp level of spudinc. The utterance outline for a discourse unit that
makes such announcements consists of a variable number of incremental microplan-
ning tasks (depending on the number of events to announce; in this example seven
impts, one for marking the speech act, three to communicate the details of each
event).
The first impt (see table 6.2) desires a single update intro(announce). It is provided
to the spud-algorithm which, using a single linguistic resource which has no presup-
positions and asserts intro(announce), constructs the utterance unit with the surface
form Die Termine sind (‘The events are’)79.
The next three impts (2–4 in table 6.2) communicate the information of event
e1, eq. (6.1): date, time slot, and subject. The desired updates for impt3, for example,
are start time— from(e1, t1)—and end time— until(e1, t2)—of the event. The spud-
algorithm generates the utterance unit von 11 Uhr 30 bis 13 Uhr 20 (‘from 11:30 to
13:20’), see fig. 6.2 for the resulting derived tree.80 The communicative effects that are
actually achieved, go beyond the requested (desired) updates. Details of the timing
information (start and end time in hours and minutes) are part of the utterance unit,
and, thus, time(t1, 11, 30) and time(t2, 13, 20) are part of its communicative intent, and
its set of achieved updates.
The second event (e2) is described in the next three impts (5–7 in table 6.2). The
realisation of impt5, which should communicate its date, is realised in a different way
than the corresponding impt2 for event e1. As both event intervals ‘meet’ at 13:20 on 27
March 2002 (e1 ends and e2 starts at that point of time) and e1 was communicated right
before e2, the spud-algorithm generates the utterance unit und direkt danach (‘and
directly afterwards’), see fig. 6.2 for the resulting derived tree. The meets-relationship
between the two events is encodedwith a semantic constraint on the linguistic resource
s— (direkt, danach). It can only be used if (i) a formula until(e1,Ti) can be presupposed
(i.e., is in the common ground), (ii) when the set of desired updates contains the
formulae at(e2,Tj) and until(e2,Tj), and (iii) if the variables Ti and Tj match. This is
the case for t2 and t3, see eqs. (6.1) and (6.2). The generated utterance unit implicitly
79. Generated utterance units are in German.
80. The linguistic resources used in this example—and in the attentive speaker system described in
chapter 8—differ from linguistically well-founded general ltag grammars, such as for example xtag
(XTAG Research Group 2001) for English, or a recent corpus-derived pltag grammar for German
(Kaeshammer and Demberg 2012) that could enable incremental generation. spudinc ’s linguistic resources
have been engineered, rather pragmatically, for the generation of domain specific discourse units describing
calendar events and operations. This is also due to the fact that available wide coverage ltag-grammars
lack the semantics needed for generation.
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impt3 s
prep
von
untiltime, e1
time, t1
time, t1
11 Uhr 30
untiltime∗, e1
prep
bis
time, t2
time, t2
13 Uhr 20
from(e1 , t1) ∧ time(t1 , ‘11’, ‘30’) ∧ until(e1 , t2) ∧ time(t2 , ‘13’, ‘20’)
Figure 6.2: Derived tree of the utterance unit von 11 Uhr 30 bis 13 Uhr 20 (‘from
11:30 to 13:20’) generated from impt3 (see table 6.2). Duplicate nodes connected by
a coloured line show the construction from linguistic resources, achieved through
taglet-operations substitution (yellow connection) and sister adjunction (green
connection; in this case post-modification), and are unified.
communicates the start time of e2. In addition to the update on(e2, t3), impt5 thus
achieves the update from(e2, t3), which was originally designated as a desired update
for the next impt.
As from(e2, t3) is already part of the discourse context when processing the sixth
incremental microplanning task, there is no need for the utterance unit to be generated
to explicitly communicate the start time of e2. The result is bis 14 Uhr (‘until 14:00’),
see table 6.2.
Discussion The outline of a discourse unit that the mcp-level of spudinc processes
and transforms into incrementalmicroplanning tasks is similar to themodern ‘template-
based’ natural language generation approaches discussed in van Deemter et al. (2005).
These use templates which allow for recursive embedding of other templates or chunks
of language that are ‘properly’ generated (e.g., referring expressions) and also make
sense from a speech production point of view as speakers often use ‘routines’ that are
nevertheless subject to situation specific adaptations (Pickering and Garrod 2004, § 5,
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Table 6.2: spudinc example generation of a discourse unit that announces two upcom-
ing events (specified in eqs. [6.1] and [6.2]). Based on the outline for such announce-
ment acts, the mcp-level incrementally generates seven incremental microplanning
task (impts) for the discourse unit, each of which specifies a set of updates that are
desired to be achieved. On the mpp-level the spud-algorithm generates an utterance
unit for each of these impts (translated from German). The interpretation of each
utterance unit (its communicative intent) achieves a set of communicative effects.
mcp-level mpp-level
impt desired updates utterance unit achieved updates
1 intro(announce) The events are: intro(announce)
2 on(e1 , t1) on Wednesday on(e1 , t1),
day(t1 , ‘27’),
dow(t1 , ‘wed’),
month(t1 , ‘mar’)
3 from(e1 , t1),
until(e1 , t2) from 11:30 to 13:20 from(e1 , t1),time(t1 , ‘11’, ‘30’),
until(e1 , t2),
time(t2 , ‘13’, ‘20’)
4 subject(e1 , ‘CS 533’) CS 533 subject(e1 , ‘CS 533’)
5 on(e2 , t3)
and
and directly afterwards on(e2 , t3),
from(e2 , t2)
and
6 from(e2 , t3),
until(e2 , t4) until 14:00 from(e2 , t3),until(e2 , t4),
time(t4 , ‘14’, ‘00’)
7 subject(e2 , ‘Lunch’) Lunch subject(e2 , ‘Lunch’)
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impt5 s
direkt danach
at(e2 , t3) ∧ from(e2 , t3)
s*
und
and ∧
Figure 6.3: Derived tree of the utterance unit und direkt danach (‘and directly after-
wards’) generated from impt5 (see table 6.2). As in fig. 6.2, the connection by a green
line indicates a sister adjunction (in this case pre-modification) of two linguistic re-
sources. The use of the resource s— (direkt, danach) is enabled by a semantic constraint
modelling the relationship between event e2 and the preceding event e1.
especially § 5.2.2). We thus think that it makes sense to use these flexible template-like
structures on the planning level.
Natural language generation is a computationally complex problem as the search
space is very large and finding a solution to a communicative goal can take a con-
siderable amount of time, especially when generating long utterances.81 Utterance
unit-based incremental generation in spudinc does not suffer from this problem as the
incremental microplanning tasks on the mpp-level are usually small (in comparison to
microplanning tasks for whole discourse units). In addition, usable output is already
available after the first utterance unit of a discourse unit. This has the potential to
increase the responsiveness of an artificial conversational agents, important for the
design of conversational, ‘human-like spoken dialogue systems’ (Edlund et al. 2008).
Apart from these computational aspects, incremental generation brings a range
of interactive phenomena that are fundamental to successful human conversation
into reach of artificial conversational agents. Agents can, for example, start speaking
before they actually have enough information to form a complete communicative goal
(Skantze and Hjalmarsson 2013), produce incremental self repair if needed (Hough
2015), or produce compound contribution with their interlocutor (Howes et al. 2011).
81. Even for a rather small fragment of German used in the spudlite-based (Stone 2002) non-incremental,
alignment-capable microplanner spudprime (Buschmeier et al. 2010), the generation of ten-word-sentences
could take several seconds.
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In general, the ability to update the message in response to ‘interactive demands’
(Brown-Schmidt and Konopka 2014, p. 842)—overtly noticeable or not— can enable
the interactive adaptations, described in section 2.3.1. In the following, we describe
our approach to adaptation.
6.2.3 ADAPTIVE GENERATION IN SPUDIA
spudinc’s capability to generate language in utterance units makes it possible to change
increments as long as they have not yet been overtly realised, or, if an utterance unit
has already been verbalised, generate a self-repair and re-generate a different version of
(only) that utterance unit that is in need of repair. In the following we present spudia, a
version of spudinc that is adaptive on both levels of processing: mcp and mpp. spudia
allows changes until the impt affected by the change is passed from the mcp-level to
the mpp-level. Depending on how generated utterance units are realised in speech
(see section 6.3 and especially section 8.3.5), this means that changes are possible
almost until the preceding increment finishes. Interactive dialogue phenomena can
thus be dealt with in a timely manner.
On the mcp-level, changes to the communicative goal itself can be dynamically
incorporated into the generation process. When conceptualising the utterance outline
as a queue of impts that need to be communicated, incremental microplanning,
from an mcp-perspective, means taking the first element from the impt-queue and
passing it to the mpp-level and continue doing so until the queue is empty. Given this
perspective, adaptation on the mcp-level can be framed in terms of operations that
alter the queue. impts may get inserted into, or removed from the queue, or their
position in the queue— relative to the other impts—may be changed.
A conversational agent might want to repeat an impt that has just been generated
and realised, for example, when it becomes aware of a perception problem on the side
of the interlocutor. This can be achieved by re-inserting the impt that has just been
removed from the front of the queue back to same position, optionally in combination
with another impt that contains information for the incremental generation of a repair
marker. A conversational agent might want to skip an impt instead of generating
it, e.g., when the information it contains is already known, or not relevant given the
interlocutor’s current level of understanding. In this case the impt is simply removed
from the queue and will thus never be passed to mpp. Similarly, a conversational agent
might want to extend the discourse unit, to dynamically provide more context, for
example. One or more impts containing the desired updates can be inserted into the
queue at appropriate positions. A conversational agent might also want to postpone
or bring forward a planned impt. This can be done by shifting the impt within the
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Table 6.3: Examples of adapted natural language output, subject to variation due
to different adaptation mechanisms. Redundancy can either be prohibited (a) or
permitted (b). Verbosity can take different strength, from low to high (c–d). On
a structural level, utterance units can be skipped (f ), produced as planned (g), or
postponed for an adapted repetition of the previous chunk (h). A ‘◇’ marks utterance
unit boundaries, a ‘ε’, shows where an utterance unit/impt has been skipped.
Mechanism Generated output
Redundancy a morgen ◇ von 11 Uhr 30 bis 13 Uhr 20
‘(tomorrow ◇ from 11:30 to 13:20)’
b morgen den 27. März ◇ 11 Uhr 30 bis 13 Uhr 20 Uhr
‘(tomorrow 27 March ◇ 11:30 to 13:20)’
Verbosity c CS 533
‘CS 533’
d Betreff: CS 533
‘subject: CS 533’
e mit dem Betreff CS 533
‘with the subject: CS 533’
Structure f ε ◇ 11 Uhr 30 ◇ CS 533
‘ε ◇ 11:30 ◇ CS 533’
g morgen ◇ 11 Uhr 30 ◇ CS 533
‘tomorrow ◇ 11:30 ◇ CS 533’
h morgen ◇ 11 Uhr 30 ◇ ähm ◇ von 11 Uhr 30 bis 13 Uhr 30 ◇ CS 533
‘(tomorrow ◇ 13:20 ◇ uhm ◇ 11:30 to 13:20 ◇ CS533’
queue. Table 6.3f–h shows example surface forms given various adaptation operations.
In addition to such structural changes, more local changes to the communicative
goal are also mediated by the mcp-level as the knowledge of how the communicative
effects of a discourse unit are distributed across individual impts and utterance units
resides there. Communicative effects of an impt can thus be updated (e.g., in light of
new information), added (e.g., to make a discourse unit more redundant), or removed
(to make it simpler).
Adaptations operating on the mpp-level influence the choices (lexical and syn-
tactic) that microplanning makes while transforming impts into communicative
intent and surface form. As these choices are ultimately determined by spud’s heur-
istic function—which evaluates the candidate next search states during generation
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and determines which linguistic resource will be integrated into the provisional tree
next82— , adaptation is achieved through dynamic changes in its parametrisation.
If the state of understanding attributed to the interlocutor is low, for example, the
heuristic function may rank candidate search states that contain redundancy higher,
although redundancy is normally dis-preferred in spud.
Adaptation in mcp is controlled top-down, for example by dialogue management.
Adaptation in mpp on the other hand depends on the task given and on the status of
the knowledge used during generation. The details are then governed by the global
parameter settings mpp uses during generation.
If there is, for example, reason for the system to believe that the current increment
was not communicated clearly because of noise in the transmission channel, the
mcp process might delay future impts and initiate a repair of the current one by
re-inserting it at the beginning of the list of upcoming impts of this utterance outline.
The mpp process’ next task then is to re-generate the same impt again. Due to changes
in the state information and situation that influence microplanning, the resulting
communicative intent and surface form might differ from the previous one.
6.2.4 ADAPTATION MECHANISMS IN SPUDIA
A number of adaptation mechanism are integrated into our nlg-microplanning
system. The goal of these mechanisms is to respond to a dialogue partner’s changing
abilities to perceive and/or understand the information the system wants to convey.
The mechanisms are implemented either with the knowledge and its conversational
status used in generation (i.e., basically relying onwhat is considered common ground)
or by altering the decision structure of spud’s search algorithm’s heuristic function.
Similar to the approach of flexible natural language generation described by Mair-
esse and Walker (2010), the latter mechanisms are conditioned upon individual flags
(see table 6.4), which, in our case, are set based on the value of the attributed listener
state’ variable U (which represents the level of understanding the system attributes to
the user). spudia thusmakes its adaptation decisions in a way similar to how decisions
in speech production aremade according to theminimal partner model theory (Galati
and Brennan 2010; Brennan et al. 2010), see section 2.3.5. In the following we describe
two adaptation mechanisms: verbosity and redundancy.
82. As in spudcoref , the evaluation function in spudia creates an order of the candidate next states. This
ordering is done according to a number of criteria (ordered descendingly by importance), for example,
which candidate search state achieves more desired updates, which is less ambiguous, etc. The order of two
candidate next states is determined as soon as a criterion favours one over the other.
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Table 6.4: Description of adaptation flags in spudia. Flags are set centrally in as soon
as an update to the attributed listener state representation becomes available.
Flag Description
GROUND-EFFECT Add all asserted information to the local representation of in-
formation status so that they can be presupposed in subsequent
parts of the utterance unit
PREFER-REDUNDANCY May use redundant expression
USE-SHORT-DATE May use a short date format, e.g. next Wednesday instead of
next Wednesday, 27 March
USE-RELATIVE-DAYS May use relative days like ‘today’ and ‘tomorrow’ to describe
dates
USE-RELATIVE-TIME May leave out date and start time information for a subsequent
event, if events are happening one after the other
NO-END-TIME May refer to events only by their start time.
REFER-ONLY-BY-NAME May refer to an event only by its title (e.g., when an event is
moved)
USE-SIMPLE-SUBJECT May use the simpler description for an event.
Verbosity The first mechanism aims at influencing the length of an utterance unit
by making it either more or less verbose. The idea is that actual language use of human
speakers does not adheres to idealised principle such as ‘textual economy’ (Stone et al.
2003). This is not only the case for reasons of cognitive constraints during speech
production, but also because words and phrases that do not contribute much to an
utterance’s semantics can serve a function, for example by drawing attention to specific
aspects of an utterance or by giving the listener time to process.
To be able to vary utterance verbosity, we annotated the linguistic resources
in our system with values of their verbosity (these are hand-crafted similar to the
rule’s annotation with production costs). During generation in mpp the values of all
linguistic resources used in a (provisional) utterance are added up and used as one
factor in spud’s heuristic function. When comparing two provisional utterances that
only deviate in their verbosity value, the one that is nearer to a requested verbosity level
is chosen. Depending on this level, more or less verbose constructions are chosen and
it is decided whether utterance units are enriched with additional words. Table 6.3c–e
show the differences in surface forms of impt4 (see table 6.2), generated with three
different levels of verbosity.
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Redundancy The second adaptation mechanism is redundancy. Again, redundancy
is something that an ideal utterance does not contain and by design spud penalises
the use of redundancy in its heuristic function. Two provisional utterances being equal,
the one exhibiting less redundancy is normally preferred. But similar to verbosity,
redundancy serves communicative functions in actual language use. It can highlight
important information, it can increase the probability of themessage being understood,
and is often used to repair misunderstanding.
In incremental microplanning, redundant information can be present both within
one utterance unit (e.g., tomorrow, 27 March, . . . vs. tomorrow . . . or across impts.
For the former case, we modified spud’s search heuristic in order to conditionally
either prefer an utterance that contains redundant information or an utterance that
only contains what is absolutely necessary. Table 6.3a,b show the differences in surface
forms for this. In the latter case, redundancy only becomes an option when later
impts enable the choice of repeating information previously conveyed and therefore
already established as shared knowledge. This is controlled via the internal structure
of an impt and thus decided on the level of mcp.
In the following section we briefly show how adaptive incremental generation in
spudia works together with speech synthesis.
6.3 ADAPTIVE INCREMENTAL SPEECH SYNTHESIS AND
BEHAVIOUR REALISATION
In Buschmeier et al. (2012), we integrated spudia with the incremental speech syn-
thesis component inpro-iss (Baumann and Schlangen 2012a)83, which, by using
just-in-time processing, supports changes to ‘unspoken’ parts of an ongoing utter-
ance. In order to provide some right context (i.e., lookahead), which is important
for synthesising coherent inter-unit intonation, spudia generates the second unit
directly after the first. inpro-iss then synthesises both units. Shortly before the first
has been fully spoken the third utterance unit is incrementally generated to serve as
right context for the (re-)synthesis of the second unit, and so on. In this approach the
increment size can be kept to a single utterance unit.
In an evaluation of the integration of spudia and inpro-iss we could show
(Buschmeier et al. 2012, § 6.1) that incremental natural language generation and speech
synthesis can significantly reduce the response time (time between generation start
and speaking start) from an average of 1582ms if both components operate in non-
83. inpro-iss is based on the mary text-to-speech system (Schröder and Trouvain 2003).
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incremental mode to 271ms if they operate incrementally and interact in the way
described above84 (Buschmeier et al. 2012, tbl. 2).
We also evaluated the responsiveness and adaptivity of the system in situations
where information presentationwas randomly interrupted by noise bursts thatmasked
the speech signal (ibid., § 6.2). The evaluation compared system utterances generated
and synthesised in three conditions: (A) non-incremental non-adaptive speech pro-
duction that does not respond to noise at all, (B) non-incremental non-adaptive speech
production that pauses upon noise detection and resumes afterwards, and (C) fully
incremental adaptive speech production that pauses at the next word boundary when
noise is detected and resumes speaking after the interruption by regenerating and re-
synthesising the interrupted utterance unit with altered adaptation parameters. Twelve
participants rated 27 randomly noise-interrupted system utterances (nine from each
condition) for human-likeness on a seven-point Likert scale. The incremental and
adaptive behaviour, condition (C), was rated statistically significantly more human-
like than the behaviours of the systems in conditions (A) and (B) between which no
difference could be found (see ibid., § 6.2, for details of the analysis).
The method to articulate the incrementally generated utterances implemented
in the attentive speaker agent, is less sophisticated than the one described in this
section. The agent synthesises each utterance unit in isolation, which results in less
than optimal utterance intonation. The interplay between incremental generation and
behaviour realisation is described in section 8.3.5.
6.4 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this chapter we developed and described the natural language generation compon-
ent spudia, which is able to generate utterances in increments of the size of utterance
units, and can adapt these increments as well as the structure of the utterance in
real-time during generation.
This approach is efficient from a computational point of view since (i) generating
only the first increment of an utterance uses far fewer resources and ismuch faster than
generating the complete utterance at once, and (ii) re-generation in face of feedback
is usually limited to a small part of an utterance. Being able to adapt on this level of
granularity often results in utterances that are adapted to the listeners’ needs (in real-
time) but often do not even show signs of adaptation (overt self-repair). Redundancy,
e.g., may be introduced in the next increment even though it was initially unplanned.
84. With a minor draw back in intonation quality (timing deviation 0.81ms, pitch deviation 7.08Hz),
response time can be improved further if generation of the next utterance unit is deferred up until the first
word of the current utterance unit has been spoken (Baumann and Schlangen 2012b).
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Adapted generation is thus similar to adapted human language production, which
can also alter yet-unspoken parts of an utterance before articulation.
So far, the repertoire and complexity of the strategies and mechanism for adaptive
language generation are quite limited in extent and should only be considered a
first step towards the creative adaptation of utterances in speech production that
human speakers are capable of. One aspect that should be improved in future work is
that adaptation is heuristic, i.e., based on spud’s heuristic function. Although spud
evaluates different utterance alternatives, this comparison is done without explicitly
reflecting on the likely effects and utilities of a specific adaptation. Ideally, adaptation
would also be a coordinated action among different levels.

CHAPTER 7
FEEDBACK ELICITATION
In this chapter we address the third capability that an attentive speaker agent is sup-
posed to have: being able to lead its interlocutors to provide as much communicative
feedback as it needs in order to be well informed about their listening-related mental
states. Based on the insight that the attributed listener state may, at times, not be
informative enough to allow the agent to adapt its language production processes,
we devise criteria for detecting such an ‘informational need’. These are then used to
decide when to generate explicit feedback elicitation cues.
7.1 SEEKING EVIDENCE OF UNDERSTANDING
As described in section 2.3.3, dialogue can be regarded as an ongoing process of
collaborative hypothesis testing (Brennan 1990, pp. 30–33): a view on dialogue inwhich
utterances are formulations of speakers’ hypotheses about their interlocutors’ common
ground and responses to utterances are expected to provide evidence for (or against)
the hypotheses that are being tested. Hypothesis testing plays a crucial role in dialogue,
as it guides the speakers’ language production process. If the hypotheses tested in an
utterance (e.g., an assumption about something being part of the common ground)
turn out to be true, because the listener signals understanding and acts accordingly, the
speaker’s communicative act can be considered successful and the previously uncertain
grounding status of the propositions can be updated to reflect this new information.
If, however, the hypotheses turn out to have been (partially) wrong, the speaker can
provide extra information and then reformulate her utterance in an adapted way.
Brennan (ibid., pp. 77–79) notes that grounding is an incremental (possibly even
continuous) process and thus hypothesis testing can be done incrementally as well.
If an interlocutor provides evidence of understanding while a speaker’s utterance is
☆ This chapter contains material previously published in Buschmeier and Kopp (2011; 2014).
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still ongoing, they might immediately take this updated information into account and
adapt.
Speakers are seeking evidence of understanding from their interlocutors, who
are usually willing to provide this information and even take the initiative, as— for
cooperative interactions— this behaviour is in the interest of both dialogue parti-
cipants as both are responsible for dialogue success and such cooperation makes the
overall dialogue more efficient (Clark and Krych 2004). Being the ones that test their
hypothesis overtly, speakers continuously ‘monitor[. . . ] addressees for understand-
ing’ (ibid.), on multiple levels, and take evidence from different sources into account
(e.g., verbal contributions, but also their speech-accompanying gestures and, in task-
oriented settings, their task-related actions). Communicative feedback is especially
well suited for incremental hypothesis testing, because it allows to provide evidence
of understanding (inter alia) in overlap to ongoing utterances.
If the evidence provided by interlocutors, however, is insufficient for verifying
or refuting a hypothesis— e.g., because they are not particularly active listeners or
only provide feedback of limited informativeness— speakers may pro-actively seek
evidence of understanding in the form of communicative listener feedback (ibid.,
p. 64). This can be achieved by producing feedback elicitation cues (e.g., Gravano and
Hirschberg 2011).
Here, we propose that one factor in determining when to elicit feedback from an
interlocutor are a speaker’s ‘information needs’. At given points in the dialogue, an
attentive speaker agent may be sufficiently certain of a human interlocutor’s listening-
related mental state. In these cases, additional feedback by the interlocutor might not
actually be informative. In other situations, however, the agent’s uncertainty about an
interlocutor’s listening-related mental state may not warrant well-grounded choices
in language generation, or may even be completely unknown. Furthermore, when
choices for strategies and mechanisms for adaptive generation are limited, the agent
needs to know in which listening-related mental state—of a number of the states
it knows how to deal with— the interlocutor is most likely to be found. Given that
such information needs occur, eliciting feedback from the human interlocutor is one
strategy to ensure and achieve an effective dialogue.
In the following, we present a model that enables artificial conversational agents
to determine when to elicit feedback by assessing their information needs about their
human interlocutors’ listening-relatedmental state when processing an utterance. This
model informs the agent’s decision making for the generation of feedback elicitation
cues.
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7.2 INFORMATION NEEDS AND FEEDBACK REQUESTS
An assumption commonly made in research on backchannels and communicative
feedback is that listeners in dialogue produce feedback, at least partly, in response
to behavioural ‘elicitation cues’ by their interaction partners85. These cues have been
analysed extensively. It has been found that acoustic features (Gravano andHirschberg
2011; Koiso et al. 1998; Ward and Tsukahara 2000), syntactic information (Gravano
and Hirschberg 2011; Koiso et al. 1998), gaze (Bavelas et al. 2002), as well as head
gestures (McClave 2000; Heylen 2006) play a role in eliciting feedback responses
from listeners. The mechanism used to identify feedback elicitation cues used in these
studies, however, is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, only cues that were actually
followed by listener feedback were analysed (i.e., only those cues to which listeners
responded). Secondly, speech that preceded listener feedback signals was assumed
to contain a cue (i.e., the possibility that the listener produced the feedback signal
without being cued by the speaker is not accounted for). Consequently, these types of
analyses miss some of the cues that speakers actually produced, while categorising
behaviours as a cue that may not have been intended as such.
These problems have been addressed by having multiple listeners respond to the
same speaker behaviour in either a ‘parasocial interaction’ setting (Huang et al. 2010)
or by creating the illusion of being in a one-on-one interaction with the speaker for
more than one listener simultaneously (de Kok and Heylen 2012). These methods
seek to remedy the first problem by increasing the range of available cues (different
listeners responding to different cues). Similarly, the second problemmay be remedied
by clustering feedback (places in the speaker’s speech that are followed by feedback
signals from multiple listeners are more likely to contain a cue). Nevertheless, the
form-features in feedback elicitation cues have proven informative enough to enable
automatic detection of feedback elicitation cues in audiovisual data-streams and have
been successfully used to model the feedback behaviour of virtual agents (Morency
et al. 2010; Schröder et al. 2012).
A different line of research has shown that artificial conversational agents produ-
cing synthetic feedback elicitation cues while speaking, actually received feedback
responses from their human interaction partners. Elicitation cues were either gen-
erated using an hmm-based speech synthesis system trained on a corpus of acted
speech containing elicitation cues at interpausal unit (ipu) boundaries (Misu et al.
85. It should be noted that communicative feedback serves functions for listeners as well, e.g., they can
signal comprehension problems early on so that speakers can address them before they get worse. Such
cases of feedback may not be a response to an elicitation cue of the currently speaking interaction partner.
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2011b; Misu et al. 2011a), or by adding prosodic and non-verbal cues to the behaviour
repertoire of a virtual agent (Reidsma et al. 2011).
What is not proposed by either of these two approaches—nor in the general liter-
ature on feedback— is a theory ofwhen andwhy speakers produce feedback elicitation
cues. Empirically, this is due to the problems involved in identifying elicitation cues
as described above. From a theoretical point of view, cues are produced at different
levels of intentionality. They can be fully intentional, e.g., when the speaker wants to
know whether the listener understood what was said. They can also be produced by
convention, e.g., by inviting a backchannel at the end of an IPU. Additionally, they
can also occur purely coincidentally, e.g., a breathing pause by the speaker might be
taken as a response opportunity.
In the following, we will concentrate on intentional feedback elicitation cues which
are strategically produced by speakers with the aim of obtaining more—possibly
new— information about their interlocutors’ listening-related mental states (i.e., cues
produced out of ‘information needs’), most likely to reduce the uncertainty about the
state of the dialogue.
Another common assumption is that communicative feedback and backchannels
are one and the same, and that listeners, when giving feedback, merely communicate
that speakers can continue speaking. Under this assumption, it would be sufficient
for feedback elicitation cue placement to be governed by simple rules. As argued
throughout this thesis, backchannels are, however, just one type of feedback. As
feedback signals can be much richer in their form and often fulfil specific functions
that go beyond the backchannel, strategically placing feedback elicitation cues in a
turn can be used as a way of querying information from listeners.
7.3 CRITERIA FOR ELICITING FEEDBACK
Our assumption for modelling when speakers elicit feedback is just that. Feedback
is elicited in situations where speakers have specific ‘information needs’ that can be
fulfilled by listeners by providing feedback.When seeking to identify these information
needs, both the attributed listener state at the current point in time as well as its
history—how it developed into this state— are relevant. We propose three criteria
that we consider useful for assessing whether an agent has an information need and
should elicit feedback from its human interlocutor.
1. When its belief about the human interlocutor’s listening-related mental state is
not very informative (i.e., when the attributed listener state has high entropy86).
86. The entropy of the probability distribution Pr(X) of a random variable X with values x ∈ Val(X) is
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2. When its belief about the human interlocutor’s listening-related mental state is
static over an extended period of time (i.e., when no feedback was received).
3. When its belief about the human interlocutor’s listening-related mental state
is different from a desired mental state (e.g., sufficient understanding, high
agreement) that is intended as the result of a specific communicative action
by the agent or interactive adaptation in a previous utterance (i.e., when the
attributed listener state diverges, by a given degree, from a given ‘reference
state’).
A maximal uncertainty about the mental state of an interlocutor would manifest
in a uniform probability distribution across the values of (one or more) variables,
e.g., when Pr(U) = (1⁄3 , 1⁄3 , 1⁄3)T . Conversely, uncertainty would be minimal in a
maximally skewed, degenerate distribution such as, e.g., Pr(U) = (0, 0, 1)T . This way
of measuring uncertainty, i.e., in terms of entropy, assumes that the underlying state
of the interlocutor is of a discrete nature, rather than fuzzy and with considerable
variance persisting over time. We therefore combine the first, entropy-based, criterion
with an operationalisation of the third criterion by quantifying the distance between
the probability distributions of the current state of a variable and a ‘reference state’
such as, for example, a state that represents very good or very bad understanding. We
measure this difference using the ‘Kullback-Leibler divergence’87.
Figure 7.1 shows a worked example88 of how the Kullback-Leibler divergence
between the current ALS-variables P, U, and AC and positive and negative reference
states of these variables89 changes over time (fig. 7.1b), alongside the temporal dy-
namics of the variables themselves (fig. 7.1a). In the example, the dynamic attributed
listener state network receives feedback of positive understanding as input at t1, and
defined as
E(︀X⌋︀ = −∑
x
PrX(x) ⋅ ln PrX(x).
Entropy is a scalar value, which we use to quantify uncertainty, with which it is positively correlated.
87. The Kullback-Leibler divergence (Kullback and Leibler 1951) of two discrete probability distributions
P and Q is defined as
DKL(P ⋃︀⋃︀ Q) =∑
i
P(i) ⋅ ln P(i)
Q(i) .
It is a scalar value greater or equal to zero, with DKL(P ⋃︀⋃︀ Q) = 0 for P = Q, i.e., the more similar the two
distributions P and Q are, the smaller their KL-divergence.
88. The underlying Bayesian network model as well as methods for assessing the criteria for information
need used in this example are archived and available at doi: 10.6084/m9.figshare.4725538 .
89. For this example we define the positive reference state as Pr(X+) = (0.01, 0.3, 0.69)T and the negative
reference state as Pr(X−) = (0.69, 0.3, 0.01)T , for X ∈ {P,U ,AC}. ¶ The implementation of the attentive
speaker agent uses slightly less skewed reference states, namely Pr(X+) = (0.01, 0.4, 0.59)T and Pr(X−) =(0.59, 0.4, 0.01)T .
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Figure 7.1: (a) Temporal dynamics of the speaker’s degrees of belief in the ALS-variables
P, U, and AC in a simulated feedback condition where the listener provides under-
standing feedback of medium certainty at t1 (visualised by the dotted vertical line),
simultaneously gazing near the target object until t2. (b) Kullback-Leibler divergence
between the distribution of the ALS-variables and the positive/negative reference
states. (c) Entropy of the ALS-variables. The solid vertical line at t6 visualises a con-
dition where the speaker can elicit feedback. Dashed lines show how the speaker’s
degrees of belief would develop when the listener immediately responds with non-
understanding feedback of medium certainty while gazing towards the speaker.
the information that the interlocutor gazes near the target object until t2. No more
feedback is received and fed into the network after this. The plots of the KL-divergence
show that understanding is believed to be mediocre with a tilt towards low under-
standing and with some volatility at the beginning when feedback is received. The
difference between the distributions of the variable U and the positive and negative
reference distributions is not very large, however. In contrast, perception clearlymoves
toward low, and acceptance is believed to be skewed towards low almost from the
beginning. The KL-divergence with the negative reference distributions is almost 0.
Based on this, we can assess the speaker’s information needs by looking for points
where (1) the KL-divergence to a positive reference distribution (representing an ALS
with sufficient certainty and positive listener attributes) has a value higher by a given
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amount α than what is desired (criterion 3),
DKL(Pr(Ut), Pr(X+)) > α, α = 1.0
and (2) where changes in the KL-divergence from one step to the next are smaller than
a given value δ, i.e., when the values converge and the belief state becomes almost
static (criterion 2):
DKL(Pr(Ut−1), Pr(X+)) − DKL(Pr(Ut), Pr(X+)) < δ, δ = 0.1
Our model regards these as points where a speaker requires new information in order
to know how to deal with the dialogue situation.
Applying these criteria to the example in Figure 7.1 to assess a point in time where
feedback should be elicited, we find that they match at time t6 with α = 1.03 and
δ = 0.077. Figure 7.1 visualises two contrasting situations in the development of the
belief state: (i) a feedback elicitation cue is produced, to which the listener responds
with feedback of negative understanding (dashed lines), (ii) or no elicitation cue is
produced and no feedback is received (solid lines).
7.4 ELICITING FEEDBACK
In the attentive speaker agent, we use a decision mechanism based on criteria 3 and 2.
After an utterance unit (Traum and Heeman 1997; see section 6.2.2) produced by the
agent has been communicated we compute the difference of the posterior marginal
probability distribution of the ALS-variableU from a positive reference state as well as
its dynamics. If the computed values exceed the thresholds for α and δ90 the behaviour
generation components immediately plan and realise an explicit multimodal feedback
elicitation cue that consists of a specific gaze behaviour (see section 8.3.6), a pause,
and possibly a verbal cue (see section 8.3.4 for details of the implementation of this
mechanism). This combination ofmultiple cues increases the likelihood that an agent’s
human interlocutor responds with feedback.
In general, planning and realisation of feedback elicitation cues should take into
account that different types and forms of cues are likely to elicit different types of
feedback. Cues should thus be chosen based on the type of information need, i.e., the
feedback type, that the agent wants to elicit, taking into account that not all elicitation
cues may be applicable in a certain utterance context or dialogue situation (e.g., some
utterances might not be suitable to be followed by okay?). This choice mechanism
could be realised with the help of a probabilistic mapping from requirements to
elicitation cues, as illustrated in fig. 7.2.
90. The thresholds in the implemented attentive speaker agent are set to α = 0.85 and δ = 0.2.
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Figure 7.2: Probabilistic mapping of elicitation cues {a, b, . . . , z} that are applicable in
certain utterance contexts or dialogue situations {1, 2, . . . , n} to the feedback types C,
P, U, AC, and AG with which listeners are likely to respond to these cues.
7.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this chapter we addressed an attentive speaker agent’s capability to elicit feedback
from its human interlocutors. In contrast to most accounts of feedback elicitation,
which deal with the formof elicitation cues and how they can be automatically detected
in human speech, the model developed here pursues the idea that feedback elicitation
has an underlying motivation, namely that speakers need information (e.g., evidence
of understanding) from their interaction partners in order to be able to verify or
refute the hypotheses that they test with their utterances, and to be able to adapt
their language production to their interlocutors’ needs. We defined the concept of
‘information need’ in relation to the representation of listening-related mental states
that speakers attribute to interlocutors and specified three criteria that can be used to
assess whether an information need is present on any of the levels of processing. This
model can serve as the basis for an attentive speaker agent’s decision making of when
to elicit feedback, i.e., when to generate a behavioural cue.
The criteria for assessing information needs that were presented should not be
regarded as definite or even exhaustive. The proposed criteria, based on simple
thresholds, should be seen as a first step towards a causal model for feedback eli-
citation. They are nevertheless sufficient to be applicable in an implemented attentive
speaker agent, as will be described in the following chapter. In a more advanced model
of feedback elicitation, the criteria should probably differ by level of processing and
co-vary with Clark’s (1996) grounding criterion.
PART III
EVALUATION

CHAPTER 8
BRINGING IT TOGETHER:
AN ATTENTIVE SPEAKER AGENT
In this chapter we describe how we bring together the three models for mental state
attribution, interactive adaptation, and feedback elicitation in an artificial conver-
sational agent that should be able to act as an attentive speaker. We first provide a
general overview of the agent’s information processing architecture, focussing on
aspects of behaviour generation, and argue that incremental processing is a necessary
requirement for being able to generate adaptive multimodal behaviour in real-time.
We present the approach to incrementality that we adopt, and discuss why and how
the behaviour generation architecture of the attentive speaker agent deviates from
standard approaches to behaviour generation. Following this, we describe how the
components in our architecture coordinate on the behaviour planning and realisation
task and how the attributed listener state interfaces with these components. We close
with a description of and motivation for the scenario in which the agent interacts with
the user.
8.1 OVERALL MODEL AND ARCHITECTURE
The overall architecture for the attentive speaker agent includes two information
processing streams: behaviour generation and input processing, linked via representa-
tions of the dialogue information state. Figure 8.1 shows an overview of the model, its
components and architecture.
☆ This chapter contains material previously published in Buschmeier and Kopp (2011) and Kopp et al.
(2014). The incremental processing middleware ipaaca, described in section 8.2.2, was designed and
developed in cooperation with Ramin Yaghoubzadeh, with contributions from Herwin van Welbergen,
Sebastian Kahl, and others. The dialogue framework, described in section 8.3.4, was also designed and
developed in cooperation with Ramin Yaghoubzadeh.
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Figure 8.1: Overview of the architecture for the attentive speaker agent consisting of
two processing branches (behaviour generation, and feedback processing, respectively
wizard interface) and an intermediate representation of information state. Arrows
between components visualise directed data flow. Arrows that end in diamonds visu-
alise that data is read from the representation that it attaches to.
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The behaviour generation stream of the architecture consists of five components. A
‘Dialogue Engine’ that manages and processes the agent’s agenda (what are the topics
to speak about) and decides upon the agent’s overall behaviour and timing (when
should the agent speak, whichmessage should it convey, when should it elicit feedback,
etc.). The dialogue engine is part dialogue manager and part behaviour planner. The
behaviour generation stream further consists of a ‘Gaze Planning’ component (see
section 8.3.6 below) which plans the agent’s gaze behaviour, and of the natural language
generation component ‘spudia’ (see section 6.2.3). Finally, the behaviour generation
branch contains the behaviour realisation component ‘AsapRealizer’ (Reidsma and
van Welbergen 2013; van Welbergen et al. 2014), which, in turn, makes use of the
‘CereVoice Engine’ for speech synthesis (by CereProc Ltd, Edinburgh, UK; Aylett and
Pidcock 2007), and drives the ‘ogre’ 3D rendering engine, which is used to render
the virtual conversational agent’s body in real-time computer graphics (ogre Team
2013).
The feedback processing stream of the architecture, greyed out in fig. 8.1, is not part
of the evaluated attentive speaker agent. Recognition and processing of multimodal
interlocutor feedback signals (speech and prosody, head gestures, gaze patterns) were
explored at the sideline of this thesis (see section 8.4.3), but did not yield results that
were reliable enough for actual interaction with the agent. To nevertheless be able
to evaluate the attentive speaker agent’s capabilities to interpret listener feedback in
the dialogue context and adapt ongoing utterances to the listeners’ needs, we decided
to use the ‘Wizard-of-Oz’ paradigm91. A human (the ‘wizard’) observes the human
interlocutors during the interaction with the agent and enters their feedback signals
into the system in real-time, using a graphical user interface (see section 9.3.5). The
human interlocutors are not aware of the wizard and are made believe that they
interact with a system that is capable of directly processing their behaviour.
The link between the two processing branches in the architecture consists of
a representation of the dialogue context (see section 8.3.4) and a component that
reasons about and represents the dynamic attributed listener state (ALS; see chapter 5
and section 8.4.2 below).
In the following, the individual components of the attentive speaker agent are
described from a technical perspective, focussing on the type of information that
is processed as well as the overall flow of information within the architecture. In
preparation for this, the next sectionwillmotivate the choice of incremental processing
91. The Wizard-of-Oz paradigm (Kelley 1983) is a common approach in research on human–agent and
human–robot interaction, where the wizard is usually used to simulate input processing technology that is
either not yet mature enough, not available at all, or not strictly necessary to answer the research question
(Riek 2012).
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as a principle of processing that underlies most of the components within the agent.
This is followed by a discussion of current architectural approaches to behaviour
generation and their limitations for incremental adaptive behaviour generation in
real-time.
8.2 INCREMENTAL PROCESSING
Human speech production is based on incremental processing (Levelt 1989). For being
able to participate in dialogue and conversation, incrementality of speech production
alone, however, does not suffice. Many phenomena that occur in dialogue have a
prerequisite of incremental processing on the comprehension side as well. There
is solid evidence that even low-level comprehension processes in non-interactive
language use are incremental and predictive (see, e.g., the line of research based on
the ‘visual world paradigm’, Tanenhaus et al. 1995). This is the case in interactive
settings as well (e.g., Tanenhaus and Brown-Schmidt 2008). A clear demonstration
that interlocutors’ behaviour is processed incrementally is also brought forth by high-
level dialogue phenomena such as listeners’ ability to produce feedback mid-utterance,
or ‘compound contributions’ (utterances that are seamlessly split across interlocutors,
see, e.g., Howes et al. [2011]).
8.2.1 INCREMENTAL PROCESSING FOR ARTIFICIAL
CONVERSATIONAL AGENTS
Buß and Schlangen (2010, §§ 2.1, 2.2) review ‘sub-utterance phenomena’ in dialogue:
linguistic feedback, hesitations, interruptions, turn-taking, and relevant non-linguistic
actions. They come to the conclusion that— if the goal is to go beyond shallow
processing— these phenomena can only be dealt with in an artificial conversational
agent (both from an understanding and generation perspective) if it does incremental
processing. Analysing prerequisites for fluid, real-time architectures for artificial
conversational agents (Kopp et al. 2014, § 2), we came to the same conclusion, and,
in addition, argued for tighter linking of input and output processing, as well as for
bottom-up and top-down flow of information.
It can be concluded that the cognitive processes for language use work increment-
ally and that artificial conversational agents need to do incremental processing in
order to be able to engage in natural, human-like dialogue with human interlocutors.
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8.2.2 THE IU-MODEL
For the attentive speaker agent we adopt the perspective and terminology of the ‘gen-
eral, abstract model of incremental dialogue processing’ developed by Schlangen and
Skantze (2011) and implement the agent’s components using our own implementation
of this model (‘ipaaca’; briefly described in Schlangen et al. 2010, § 3).
According to Schlangen and Skantze (2011), incremental processing can be mod-
elled in terms of ‘processing modules’ and ‘incremental units’ (ius). Processing mod-
ules consist of a left buffer, a right buffer, and a processing proper. The processing
proper carries out the actual computations, and consumes and posts ius from and to
its buffers92. Processing modules form networks, in which, depending on topology,
modules share ius. If a processing module posts an iu to its right buffer, it is immedi-
ately present in the left buffer of processing modules that it is connected to. In ipaaca,
the network topology is implicitly and functionally defined through categorisation of
incremental units. Posted ius are of certain categories. Processing modules that are
interested in ius of a category will find all ius of this category in their input buffers
and are notified of any changes in their buffers.
Once posted, an iu can be ‘updated’ by its owner (the component that posted
it to its own output buffer) and also by those components that have the iu in their
input buffers. Updates are immediately reflected in all buffers where the iu is present.
Figure 8.2 illustrates various actions and operations of ius in an implicit network of
three ipaaca-components.
ius consist of an identifier, meta-information, relation-information, and the actual
payload. The piece of meta information that is specifically relevant here is the binary
information of whether an iu is committed, or not (ibid., § 3.3.3). If an iu is set
committed, it becomes immutable and thus cannot be updated further. As in Schlangen
and Skantze’s model, commitment in ipaaca is a technical concept, but it is also
used in the attentive speaker agent as a signal that, from the moment of commitment
onward, something is an unchangeable fact, e.g., that an utterance unit has been fully
articulated (see below).
Relation information is used to build iu-networks from individual ius. Schlan-
gen and Skantze propose two types of relationships: the hierarchical grounded-in
relationship and horizontal same-level-links (ibid., §§ 3.3.1 and 3.3.2). A grounded-in
relationship from one iu to another means that the first is grounded in the latter,
which can be used to make the flow of information traceable. Horizontal links can
reflect various relationships, such as for example successor/predecessor relationships.
92. In ipaaca, processing modules are called ‘components’. They consist of one or more buffers. ius are
consumed via ‘input buffers’ and posted via ‘output buffers’.
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Figure 8.2: Illustration of three ipaaca-components A, B, and C and various iu-based
operations over time (from top to bottom).Depending on the interests in iu-categories,
ius posted to the output buffer (OB) of a component, appear in the input buffer (IB)
of other components. (a) iu1, posted by component A, appears in the input buffers
of components B and C. (b) iu1 is updated by its owner (component A), and later
(c) also by component B that has iu1 in its input buffer. Updates are reflected in all
buffers where iu1 is present. (d) iu2, also posted by component A, only appears in the
input buffer of component B, as C is not interested in its category. (e) Component B
set the meta-information committed, also an update, on iu2. (f) iu3, posted by B, is
hierarchically linked to iu2 in a ‘grounded-in’ relationship, which indicates that it is
derived from iu2. (g) iu4, also posted by B, is horizontally linked to iu3, which means
that they are on the same level, for example in a successor/predecessor relationship.
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In ipaaca both kinds of links are directed and realised with a unified mechanism.
Both kinds of links are used in the attentive speaker agent.
The payload of an incremental unit holds the actual information that is transferred
between processing modules. In ipaaca this information is encoded in a tree-like
data structure that is flexibly composed of dictionary and list objects with numbers,
strings, or boolean values as atomic elements (basically json-objects [Bray 2014]).
Payload objects do not have a type. Their structure is defined based on convention.
All components in the attentive speaker agent are realised as ipaaca components
and exchange information via ius (and construct iu-networks). It should be noted,
though, that not every iu passed between components contains an increment of
information (in the strict sense), e.g., some contain control signals or commands.
Components usually do not keep such information in their buffers once it has been
processed.
8.3 BEHAVIOUR PLANNING AND REALISATION
In the following we describe how the attentive speaker agent’s multimodal behaviour
is incrementally and dynamically planned and realised in real-time. We begin this
description with a brief review of the standard approaches to behaviour generation
and then discuss the specific requirements that emerge from the need to be able to
incrementally adapt behaviour to interlocutor feedback. We then discuss the attentive
speaker agent’s components for dialogue planning, natural language generation, and
gaze behaviour planning and how they interact.
8.3.1 THE SAIBA-ARCHITECTURE FOR BEHAVIOUR GENERATION
The prototypical architecture for multimodal generation of behaviour for artificial
conversational agents, ‘saiba’ is envisioned to consist of three broad levels: ‘intent
planning’, ‘behaviour planning’, and ‘behaviour realisation’ with standardised interfaces
(Kopp et al. [2006, § 3]; see fig. 8.3). Tasks for behaviour realisation are specified as
documents in Behavior Markup Language (bml, Kopp et al. 2006; Vilhjálmsson
et al. 2007; BML Committee 2011). With multiple realisers implementing bml, it
has reached a level of maturity and stability such that it can be considered a widely
adopted standard (van Welbergen et al. 2011).93
Tasks for behaviour planning are specified to be documents in Functional Markup
Language, but standardisation efforts are still ongoing (Heylen et al. 2008; Cafaro et al.
93. There exist local dialects that extend (or deviate from) the bml-core language, such as, for example,
bmla at Bielefeld University (Kopp et al. 2014; van Welbergen et al. 2014).
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Figure 8.3: Macroscopic schema of the saiba architecture for multimodal behaviour
generation in artificial conversational agents (redrawn from Kopp et al. 2006, fig. 1).
The interface between levels is defined in terms of the markup languages fml and
bml, which specify the documents in which information is passed from higher to
lower levels (black arrows). Lower levels can pass information (as feedback) to higher
levels (grey arrows).
2014). This seems to be the case because, fundamentally, the extent of fml is less clear
than the extent of bml. It is not obvious which aspects of a behaviour to be planned
result from an intention (i.e., from intent planning) and which are unconscious or
merely contextual (Cafaro et al. 2014). Additionally, behaviour planning is potentially
much broader in scope than behaviour realisation. A functional markup language
would need to comprise specifications of disparate aspects of communication, e.g.,
mental and emotional states, context, communicative actions and their propositional
content, person characteristics, goals on different levels (ibid., p. 82). Some of these
aspects are research areas in their own right, with competing, ununified (or not even
unifiable) theories that would need their own specification languages. bml allows
for an extension with sub-languages (e.g., for the description of facial expressions or
manual gestures [BML Committee 2011]) and an fml specification would likely need
to rely on extensions to an even greater extent.
In general, standardised interfaces such as fml and bml are useful to make com-
ponents from different research groups easily exchangeable. For individual endeavours
they can, however, be limiting in terms of flexibility.
8.3.2 REAL-TIME GENERATION OF MULTIMODAL BEHAVIOUR
Even though early architectures of embodied conversational agents already specified
real-time requirements similar to the ones needed for the attentive speaker agent (in-
cremental processing and real-time reactivity) and also relied onmultiple coordinating
components that operated on different layers (e.g., the ‘Ymir’ architecture; Thórisson
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1996, §§ 7–8), features that can be considered fundamental to real-time behaviour
realisation— such as the ability to incrementally add and dynamically change ongoing
behaviours— are not part of the bml core standard, but come as an extension that is
currently only available in AsapRealizer (bmla, Kopp et al. 2014; van Welbergen et al.
2014)94.
But even this extension does not answer the question where incrementally pro-
duced behaviours on multiple modalities generated from independent components
that operate on different time scales (e.g., different increment sizes) come together.
Current non-incremental approaches to multimodal behaviour generation, that are
in line with the saiba-framework, produce bml behaviour specifications that are
fully specified and fused on the behaviour planning level.
The ‘Nonverbal Behavior Generator’ (Lee andMarsella 2006; Wang et al. 2013), for
example, is a single component that plans multimodal non-verbal behaviour based
on an fml specification that already includes the surface text to be spoken (the gener-
ated behaviour is based on an analysis of this text) and produces a bml behaviour
specification to the realiser. The ‘GeNetIc’ generator for speech-accompanying iconic
gestures (Bergmann and Kopp 2009), on the other hand, comprises multiple interact-
ing components on the intent and behaviour planning levels (for natural language
generation and for gesture generation), which enables modelling of the complex
interactions found in speech–gesture production, e.g., differences in the semantic
coordination of these modalities based on linguistic encoding patterns or on cognitive
load (Bergmann et al. 2013). Despite being produced in independent components, a
single bml behaviour specification is produced within the behaviour planning level
and sent off to be realised.
In bml, behaviours are coordinated in relation to synchronisation points which
can be located at arbitrary time points. In bmla, sync-points can be used to coordinate
behaviours that are specified across multiple independent bml blocks. Increments of
behaviour (‘chunks’ in bmla-parlance) can be composed through various operations,
even allowing for co-articulation (that is, blended transitions). bmla also allows for
‘pre-planning’ of behaviours that are then ready for immediate realisation as soon as
they are needed.
94. AsapRealizer—developed at the Social Cognitive Systems group, Bielefeld University, and at the
Human Media Interaction research group, University of Twente— is a successor of the bml-realiser ‘Elck-
erlyc’ (van Welbergen et al. 2009; van Welbergen 2011) that, inter alia, integrates principles for continuous
adaptation of ongoing plans from the ‘articulated communicator engine’ (ace, Kopp and Wachsmuth
2004). AsapRealizer is bml 1.0-compliant (van Welbergen et al. 2011) and goes beyond the core standard
with the extensions bmlt (van Welbergen et al. 2009), bmla (Kopp et al. 2014; van Welbergen et al. 2014),
and murml (Kranstedt et al. 2002).
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These mechanisms of bmla make it possible to start articulating an utterance as
soon as an opportunity to take the turn opens up. They also enable the realisation of
various other dialogue phenomena. Still, they do not present a general solution for
real-time generation and coordination of behaviours that are not pre-plannable, e.g.,
when they are responsive to user behaviour. Sync-points are not a general solution to
such situations either, because they cannot be added on the fly—at least not when
the behaviour is already in execution.
8.3.3 BEHAVIOUR GENERATION FOR ATTENTIVE SPEAKING
As the attentive speaker agent requires this kind of flexibility, standard behaviour
coordination mechanisms present in bml and bmla are not sufficient.
Behaviour planning and intent planning in the attentive speaker agent architecture
are distributed across multiple components. One of these components, the ‘Dialogue
Engine’, is responsible for multiple tasks, some of which fall on the intent planning,
others on the behaviour planning level. Other components, such as natural language
generation and gaze planning focus on specific tasks, but may also cut across plan-
ning levels. All components exchange information using specific iu-based protocols
(instead of framing requests and answers in the fml structures as proposed by Cafaro
et al. [2014]).
Behaviour realisation is done in the standard saiba way using ‘AsapRealizer’ (Re-
idsma and vanWelbergen 2013; vanWelbergen et al. 2014), which receives incremental
units with a payload that contains a bml- or bmla-specification. During articulation
this iu is then incrementally updated with prediction and progress information that
would normally be provided as bml-feedback messages (BML Committee 2011). The
timing for real-time behaviours, where necessary, however, will not be left to the
behaviour realiser alone, but are planned by the behaviour planning components.
The approach we chose here is to frame behaviour planning and realisation as
an interactive process. The planning components act autonomously, but coordinate
their actions in an interplay with behaviour realisation, the information state, and
the interlocutors’ actions. Each component is the expert on the planning problem it
handles, but can integrate information from other components.
The architecture implements ideas from fluid real-time incremental behaviour
generation which we presented in Kopp et al. (2014, fig. 3). Behaviours unfold incre-
mentally on all levels. Higher levels are kept informed about the progress made on
lower levels and act accordingly. Lower levels, in turn flexibly adapt their output when
plans on higher levels change.
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In the following three sections we present the individual components and their
role in the attentive speaker agent’s architecture.
8.3.4 DIALOGUE ENGINE
The dialogue engine is based on a simple framework for representing dialogue context,
actions that can change this context, and rules that trigger these actions. An action
and the rules that trigger it form a ‘restricted action’. The framework is basically an
implementation of the ‘Information State Update’ approach to dialogue management
(isu; Larsson and Traum 2000). The context corresponds to isu’s informational
components and the restricted actions to isu’s update rules (ibid., pp. 324–325).
Restricted actions consist of a function and three conditions (a pre-condition on
the context, a pre-condition on potential input, and a post-condition on proposed
changes to the context; all three are optional) in form of boolean conditional expres-
sions. The function of a restricted action can be called when both pre-conditions are
met (or are unspecified). It has, by convention, no side effects and returns a proposal
for a set of changes to the context. These changes are applied to the context if they
meet the post-condition (if specified), otherwise they are discarded.
A ‘dialoguemodel’ in this framework consists of an ordered set of restricted actions
(more specific— in terms of conditions— restricted actions take precedence over
less specific ones) and a representation of the context. An active loop continuously
evaluates the restricted actions against the context in each iteration (which enables
the agent to be very responsive and able to adapt almost immediately upon relevant
new information). The result of the first restricted action that meets its pre- and
post-conditions (if specified) is applied to the context. The dialogue engine then acts
based on the updated state of the context.
In general, the dialogue engine is informed about realisation progress and uses
this information to incrementally plan upcoming behaviour onmultiple levels. On the
highest level it decides which topic to talk about with the interaction partner (topics
are maintained in an agenda of things to do).
On an intermediate level it constructs the local structure of the conversation,
making decisions that may take the interlocutors’ conversational actions (such as
their utterances or, via the ALS, their feedback) into account. After the agent finishes
producing a presentation, for example, the dialogue engine decides—depending on
some of the attributed listener state variables—whether to (i) continue with the next
utterance (if understanding is sufficient), (ii) repeat the utterance (if understanding
is insufficient), or (iii) explicitly ask which of the two alternatives the interlocutor
prefers (if the agent’s information about the listener’s mental state of understanding is
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uncertain). When generating these transitions, the dialogue engine chooses, with a
simple threshold model, from a set of pre-formulated utterances (see table 8.1) and
realises them.
On the lowest level, the dialogue engine decides whether to elicit feedback via a
behavioural cue and a pause or whether to generate the next increment of an ongoing
utterance to continue speaking without interruption. In the following we focus on
these low-level decisions.
Listing 8.1 shows a simplified version of the restricted action ongoing.elicit
that is used to decide whether and when to produce a feedback elicitation cue in
an ongoing utterance. It only consists of a context pre-condition and the action
function elicit_feedback. The pre-condition is a lambda function that is a conjunc-
tion of four boolean conditionals: (i) the current ‘state’ of the dialogue needs to be
UTTERANCE::Ongoing, (ii) the current realiser request iu is either being in execution
(IN_EXEC), or execution is finished (DONE), (iii) given the current attributed listener
state the agent assesses an information need on the understanding level (see chapter 7),
and (iv) realisation of the current request is predicted to be (nearly) finished or fin-
ished. All four conditionals make use of the context object (ctx), which contains all
relevant information on the current state of the dialogue, including, e.g., the attributed
listener state.
The elicit_feedback action that is called proposes five changes to the context:
(i) to produce a verbal feedback elicitation cue, (ii) to make a pause of (up to) 1.5 s,
(iii) to change the current high-level gaze behaviour to ‘elicit’ (see section 8.3.6), (iv) to
set the attributed listener state into a mode where it processes incoming evidence
immediately (see section 8.4.2), and (v) it changes the state to UTTERANCE::NeedFB.
The dialogue engine then processes the updated context within the same iteration, for
example by posting a behaviour specification containing the chosen verbal feedback
elicitation cue to the behaviour realiser.
The following section describes how natural language generation is integrated into
the behaviour generation architecture and how the dialogue engine mediates between
language generation and behaviour realisation in order to produce continuous and
incrementally adaptive verbal behaviour for the agent.
8.3.5 NATURAL LANGUAGE GENERATIONWITH SPUDIA
The incremental and adaptive natural language generation component spudia (see
section 6.2) is implemented as an ipaaca processing component as well. Figure 8.4
visualises the iu-based approach for incremental output generation in the attentive
speaker agent that will be presented in this section.
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Figure 8.4: Incremental natural language generation (and realisation) architecture
for the attentive speaker agent. Three ipaaca-components are involved: spudia, the
dialogue engine, and AsapRealizer, a bml-realiser. (a) The dialogue engine posts an
iu containing an nlg-request. (b) spudia generates the first utterance unit grounded
in this request and posts it as an iu. (c) The dialogue engine generates a bml block
grounded in this utterance unit and posts it as an iu. (d) AsapRealizer updates this
iu with status information and an estimation of when realisation will end. (e) When
realisation is nearly finished the dialogue engine sets the utterance unit iu committed.
(f) As soon as it is committed, spudia starts generating the succeeding utterance
unit. (g)–(i) analogue to (c)–(e). (j) When the last utterance unit of belonging to the
request has been realised, the request iu is set committed. Adaptation is not shown as
it happens within spudia, based on ius consumed from the attributed listener state
component, which is omitted here.
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RestrictedAction(
id='ongoing.elicit',
context_precondition=lambda ctx: ctx['STATE'] == 'UTTERANCE::Ongoing'
and ctx['REALIZERRQ']['current'].payload['status'] in ['IN_EXEC', 'DONE']
and information_need(ctx, level='understanding', alpha=0.85, delta=0.2)
and time.time() >= ctx['REALIZERRQ']['current'].payload['predEndTime'] - 0.3,
input_precondition=None,
output_precondition=None,
action=elicit_feedback)
def elicit_feedback(ctx, inp, outp):
outp['REALIZERRQ'] = random.choice(verbal_elicitation_cues)
outp['FB-ELICITATION']['time_to_wait'] = 1.5
outp['GAZE_STATE'] = 'elicit'
outp['ALS_MODE'] = 'process-next-fb-immediately'
outp['STATE'] = 'UTTERANCE::NeedFB'
Listing 8.1: Example of the restricted action that plans the production of a feedback
elicitation cue, given that the agent has an information need on the level of under-
standing. Both the context pre-condition as well as the action function are simplified
and adapted for presentational purposes.
spudia generates utterances incrementally, utterance unit by utterance unit. In
the attentive speaker agent, it becomes active when it consumes an nlg-request-
iu (posted by the dialogue engine component, fig. 8.4a). Such requests consist of a
specification of the type of speech act, as well as the information that is to be verbalised
(as, e.g., in eqs. [6.1] and [6.2] on page 130).
Themicro-content-planning level (mcp) creates a dynamic utterance plan (a list of
incrementalmicroplanning tasks) from the request and triggersmicroplanning-proper
(mpp) into generating the first utterance unit from the first incrementalmicroplanning
task (impt) and posting it as an utterance-unit-iu. This iu is linked hierarchically to
the nlg-request-iu in a grounded-in relationship (fig. 8.4b).
After posting an incremental unit containing an utterance unit (say, iu i), spudia
becomes inactive until it is notified that iu i has been set committed (fig. 8.4e,i). It
then provides the next incremental microplanning task impt i+1 to the mpp-level for
generation, the result of which is then posted as iu i+1. iu i+1 is linked horizontally to
iu i in a successor relationship (fig. 8.4f ).
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spudia’s utterance unit ius are consumed by the dialogue engine and their content
is relayed as bml-ius to the bml-realiser component (‘AsapRealizer’; van Welbergen
et al. 2014) for synthesis and realisation (fig. 8.4c,g). During realisation, the bml-
realiser incrementally updates the bml-ius with status information (feedback; BML
Committee 2011), such as the stage of processing and a prediction of when articulation
will end (fig. 8.4d,h). Towards an utterance unit’s end of articulation— timing depends
on whether feedback from the interlocutor will be elicited— the corresponding utter-
ance unit iu is set committed by the dialogue engine component,95 which re-activates
spudia and an utterance unit is generated from the next impt (see above).
When the last incrementalmicroplanning task of an nlg-request has been commit-
ted, the nlg-request-iu, in which the whole utterance is grounded, is set committed
as well (fig. 8.4j).
Adaptation of utterances is handled spudia-internally (see section 6.2.3), based
on the attributed listener state. To be informed of the current state, spudia consumes
ius of the attributed listener state component (section 8.4).
8.3.6 GAZE BEHAVIOUR
Finally, we describe how the attentive speaker agent’s gaze behaviour is incrementally
planned by an autonomous component that acts in coordination with behaviour
realisation and other behaviour planning components.
As in many other computational models of gaze behaviour for embodied conver-
sational agents (e.g., Pelachaud and Bilvi 2003; Lee et al. 2007), gaze is planned on
two levels. Depending on the interactional context ((i) an interlocutor is present but
not in contact, (ii) a conversation is ongoing, (iii) the agent is producing an utterance,
(iv) the agent is eliciting feedback) provided by the dialogue engine, the gaze planning
component chooses an appropriate high-level gaze strategy. These strategies activate
continuously running low-level ‘action patterns’ (de Kok et al. 2015, § 3.3.2) that dy-
namically and incrementally generate bml gaze behaviours (effectively shifts of gaze
direction using eye and head movement [BML Committee 2011]) that it posts as ius
to be realised incrementally and in real-time by the behaviour realisation component
AsapRealizer.96 Figure 8.5 shows examples of the gaze behaviour for the four high-level
strategies.
95. Utterance unit ius are always set committed after realisation, regardless of interlocutor feedback.
Importantly, commitment is independent of interlocutor feedback, attributed listener state, or estimated
groundedness.
96. AsapRealizer realises specified gaze shifts based on biological models for eye movement, head move-
ment, and saccades (van Welbergen 2011, pp. 62–63).
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DC
B
A
Figure 8.5: Gaze behaviour examples from the four high-level gaze strategies. (A) gaze
wanders freely in the idle gaze strategy; (B) the attentive gaze strategy fixates different
points estimated to lie on the interlocutor’s face; (C) when articulating an utterance,
gaze may be averted mid utterance unit and directed back at the interlocutor towards
its end; and (D)when eliciting feedback, the interlocutor is fixated for a certain amount
of time, or until she produces feedback (see listing 8.1).
Generation of low-level gaze behaviour is influenced bottom-up and in real-time
by the agent’s ongoing behaviour as well as the interlocutor’s behaviour.97 That is, it is
not decided on up-front simultaneously with planning of the speech content of the
utterance unit.
While the agent is articulating an utterance unit, for example, the gaze component
may produce gaze aversion behaviour in order to display ‘cognitive effort’ (Andrist
et al. 2013).98 It also ensures that gaze is directed back at the interlocutor right before
97. In the attentive speaker agent evaluated in chapter 9, the interlocutor’s feedback behaviour is taken
into account via the dialogue engine. In the context of the kompass-project, action patterns in this gaze
planning component are also aware of and responsive to the human interlocutor’s gaze behaviour (which is
tracked in real-time with ‘EyeX’, a consumer ‘eye tracker’ from Tobii AB, Danderyd, Sweden).
98. As information on the internal structure of the utterance relevant for gaze behaviour (e.g., thema/rhema,
Cassell et al. 1999; Heylen et al. 2005) is currently not available to the gaze planning component, gaze is
averted randomly in 1⁄3 of all utterance units. When available, information from other behaviour planning
components could easily be taken into account during gaze planning though.
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articulation finishes in order to display its willingness and ability to receive listener
feedback (Lee et al. 2002, § 2.2). Planning of this gaze-while-speaking behaviour is
achieved in interaction with the behaviour realisation component that incrementally
reports articulation progress as well as a prediction of when articulation will end.
Gaze aversion is decided upon between 1⁄3 to 1⁄2 into the articulation of the utterance
unit. When more than three quarters of the utterance unit has been articulated, gaze
is directed back at the interlocutor. See fig. 8.5C for an illustration of the agent’s gaze
behaviour while articulating an utterance unit.
The description of these three components shows that incremental planning and
realisation of multimodal behaviour with multiple behaviour planning components
opens up many questions for the saiba framework, especially if behaviour planning
is required to take into account the actions of the human interlocutor in real-time.
8.4 ATTRIBUTED LISTENER STATE
The theoretical computationalmodel for dynamic listener state attribution, specified in
chapter 5, is also implemented as an ipaaca processing component within Schlangen
and Skantze’s (2011) framework for incremental dialogue processing. The compon-
ent consumes two types of incremental units: (i) ius that contain evidence for the
network, and (ii) ius that contain control information for the module. As output
the module posts incremental units that contain the current state of the attributed
listener state. This results in a loose coupling of the attributed listener state to any of
the other components in the attentive speaker agent system. Any other component
can provide evidence to be used in the attribution process, which is important for
example, for modelling contextual influences (see fig. 5.9). Similarly, information from
the attributed listener state is readily available wherever it is needed (in the dialogue
engine, in spudia, etc.) to make informed adaptation decisions.
8.4.1 COLLECTING EVIDENCE
The fundamental principle for feedback processing in the ALS-module is that evidence
is asynchronously collected over a span of time after which the Bayesian network
inference is carried out. Evidence is specified in form of pairs of a name of an evidence
node and hard evidence for this node, i.e., a value that it can take. Feedback of function
understanding, with positive polarity, for example, is specified as ∐︀FB,u+̃︀. Evidence
is not just restricted to feedback behaviour of the agent’s interlocutor. Contextual
factors, such as an utterance’s estimated difficulty (see section 5.5) are also specified
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as evidence. Evidence is thus consumed from multiple processing modules in the
attentive speaker agent.
The implication from the collection of evidence over a span of time is that only
the latest evidence for each variable is used for inference. Consider the following
example where an interlocutor provides feedback to one of the agent’s utterance
of medium difficulty. While looking at the agent, the interlocutor first provides a
feedback signal of understanding with positive polarity but high uncertainty. Shortly
afterwards, it provides a second feedback signal of understanding with low uncertainty.
The ALS-module linearly consumes three incremental units containing evidence for
the network:
iu1 : ∐︀DI,medium̃︀
iu2 : ∐︀FB,u+̃︀, ∐︀GT, agent̃︀, ∐︀UNC,high̃︀
iu3 : ∐︀FB,u+̃︀, ∐︀UNC, low̃︀
iu1 is posted by the dialogue engine, which has an estimate of the difficulty of a
discourse unit based on the amount of information it contains. This is followed by iu2
and iu3, which are posted by the wizard after the first (respectively second) feedback
signal has been perceived.When the collection time span reaches its end, the following
hard evidence is set in the network prior to doing the inference:
∐︀DI,medium̃︀, ∐︀FB,u+̃︀, ∐︀GT, agent̃︀, ∐︀UNC, low̃︀
The fact that the interlocutor, for a certain period of time (at iu2), was uncertain in
her understanding is not known to the network when computing the ALS because∐︀UNC, low̃︀ in iu3 shadows ∐︀UNC,high̃︀ in iu2.
The extent of the time span in which evidence is collected varies. During incre-
mental generation and production of a discourse unit (see section 6.2.2) it encompasses
a single increment, that is, one utterance unit. Evidence is collected when an utterance
unit is being articulated and collection ends when the next utterance unit is ready to
be articulated (see section 8.3.5, especially fig. 8.4), this basically happens exactly at
the moment when articulation finishes. If the attentive speaker agent is in need of
feedback and produces feedback eliciting behaviours (directing its gaze at the inter-
locutor, pausing articulation of the next utterance unit, producing a verbal elicitation
cue) the evidence collection period extends beyond the end of articulation of the
utterance unit. In this case it either ends as soon as feedback is perceived, or, when
the interlocutor does not respond to the feedback elicitation cue, after a fixed amount
of time (1.5 s).
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The dynamic Bayesian network model (structure and parameters) used in the
implemented and evaluated attentive speaker agent is the one used for the worked
example discussed in section 5.7.2 (see fn. 73 on page 114).
8.4.2 PROCESSING EVIDENCE
Immediately after the evidence collection period ends, Bayesian network inference
is carried out using the joint-tree algorithm using elimination trees (see fn. 59 on
page 95). A factor tree for the network at time t is created, evidence is set, and the
marginal posterior distributions of all ALS-network variables is computed. These are
(i) used internally as prior feedback (Robert 1993) for the next time slice t + 1 of the
dynamic Bayesian network (see section 5.7), and (ii) posted in form of an incremental
unit that contains the posterior marginal distributions for each variable at time t, the
ALSt . This iu is horizontally double-linked in a successor/predecessor relationship
to the iu containing ALSt−1, which is set committed at this point.
8.4.3 A NOTE RECOGNISING LISTENER FEEDBACK SIGNALS
Signal processing of multimodal feedback signals is a hard research problem in itself
that is not in the focus of this thesis. Recognition of verbal/vocal feedback signals, head
gestures, and listener gaze were, however, explored at the sideline of the thesis-work.
Analysing isolated verbal/vocal feedback signals in the alico-corpus, we found
that prosodic correlates of feedback function interact with the segmental and syllabic
structure of feedback expressions (Malisz et al. 2012). Although some relationships
could be identified in the data, the overall results are of limited usefulness for prac-
tical applications as classification experiments did not yield reliable results. We also
attempted to classify short feedback expressions using standard speech recognition
technology (Walker et al. 2004) with manually authored pronunciation lexica and
grammars, but recognition error rates were too high for non-lexical feedback expres-
sions such asm,mhm, etc.99 In general, the research reviewed in section 3.3 shows
that current approaches, while in principle being able to find relationships between
form and function, are still experimental and not yet ready for use in interactive
systems. Recent developments in the field of ‘computational paralinguistics’ (Schuller
and Batliner 2014), however, yield promising results in detecting emotional and other
cognitive states of the speaker in larger chunks of speech. This gives hope that, given
99. Unpublished feedback recognition experiments by Hendrik Buschmeier and Ramin Yaghoubzadeh
(2009/2010), as unpublished student work report by Oliver Ast (2014/2015), supervised by Hendrik Busch-
meier.
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more research, it will be possible to automatically extract features relevant to listening
related mental states from short feedback expressions.
Concerning non-verbal embodied feedback, intermediate versions of the attentive
speaker agent used a relatively robust and user-independent approach to online head
gesture recognition, based on ‘orderedmeans’ sequential probabilistic models (Wöhler
et al. 2010), that could recognise two types of head gesture movement (nods and
shakes), as well as their absence. Extending this approach to a greater variety of head
gesture movement types, however, resulted in reduced robustness and recognition of
more nuanced differences in head gesture units such as number of cycles, amplitude,
as well as a description of complex head-gesture units (see section 3.3.3; Włodarczak
et al. [2012]) would have been impossible in that framework. In general, state-of-
the-art approaches to conversational head gesture recognition are usually limited to
recognising the movement types nod and shake (e.g., Morency et al. 2007; Chen et al.
2015), too.
8.5 PERSONAL CALENDAR ASSISTANT SCENARIO
To apply and test the proposed architecture, we chose a scenario in which the attent-
ive speaker agent is a ‘personal assistant’ for its human user.100 The domain for the
interaction and topic of interaction is the user’s calendar, that is, her appointments,
changes to these appointments, recommendations of activities, and so on. The user
takes the role of the agent’s conversation partner (see fig. 8.6), who— in the evaluation
study in chapter 9— listens to the agent presenting101 information that is related to
her calendar and is able to provide feedback, which the agent can interpret and adapt
its ongoing behaviour to.
In addition to being of real-world significance,102 the calendar domain was chosen
for several reasons:
– The basic domain—disregarding the actual content of appointments— is task-
oriented, highly structured, and thus relatively well defined (the characteristics
100. The choice was inspired by the ‘Knowledge Navigator’ concept developed in 1987 at Apple Computer
Inc. (Cupertino, CA, USA). See Scully (2010) for its history.
101. In the scope of the kompass-project (2015–2018; https://purl.org/scs/kompass; Yaghoubzadeh, Busch-
meier et al. [2015]) the calendar assistant agent is— to a certain extent— able to discuss calendar-related
topics with its user.
102. Calendaring is a somewhat natural task domain for personal assistants. Within the large-scale project
calo (‘Cognitive Assistant that Learns and Organizes’, 2003–2005, led by SRI International [Stanford, CA,
USA]) assistance in task and time management was one central research direction (Myers et al. 2007).
Apple Inc.’s personal assistant ‘Siri’—which, one day, might have functionalities similar to the Knowledge
Navigator, see fn. 100—was a spin-off from the calo-project.
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Figure 8.6: Illustration of the personal calendar assistant scenario.
of dates, times, intervals, calendar operations, etc. are almost formal in nature).
Because of this, a relatively small and manageable language fragment should be
sufficient for the generation of the agent’s utterances as well as for the interpret-
ation of the user’s utterances.
– Despite the domain’s simplicity, misunderstandings are likely to happen, e.g.,
due to differences in knowledge between agent and user, ambiguous references,
etc. Even if misunderstandings seem absent, ensuring understanding between
agent and user is important in this domain as there could be undesirable real-
world consequences for the user— e.g., missing an important appointment—
if understanding is attributed falsely. Being able to attribute other listening-
related mental states (e.g., acceptance, agreement) is important in this domain,
too. Thus we expect the domain to yield a large amount of listener feedback
spanning the rich form–meaning spectrum (sections 3.3 and 3.4).
– Most humans have appointments. Calendars are commonly used tools for
recording, planning, reminding, etc. of appointments. Deployed to real-world
users, the domain thus has the potential for regular and repeated interactions,
potentially over extended periods of time.
· The agent potentially provides real-world utility to its users. This will likely
increase their engagement. This, in turn, will likely increase the chance
that users provide natural (i.e., non-acted) and truthful (i.e., correspond-
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ing to their mental state of listening) feedback. Similarly for other verbal
and non-verbal behaviours that are interesting for research on conversa-
tional interaction. Interactions between unacquainted people differ from
interactions between people that already know each other, the latter being
better coordinated and less cautious in their actions (for example, being
less positive; Tickle-Degnen and Rosenthal 1990; Cassell et al. 2007).
· The agent can become familiar with its users. It can get to know a user’s
idiosyncratic feedback behaviour as well as the effectiveness of its own
feedback-based adaptation. As the domain is personal, the agent can
also learn its users’ preferences regarding appointments, e.g., which ap-
pointments are important to a specific user and which ones not. This
information can be of interest, e.g., when modelling dynamic grounding
criteria (see section 2.2; Clark and Schaefer [1989, p. 291]).
This makes the calendar assistant domain suitable for both real-world applications as
well as for smaller, focussed studies of individual aspects of speech based human–agent
interaction.
8.6 SUMMARY
In this chapter we described how we integrated the models for attentive speaking—
feedback based mental state attribution, adaptive natural language generation, and
information-needs based feedback elicitation— into an artificial conversational agent.
We discussed the limitations that saiba, the standardised architecture for behaviour
generation, poses for planning and realising adaptive multimodal behaviour in real-
time and presented an alternative architecture which is based on the principle of
incremental processing and frames behaviour generation as an interactive process
betweenmultiple behaviour planning components, behaviour realisation, information
state, and the interlocutor. In the next chapter, we will evaluate whether interactions
with this implemented conversational agent show qualities that we expect from an
agent that is an attentive speaker, and whether interlocutors are able to perceive this
quality.

CHAPTER 9
EVALUATION OF THE ATTENTIVE SPEAKER AGENT
In this chapter we evaluate the implemented attentive speaker agent. We begin by
giving a general perspective on the evaluation of artificial conversational agents and,
based on this, develop an evaluation strategy and state the general hypotheses that we
want to investigate.Wedescribe ourmetrics and variables, the experimental conditions,
the concrete hypotheses that we test, the setup of the study and the procedure. We
then discuss the participants that took part in the study and analyse the data that we
collected. In particular, we analyse whether participants provided feedback to the
attentive speaker agent and whether this feedback is comparable to feedback produced
in human–human interaction. We then analyse the objective and subjective quality of
the interaction. This is followed by a general discussion of the results.
9.1 EVALUATING ARTIFICIAL CONVERSATIONAL AGENTS
Isbister and Doyle (2004) note that evaluation in the field of embodied conversational
agents (and artificial conversational agents in general) is an inherently complex en-
deavour. The major reason for this is that it is often not clear how evaluation success
should be measured (ibid., p. 5)— even to the degree that it is only vaguely defined
what constitutes a successful interaction. The difficulty in finding crisp definitions of
success is due to the many facets and to the complexity of what is being evaluated.
Embodied conversational agents are ‘complete’ systems (ibid., p. 5), often consisting
of individual components that are integrated to form a whole. The behaviour of an
agent arises from the interaction of its components. Thus, a successful evaluation of
individual components of an agent does not guarantee a successful evaluation of a
combination of them.
When humans become part of an evaluation, the result is a dynamic and con-
tinuous interaction of two ‘systems’ that are already complex in isolation. Humans
177
178 EVALUATIONOF THE ATTENTIVE SPEAKER AGENT
bring their personal expectations as well as a bulk of (practical) knowledge, acquired
during a lifetime, to the interaction. This gives rise to enormous complexity and adds
subjectivity to the formula. Each interaction is unique and not easily comparable.
What might work well with one person might not work well with another. Individuals
might also differ in their subjective judgement of what is important for the interaction
to be successful.
The various facets of such systems can be evaluated from different perspectives. A
conversational agent can be evaluated in terms of the task it fulfils (e.g., is it useful?), in
terms of its implementation (e.g., is it algorithmically efficient?, is it well structured?),
and in terms of its appearance and behaviour (is it human-like?, is it believable?), as
well as its capabilities (Ruttkay et al. 2004). Multiple scientific disciplines are involved,
each having its own perspective on, and approaches to, evaluation (Isbister and Doyle
2004).
Evaluation results may thus differ depending on the perspective taken, or on
the specific aspect that is evaluated. A believable agent with good conversational
capabilities might fail on the task-level or vice-versa, and neither of the two aspects
might be determinant for whether a human interaction partner found the interaction
to be enjoyable or not. Thus, it is interesting to note that interactions can be considered
a success or a failure depending on the perspective of evaluation. Additionally, a system
that performs sub-optimal according to some perspectives might still be considered
successful in general.
For the computational models underlying the attentive speaker agent developed
in this thesis, we need to take all of this into account.
9.2 EVALUATION STRATEGY AND GENERAL HYPOTHESES
Our research hypothesis in this thesis is that attentive speaker agents endowed with
capabilities of interactional intelligence should be able to engage in a simple and
effective form of interactive feedback-based coordination on the levels of belief and
attitude (see section 1.2, page 8). We break this down into three measurable correlates,
that will serve as evaluation criteria, namely
(A) The attentive speaker agent and its interlocutors establish understanding (and
evaluate acceptance and agreement) in a loop of feedback and adaptation of
the agent’s communicative behaviours.
(B) Interlocutors notice that the attentive speaker agent is interested in and able to
infer their mental state of listening and responds appropriately.
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(C) Interactions with an attentive speaker agent will be better than interactions
with non-attentive speakers in that higher understanding will be reached, in a
more efficient way.
These criteria will help us guide the process of defining a suitable evaluation strategy
as well as concrete measures and hypotheses that can be tested.
Most importantly, all three criteria suggest that the evaluation of the attentive speaker
agent has to be based on actual interactions with human interlocutors.103 It follows
from this that the agent needs to be sufficiently robust since evaluation studies with
human participants are costly: they take a lot of resources and cannot be easily repeated
when problems occur.
A further consequence of using human interlocutors is that the input processing
problemneeds to be solved, whichwe address by using theWizard-of-Oz paradigm (as
we have alreadymentioned in section 8.1). The wizard interprets participants’ feedback
signals in terms of form and communicative function and feeds this information to
the attributed listener state component of the attentive speaker agent. A detailed
description of the wizard’s tasks are presented in section 9.3.5.
Measuring the correlates of evaluation criterion (A) requires a way to analyse the
interaction between the agent and the participant, as well as the processes within the
agent. To fulfil this requirement we record the interaction and write log files of the
system behaviour (see section 9.3.4).
Measuring the correlates of evaluation criterion (B) requires an assessment of
participants’ subjective impression of the interaction. To gather this information,
participants will have to fill in a questionnaire after the interaction. The questionnaire
is presented in section 9.3.2.
Measuring the correlates of evaluation criterion (C) requires an operationalisation
of the variables understanding and efficiency. Especially the degree of understanding
should be measured shortly after a piece of information has been presented by the
agent. The definition of these variables has a large influence on the overall design of
the task and interactions and is described in section 9.3.1.
103. In principle, interaction partners for the attentive speaker agent could also be simulated active listener
agents, which would result in greater control and clearly defined behaviours. We opted for human inter-
locutors for three reasons: (i) adequate models for simulated interlocutors, which produce feedback based
on actual understanding, are not readily available, (ii) ad-hoc models of active listening for the purpose of
evaluation would carry the risk of only generating listening behaviour that we expect the speaker model to
be capable of handling, and (iii) human interlocutors provide greater and more direct empirical validity to
the evaluation.
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Both (B) and (C) further imply that the evaluation of the interaction is compared
to a baseline. We address this issue by defining two different baseline agents to which
we can compare the attentive speaker agent. This yields three different experimental
conditions, which we evaluate in a between-subjects design.104 Consequently, several
conversational agents—with different behaviours and capabilities—need to be cre-
ated, and a higher number of participants is needed. The experimental conditions
are described in section 9.3.3, the scenario for the evaluation— calendar assistance—
was described in section 8.5.
9.3 MATERIALS AND METHODS
In this section, we describe the study design, including the objective and subjective
variables that we measured, the experimental conditions we designed, the setup of the
study, the task and training procedure of the wizard, and the experimental procedure.
9.3.1 OBJECTIVE METRICS AND VARIABLES
We defined the attentive speaker agent to be effective if interactions will be better
than interactions with non-attentive speakers in that higher understanding will be
reached in a more efficient way. In the following we develop metrics for the variables
understanding and efficiency.
Understanding is problematic to evaluate objectively since it is not directly observ-
able. This could be addressed by letting third parties rate and annotate participants’
levels of understanding, e.g., by letting them analyse participants’ understanding from
their behaviour in a way the model of attributed listener state is not capable of. This
would, however, create a new source of uncertainty.
We resort to a more objective—but also less direct—measure of understanding
in terms of the ability of a participant to correctly recall information that the agent
communicates. Such a ‘recall score’ is a continuous measure of performance on a
ratio scale, which makes it suitable for comparisons. As described in section 8.5, the
scenario for the attentive speaker agent is that of a personal calendar assistant. In
the evaluation study the agent will present calendar information (it will announce
appointments, it will communicate that some event needs to be moved to a different
point in time, that an event needs to be cancelled, and it will propose new events to the
104. Between-subject designs are cleaner in that participants are not influenced in their behaviour (and
answers) by noticing differences between conditions. Such designs are also more straightforward to ana-
lyse. The disadvantage is that outcomes may be influenced by inter-individual differences and that more
participants are needed.
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interaction partner). The task of the participants then is to understand the information
that the agent presents as well enough to be able to recall as much information as
possible later.
Since memory fades over time (and we do not want to assess participants’ memor-
isation skills), recall should be assessed not too long after the information has been
presented. At the same time we do not want to assess recall immediately, as it would be
interrupting and inhibiting to the unfolding of the dynamics of the interaction.105 The
solution that we choose is to divide the interaction into several blocks, each of which
consists of a dialogue phase, in which the agents present the calender information of
one week, and a recall phase, in which participants will (try to) recall this information
by entering the calender events into a printed empty calendar. These can then be
scored later, yielding the recall score.
Efficiency cannot be measured with a single variable. Conceptually speaking, it is a
compound that consists of two factors: (i) a measure of performance (here operation-
alised in terms of recall/understanding), and (ii) a measure of the energy spent on
achieving the performance (the costs of making the information understood). The
efficiency variable is then defined as the ratio of performance to costs. Costs of the
interaction can be defined in (at least) to ways:
First, we can resort to a simple objective metric that is often used to evaluate
the quality of interactions with conversational agents: the duration of the interaction
(Walker et al. 1998).Whether long or short interaction durations are desirable depends
on the type and purpose of the dialogue. For an agent that primarily serves enter-
tainment purposes, longer interactions might be indicators for dialogue success (as
used, e.g., in Kopp et al. 2005; Swartout et al. 2010). Conversely, in more task-oriented
interactions, where tasks are to be solved efficiently, short interaction durations are
often desirable.
With no social talk—aside from a short hello in the beginning and a bye at the
end of the interaction— the interaction in the calendar scenario of this evaluation
study is purely task-oriented. As we are primarily interested in the efficiency of the
interaction, low costs, and therefore shorter interactions are, in principle, desirable.
Interaction duration can also be extracted automatically from system logfiles written
during the interaction.
105. Another approach to assessing understanding as soon as possible is to let participants answer simple
yes-no questions about the information presented. We successfully employed this when evaluating an
incremental, adaptive and situation aware in-car dialogue system where participants were distracted by the
driving task (Kennington et al. 2014; Kousidis et al. 2014). Here such an approach would likely make recall
to easy.
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Alternatively, we can also define costs in terms of the amount of information being
communicated redundantly. In principle, repeatedly expressing a piece of information
that has already been communicated is not desirable, unless it has not yet been
understood— in which case producing a repetition may be a useful mechanism to
achieve understanding. The number of repetitions produced can also be extracted
automatically from system logfiles written during the interaction.
We can thus define two metrics for efficiency of the agent: (i) the ratio of recall
score to duration of the interaction, and (ii) the ratio of recall score to the amount of
redundant information, in terms of repetitions.
9.3.2 SUBJECTIVE METRICS AND VARIABLES
Having defined these objective measures and variables for criterion (C), we can now
turn to the measurement of subjective factors that reflect the participants’ perception
of the agent (criterion B) as well as some information about participants that may
have an influence on the study. We measured these variables with a questionnaire that
immediately followed the experiment and consisted of four parts.
The first part asked participants to report their subjective experience of the interac-
tion. Twenty items were presented in random order and had to be rated on seven-point
Likert scales.106 In the following, these 20 items are grouped and presented according
to five categories.
There were three items that target whether the agent is perceived to be a com-
petent speaker, the first two (derived from a communicative competence self-report
questionnaire [Rubin 1985, p. 177])
(Q1) Billie drückt sich klar und präzise aus
(‘When Billie speaks, his ideas are clearly and concisely presented’)
(Q2) Wenn Billie etwas erklärt ist es oft durcheinander
(‘When Billie explains something to someone, it tends to be disorganized’)
deal with the agent’s ability to speak clearly. This is of interests as self-corrections or
repetitions that might occur when adapting to its interlocutor’s feedback may result
in sub-optimal presentation. Finally, we wanted to know whether participants had
problems understanding the agent
106. Labels for the response anchors were: 1— stimme überhaupt nicht zu (‘strongly disagree’), 2— stimme
nicht zu (‘disagree’), 3— stimme eher nicht zu (‘somewhat disagree’), 4— teils teils (‘neither agree nor
disagree’), 5— stimme eher zu (‘somewhat agree’), 6— stimme zu (‘agree’), and 7— stimme voll zu (‘strongly
agree’).
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(Q3) Ich konnte Billie gut verstehen
(‘I could understand Billie well’)
as its speech may contain pronunciation errors due to synthesis artifacts.
Following these questions, six items on the agent’s feedback processing capabilities
were to be rated. The first two items
(Q4) Billie hat mir signalisiert, wenn er eine Rückmeldung haben wollte
(‘Billie gave me signals when he wanted to have feedback’)
(Q5) Billie war daran interessiert, dass ich ihn verstehe.
(‘Billie wanted me to understand him’)
target whether participants felt that the agent was interested in their feedback. These
were followed by two items that ask participants whether they felt that their feedback
was perceived and understood.
(Q6) Billie hat meine Rückmeldungen wahrgenommen.
(‘Billie perceived my feedback’)
(Q7) Billie hat meine Rückmeldungen verstanden.
(‘Billie understood my feedback’)
These were followed by two items that ask participants whether they felt that the
agent made correct attributions of their mental state of listening, both in terms of
understanding and attitude towards calendar items.
(Q8) Billie kann einschätzen, ob ich verstanden habe was er sagt
(‘Billie is able to tell whether or not I have understood what he has said’)
(Q9) Billie hat meine Einstellung zu den Terminen wahrgenommen.
(‘Billie perceived my attitude towards calendar items’)
Finally, participants were directly asked whether the agent was attentive and adaptive.
(Q10) Billie war rücksichtsvoll und ist auf mich eingegangen.
(‘Billie was attentive to me and adapted to my needs’)
Participants further rated four items that could be grouped into a category that
Ruttkay et al. (2004, p. 58) call ‘helpfulness’, that is, the items querywhether participants
perceived the agent to be cooperative. The first three items in this category specifically
target whether the agent is attentive and adapted to the participants’ needs.
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(Q11) Billie hat mir geholfen Schwierigkeiten beim Verstehen zu beheben
(‘Billie helped me resolve difficulties in understanding’)
(Q12) Es war hilfreich, dass sich Billie bei Bedarf wiederholt hat
(‘It was helpful that Billie repeated himself, when needed’)
(Q13) Es war hilfreich, dass Billie bei Bedarf weitere Informationen geliefert hat
(‘It was helpful that Billie provided further information, when needed’)
The fourth item targets interaction duration, with the underlying assumption that a
helpful agent does not stretch the interaction unnecessarily.
(Q14) Billie hat versucht das Experiment nicht länger als nötig dauern zu lassen
(‘Billie tried to keep the experiment as short as possible’)
Following this, three items on the perceived ‘naturalness’ of the agent’s behaviour
were to be rated. Ruttkay et al. (2004, pp. 58–59) define naturalness as being ‘in line
with the expectations of the user about a living, acting creature with respect to its
embodiment and communicative behaviours’. The focus here is on the agent’s ability
to communicate in a smooth and well coordinated way as would be expected from a
human speaker.
(Q15) Die Interaktion mit Billie verlief reibungslos
(‘The interaction with Billie was smooth’)
(Q16) Die Interaktion mit Billie war gut koordiniert
(‘The interaction with Billie was well coordinated’)
We also wanted to know directly, whether the agent’s behaviour was perceived to be
similar to a human speaker:
(Q17) Billies Verhalten ähnelte dem eines menschlichen Sprechers
(‘Billie’s behaviour was similar to the behaviour of a human speaker’)
Finally, three items on the task and the study itself were asked: The first two items
target whether the task was difficult but still doable,
(Q18) Ich empfand die Aufgabe als schwierig
(‘I perceived the task to be difficult’)
(Q19) Ich konnte mir die Termine und Terminänderungen merken
(‘I could remember calendar events and changes to them’).
and the third item asks whether participants would regard their interaction as being
successful in the context of the experiment.
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(Q20)Das Experiment war erfolgreich
(‘The experiment was successful’).
Table 9.13, on page 222 below, provides a structured and concise overview of all
questionnaire items.
The second part of the questionnaire asked participants to provide demographic
information about themselves. Participants reported their age and gender, their native
languages and— if German is not among them—how many years of experience they
have in speaking German. We further asked whether participants have normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and hearing or not. We finally asked, whether participants
had prior experience interacting with virtual agents or humanoid robots, as both
experience and non-experience might have an influence on the interaction (ibid.,
p. 50).
The third part of the questionnaire was a personality test. We wanted to measure
personality in case we notice huge differences in feedback behaviour among parti-
cipants (feedback is likely influenced by personality; see, e.g., [Schröder et al. 2012;
Huang and Gratch 2012]). We chose a short 11-item personality test for the ‘Big Five’
inventory (the bfi-10; Rammstedt and John 2007).107
Finally, in part four of the questionnaire, participants were given an opportunity
to provide general remarks on the study by filling in a free-form field.
The questionnaire was automatically opened in a web-browser window after the
agent closed the interaction and disappeared from the screen. Participants remained
alone while answering the questions and left the room to meet with the experimenter
once they completed the task.
9.3.3 EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS
Having defined the dependent variables that we want to measure, we now turn to
the definition of the experimental conditions, which will serve as the independent
variable.
The evaluation study consists of three experimental conditions, themain condition
(ATTENTIVE SPEAKING or AS), in which participants interact with the attentive
speaker agent, and two control conditions that serve as baselines to which conditionAS
will be compared, one as a lower-bound baseline, the other as an upper-bound baseline.
Across all three conditions, the agents’ appearance and voice are the same, they present
107. Although this specific test has less statistical power than the full 44 item test it is derived from (the bfi),
we accepted the power versus time-to-complete trade-off since personality is not central to our research
questions.
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the same calendar operations and items to the participants, and participants receive
the same instructions and the same questionnaire.
The attentive speaker agent perceives its participants’ feedback in a timely manner
(via the wizard), probabilistically attributes a listening-related mental state to them,
incrementally adapts its natural language generation process—potentially already
tailoring the next utterance unit of an information presentation unit to the participants’
needs. If the agent itself has an information need, it can also try to elicit feedback from
its users by producing feedback elicitation cues between utterance units and at the end
of an utterance. Towards the end of each information presentation unit, the attentive
speaker agent evaluates the attributed listener state again and decides how to continue.
If the agent attributes sufficiently high understanding to the participant it proceeds to
the next information presentation unit. If it attributes low understanding, it will repeat
the information unit. If the information in the attributed listener state is not clear, it
will explicitly ask the participant, whether it should repeat the information (which
will then happen in an adapted manner) or whether it should continue. Depending
on the type of calender operation that is communicated (announce, cancel, move,
propose) the agent may also want an attitudinal reaction of the listener, on which it
may then comment. See section 8.3.4, especially table 8.1), for an overview of these
transitions. Whether these models work as intended is subject to this evaluation study.
In contrast to this, the agents in the two control conditions do not have models
for any of the above and represent the classic, non attentively speaking artificial
conversational agents. The agent in control condition (NOADAPTATION or NA) is
completely ignorant of its interlocutor when presenting information and could, in
principle, be replaced with a video. An illusion of interactivity is only created (and
maintained) in that the agent replies to the initial greeting of the participants and in
that it reacts promptly to participants’ requests to continue the ‘interaction’ after each
of the recall phases.
ConditionNA is intended to serve as the lower-bound baseline on participants’ un-
derstanding (how much information can participants recall when it is only presented
once) and on interaction duration.
The agent in control condition (EXPLICIT ASKING or EA) has the same basic
behaviour as the agent in control condition NA, but differs in that it explicitly asks
participants after each presented unit of information, whether it should continue with
the next unit or should repeat the current unit again. Participants have to answer
this question and the agent then proceeds accordingly. Participants can have an item
repeated as often as they want to.
Condition EA is intended to serve as an upper-bound baseline for the level of
understanding that participants can achieve in a system that resembles a classical
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interactive conversational agents that repeats information upon request. It is also
(likely) an upper-bound for the duration of interactions.
The overview of the study, fig. 9.4 on page 193 below, schematically illustrates the
differences between the three conditions in form of simple flow charts.
The control conditions also serve as baselines for the questionnaire, e.g., whether
participants notice that these agents do not attend to and react to their feedback.
Moreover, they can be used to assess whether participants provide as much feedback
to such an agent as to the attentive speaker agent.
Both control conditions are important for the evaluation of the attentive speaker
agent since they allow an assessment of the agent on scales with upper and lower
bounds, measured in the same task. Ideally, the attentive speaker agent would ap-
proach the upper bound for understanding (EA) and the lower bound for costs of the
interaction (NA)— reaching better efficiency than the agents of the control conditions.
But such simple predictions are insufficient when evaluating dynamic interactions
between complex computational models and human interlocutors. Hence, the argu-
ments on which the actual hypotheses we will test are based will be more complex
as well. We will formulated them later, in section 9.5, right before analysing each
individual variable.
9.3.4 SETUP
The study was carried out in the lab space of the ‘Social Cognitive Systems Group’, at
citec, BielefeldUniversity.The conversational agent and the recording equipmentwas
set up in the ‘Computational Interaction Studies Lab’, where instruction of participants
as well as the interactions themselves took place.
Participants were seated at a desk at an approximate distance of 50–80 cm to an
all-in-one computer with a 27 inch 16:9 screen which ran and displayed the conversa-
tional agent during the interaction and, later, the post-interaction questionnaire (see
fig. 9.1AB). A wireless keyboard/touch-pad-combination was available for doing the
questionnaire.
The agent was visible from the chest upwards (see fig. 9.1C). The configuration
resulted in a slightly smaller than life sized visualisation of the agent with a displayed
height of approximately 33.5 cm (head 17.5 cm) and width of 23 cm (head 12 cm). The
agent’s voice was played from speakers positioned below the desk.
The interactions were filmed with Sony NEX-VG30 HD cameras from two per-
spectives, see fig. 9.2: (A) an ultra wide angle perspective capturing the whole scene
from behind— including agent, participant, and experimenter (when present)— ,
and (B) a frontal close-up perspective capturing the participant’s face, head, and upper
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A B C
Figure 9.1: Setup of the evaluation study photographed from two perspectives (A, B).
Photos are stagedwith a person thatwas not a participant. (C) shows the conversational
agent in the neutral pose.
body. Videos were recorded in 1080p with 50 frames per second. Audio was recorded
with the build-in microphones of these cameras. In addition to the behaviour of
the participants, log files— logging the processes within the agents as well as all the
actions of the wizard—were written.
A third perspective (C)—very similar to (B)—was filmed with a webcam and
displayed in real-time to the wizard. This perspective was streamed and recorded in
720p with 10 frames per second (see fig. 9.2C) and also includes an audio stream.
9.3.5 THE WIZARD-OF-OZ
The wizard operated from the ‘Interactive Media Lab’ next door to the ‘Computational
Interaction Studies Lab’. The interaction, as well as the general progress of each trial,
could be observed and listened to in real-time via the webcam-based video stream
(fig. 9.2C) and a high-quality audio-link recorded with a room microphone.
The wizard’s tasks varied depending on the experimental condition (see table 9.1).
In all three conditions the wizard started the interaction as well as the six information
presentation blocks as soon as participants signalled that they are ready to begin or
continue. In conditions ATTENTIVE SPEAKING and EXPLICIT ASKING the wizard
additionally chosewhich continuation the participants requestedwhen the agent asked
them for a preference (continue with next or repeat the current calendar item). Most
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A
B
C
Figure 9.2: Stills from the three camera perspectives. (A) ultra wide angle shot captur-
ing the agent, the participants from behind, and the experimenter—during instruc-
tion; (B) frontal close-up shot capturing participants; and (C) webcam-perspective
used by the wizard to observe participants during the interaction.
Table 9.1: Wizard-of-Oz tasks depending on experimental condition.
Condition Start interaction/blocks Choose continuations Interpret feedback
AS ● ● ●
EA ● ● ○
NA ● ○ ○
importantly, in condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING, the wizard had to pay attention
to the participants’ feedback signals—verbal and non-verbal— , categorise their
function, polarity, and level of certainty, and feed them as input to the attributed
listener state component of the attentive speaker agent system.
The Wizard-of-Oz system consisted of two user interface windows displayed next
to each other on a 24 inch screen. One window displayed the streamed webcam
perspective (see fig. 9.2C), the other the Wizard-of-Oz graphical user interface (see
fig. 9.3A).
The Wizard-of-Oz interface is controlled via keyboard shortcuts and mouse
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Figure 9.3: The Wizard-of-Oz interface. (A) Screenshot of the graphical user interface
with a feedback input area; buttons to input a participant’s head gestures events (tilt,
shake, jerk, nod) and gaze target (agent, away); to choose continuations (continue,
repeat); to control the study (start, next block, reset); and utterance progress bar. (B)
The feedback input area is divided into six invisible regions: negative (−) or positive
(+) polarity; and low (+), medium (-) or high (/) level of certainty. The feedback
input area shows the active feedback function (chosen by keyboard) and polarity in
large type on a background coloured depending on the level of certainty (the former
selected by keyboard, the latter two by mouse pointer position). A mouse click inputs
a feedback event.
pointer. The basic actions for starting the experiment and experimental blocks as well
as for repeating information presentation units or continuing with the next unit are
triggered with a click on the respective interface buttons on the right hand side of the
window. During the interaction in condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING the gaze target
of the participant (a binary state, either agent or away) can be set by either typing
the key f, which toggles the gaze target, or by clicking one of the labelled interface
buttons. The set gaze target is highlighted in light blue.
Similarly, head gestures (types: nod, jerk, shake, tilt) performed by participants are
entered by either typing a key (v, c, x, z) or by clicking the labelled interface button.
Participant feedback is specified via the feedback input area, a custom user-
interface element (see fig. 9.3B) that works in two stages and allows for quick entry of
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multidimensional features of a feedback signal: function, polarity, and level of certainty.
Feedback function is set via the keyboard to either perception/p, understanding/u,
or acceptance/ac using the keys (a, s, or d). This function remains set until another
function is chosen. When participants produce feedback, the events are entered into
the system by simultaneously selecting the polarity (positive/+, negative/−) and level
of certainty (low/+, medium/- or high//). This is done by clicking into one of six
specific regions of the feedback input area. As shown in fig. 9.3B, it is divided into two
horizontal regions and three vertical regions. The right half corresponds to positive,
the left half to negative polarity. The top third corresponds to a high level of certainty,
the middle third to a medium level of certainty, and the bottom third to a low level of
certainty.
The feedback input area constantly shows the currently selected feedback function
in large type. In addition, information on polarity (in front of the function) and level
of certainty (different intensity level of the background) that would result from a click
into a specific region are shown when the mouse pointer hovers over the area.
As an example, illustrated in fig. 9.3A, positive feedback of understanding with
a high level of certainty can be entered into the system by first setting the feedback
function to u and then clicking somewhere in the upper-right region of the feedback
input area. Timing of the click is meant to correspond to the timing the feedback
event occurs, disregarding the wizard’s processing delay.
Finally, the wizard user-interface shows a progress bar for the utterance that the
agent is currently speaking (see bottom left of fig. 9.3A). Utterance progress is updated
via information on the predicted end time of the utterance (provided through bml
prediction feedback [BML Committee 2011]) and the current point of time. This gauge
is meant to help the wizard predict when user feedback is most likely to happen.
In all trials that required feedback to be entered into the system (condition AT-
TENTIVE SPEAKING), the same person—SR—acted as the wizard. In the control
conditions EXPLICIT ASKING and NO ADAPTATION, where the wizard’s task was
straightforward and did not involve subjective decision making, either SR or HB acted
as wizards.
SRwas instructed and trained startingweeks before the actual study took place.The
first step was a familiarisation with the subject matter, especially linguistic feedback.
This was done via reading and discussion (withHB) of the theory underlying themodel
implemented in the attentive speaker agent (e.g., Allwood et al. 1992; Buschmeier
and Kopp 2012b; Buschmeier and Kopp 2014a). Following this, the wizard analysed
feedback annotations in the kds-1-corpus (Buschmeier and Yaghoubzadeh [2011]),
which follows a scheme of categories very similar to what is fed into the attributed
listener state component of the attentive speaker agent system. One dialogue was
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re-annotated and differences in choice were discussed. As soon as the user interface
was available, the wizard tested it on video-data from the kds-1-corpus. Feedback
from these trials was integrated into the wizard interface in several iterations. Finally,
a total of 17 pilot trials (see section 9.4) were carried out.
With this amount of preparation, we were very confident that the wizard was well
trained and fully understood his task. It should be noted that the wizard was in the
known of experimental conditions. We are aware that this is rather undesirable in
experimental settings, but it was unavoidable for the study we conducted because the
experimental condition can easily be guessed from the agents’ behaviour. The option
of concealing the agents’ actions from the wizard was ruled out since it would have
severely impaired his ability to classify feedback in the way needed for the system
being evaluated.108
By design, the wizard’s input influenced the behaviour of the attentive speaker
agent. The wizard’s choices, however, do not necessarily have a directly predictable
effect on the agent’s behaviour as it is mediated by the attributed listener state, which
brings factors that are not under the control of the wizard (dialogue context, listener
state dynamics, processing delays) into play. For this reason, we are confident that
the wizard was not making decisions biased towards a desirable outcome of the
agent’s behaviour. Anecdotally, the wizard was occasionally surprised by the agent’s
behaviour—as it did not do what he would have expected. Because of this, it was
made clear, right at the beginning, that the wizard should not try to optimise their
feedback classification ability in responses to unexpected agent behaviour.
9.3.6 PROCEDURE
Having defined all properties of the study, we can now describe the experimental
procedure, a schematic overview of which is given in fig. 9.4.
Participants were met in the foyer of the citec building, greeted and brought
to the lab by the experimenter (HB). Once in the lab, they were asked to sit at the
table and to read an information sheet on the study and a consent form. The sheet
contained information on the general procedure, a short instruction (109 words, see
appendix B.1), information on the data acquired, how this data will be processed
and pseudonymised/anonymised, who may access the data, how long the study will
take, and how participants will be compensated. Participants were encouraged to ask
questions and were given as much time as needed to read the information.
108. An insight we gained when working on the alico-corpus (Malisz et al. 2016) is that dialogue context
is needed when classifying feedback functions in an annotation task— and the wizard’s task in this study is
basically an annotation task that has to be done in real-time.
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Instruction Interaction Questionnaire Debriefing
Hello Block1 . . . Blocki . . . Block6 Bye
Dialogue phase Recall phase
IP unit1 . . . IP uniti . . . IP unitn
U E A
C
R
AS
U A
C
R
EA
U
C
NA
Figure 9.4: Overview of the evaluation study. The interaction basically consists of
six experimental blocks, each of which has a dialogue and a recall phase. Dialogue
phases consist of two to three information presentation units (IP), the structure of
which differs depending on the experimental condition (AS/EA/NA), as the flow
charts schematically illustrate. Nodes in these charts represent the following actions:
U—present information in an incremental utterance; E— evaluate current attributed
listener state, decide what to do next, and describe this to the participant; C— continue
with next unit; R— repeat this unit; A—ask interlocutorwhether to repeat or continue.
Recall phases consist of a pen-and-paper information recall task.
194 EVALUATIONOF THE ATTENTIVE SPEAKER AGENT
After signing the consent form, camera recordings were started and more detailed
oral instructions were provided by the experimenter (see appendix B.2 for the tran-
script of one exemplary oral instruction). Notably, the instructions contained the
information that participants can provide feedback and that the agent may take this
information into account in its own behaviour. Participants were again encouraged to
ask questions.
After the experimenter left the room, participants started the interaction on their
own by gazing towards the screen and calling the agent using a greeting such as
Hallo Billie! (‘Hello Billie!’). After the interaction, the participants had to do the ques-
tionnaire (electronically). After that they could leave the room and were awaited by
the experimenter. Participants were then asked whether they had suspected some-
thing during the experiment and were debriefed (i.e., they were told that, behind the
scenes, aWizard-of-Oz was at work, and that their interaction was subject to a specific
experimental condition).
The interaction itself started with a greeting and the agent signposting what will
happen next. After that the first of six randomized experimental blocks started. Each
block consisted of an information presentation phase followed by a recall phase.
During the information presentation phase, two to three information presentation
units, each consisting of one calendar operation, were performed. During these units,
the agent announced calendar events to the participant, talked about changes to an
event (cancel, move) or proposed a new event (see table 9.2). The flow charts in fig. 9.4
schematically illustrate how the information presentation units were presented in
each of the experimental conditions.
9.4 PARTICIPANTS
We recruited 59 participants via advertisements posted on bulletin boards at Bielefeld
University and Bielefeld University of Applied Sciences as well as in the student-run
Facebook groups of the two institutions.The advertisements vaguely described the pur-
pose of the study (to test and rate spoken interaction with a ‘virtual assistant’), stated
requirements (a high proficiency of spoken German), duration (about 30 minutes)
and compensation (5 euro).
Seventeen of the recruited participants served as pilots and six had to be excluded
from the analysis for technical problems. We kept recruiting participants until we had
successful trials for all twelve slots per condition. Participants were blindly assigned
to conditions (i.e., before showing up at the lab).109
109. Assignment of participants to conditions resulted in the following sequence: EEEEENNENENNNEN-
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Table 9.2: Structure of the information presentation phase of each of the six experi-
mental blocks. Blocks contain a sequence of two or three information presentation
units, each consisting of one calendar operation (announce, cancel, move, or propose
calendar items). Announce operationsmaymentionmultiple calendar items, resulting
in a larger number of calendar items than information presentation units per block.
Block (id) Calendar operations (type) IP units Items (counts)
announce cancel move propose U1 U2 U3
1 ● ● ○ ● P A C 4
2 ● ○ ● ○ A M A 4
3 ● ○ ● ○ A M 4
4 ● ● ○ ● A P C 4
5 ● ○ ● ● P M A 3
6 ● ○ ● ○ A M A 5
Table 9.3: Demographics (age and gender) of participants—by condition and overall.
N is the number of participants.
Condition Age (years) Gender (counts) N
min max M SD female male
AS 19 31 24.3 3.7 8 4 12
EA 18 40 24.3 6.2 10 2 12
NA 20 28 24.1 2.5 7 5 12
Overall 18 40 24.2 4.4 25 11 36
The 36 participants included in the analysis ranged between 18 and 40 years of age
(M = 24.2, SD = 4.4), with similar age distributions among conditions (see table 9.3).
We did not have the objective to balance gender, which resulted in a significant gender-
imbalance. 69% of participants reported to be ‘female’, and 31% to be ‘male’.
We analysed whether it is likely that gender distribution is independent from
condition, as there could be an influence on the outcome of the study, if not. Based
on an approximate Pearson’s χ2-test (χ2 = 1.8327, p = 0.543) the null hypothesis of
NNENEENENAAAAAAAAAAAA. Condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING was acquired after the acquisition of
conditions EXPLICIT ASKING and NOADAPTATION.
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independence cannot be rejected. A contingency table Bayes factor test110 (bf01 =
2.557, prior concentration set to a = 1), however, finds only ‘anecdotal’ evidence111 for
the null hypothesis. Based on this analysis, an influence of gender on the outcome of
the study cannot be ruled out.
We asked participants for their native languages and— if German is not among
them—how many years of experience they have in speaking German. Three parti-
cipants (8%) reported German not to be among their native languages (see table 9.4.
One of these participants fell into condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING (with 2.5 years of
experience speaking German), two into condition NOADAPTATION (with 16 and 23
years of experience speaking German).
We analysed whether it is likely that being a native speaker of German is independ-
ent from condition. Based on an approximate Pearson’s χ2-test (χ2 = 2.1818, p = 0.765)
the null hypothesis of independence cannot be rejected. Furthermore, a contingency
table Bayes factor test (bf01 = 6.586, prior concentration set to a = 1) finds ‘substantial’
evidence in favour of independence. As the number of cases is very low and both tests
point in the direction of independence, we assume that an influence on the outcome
of the study is unlikely.
We also asked participants whether they had prior experience interacting with
virtual agents or humanoid robots. Surprisingly, half (50%) of the participants had—
usually from participating in similar studies at Bielefeld University.
110. Gûnel and Dickey’s (1974) contingency table Bayes factor test— as implemented in the ‘BayesFactor’ R
package (Morey and Rouder 2015). We assume Gûnel and Dickey’s sampling model (iii), with fixed row
marginals and independent multinomially distributed rows, i.e., the null hypotheses states that multinomial
probabilities are equal across rows. This model is also used in subsequent contingency table Bayes factor
tests.
111. Interpretation of strength of evidence K (= bf) for a hypothesis according to Jeffreys (1961, p. 432):
1 < K < 3.16 barely worth mentioning/anecdotal
3.16 < K < 10 substantial
10 < K < 31.62 strong
31.62 < K < 100 very strong
100 < K decisive
Values of K between 0 and 1 are evidence for the ‘other’ hypothesis, but can be interpreted by calculating
1⇑K. ¶ Given two hypotheses A and B, a value of K > 1 is evidence for hypothesis Awhen a Bayes factor
bfAB is specified, and for hypothesis B when a Bayes factor bfBA is specified. Similarly, a value of K < 1 is
evidence against hypothesis A when a bfAB is specified, and against hypothesis B when a bfBA is specified.
¶Typically A and B are null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis— and represented as 0 and 1, respectively.
The Bayes factor is then specified as bf01 or bf10 . Further symbols can be used when comparing more
specific hypothesis, such as, for example, > and < for one-sided hypothesis with a specific ordering. The
Bayes factor is then specified as bf>0 , bf0>, bf<0 , bf0<, or even bf<> or bf>< when comparing one-sided
hypothesis against each other.
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Table 9.4: Proportions of participants that reported being native speakers of German;
having prior experience interacting with virtual agents or humanoid robots; having
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing.
Condition Native speaker Prior experience Normal vision Normal hearing
AS 0.92 0.5 0.92 1
EA 1 0.42 1 1
NA 0.83 0.58 0.75 0.92
Overall 0.92 0.5 0.89 0.97
We analysed whether it is likely that having prior experience interacting with
virtual agents or humanoid robots is independent from condition. Based on an approx-
imate Pearson’s χ2-test (χ2 = 0.66667, p = 0.9144) the null hypothesis of independence
cannot be rejected. Furthermore, a contingency table Bayes factor test (bf01 = 3.792,
prior concentration set to a = 1), finds ‘substantial’ evidence in favour of independence.
As both tests again point into the direction of independence, we can assume that an
influence on the outcome of the study is unlikely.
We also asked participants whether they have normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and hearing or not. Four participants (11 %) reported non-normal and non-
corrected vision (one in condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING, three in condition NO
ADAPTATION). A different participant reported non-normal and non-corrected hear-
ing (in condition NOADAPTATION).
With regard to vision, we analysed whether it is likely that distribution of parti-
cipants reporting non-normal and non-corrected vision is independent from con-
dition. Based on an approximate Pearson’s χ2-test (χ2 = 3.9375, p = 0.2963) the null
hypothesis of independence cannot be rejected, but a contingency table Bayes factor
test (bf01 = 2.661, prior concentration set to a = 1), only finds ‘anecdotal’ evidence in
favour of independence. Based on this analysis, an influence of vision on the outcome
of the study cannot be ruled out.
The agent’s non-verbal (i.e., visible) behaviour, however, only plays a minor role in
the evaluation study, with the agent’s presence and its gaze behaviour being the only
two important features. Considering the study setup (see fig. 9.1), presence is likely
perceivable even for participants with lower than normal eyesight. The agent’s eye
movements, however, are more subtle and are used for feedback elicitation— though
only in condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING. Weighting all these aspects, we consider
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Figure 9.5: Distribution of participants’ ‘Big five’ personality traits by experimental
condition. Each facet of the plot shows the distribution of the strength (1–5) of one
factor (openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism) in all
three conditions (purple: ATTENTIVE SPEAKING; green: EXPLICIT ASKING; yellow:
NOADAPTATION).
it unlikely that imperfect vision reported by four participants will have a significant
influence on the outcome of this study.
With regard to hearing, it does not make sense to carry out a statistical analysis
for the single participant and we do not expect it to have an influence on the outcome
of the study.
We also measured the participants’ personality (in terms of the ‘Big five’ invent-
ory using the bfi-10 test, [Rammstedt and John 2007]; see section 9.3.2). Figure 9.5
shows the distribution of the strength (from 1–5) of each factor, split up by factor
(openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism) and exper-
imental condition. It can be seen that, in general, participants range across the full
strength-spectrum on all factors except conscientiousness. Comparing experimental
conditions, it can be noticed that the distributions of strength values of each factor
are quite similar across conditions (again with an exception in conscientiousness,
where values in condition NOADAPTATION are more uniformly distributed than in
conditions ATTENTIVE SPEAKING and EXPLICIT ASKING).
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9.5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In this section we analyse the data gathered during the interaction study, directly
summarising and discussing intermediate results.
9.5.1 PARTICIPANTS’ FEEDBACK BEHAVIOUR
We begin by analysing whether participants actually provided feedback to the agents
they interacted with.
Annotation of participant’s feedback signal
In order to be able to analyse the feedback behaviour that participants showed during
the interactions with the agent, we annotated the recordings using the audio-visual
data from the webcam perspective (i.e., annotators had the same information as the
wizard; see fig. 9.2C).
All utterances by participants were segmented and transcribed from audio data
only, using ‘Praat’ (Boersma and Weenink 2016). Those with feedback characteristics
that were not produced in response to questions of the agent were classified as feedback
and transcribed on one tier, all other verbal acts were transcribed on a second tier.
Transcription of feedback was based on the conventions of the alico-corpus (Malisz
et al. 2016).
Head gesture feedback was segmented and labelled from video data only, using
‘ELAN’ (Wittenburg et al. 2006). Head gesture unit labels were limited to Włodarczak
et al.’s (2012) head movement types (nod, shake, jerk, tilt, turn, protrusion, and re-
traction). As no audio was used during annotation, head gestures that were produced
while responding to questions of the agent were segmented and annotated as well—
and filtered out during the analyses.
In total 33 (of the 36)112 interactions were segmented, transcribed, annotated,113
☆ Classical null hypothesis significance testing (nhst) based analyses in this section follow the applied
statistics textbooks of Field (Field et al. 2012; Field 2009). Bayesian analyses are based on the work of
Rouder, Morey, and colleagues (Rouder et al. 2009; Rouder et al. 2012; Morey 2014; Morey 2015). Both types
of analyses were carried out with the statistics software R (version 3.2.3). Non-standard R-packages critical
to the analyses are cited when relevant. ¶ The evaluation data and analysis source code are available as a
data publication at doi: 10.6084/m9.figshare.3827277 .
112. Audio-visual data from the webcam was incomplete or unavailable for three interactions in the
EXPLICIT ASKING condition.
113. Some of the segmentation and transcription was carried out byHB. A second annotator, KS, segmented,
transcribed, and annotated the largest part of the data— supervised by HB. Segmentation was done rather
coarsely. Transcriptions of verbal feedback signals were checked and corrected through systematic listening.
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and analysed114.
Do participants provide natural feedback in human–agent interaction?
Counting all instances of feedback across conditions yields a total number of 734
signals, 127 (17.3 %) of which are unimodal verbal signals, 296 (40.3 %) are unimodal
head gestures, and 311 (42.4%) are bimodal signals in which a verbal/vocal feedback
expression and a head gesture unit are produced in overlap. These numbers show that
participants in the evaluation study were willing to provide feedback to an artificial
conversational agent, a result that parallels the findings of Reidsma et al.’s (2011) study
of an attentive speaker agent.
The question, of course, is whether the feedback signals that participants provided
in interaction with the artificial agent can be considered ‘natural’, i.e., whether they
are similar or different to feedback that is provided in human conversation. To this
end, we will next analyse form and frequency properties of the feedback signals.
Of the 436 verbal/vocal feedback signals produced, okay is the most frequent
(41.5 %) feedback expression, followed by mhm (18.3 %), ja (14.2 %), m (6%), nein
(3.2 %), hm (1.8 %), ja okay (1.6 %), and nee (1.4 %). These are followed by a ‘long tail’
of expressions (each < 1%), 16 of which are single feedback morphemes (e.g., oh,
hä?) and 21 are expressions created through syntactic operation (e.g., mhm ja, hm
nein, okay ja; Allwood 1988, see section 3.3.1). This distribution of short feedback
expressions is similar to the distribution we found in human–human conversations in
the alico-corpus (Malisz et al. 2016, tbl. 7), where the four most frequent feedback
expressions are ja,m,mhm, and okay, too.
Of the 598 head gestures produced as feedback, 81.6% were labelled nod, 8.9% tilt,
6.4% shake, and 3.2% jerk. This distribution of head gesture types is, again, similar to
the one we found in human–human conversation in the alico-corpus (ibid., tbl. 4),
both are nod-heavy and the four most frequent units are also nod, jerk, tilt, and shake.
The 311 bimodal feedback signals were coherent in that almost all head gestures
of the category nod occurred together with verbal feedback expressions that can be
considered positive in polarity (okay,mhm, ja andm). Head gestures of the type shake,
on the other hand, occurred in overlap with the verbal feedback expression nein (and
variants of it such as hm nein)— these have negative polarity. Head gesture types tilt
and jerk occurred rarely in overlap with verbal/vocal feedback.
Segmentation and annotation of head gestures were checked for systematic problems. Misspelled labels
and transcription were corrected semi-automatically.
114. Annotations and transcriptions were brought into R via Python and ‘TextGridTools’ (Buschmeier and
Włodarczak 2013).
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In summary, it can be said that (i) participants provided multimodal commu-
nicative listener feedback to the artificial conversational agents they interacted with,
and (ii) the feedback they produced is comparable, in its form and distribution, to
feedback found in human–human conversations.
It is important to acknowledge though that participants were told consistently
across all three experimental conditions— in the instructions— that they can provide
multimodal communicative listener feedback to the agent and that the agent can take
their feedback into account in its own behaviour (see section 9.3.6 and appendix B).
Only the agent in condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING (the attentive speaker agent), how-
ever, perceived participants’ feedback signals and adapted its behaviour.Moreover, this
agent pro-actively elicited feedback, if participants did not provide it spontaneously
(see chapter 7). The agents in the two control conditions EXPLICIT ASKING and NO
ADAPTATION did neither of this.
Does the agent’s behaviour influence participants’ feedback rate?
This raises the question whether the agents’ behaviours (i.e., the experimental condi-
tion) actually influenced participants in their feedback behaviour—or whether they
provided feedback because the instructions mentioned that they could do it. To shed
light on this question, we analyse if and how participants’ feedback behaviour differed
across conditions. Since the agent in condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING takes feedback
into account—and even produces feedback elicitation cues— , our hypothesis is
that participants provide more feedback in this condition than in the two control
conditions EA and NA, between which we expect no difference (in both conditions
the agent ignored listener feedback).
Analysing the absolute number of feedback signals provided by participants115 is
not useful because net durations (i.e., disregarding the time of the recall phases) of the
interactions differ (this is further analysed in table 9.7 below). The main reason for
this is that information presentation units can be presented repeatedly in conditions
AS and EA (see section 9.5.2, page 211 for an analysis of the number of presentations
and repetitions). To be comparable across participants and conditions, we therefore
base the following analysis of participants’ feedback behaviour on the rate at which
they provided feedback. We define this ‘feedback rate’ fFB as the number of feedback
signals per presentation (i.e., fFB = #FB⇑(#repetitions + 17); see caption of fig. 9.9).
Across all conditions, participants produced between 0 and 2.4 feedback signals
per presentation unit, with a mean feedback rate of M = 1.1 (SD = 0.8). Analysing
participants’ feedback behaviour by experimental condition we find differences in
115. Across conditions, participants produced between 0 and 54 feedback signals (M = 22.2, SD = 17.6).
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Figure 9.6: Distribution of participants’ feedback rate (number of feedback signals
per presentation; see text) by experimental condition. Data points are y-jittered in
translucent light grey; black dots are medians, black lines are whiskers, mid gaps are
quartiles.
feedback rate. Participants in condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING have a mean feedback
rate of M = 1.97 (Mdn = 1.93, SD = 0.22, min = 1.65,max = 2.4). Participants in
condition NOADAPTATION follow with a mean feedback rate ofM = 0.65 (Mdn =
0.56, SD = 0.6, min = 0.06,max = 1.94). Participants in condition EXPLICIT ASKING
only have a mean feedback rate ofM = 0.1 (Mdn = 0.41, SD = 0.31, min = 0, max =
0.92). Figure 9.6 shows the distribution of feedback rate by condition. To confirm our
hypothesis that participants provide more feedback in the ATTENTIVE SPEAKING
condition, we will carry out an inferential analysis of feedback rates.
An independent one-way Welch-approximated anova116 indicates that feed-
back frequencies are statistically significantly different between experimental con-
ditions: F(2, 17.112) = 94.68, p = 5.571e−10. Post-hoc Welch’s one-sided two sample
t-tests between conditions (see table 9.5) further reveal statistically significant (to
a Bonferroni-corrected alpha-level of α⇑3 = 0.0167) differences of feedback rates
between conditions ATTENTIVE SPEAKING and NOADAPTATION as well as between
conditions ATTENTIVE SPEAKING and EXPLICIT ASKING. In both cases the effect
size can be considered large (r > 0.5; Cohen 1992). However, the null hypothesis
that participants’ feedback rate in condition EXPLICIT ASKING does not differ from
116. Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality yield statistically non-significant results (Wα = 0.859; α = 0.05) for
the distributions of feedback rate in all three conditions (AS : W = 0.954, p = 0.7; EA : W = 0.919, p =
0.38;NA : W = 0.866, p = 0.06). Hence, we assume that data was drawn from a normally distributed
population and will use parametric tests. ¶ Even though Levene’s test does not reject the null hypothesis
of equal variance F(2, 30) = 3.27, p = 0.052, we assume from the distributions of feedback rate (see
fig. 9.6) that the variance between experimental conditions differs and compensate for this by using Welch’s
approximation method.
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Table 9.5: Results of post-hoc nhst and Bayes factor analyses of feedback rate (feed-
back signals per presentation). Tests AS : EA and AS :NA are one-sided and two sample
Welch’s t-tests and use ‘greater’ as the alternative hypothesis, e.g., AS > EA. The test
EA : NA is two-sided and two sample. Bayes factor t-tests of conditions AS : EA and
AS : NA analyse both alternative hypotheses against the null hypothesis, and against
each other (see fn. 118).
Comparison Welch’s t-test Bayes factor t-test
df t p r bf>0 bf0< bf><
AS : EA 13.854 13.182 1.575e−9 0.95 3.934e8 225.395 8.868e10
AS : NA 13.901 7.105 2.753e−6 0.83 5.148e4 100 5.016e6
EA : NA 17.141 -1.371 0.1881 0.3 bf01 = 1.467
participants’ feedback rate in condition NOADAPTATION, tested with Welch’s two
sample t-test, cannot be rejected.
Following this, we analyse feedback rates in a Bayesian framework. A Bayesian an-
ova117 yields the Bayes factor bf10 = 1.042e7, which is considered ‘decisive’ evidence
for the alternative hypothesis that feedback frequencies differ between experimental
conditions against the null hypothesis that only contains the intercept.
Similar to the classical analysis above, we can further analyse this omnibus result
with post-hoc tests. Firstly, we analyse our hypothesis that participants in experimental
condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING produced more feedback per presentation than par-
ticipants in condition EXPLICIT ASKING, i.e, AS > EA. We do this using a BayesFactor
two sample t-test.118,119 For the one-sided alternative hypothesis of a positive effect,
i.e., that participants in condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING produced more feedback
117. Rouder et al.’s (2012) Bayes factor test for anova designs as implemented in the ‘BayesFactor’ R
package (Morey and Rouder 2015).
118. Rouder et al.’s (2009) Bayes factor t-test as implemented in the ‘BayesFactor’ R package (Morey and
Rouder 2015). The test calculates how likely the observed effect size is given a prior distribution over the
true effect size δ (modelled with a scaled Cauchy distribution). The one-sided two sample version of the test
compares both possible alternatives— the observed effect size of one sample is greater or less than the effect
size of the other sample—against the null hypothesis (no effect) and, therefore, yields two Bayes factor
values: bf>0 for a positive effect (δ ∈⌋︀0,∞⌋︀); and its complement bf<0 for a negative effect (δ ∈ (︀−∞, 0⌋︀).
A Bayes factor that evaluates the more specific hypothesis greater vs. less (or vice versa) can simply be
calculated by division (Morey 2014), e.g., bf>< = bf>0⇑bf<0 .
119. Using the default, ‘medium’-scaled prior distribution (r = ⌋︂2⇑2), for each one-sided alternative
hypothesis (positive/negative effect) against the null hypothesis (no effect), and then against each other.
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signals per presentation than participants in condition EXPLICIT ASKING, this yields
the Bayes factor bf>0 = 3.934e8, which is considered ‘decisive’ evidence against the
null hypothesis that there are no differences (see fn. 111). The complementary altern-
ative hypothesis of a negative effect yields the Bayes factor bf<0 = 0.004, which is
considered ‘decisive’ evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. Directly comparing
the two alternative hypotheses yields the Bayes factor bf>< = 8.868e10, which is ‘de-
cisive’ evidence in favour of our hypothesis that participants in condition ATTENTIVE
SPEAKING produced more feedback per presentation than participants in condition
EXPLICIT ASKING.
Secondly, we analyse the hypothesis that participants in experimental condition
ATTENTIVE SPEAKING produce more feedback per presentation than participants
in NOADAPTATION, i.e, AS > NA, in the same way. For the one-sided alternatives
of a positive effect this yields the Bayes factor bf>0 = 5.148e4, which is considered
‘decisive’ evidence against the null hypothesis. Similarly the complementary altern-
ative hypothesis of a negative effect yields bf<0 = 0.01, which is considered ‘strong’
evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. The direct comparison of the two alternative
hypotheses yields the Bayes factor bf>< = 5.016e6, also ‘decisive’ evidence for our
hypothesis that participants in condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING will produce more
feedback per presentation than participants in NOADAPTATION.
Finally, we analyse the experimental condition EXPLICIT ASKING against con-
dition NOADAPTATION. Here our hypothesis is that there should be no difference
in feedback rate since the agents in both conditions ignored participants’ feedback
signals. The analysis yields the Bayes factor bf01 = 1.467, which can be considered
‘anecdotal’ evidence for the null hypothesis that there is no difference in feedback rate.
Such weak evidence, however, suggests that we do not have enough data to make a
definite statement.
Both analyses show that those participants that interacted with the attentive
speaker agent (in experimental condition AS) clearly produced more feedback signals
per presentation than participants that interacted with the agents that were ignorant
of participants’ feedback (in experimental condition EA and NA). No difference in
feedback rate between these latter two conditions were found. We can conclude from
this that the attentive speaker agent’s capabilities and behaviour had a decisive effect
on the rate of communicative listener feedback being provided.
Does participants’ feedback rate change over time?
Participants went into the interaction with the idea that they can provide feedback
and that the agent can take their feedback signals into account. The preceding analysis
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Figure 9.7: Development of participants’ feedback rate (feedback signals per presenta-
tion) from Block1 to Block6, by condition. Data points are x-jittered in translucent
light grey; black dots are medians, black lines are whiskers, mid gaps are quartiles.
leaves open the question whether participants in the control conditions EA and NA
had a lower feedback rate throughout the interaction, or whether they noticed at
some point that providing feedback has no effect. One way to look at this is to analyse
how participants’ feedback rate changes over the course of the experiment. As each
interaction consists of six consecutive blocks (see fig. 9.4), we can analyse the feedback
rate in each of these blocks and look at its development from the beginning of the
interaction towards its end.
As can be seen in fig. 9.7, participants’ feedback rates do not vary much by block
number. In condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING, the standard deviation of the mean
feedback rate across blocks and participants is SD = 0.23 and it is even smaller in
conditions EXPLICIT ASKING (SD = 0.08) and NOADAPTATION (SD = 0.11).
There are two explanation for this. Either participants noticed within the first
few information presentation units of the first block whether their feedback beha-
viour made a noticeable difference or not. Or participants in condition ATTENTIVE
SPEAKING simply responded to feedback elicitation cues that the attentive speaker
agent produced and, as no such cues were produced in the two control conditions,
participants in these conditions did not provide feedback.
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Do participants (just) respond to feedback cues?
To investigate this issue, we analyse how effective the feedback elicitation cues of the
attentive speaker agent in condition AS are. To this end, we extract the points in time
at which the agent produces such cues from the log files of the interactions and jointly
analyse elicitation cue timing and the timing of participants’ feedback signals. The
approach we take is rather simple. Given a feedback elicitation cue that the attentive
speaker agent produces, we check whether participants produce a feedback signal
within a window of 4 s after the decision to produce a cue is made (a rather generous
window size, but it takes some time for the cue to actually be realised). If a listener
feedback signal falls within the window, the elicitation cue is considered ‘effective’.
Across interactions in condition AS the attentive speaker agent has a mean elicita-
tion cue rate (defined analogously to feedback rate; see above) ofM = 1.8 (Mdn = 1.86,
SD = 0.26; see table 9.6), that is, on average 1.8 feedback elicitation cues are produced
for each presentation. On average, 61 % of the cues were effective (i.e., followed by
participant feedback).
Table 9.6 also shows that, on average, 54% of participants’ feedback signals were
preceded by an elicitation cue of the agent, which, in turn, means that an average of
46% of participants’ feedback signals were produced ‘pro-actively’, i.e., not preceded
by a feedback elicitation cue (other features in the agent’s behaviour may serve as
cues as well but are consistent across experimental conditions). Based on this, we can
calculate that, on average, participants pro-actively produced 0.91 feedback signals per
presentation. This rate is 9.1, respectively 1.4, times as high as the mean feedback rate
of participants in conditions EA and NA (see above). Hence, the difference in feedback
rate between condition AS and the control conditions cannot be reduced to the factor
that the attentive speaker agent deliberately produces feedback elicitation cues. This
result suggests that participants indeed noticed that their feedback behaviour has an
influence on the agent’s behaviour.
The analysis further indicates that the form of an elicitation cue influences its
effectiveness. In those cases where the agent simply made a pause and focussed its gaze
on the listener (L1-cues), an average of 49% of the cues was effective, whereas L2-cues,
which additionally contained a verbal request (e.g., okay?), were, on average, effective
82% of the time (see table 9.6). As has been found in human–human conversation
(Gravano and Hirschberg 2011, pp. 623–625), increasing the number of features in
feedback elicitation cues produced by an artificial conversational agent also increases
their effectiveness.
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Table 9.6: Feedback elicitation cue rate and effectiveness (proportion of cues that are
followed by listener feedback in a 4 s window) across interactions in experimental
condition AS. The bottom half of the table shows participants’ feedback rate as well as
the proportions of feedback that can be considered elicited or pro-active (i.e., preceded
by a deliberately produced elicitation cue, or not).
rate effectiveness (proportion)
Cue M Mdn SD M Mdn SD
Total 1.8 1.86 0.26 0.61 0.59 0.19
L1 (pause) 1.29 1.31 0.17 0.49 0.52 0.19
L2 (verbal) 0.51 0.54 0.19 0.82 0.77 0.20
Feedback 1.97 1.93 0.22 proportion of feedback
elicited 1.06 1.1 0.2 0.54 0.57 0.10
pro-active 0.91 0.87 0.24 0.46 0.43 0.10
Intermediate summary
We can summarise the analysis of participants’ feedback behaviour by asserting that
(i) in conversation with attentive speaker agents, human interaction partners provide
communicative listener feedback that is similar in surface form to feedback that
occurs in human–human interaction; (ii) the behaviour of the agent is decisive for its
human interaction partner’s feedback behaviour, (iii) participants interacting with
agents that do not respond to communicative listener feedback quickly notice that
providing feedback has no effect, and they immediately stop doing it, and (iv) feedback
elicitation cues are effective (depending on their form even highly effective), but the
rate of pro-actively produced feedback still exceeds the feedback rate in both control
conditions, which suggests that participants in the ATTENTIVE SPEAKING condition
noticed that their feedback behaviour has an effect on the agent and the interaction.
9.5.2 OBJECTIVE QUALITY OF THE INTERACTION
In this section, we analyse the objective quality of the interaction, starting with two
analyses of costs: interaction duration and repetitions. This is followed by an analysis
of participants’ performance, i.e., understanding operationalised in terms of their
recall of calendar events. Finally, we bring these results together in an analysis of the
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efficiency of the interactions.
Analysing costs: interaction durations
We begin the investigation of costs by analysing whether the experimental condition
(i.e., the agent’s behaviour) has an influence on the durations of the interactions. Our
hypothesis is that the two control conditionsNOADAPTATION and EXPLICITASKING
mark two extremes of the duration spectrum, with interactions being shortest in
conditionNA (where the agent never repeats presentation of information presentation
units) and longest in condition EA (where the agent always asks participants if an
information presentation unit should be repeated again). We expect experimental
condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING to fall in between these two ends of the spectrum.
In this condition, information presentation units are only repeated if (i) the agent
attributes perception or understanding below a certain threshold to the participant,
or (ii) the agent is unsure about the participant’s levels of perception or understanding
and lets them explicitly chose to have an information presentation unit repeated.
Interaction durations were automatically extracted from the log file of the interac-
tions. We define duration to be the sum of the durations of the dialogue phases of the
six individual blocks (see fig. 9.4). Not included in the measure are therefore the hello
and bye sequences (which have the same length across conditions), and the recall
phases (which are not considered part of the interaction itself). Measuring begins at
the point where the first utterance of a block (e.g., In diesem Block werde ich über drei
Termine sprechen (‘In this block, I will talk about three appointments’)) is planned
and send to the behaviour realizer120 and ends when the last utterance of a block is
planned and send to the behaviour realiser (e.g., Dies war der erste Block . . . (‘This
was the first block . . . ’)).
Overall, interaction duration varied between 209.5 s and 781.4 s, with a mean of
M = 424.5 s and a standard deviation of SD = 177.9. Splitting the data by experimental
condition we can observe that there are differences in duration (see table 9.7). Dur-
ations in condition NO ADAPTATION are shortest—with a mean of M = 210 s—
and almost constant in length (SD = 0.4). In contrast to this, durations in condition
EXPLICIT ASKING are longest with a mean ofM = 594.9 s, but here the length varies
significantly (SD = 103.9). Interaction durations in condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING
fall in between with a mean ofM = 468.5 s and considerable variation (SD = 76.7),
too. Figure 9.8 shows the distribution of duration by conditions. This descriptive view
120. Due to variations in processing time, measuring at this point might lead to a negligible error of a few
milliseconds per block.
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Table 9.7: Duration (in seconds) of interactions by condition and overall. Duration
measures the length of an interaction disregarding the recall phases. See fig. 9.8 for
the distribution of the data.
Condition M SD min max
AS 468.5 76.7 353.8 605.2
EA 594.9 103.9 445.1 781.4
NA 210.0 0.4 209.5 210.6
Overall 424.5 177.9 209.5 781.4
NA
EA
AS
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Figure 9.8: Distribution of durations of interactions (in seconds) by condition. Dura-
tion measures the length of an interaction disregarding the recall phases. Data points
are y-jittered in translucent light grey; black dots are medians, black lines are whiskers,
mid gaps are quartiles.
on the data is in line with our hypothesis. To confirm it, we will turn to an inferential
analysis of durations.
An independent one-way Welch-approximated anova121 reveals a statistically
significant effect of condition on interaction duration, F(2, 14.667) = 143.84, p <
0.001, η2 = 0.83. Post-hoc pairwise Welch’s one-sided two sample t-tests between
conditions further reveal statistically significant (to a Bonferroni-corrected alpha-
level of α⇑3 = 0.0167) mutual differences of interaction duration between conditions
121. Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality yield statistically non-significant results (Wα = 0.859; α = 0.05) for
the distributions of interaction duration in all three conditions (NOADAPTATION:W = 0.935, p = 0.44;
EXPLICIT ASKING:W = 0.945, p = 0.57; ATTENTIVE SPEAKING:W = 0.97, p = 0.92). Hence, we assume
that data was drawn from a normally distributed population and will use parametric tests in the analysis. ¶
As is apparent from fig. 9.8, the variance in the three groups is not homogeneous. This is confirmed by
Levene’s test, which rejects the null hypothesis of equal variance F(2, 33) = 14.05, p < 0.001.We compensate
for this by using Welch’s approximation method.
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Table 9.8: Results of post-hoc nhst and Bayes factor analyses of interaction durations.
All tests are one-sided and two sample. Welch’s t-tests use ‘less’ as the alternative
hypothesis, e.g., ATTENTIVE SPEAKING < EXPLICIT ASKING. Bayes factor t-tests
analyse both alternative hypotheses against the null hypothesis, and against each other
(see fn. 118).
Comparison Welch’s t-test Bayes factor t-test
df t p r bf<0 bf0> bf<>
AS : EA 20.246 -3.391 1.431e−3 0.59 28.309 8.695 245.478
NA : AS 11.001 -11.668 7.752e−8 0.93 1.509e8 194.882 2.941e10
NA : EA 11 -12.831 2.914e−8 0.94 8.383e8 219.295 1.838e11
(see table 9.8). With effect sizes of r > 0.5, the effects are considered large (Cohen
1992).
A Bayes factor analysis of the interaction durations further confirms these results.
A Bayes factor anova yields the Bayes factor bf10 = 3.78e10, which is considered ‘de-
cisive’ evidence for the alternative hypothesis that interaction durations differ between
experimental conditions against the null hypothesis that only contains the intercept.
In order to analyse whether our ordering hypothesis is met, we will proceed in two
steps. We begin by conducting pairwise one-sided two sample Bayes factor t-tests122.
As can be seen in table 9.8, the analysis of AS vs. EA yields ‘strong’ evidence for a
negative effect against the null hypothesis, ‘substantial’ evidence for the null hypothesis
against a positive effect, and ‘decisive’ evidence for a negative against a positive effect.
The analyses of NO ADAPTATION against conditions ATTENTIVE SPEAKING and
EXPLICIT ASKING both yield ‘decisive’ evidence for a negative effect against the null
hypothesis, for the null hypothesis against a positive effect, and for the evidence of a
positive effect against a negative effect. This supports our hypothesis.
As a second step, we conduct a Bayes factor analysis that evaluates the ‘specific
restricted ordering hypothesis’ NA < AS < EA against the more general hypothesis
analysed by the omnibus Bayesian anova above (that there is a difference among
conditions).123 For this analysis we drew 10000 samples from the posterior distribution,
122. Using the default, ‘medium’-scaled prior distribution (r = ⌋︂2⇑2), for each one-sided alternative
hypothesis (positive/negative effect) against the null hypothesis (no effect), and then against each other.
123. Following Morey (2015), this can be done by (i) sampling from the posterior distribution of the
data, (ii) computing the proportion of samples that are consistent with the specific ordering hypothesis,
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9999 of which matched our specific restricted ordering hypothesis R, resulting in a
posterior probability of p(R⋃︀data) = 0.9999. Contrasting this with the full model F
and considering the riskiness of themodel (1⇑n!), yields124 a Bayes factor bfRF = 5.999,
which can be considered ‘substantial’ evidence in favour of the model of the specific
ordering hypothesis and against the full model. Using bfRF as an ‘evidential boost’, we
can now calculate125 the Bayes factor bfR0 = 2.265e11 of our specific order restriction
against the null hypothesis (no effect of condition) from the omnibus Bayesian anova
above, which is considered ‘decisive’ evidence for the specific ordering restriction
NA < AS < EA of interaction durations in contrast to the null hypothesis of no effect.
Analysing costs: repetitions
We continue the investigation of costs by analysing whether the experimental condi-
tion (i.e., the agents’ behaviour) has an influence on the amount of information that
the agent repeats during an interaction. A simple way to extract this information is by
counting the number of information presentation units that the agent repeats (or the
total number of presentations).
Repetition of information can only happen in two of the three experimental
conditions: in condition AS, the attentive speaker agent repeats an information unit
in two cases: (i) when it attributes a level of understanding to an interlocutor that
it deems insufficient for current purposes, and (ii) when it is uncertain whether the
level of understanding of the interlocutor is sufficient or not. In case (i), the agent tells
its interlocutors that it attributes non-understanding and automatically repeats the
information (in an adapted way). In case (ii), the agent tells its interlocutor that it is
uncertain about their level of understanding and ask them whether they want it to
present the information again (see table 8.1 on page 165)
As with the analysis of durations, our hypothesis is that the two control conditions
NOADAPTATION and EXPLICITASKINGmark two extremes of the amount of inform-
ation spectrum, with interactions in condition NA—trivially—having the lowest
number of repetitions (zero) and condition EA the highest number of repetitions. We
expect experimental condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING to fall in between these two
ends of the spectrum.
(iii) computing the posterior odds of a model R of our specific restricted ordering hypothesis and of the
full model F of all possible orderings, and (iv) factoring in the riskiness of the specific ordering hypothesis.
¶ Given n factors, there are n! possible orderings, i.e., 3! = 6 in our case: NA-AS-EA (the specific ordering
hypothesis under consideration), NA-EA-AS, EA-NA-AS, EA-AS-NA, AS-EA-NA, and AS-NA-EA.
124. bfRF = P(R⋃︀samples)P(F⋃︀samples) ⋅ n! = 0.99991 ⋅ 3! = 5.999.
125. bfR0 = bfRF ⋅ bf10 = 5.999 ⋅ 3.775e10 = 2.265e11.
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Figure 9.9: Distribution of total number of information presentations by condition.
Each condition consisted of the same 17 individual information presentation units
(grey vertical line; see table 9.2), each of which could be presented multiple times in
conditions ATTENTIVE SPEAKING and EXPLICIT ASKING. The number of repetitions
can be easily derived from the number of presentations Data points are y-jittered in
translucent light grey; black dots are medians, black lines are whiskers, mid gaps are
quartiles.
The mean number of repetitions in condition EA isM = 12.4 (SD = 4.5), whereas
it is onlyM = 4.5 (SD = 2.9) in condition AS, a meanM = 3.2 of which was, initiated
automatically by the agent (SD = 2.8). As explained above, there are no repetitions in
condition NA. Figure 9.9 shows the distribution of the number of presentations (and
therefore repetitions) per condition.
A Welch’s one-sided two sample t-test (using ‘less’ as the alternative hypothesis,
i.e., AS < EA) reveals that this difference is statistically significant (t = −5.1173,df =
18.984, p = 3.07e−5, r = 0.74) and has an effect size that is considered large (r > 0.5;
Cohen 1992). Similarly a BayesFactor t-test yields a bf<0 = 892.86 for the negative
effect against the null hypothesis, which is considered ‘decisive’ evidence.
Intermediate summary: Costs
Summarising the analysis of costs, our hypothesis could be confirmed. The experi-
mental condition has an influence on both interaction duration and the amount of
redundant information (in terms of repetitions). As hypothesised, interactions were
shortest in control conditionNA and longest in control conditions EA.The interactions
with the attentive speaker agent fell right between these extreme ends of the spectrum.
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Having addressed the ‘cost’ aspect of the promise of computational models of interac-
tional intelligence, we can now turn to the promise of better performance, measured
in terms of participants’ level of understanding.
Our hypothesis is that participants will perform worst in experimental condition
NOADAPTATION, since problems in perception or understanding could not be solved
through simple repetition or interactive adaptation. It is more challenging to formulate
a hypothesis about the relation between recall performance in conditions ATTENTIVE
SPEAKING and EXPLICIT ASKING. On the one hand, participants in condition EA
can explicitly choose to have an information presentation unit repeated as often as
they wish, whereas participants in condition AS can only choose whether they want
a repetition when the agent is unsure about their listening-related mental state. As
we have just analysed there are less repetitions in condition AS than in condition
EA. On the other hand, presentations in condition AS receive presentations that are
adapted to their immediate needs. Furthermore, dialogue phases in condition AS
were shorter (see above), so events needed to be remembered for shorter periods of
time. Weighting these influences, we expect recall scores to be moderately higher in
condition EXPLICIT ASKING.
As already mentioned above, interaction duration on its own is hardly a useful
criterion for evaluating an attentive speaker agent’s performance. The essential idea
underlying this thesis is that computational models of interactional intelligence, such
as for example the model for interactive feedback-based coordination in an attentive
speaker agent, will lead to better understanding among interlocutors, in a cost-efficient
manner (see section 1.2).
Analysing performance: understanding in terms of recall
As explained in section 9.3.1, we operationalise participants’ understanding by meas-
uring their recall of the calendar events that the agents’ present, gathered with a
pen-and-paper task in the recall phase following the dialogue phase in each of the six
blocks (see fig. 9.4). The scoring of the filled calendars was done manually (by HB),
with the help of printed stencil overlays that show the correct positions in the week
(weekday, start and end times) and titles of the calendar events. For each calendar
event that the agents described three points could be achieved: one for the weekday,
one for the start time, and one for the title of the event.126 The maximum number of
points for each block is thus three times the number of calendar events (see column
‘Items (counts)’ in table 9.2), resulting in a maximum of 24 ⋅ 3 = 72 points.
126. End times and durations of events were not scored as they were not always mentioned explicitly during
the agents’ presentation.
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Figure 9.10: Scoring of a participant’s recall for block number 5 (the fourth block
presented in this case). The participant reached a score of 6 out of 9 points. Two events
were recalled correctly, one event is missing completely.
Scoring was done liberally, with rules set up beforehand. Each piece of correct
information in a block yielded one point, even when mixed-up among events (e.g.,
when the titles of two events were interchanged, both points for titles were given
nonetheless). Non-queried extra information given by participants (e.g., specifying
information from the conflicting event in case of a ‘cancel’ operation) could make up
for wrong/missed information within one block. Figure 9.10 shows the scoring of one
of the filled calendars.
Overall, participants reached scores between 29 and 68 points, with amean ofM = 56.3
and a standard deviation of SD = 10.2 points (see table 9.9). Splitting participants by
experimental condition reveals differences in the scores reached, with participants in
condition EXPLICIT ASKING reaching highest mean score ofM = 62.8 (Mdn = 63.5,
SD = 5.5, min = 52,max = 69). Participants in condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING
follow with a mean score of M = 58.4 (Mdn = 59, SD = 7.6, min = 46,max = 68).
Participants in conditionNOADAPTATION reached the lowest mean score ofM = 47.5
(Mdn = 49.5, SD = 10.4, min = 29, max = 62). Figure 9.11 shows the distribution of
scores by conditions. These numbers are in line with our hypothesis. To confirm it,
we will turn to an inferential analysis of the recall scores.
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Table 9.9: Scores reached in the calendar recall-task by conditions.
Condition M SD min max
AS 58.4 7.6 46 68
EA 62.8 5.52 52 69
NA 49.5 10.4 29 62
Overall 56.3 10.2 29 68
NA
EA
AS
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Figure 9.11: Distribution of scores reached in the calendar recall-task by conditions.
Data points are y-jittered in translucent light grey; black dots are medians, black lines
are whiskers, mid gaps are quartiles.
A Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test127 indicates that the reached scores are statistically
significantly different between experimental conditions H(2) = 14.315, p < 7.791e−4
(α = 0.05).
Post-hoc pairwise approximative Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests (10000 Monte
Carlo replicas; a Bonferroni-corrected alpha-level of α⇑3 = 0.0167) reveal statistically
significant differences of the scores reached by participants between conditions AS
and NA, as well as between condition EA and NA (see table 9.10). With effect sizes of
r > 0.5 the effects of the two comparisons are considered large (Cohen 1992).
The difference between the scores reached by participants between conditions AS
and EA, however, are not significantly different.
As before, we also analyse recall scores in a Bayesian framework. A Bayesian
anova yields the Bayes factor bf10 = 160.681, which is considered ‘decisive’ evidence
127. A Shapiro-Wilk test for normality yields statistically significant results (Wα = 0.859; α = 0.05) for the
distribution of calendar scores in condition EA (W = 0.846, p = 0.033). Hence, we cannot assume that data
was drawn from a normally distributed population and will use non-parametric tests.
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Table 9.10: Results of post-hoc pairwise nhst and Bayes factor analyses of recall scores.
Bayes factor t-tests analyse both alternative hypotheses against the null hypothesis,
and against each other (see fn. 118).
Comparison Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test Bayes factor t-test
W p r bf>0 bf0< bf><
AS : EA 99 0.121 −0.32 0.171 0.571 0.097
EA : NA 133.5 2e−4 −0.79 261.717 9.909 2593.342
AS : NA 115 0.0119 −0.51 12.718 8.065 102.572
for the alternative hypothesis that the recall scores reached differ between experimental
conditions against the null hypothesis that only contains the intercept.
In order to analyse whether our ordering hypothesis is met, we will proceed in two
steps. We begin by conducting pairwise one-sided two sample Bayes factor t-tests128.
As can be seen in table 9.10, the analysis of AS versus NA yields ‘strong’ evidence
for a positive effect against the null hypothesis (i.e., AS > NA), ‘substantial’ evidence
for the null hypothesis against a negative effect, and ‘decisive’ evidence for a positive
against a negative effect. The analysis of EA versus NA yields ‘decisive’ evidence for
a positive effect against the null hypothesis (i.e., EA > NA), ‘substantial’ evidence
for the null hypothesis against a negative effect, and ‘decisive’ evidence for a positive
against a negative effect. Interestingly, the analysis of AS versus EA129 yields substantial
evidence against a positive effect and for the null hypothesis, basically no evidence for
a positive effect against the null, but ‘strong’ evidence for a negative effect against a
positive effect. This is an interesting result, as the nhst-based analysis did not find a
difference between these two conditions. The difference in interpretation of the data
under the two statistical perspectives shows that the difference in recall scores between
the attentive speaker agent and the upper-bound baseline may actually be quite small.
Nevertheless, carrying out the additional Bayesian analysis proved important, as it
finds strong evidence for a negative effect, i.e., for AS < EA.
This supports our hypotheses and suggests a specific ordering of experimental
condition by score, namely R = EA > AS > NA, which we can analyse separately, as in
128. Using the default, ‘medium’-scaled prior distribution (r = ⌋︂2⇑2), for each one-sided alternative
hypothesis (positive/negative effect) against the null hypothesis (no effect), and then against each other.
129. Note that the test analysed the hypothesis AS > EA (see table 9.10). It can, however, easily be interpreted
as its complement (see footnote 118).
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the analysis of interaction duration, see fn. 123.
Evaluating the specific ordering hypothesis R, we drew 10000 samples from the
posterior distribution. 8809 of these samples matched the specific restricted ordering
hypothesis R, resulting in a posterior probability of p(R⋃︀data) = 0.8809. Contrasting
this with the full model F and considering the riskiness of the model (1⇑n!), yields
a Bayes factor of bfRF = 5.285, which can be considered ‘substantial’ evidence in
favour of the model of the specific ordering hypothesis and against the full model.
The Bayes factor of our specific order restriction against the null hypothesis (no effect
of condition) from the omnibus Bayesian anova above is bfR0 = 849.26. Thus, there
is ‘decisive’ evidence for the specific ordering restriction R of recall scores achieved by
participants in contrast to the null hypothesis of no effect.
Intermediate summary: Performance
In summary, we can say that the experimental condition has a decisive influence on
participants’ recall scores. Participants in the control condition NA, who interacted
with the agent which only presents each information presentation unit once and
does not respond to participants’ feedback at all, performed decisively worse than
participants in the attentive speaker condition AS and the second control condition
EA.
Participants in condition EA, who interacted with the agent which would repeat
each information unit as often as participants wished, performed moderately better
in the recall task than participants who interacted with the attentive speaker agent,
the effect is smaller however.
Given a recall-based operationalisation of understanding, the attentive speaker
agent’s capabilities could not compete with the simple power of repetition. And, parti-
cipants in condition EAmade extensive use of the opportunity of getting information
presented repeatedly (see fig. 9.9 and the analysis of repetitions on page 211). In light
of this information, the performance of participants who interacted with the attentive
speaker agent does not seems to be too bad after all, even if it is lower in absolute
terms.
Revisiting the promise of computational models of interactional intelligence, we
can now say that the attentive speaker agent falls in between the two ends of the
spectrum on both aspects: Costs (interaction duration, repetitions) and performance
(understanding in terms of recall). In the following we will now compute the trade-off
between these aspects and analyse the efficiency of the interactions.
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Efficiency: Recall score versus duration or repetition
As mentioned above, we model efficiency as the ratio of performance to costs. This
yields two measures for efficiency, one based on duration, the other based on the
number of repetitions, namely
ηdur = recall scoreduration , and ηrep = recall score#repetitions . (9.1)
Our hypothesis for efficiency is that the attentive speaker agent is more efficient than
the two agents of the control conditions.
As a first step, we calculate the ratios ηdur and ηrep for each conditions, using the
mean score, mean duration, and mean number of repetitions (see table 9.11). The
first point to notice is that the lower bound control condition NA is far more efficient
than the two other conditions. Considering ηdur, it is 1.8 times more efficient than
condition AS and 2.1 time more efficient than condition EA. And it basically does
not make sense to consider ηrep for condition NA. As no information gets repeated,
it is infinitely more efficient.130 Still, the amount of information that participants in
this control condition could recall is (perhaps surprisingly) high. We will discuss this
below.
The difference in efficiency between the attentive speaker agent condition AS and
the upper-bound control condition EA is rather small when considering ηdur (the
attentive speaker is 1.18 times more efficient), but quite large in terms of ηrep (where
it is 2.56 times as efficient). Are these differences, especially between conditions AS
and EA, significant? To investigate this, we calculate the efficiency ratios for each
participant and test in the usual way.
An independent one-way Welch-approximated anova131 reveals a statistically
significant effect of condition on efficiency in terms of ηdur, F(2, 30.922) = 19.169, p =
1e−6, η2 = 0.73. Post-hoc pairwise Welch’s one-sided two sample t-tests between
conditions further reveal statistically significant (to a Bonferroni-corrected alpha-level
of α⇑3 = 0.0167) mutual differences of ηdur between conditions (see table 9.12). With
an effect size of r > 0.3 the difference between conditions AS and EA are considered
130. If we instead replace number of repetitions by number of presentations (i.e., #repetitions+17), condition
NA is only marginally more efficient (only 1.02 times more efficient than condition AS and 1.3 times more
efficient than condition EA).
131. Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality yield statistically non-significant results (Wα = 0.859; α = 0.05)
for the distributions of ηdur in all three conditions (ATTENTIVE SPEAKING:W = 0.937, p = 0.4644; NO
ADAPTATION:W = 0.943, p = 0.5409; EXPLICIT ASKING:W = 0.96, p = 0.7966). Hence, we assume that
data was drawn from a normally distributed population and will use parametric tests in the analysis. ¶
A Levene’s test rejects the null hypothesis of equal variance F(2, 33) = 6.339, p = 0.0047, for which we
compensate by using Welch’s approximation method.
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Table 9.11: Mean recall scores, mean durations, mean number of repetitions, as well as
derived efficiency values ηdur and ηrep (see eq. [9.1]) by experimental condition.
condition recall duration (s) ηdur # repetitions ηrep
AS 58.4 468.5 0.125 4.5 (+17) 12.98(2.73)
EA 62.8 594.9 0.106 12.43 (+17) 5.06(2.14)
NA 49.5 210.1 0.226 0 (+17) ∞(2.79)
of medium size. The effect sizes of r > 0.5 of the two test involving condition NA are
considered large (Cohen 1992).
As before, we also analyse ηdur in a Bayesian framework. A Bayesian anova
yields the Bayes factor bf10 = 1.575e7, which is considered ‘decisive’ evidence for the
alternative hypothesis that ηdur differs between experimental conditions against the
null hypothesis that only contains the intercept.
A one-sided two sample Bayes factor t-test132 yields a difference between the attent-
ive speaker condition AS and the control condition EA, this is considered ‘substantial’
evidence for a positive effect against the null-hypothesis. The evidence of a positive
effect against a negative effect is even considered to be ‘very strong’. Further tests yield
‘decisive’ evidence for a positive effects against the null hypothesis for comparisons
NA > AS and NA > EA.
Turning to the analysis of ηrep we only investigate the difference between the
attentive speaker condition AS and the upper-bound control condition EA—it does
not make sense to investigate it for control condition NA (where ηrep =∞). A Welch’s
one-sided two sample t-test reveals a statistically significant differences of ηrep between
conditions AS and EA (see table 9.12). The effect size of r > 0.5 is considered to be large
(ibid.). This is confirmed by a Bayesian analysis. A one-sided two sample Bayes factor
t-test yields evidence for a positive effect against the null-hypothesis that is considered
‘substantial’, similar for the null hypothesis against a negative effect. Comparing the
positive effect against the negative effect yields evidence that is even considered to be
‘very strong’.
132. Using the default, ‘medium’-scaled prior distribution (r = ⌋︂2⇑2), for each one-sided alternative
hypothesis (positive/negative effect) against the null hypothesis (no effect), and then against each other.
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Table 9.12: Results of post-hoc nhst and Bayes factor analyses of efficiency in terms
of the ratios of recall to duration (ηdur) and recall to repetitions (ηrep). All tests are
one-sided and two sample. Welch’s t-tests use ‘greater’ as the alternative hypothesis,
e.g., AS > EA. Bayes factor t-tests analyse both alternative hypotheses against the null
hypothesis, and against each other (see fn. 118).
Comparison Welch’s t-test Bayes factor t-test
df t p r bf>0 bf0< bf><
ηdur AS : EA 2.346 18.295 0.0152 0.45 4.73 7.124 33.696
NA : AS 6.174 16.199 6.318e−6 0.8 1.509e8 194.881 2.941e10
NA : EA 7.919 13.077 1.203e−6 0.86 2.491e5 114.85 2.861e7
ηrep AS : EA 2.843 11.18 0.0079 0.52 10.6 7.91 83.834
Intermediate summary: Efficiency
In summary, the cost-efficiency of the interaction—whether operationalised in terms
of the ratio of recall score to duration or to number of repetitions—varies with
experimental condition.
The results, consistent across both operationalisations, are that (i) the agent in
control condition NA (which did not take into account its interlocutor’s feedback at
all) is more efficient than the attentive speaker agent (condition AS) as well as the
agent in control condition EA (which always asked its interlocutors whether it should
repeat or continue), and (ii) the attentive speaker agent is more efficient than the agent
in control condition EA. That is, the attentive speaker agent’s efficiency lies in between
the two control conditions.
Our expectation was that, in terms of cost-efficiency, the attentive speaker agent,
should perform better than the agents in both control conditions. This raises the
question why the agent in condition NA was most efficient. It was clear that this agent
would perform best in terms of interaction duration and number of repetitions. It was
also expected that it would perform worst in terms of understanding operationalised
via recall performance. Despite being low in relation to the two other conditions,
participants recall scores in NA were actually quite high in absolute terms. It was not
expected, however, that these were high enough for the agent being competitive in
terms of efficiency.
One explanation that we have to offer is that the interactions in the two control
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conditions were more predictable than the interaction with the attentive speaker
agent and that this may have influenced participants’ recall performance. In the two
control conditions, most participants were probably familiar with the structure of
the interactions after the first few presentations (see the discussion of changes in
participants’ feedback rate over time on page 204 and fig. 9.7), which might have
enabled them to fully focus on the recall task. In condition EA, participants learned
that they could get as many repetitions as needed. In condition NA, however, they
learned that they only have a single chance to understand and memorise each event
the agent presented. In addition, the presentation phase was short.
In contrast to this, the agent’s exact dialogue moves were more difficult to predict
in the attentive speaker condition AS. In each presentation it was uncertain whether
the agent will offer a repetition, whether it will ask the participants, or whether par-
ticipants have to make do with a single presentation. These dialogue management
decisions were made automatically, based on the agent’s attribution of listening-related
mental state to its interaction partners. This attribution might not have always reflec-
ted participants’ actual listening-related mental states and might have thus resulted
in decisions that, from a human perspective, were inappropriate and, perhaps, irrit-
ating, or even disruptive, for participants. After an initial phase of familiarisation,
participants in the control conditions did not have to deal with this.
Having analysed the objective quality of the attentive speaker agent, we can now
turn to participants’ subjective perception of the agent and the interaction.
9.5.3 SUBJECTIVE QUALITY OF THE INTERACTION
As described in section 9.3.2, participants’ subjective perspectives were elicited with
the help of 20 items (repeated in table 9.13), each rated on a seven-point Likert scale.
Figure 9.12 shows participants’ responses to all items grouped by experimental condi-
tion.
In contrast to usual analyses of questionnaires of Likert scale items, we will com-
pare ratings of items individually, i.e., not grouped into higher level factors. We do this
since the questionnaire was not developed with the intent of items to be grouped.133
This, however, makes it difficult to do a proper inferential analysis. Carrying out many
statistical tests (20×3 = 60) would eithermake type I errors due tomultiple testing very
likely or lead to a very small Bonferroni-corrected α-level of α = 0.05⇑60 = 0.00083.
Given this, classical nhst-based inference would most likely not be very informative.
We will therefore carry out an analysis that is descriptive in nature.
133. The categories according to which the items are discussed in section 9.3.2 and structured in table 9.13
serve presentational purposes.
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Table 9.13: Overview of the 20 questionnaire items participants rated on seven-point
Likert scales (see section 9.3.2) and their median rating by experimental condition
( AS; EA; NA).
No. Item (translated from German) Rating (Mdn)
Speaking competence 1 7
Q1 When Billie speaks, his ideas are clearly and concisely presented
Q2 WhenBillie explains something to someone, it tends to be disorganized
Q3 I could understand Billie well
Attentive speaking capabilities
Q4 Billie gave me signals when he wanted to have feedback
Q5 Billie wanted me to understand him
Q6 Billie perceived my feedback
Q7 Billie understood my feedback
Q8 Billie is able to tell whether or not I have understood what he has said
Q9 Billie perceived my attitude towards calendar items
Q10 Billie was attentive to me and adapted to my needs
Helpfulness
Q11 Billie helped me resolve difficulties in understanding
Q12 It was helpful that Billie repeated himself, when needed
Q13 It was helpful that Billie provided further information, when needed
Q14 Billie tried to keep the experiment as short as possible
Naturalness
Q15 The interaction with Billie was smooth
Q16 The interaction with Billie was well coordinated
Q17 Billie’s behaviour was similar to the behaviour of a human speaker
Task and study
Q18 I perceived the task to be difficult
Q19 I could remember calendar events and changes to them
Q20 The experiment was successful
1 7
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12
Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16
Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Figure 9.12: Participants’ responses to questionnaire items (see table 9.13 and sec-
tion 9.3.2) by experimental condition. x-axes show seven-point Likert scale response
anchors (1 [strongly disagree] to 7 [strongly agree], see fn. 106); stacked dots correspond
to number of responses; colours show experimental condition ( AS; EA; NA).
224 EVALUATIONOF THE ATTENTIVE SPEAKER AGENT
For each item we will compare the median rating—visualised in table 9.13 and
figs. 9.13 to 9.17—of the experimental conditions. We will substantiate our arguments
by making estimations of how likely, given the data, the observed ordering of a rating
of an item is in relation to its alternatives. We do this— similar to the procedures used
in the Bayesian analysis in previous sections—by first computing the Bayes factor
t-test134, with the default, ‘medium’-scaled prior distribution (r =⌋︂2⇑2), for each one-
sided alternative hypothesis (positive/negative effect) against the null hypothesis (no
effect), and then against each other.135 All computed Bayes factor values are tabulated
in table 9.14 and the most relevant ones—where evidence is at least ‘substantial’—
are visualised in figs. 9.13 to 9.17.
The agent’s communicative competence (Q1–Q3)
We will begin the analysis with the first three questionnaire items (Q1–Q3), which
deal with the agents’ communicative competence. In general, we expected the agent
in the attentive speaker condition AS to be a more competent communicator than
the agents in the two control conditions EA and NA, i.e., we expected it to present its
ideas clearly and concisely, to speak in an organised way, and to be understandable.
Figure 9.13 visualises the median ratings and the Bayes factor analyses for each of
the three questionnaire items. We start with questionnaire item Q1, the analysis of
which we describe in detail in order to illustrate the process we use in analysing all
questionnaire items to follow.
Q1 Participants in experimental conditions AS and NA gave questionnaire item Q1
(When Billie speaks, his ideas are clearly and concisely presented) a median rating of
Mdn = 5 (‘somewhat agree’), participants of condition EA gave a lower median rating
of Mdn = 4 (‘neither agree nor disagree’). That is, there seems to be no difference
between the attentive speaking condition and the lower-bound control condition, but
both receive a higher rating than the upper-bound control condition.
134. We are aware that using t-tests is not recommended for Likert scale data because response anchors are
merely ranked and a distance metric between the anchors cannot be assumed. This holds for the Bayes
factor t-test, too. We nevertheless use it here because we merely consider it to be a tool for weighing the
evidence for specific orderings of experimental conditions.
135. That is, for each pair of experimental conditions (C i ,C j), with C i ,C j ∈ {AS, EA,NA},C i ≠ C j , we
compute a Bayes factor bf>0 (how likely is a positive effect, i.e., that ratings are higher in C i than in C j ,
relative to the null hypothesis), the Bayes factor bf<0 (how likely is a negative effect, i.e., that ratings are
lower in C i than in C j , relative to the null hypothesis). Based on this we then compute the Bayes factor
bf>< (how likely is a positive effect C i > C j compared to a negative effect C i < C j)— see the explanation in
fn. 118 for details. These values allows us to evaluate the strength of evidence for the ordering of conditions
based on their rating.
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Table 9.14: Bayesian analyses of questionnaire items (using Bayes factor t-tests). Both
one-sided alternative hypotheses (positive/negative effect) are analysed against the null
hypothesis (no effect), and against each other. Intensity encodes strength of evidence
(see fn. 111) as follows: anecdotal – substantial – strong – very strong – decisive.
Q AS:EA AS:NA EA:NA
bf>0 bf<0 bf>< bf>0 bf<0 bf>< bf>0 bf<0 bf><
Q1 1.997 0.165 12.072 0.288 0.508 0.568 0.107 3.449 0.031
Q2 1.544 0.177 8.735 0.373 0.373 1.000 0.118 2.050 0.057
Q3 2.950 0.152 19.386 0.302 0.476 0.636 0.096 7.156 0.013
Q4 0.328 0.429 0.764 1.443 0.180 8.006 1.528 0.126 12.145
Q5 0.765 0.228 3.355 1554.6 0.016 95966 83.150 0.078 1067.6
Q6 0.373 0.373 1.000 4.144 0.143 28.909 2.904 0.110 26.434
Q7 0.206 0.966 0.214 1.214 0.190 6.383 2.300 0.115 20.027
Q8 1.982 0.166 11.959 7.402 0.132 56.119 0.543 0.182 2.980
Q9 1.946 0.166 11.691 0.745 0.231 3.226 0.205 0.440 0.465
Q10 0.342 0.409 0.837 2.992 0.152 19.712 3.526 0.106 33.180
Q11 50.583 0.111 457.68 467.76 0.098 4751.5 0.709 0.161 4.403
Q12 0.302 0.477 0.633 579.31 0.098 5934.4 716.36 0.070 10203
Q13 0.186 1.295 0.144 0.488 0.297 1.642 1.256 0.132 9.482
Q14 1.427 0.181 7.888 0.151 3.064 0.049 0.086 21.416 0.004
Q15 0.180 1.454 0.124 0.373 0.373 1.000 1.112 0.137 8.108
Q16 0.190 1.217 0.156 0.563 0.269 2.092 2.737 0.111 24.642
Q17 0.558 0.271 2.059 0.448 0.317 1.413 0.242 0.348 0.696
Q18 0.313 0.455 0.688 0.217 0.859 0.252 0.166 0.662 0.250
Q19 0.250 0.639 0.392 0.413 0.339 1.219 0.653 0.167 3.920
Q20 0.282 0.525 0.537 2.006 0.165 12.137 2.498 0.113 22.109
The Bayes factor analysis supports this ordering: Comparing the hypothesis AS >
EA against its inverse (i.e., AS < EA) yields a Bayes factor bfAS:EA>< = 12.072, which
is considered ‘strong’ evidence in its favour, i.e., that the attentive speaker agent
presented its ideas more clearly and concisely than the agent in the upper bound
control condition. Similarly, comparing the hypothesis EA > NA against its inverse
yields a Bayes factor bfEA:NA>< = 0.031, which is considered ‘very strong’ evidence in
favour of the inverse ordering (i.e.,EA < NA). Comparing the hypothesisAS > NA to its
inverse, yields a bfAS:NA>< = 0.508, which is considered to be evidence of only ‘anecdotal’
strength (i.e., we have not enough data to argue for or against either ordering).
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Q1—When Billie speaks, his ideas are clearly and concisely presented
1 74
BF><= 12.072
BF><= 0.031
Q2—When Billie explains something to someone, it tends to be disorganized
1 74
BF><= 8.735
BF><= 0.057
Q3— I could understand Billie well
1 74
BF><= 19.386
BF><= 0.013
Figure 9.13: Median ratings and Bayes factor based comparison of experimental con-
ditions ( ATTENTIVE SPEAKING; EXPLICIT ASKING; NO ADAPTATION) of the
questionnaire items relating to communicative competence (Q1–Q3). Brackets over
two median dots show the Bayes factor t-test value comparing both one-sided altern-
ative hypotheses (positive/negative effect) against each other. Colour-coded angle
brackets indicate ordering of conditions (given, e.g., BF><, a value of K > 0 is evidence
in favour of the ordering AS > EA, a value of K < 0 is evidence in favour of the inverse
ordering AS < EA). Intensity encodes strength of evidence (see fn. 111) as follows:
‘substantial’ – ‘strong’ – ‘very strong’ – ‘decisive’. Brackets for evidence considered
merely ‘anecdotal’ are omitted.
Q2 The analysis of the itemWhen Billie explains something to someone, it tends to be
disorganized yields ‘substantial’, respectively ‘strong’ evidence that participants in AS
and NA perceived the agents’ speech production to be less organised than participants
in EA,. Even though the attentive speaker agent’s explanation were rated to be even
less organised than that of the agent in NA, there is not enough evidence to claim so.
Q3 The analysis of the item I could understand Billie well yields strong, respectively
very strong, evidence that participants perceived that they could understand the agents
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in conditions AS and NA better than the agent in condition EA. Despite receiving a
slightly higher median rating, there is not enough evidence to assert that participants
interacting with the attentive speaker agent felt they understood better than the agent
in the lower-bound control condition NA.
Interestingly, and contrary to our expectations, no differences in perceived basic
communicative competence could be asserted between the attentive speaker condition
AS and the lower bound control condition NA, whereas there is clear evidence for
differences of these two conditions to the upper bound control condition EA.
Participants perceived the attentive speaker agent to be speaking more clearly and
concisely (Q1) and also asserted that they could understand it better (Q3) than the
agent in control condition EA. It is particularly unexpected that participants of control
condition NA rated their own understanding higher than participants in control
conditions EA, especially given that their objective understanding—operationalised
via recall, see section 9.5.2—was actuallymuch lower. Given that the control condition
in which the agent did not take participants into account (NA) was rated similarly, this
might indicate that always asking participants explicitly for their understanding was
perceived to be overly verbose and influenced participants’ self perception such that
they were less able to correctly estimated their own ability to understand the agent.
Explicitly asking for understanding too often, might have raised doubts on their
side and diminished their retrospective feeling of understanding while rating ques-
tionnaire item Q3. Not questioning participants’ understanding, on the other hand,
let participants overestimate their level of understanding. The strategy of the attentive
speaker agent— informing participants of their estimated level of understanding
and only questioning them if necessary seems to have enabled participants to make
realistic estimations of their understanding.
The agent’s attentive speaking capabilities (Q4–Q10)
Next, we look at the seven questionnaire items Q4–Q10 that deal with the parti-
cipants’ subjective perception of the agent’s attentive speaking capabilities. In general
we expected that participants in the ATTENTIVE SPEAKING condition will provide
higher ratings than participants in both control conditions EXPLICIT ASKING and
NOADAPTATION. We also expect that participants who interacted with the agent
that explicitly asked whether it should repeat or continue (EA) is rated higher than
the agent that did not adapt at all (NA)— at least for some of the questionnaire items.
Figure 9.14 shows the visualisation of the median ratings and the Bayes factor analyses
of these six questionnaire items.
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Q4—Billie gave me signals when he wanted to have feedback
1 74
BF><= 8.006
BF><= 12.145
Q5—Billie wanted me to understand him
1 74
BF><= 3.355
BF><= 95966
BF><= 1067.6
Q6—Billie perceived my feedback
1 74
BF><= 28.909
BF><= 26.434
Q7—Billie understood my feedback
1 74
BF><= 0.214
BF><= 6.383
BF><= 20.027
Q8—Billie is able to tell whether or not I have understood what he has said
1 74
BF><= 11.959
BF><= 56.119
Q9—Billie perceived my attitude towards calendar items
1 74
BF><= 11.691
BF><= 3.226
Q10—Billie was attentive to me and adapted to my needs
1 74
BF><= 19.712
BF><= 33.180
Figure 9.14:Median ratings and Bayes factor based comparison of experimental conditions
( AS; EA; NA) of the questionnaire items relating to attentive speaking capabilities (Q4–Q10).
For an explanation of the plots see the caption of fig. 9.13.
9.5 ANALYSIS ANDRESULTS 229
Q4 Examining the answers to the item Billie gave me signals when he wanted to
have feedback, we see ‘substantial’, respectively ‘strong’, evidence that participants in
condition AS and EA were more convinced that the agent provided signals in order to
elicit feedback than participants in condition NA, who where rather uncertain about
this. Even though condition EA received a slightly higher median rating than the
attentive speaking condition AS, there is not enough evidence to draw conclusions
from it.
Q5 The analysis of the item Billie wanted me to understand him finds ‘decisive’
evidence that participants in conditions AS and EA attributed, to a higher degree, a
desire to be understood to the agent that they interacted with than participants in
condition NA. Furthermore, there is ‘substantial’ evidence that condition AS was rated
higher than condition EA.
Q6 For the questionnaire item Billie perceived my feedback there is ‘strong’ evidence
that participants in conditions AS and EA felt more strongly that the agent they
interacted with perceived their feedback than participants in condition NA. The Bayes
factor analysis finds no evidence for a difference between the attentive speaking
condition AS and the upper bound control condition EA.
Q7 Clear differences in participants’ ratings can be observed for the question Bil-
lie understood my feedback. There is ‘substantial’, respectively ‘strong’, evidence that
participants in conditions AS and EA were convinced to a higher degree that their
feedback is understood by the agent they interacted with than participants in the
lower-bound control condition NA in which the agent did not even perceive their
feedback. In contrast to our prediction, there is also ‘strong’ evidence for a higher
rating of participants in condition EA than in the attentive speaking condition AS.
Q8 For the questionnaire item Billie is able to tell whether or not I have understood
what he has said there is ‘strong’, respectively ‘very strong’ evidence that participants
in the attentive speaking condition AS were convinced to a higher degree that the
agent was able to tell whether they understood or not than participants in the two
control conditions EA and NA, whereas there is not enough data to claim a difference
between conditions EA and NA.
Q9 Similar, only a little less pronounced, were participants’ impressions of the item
Billie perceived my attitude towards calendar items. There is ‘strong’, respectively ‘sub-
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stantial’, evidence that participants in the attentive speaking condition AS rated the
agent’s ability to perceive their attitude higher than participants in the control condi-
tions EA and NA. Again, the Bayes factor analysis finds no evidence for a difference
between the two control conditions.
Q10 For the questionnaire item Billie was attentive to me and adapted to my needs
there is ‘strong’, respectively ‘very strong’, evidence that participants in conditions
AS and EA felt more strongly that the agent they interacted with was attentive and
adapted to their needs than participants in condition NA. The Bayes factor analysis
finds no evidence for a difference between the attentive speaking condition AS and
the upper bound control condition EA.
The picture that arises form these question targeting the agents’ attentive speaking
qualities is as follows. Firstly, we can say that participants rated the agent in condition
NO ADAPTATION lowest across all seven items. The agent in this condition was
designed to neither elicit feedback from participants, nor to react to their feedback—
it basically ignored participants. Given this, it might be surprising that median ratings
for these items still ranged between 3 and 4.5, but participants had the expectation
that they can provide feedback and that the agent can react to it.
Secondly, we can conclude that participants in the attentive speaking condition
AS recognised qualities in the agent that we consider to be constitutive of an attentive
speaker agent. Participants felt that the agent wanted them to understand its utterances
(Q5), that it perceived and understood their feedback (Q6, Q7), that it is able to reason
about their mental state (Q8, Q9), that the agent is interested in their feedback (Q5)
and that it was attentive and adaptive (Q10).
Thirdly, wemust conclude that the difference of participants’ subjective perception
of the agents in conditions ATTENTIVE SPEAKING and EXPLICIT ASKING is not
clear. Looking at participants’ ratings, the agent in condition EXPLICIT ASKING was
perceived to have several qualities of an attentive speaker agent, despite not having
them by design. This outcome may be due to several reasons. According to our
definition, an attentive speaker agent is able to perceive and interpret the feedback
of its interaction partners and attribute listening-related mental states to them, it is
able to interactively adapt to their interaction partners’ needs, and it elicits feedback
from its interaction partners— if needed. Firstly, depending on the definition of
feedback, the agent in condition EXPLICIT ASKING did neither or all of that. Secondly,
it did not perceive and interpret participants’ verbal feedback, head gestures, etc.
but it perceived their explicit answers to its questions—which can be considered a
form of feedback as well. Similarly, the agent in condition EXPLICIT ASKING did not
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adapt to participants’ needs as expressed in their feedback behaviour, but it repeated
information presentation units or continued with the next one exactly as participants
told it to. Finally, it did not elicit feedback from participants via feedback elicitation
cues, but it explicitly asked participants what to do.
The wording of questionnaire items Q4–Q7, and Q10, however, results in vague
meanings behind the terms feedback, adaptation to feedback, and feedback elicitation
cues. This could be an explanation for the similarity of participants’ ratings of the
agents in conditions AS and EA.
Questionnaire items Q8 and Q9, on the other hand, address abilities of the agent
that are absent in the agent in condition EA. Both items deal with the ability to
attribute listener state (understanding and attitude). Although the EA-agent was able
to ‘perceive/understand [participants’] feedback’ (Q6, Q7), it clearly was not ‘able to
tell whether or not [participants] have understood what it has said’ (Q8). It also was
not able to perceive participants’ attitude towards calendar items (Q9).
The agent’s helpfulness (Q11–Q14)
We now turn to the four questionnaire items related to the agents’ perceived helpful-
ness (Q11–Q14). Our prediction was that the agent is, in general, rated more helpful in
the ATTENTIVE SPEAKING condition than in the EXPLICIT ASKING and NOADAPT-
ATION conditions and more helpful in the EXPLICIT ASKING condition than in the
NOADAPTATION condition, i.e, we expect the ordering AS > EA > NA. Figure 9.15
shows the visualisation of the median ratings and the Bayes factor analyses.
Q11 Clear differences in participants’ ratings can be observed for the item Billie
helped me resolve difficulties in understanding. There is ‘decisive’ evidence that parti-
cipants in the attentive speaking condition AS felt to a larger degree that the agent
helped them resolve difficulties in understanding than participants in the two control
conditions. In addition, there is also substantial evidence that the agent in control
condition EA was rated higher than the agent in control condition NA in which the
agent did not even perceive their feedback.
Q12 Analysing participants’ responses to the item It was helpful that Billie repeated
himself, when needed, we find ‘decisive’ evidence that the agents in the conditions in
which they actually produced repetitions (AS and EA) where rated more helpful than
the agent in condition NA. Even though the agent in control condition EA received a
higher median rating than the attentive speaker agent, evidence for such a difference
can only be considered of ‘anecdotal’ strength.
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Q11—Billie helped me resolve difficulties in understanding
1 74
BF><= 457.68
BF><= 4751.5
BF><= 4.403
Q12— It was helpful that Billie repeated himself, when needed
1 74
BF><= 5934.4
BF><= 10203
Q13— It was helpful that Billie provided further information, when needed
1 74
BF><= 0.144
BF><= 9.482
Q14—Billie tried to keep the experiment as short as possible
1 74
BF><= 7.888
BF><= 0.049
BF><= 0.004
Figure 9.15: Median ratings and Bayes factor based comparison of experimental con-
ditions ( AS; EA; NA) of the questionnaire items relating to helpfulness (Q10–Q14).
For an explanation of the plots see the caption of fig. 9.13.
Q13 This questionnaire item asked whether the provision of additional information
by the agent was helpful (It was helpful that Billie provided further information, when
needed)—an ability that only the agent in the attentive speaking condition AS had.
Mostly, participants’ neither agreed nor disagreed on this item. Nevertheless, the
analysis still finds ‘substantial’ evidence that participants rated condition EA higher
than conditions AS and NA.
Q14 Concerning the question whether Billie tried to keep the experiment as short
as possible we expect that the lower bound control condition AS will receive the
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highest and control condition EA the lowest agreement by participants. We expect the
attentive speaker condition to fall in between. The analysis of participants’ responses
yields substantial evidence for a higher rating of AS than EA, strong evidence for a
higher rating of NA than AS, and decisive evidence for a higher rating of NA than EA.
This subjective characterisation of the agent’s behaviour is in line with the objective
measures of interaction duration, where the same ordering of conditions EA > AS >
NA was observed (see section 9.5.2). Participants accurately perceived how costly
interactions were in terms of duration—without having any comparison.
The most important result from these four questions is that the agent in the attentive
speaking condition AS was clearly rated—with a large margin— to be most helpful
in resolving difficulties in understanding (Q11). This is consistent with their rating of
questionnaire items relating to the perception of the agent being an attentive speaker
(Q4–Q10), especially with item Q8.
The question, however, is why participants in condition EA—who also felt that
the agent wanted them to understand (Q5), that it perceived and understood their
feedback (Q6, Q7), and that it was attentive and adaptive to their needs (Q10)— found
the agent they interacted with less helpful in resolving difficulties in understanding
than participants that interacted with the agent from the attentive speaking condition.
Is it because they mis-judged their own level of understanding (Q3), is it because they
found the agent to be less able to tell whether they understood or not (Q8), or are the
specific adaptation capabilities of the agent in the attentive speaking condition pivotal
to its success?
Similar to participants that interacted with the agent in the attentive speaking
condition AS, participants in condition EA found it helpful that the agent actually
repeated itself upon request (Q12).136 The agent in the attentive speaking condition
could provide additional information as part of its adaptation process—which the
agents in the control conditions could not. This capability, however, was not rated
to have been particularly helpful in any condition (Q13).137 Still, the difference in
perceived helpfulness in resolving difficulties in understanding may lie in this addi-
136. There is no differences in perceived helpfulness of repetitions between conditions AS and EA (Q12),
despite the possibility that some repetitions in the attentive speaking condition might have been produced
due to mis-attribution of listening-related mental states to the participant.
137. It needs to be taken into account that it might have been difficult for participants in condition AS to
notice the introduction of additional information, because (i) the amount of additional information that
could have been provided was rather limited, (ii) additional information was not marked as such and only
implicitly introduced, and (iii) it is actually possible that—due to participants’ state of listening and/or
unpredictable communication dynamics— some participants may not have been provided with additional
information at all.
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tional information that the agent in condition ATTENTIVE SPEAKING could provide.
It could also lie in further means of adaptation (i.e., redundancy, see section 6.2.3) that
the agent in the attentive speaking condition could use. Another factor might also
be that the agent in the attentive speaking condition usually adapted its behaviour
‘pro-actively’— instead of requesting whether it should adapt (i.e., repeat information)
which the agent in control condition EA did. This question cannot be conclusively
answered here.
As before (Q4–Q10), the agent in the lower-bound control condition is rated
worst— i.e., least helpful—on all these items. One could argue that it has an edge
when equating short interaction duration with helpfulness (Q14). But the argument
that duration in itself is not very informative in terms of quality— see section 9.5.2—
applies for the subjective evaluation as well. An agent that wants to keep the interaction
short at the cost of understanding cannot be considered helpful. On the contrary a
helpful agent can find a trade-off between keeping the interaction short and making
the interaction successful, i.e., making itself understood. The agent in the ATTENTIVE
SPEAKING condition managed to be perceived as keeping the interaction short (Q14)
while still being perceived as helpful in resolving difficulties in understanding (Q11).
The agent’s naturalness (Q15–Q17)
Two of the three questionnaire items of the next group deal with the naturalness
of the interaction, more specifically whether the interaction is as smooth (Q15) and
well coordinated (Q16), as a good interaction with a human speaker would be. An
attentive speaker agent should be rated high on both scales. Interaction with them
should be smooth because they can— ideally— sense understanding problems of
their interaction partners early on and in a non-disruptive way (concurrent feedback
instead of explicit other-initiated repair) and can adapt their ongoing utterances before
a problem becomes serious. The third item in this group (Q17) asks whether the agent’s
overall behaviour was similar to that of a human speaker. An attentive speaker agent
should be rated high on this scale as well as it can produce behaviour of human
speakers which the agents in the two control conditions cannot produce.
Our expectations are thus that participants in the ATTENTIVE SPEAKING con-
dition rate these three items higher than participants in the two other conditions.
We also expect that condition EXPLICIT ASKING is rated higher than condition NO
ADAPTATION, as the agent in the latter condition basically ignores its interaction
partner, which is neither a natural behaviour nor well coordinated and smooth (in
cases where participants provide feedback). Figure 9.16 shows the visualisation of the
median ratings and the Bayes factor analyses.
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Q15— The interaction with Billie was smooth
1 74
BF><= 0.124
BF><= 8.108
Q16— The interaction with Billie was well coordinated
1 74
BF><= 0.156
BF><= 24.642
Q17—Billie’s behaviour was similar to the behaviour of a human speaker
1 74
Figure 9.16: Median ratings and Bayes factor based comparison of experimental
conditions ( AS; EA; NA) of the questionnaire items relating to naturalness (Q15–
Q17). For an explanation of the plots see the caption of fig. 9.13.
Q15 For the itemThe interactionwith Billie was smooth, the analysis finds ‘substantial’
evidence that participants perceived the interactionwith the agent in control condition
EA to be smoother (it received a median rating of Mdn = 5) than the interactions
with the agents in conditions AS and NA (which both received a median rating of
Mdn = 4).
Q16 The analysis of participants’ responses to the questionnaire item (The interaction
with Billie was well coordinated) yields similar results to the previous item, the attentive
speaker conditionAS, however, received the samemedian rating as conditionEA.There
is, nevertheless, ‘substantial’ evidence that participants rated the control conditionEA
to be better coordinated. It further yields evidence that is considered to be ‘strong’ that
EA is rated higher than condition NA. The data does not allow us to draw conclusions
about the ordering of conditions AS and NA.
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Q17 The final questionnaire item in this group, Billie’s behaviour was similar to
the behaviour of a human speaker, did not receive pronounced ratings in any of the
conditions. Although the median rating of condition AS is slightly higher than the
median rating of conditions EA and NA, participants’ response data does not contain
conclusive evidence for any ordering of conditions (see also table 9.14).
All three questionnaire items were not very informative. Participants’ ratings suggest
that there are no big differences between the agents in the three experimental con-
ditions. Participants also did not express strong opinions (answer distributions are
roughly centred in the middle of the scale, see fig. 9.12), i.e., none of the interactions
was perceived as particularly natural, smooth, or well coordinated—but they were
also not perceived as unnatural, rough, or uncoordinated.
The results seem plausible, since, in the control conditions, everything proceeded
orderly once participants understood the mode of interaction and adapted to it. For
the attentive speaking condition we may even read the result as a positive sign: The
interaction was not seen as rough or uncoordinated even though the agent might have
chosen an unpredictable or wrong communicative action from time to time.
Perception of the task and study
Finally, the questionnaire contained three items on the participants’ subjective per-
ception of the task (Q18, Q19) and the study (Q20).
Sincewe expect the interaction in conditionATTENTIVESPEAKING to be smoother
and better coordinated and the resulting understanding of the participants to be better,
we expect that the task would be easier for them in this condition than in the two other.
We also expect the task in condition EXPLICIT ASKING to be easier than in condition
NOADAPTATION since participants could listen to information presentation units
repeatedly. Figure 9.17 shows the visualisation of the median ratings and the Bayes
factor analyses.
Q18 Concerning the questionnaire item I perceived the task to be difficult, the analysis
yields ‘substantial’ evidence that participants in condition NA found the task more
difficult than participants in AS and EA, for which there is no evidence for a difference
in perceived difficulty.
Q19 Concerning the questionnaire item (I could remember calendar events and
changes to them), the analysis yields ‘substantial’ evidence that participants in condition
9.5 ANALYSIS ANDRESULTS 237
Q18— I perceived the task to be difficult
1 74
BF><= 0.252
BF><= 0.250
Q19— I could remember calendar events and changes to them
1 74
BF><= 3.920
Q20— The experiment was successful
1 74
BF><= 12.137
BF><= 22.109
Figure 9.17: Median ratings and Bayes factor based comparison of experimental
conditions ( AS; EA; NA) of the questionnaire items relating to the task and the
study (Q18–Q20). For an explanation of the plots see the caption of fig. 9.13.
EA felt that they could remember calender events and changes better than participants
in condition NA.
Q20 Finally, the analysis of questionnaire item The experiment was successful yields
‘strong’ evidence that participants in conditions AS and EA perceived the experiment
to be more successful than participants in condition NA.
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Differences in participants’ ratings between conditions for questionnaire items Q18
and Q19 are small—but generally correspond to what was found in the analysis of
participants’ recall scores (see section 9.5.2). For Q20, participants in the lower-bound
control condition noticed that something is not the way it should be. They were
expecting an agent that listens to their feedback, but instead they were ignored.
Intermediate summary
The results of the subjective evaluation are less clear than those from the objective
evaluation. Generally, the attentive speaker agent was rated well. Participants in the
ATTENTIVE SPEAKING condition felt that the agent they interacted with speaks clearly
and concisely and that they could understand it well. Participants also recognised
qualities that are constitutive for attentive speaking, as defined in this thesis. Parti-
cipants felt that the agent wanted them to understand its utterances, that it perceived
and understood their feedback, that it is able to infer their mental state and that the
agent is attentive and adaptive. The agent was also rated to be helpful in resolving
difficulties in understanding.
Nevertheless, participants’ answers were not always consistent across questions,
which might be due to ambiguous formulation and unclear terminology. The results,
although generally positive for the attentive speaker agent, should thus be taken with
a grain of salt.
9.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION
The evaluation study shows that humans arewilling and able to provide communicative
listener feedback— that is comparable in form to feedback in human communica-
tion— in dialogue with artificial conversational agents, both in response to feedback
elicitation cues and pro-actively. This confirms previous findings with an attentive
speaker agent (Reidsma et al. 2011, § 7.2). Going beyond this result, we find decisive
evidence that participants provide more feedback when agents show an actual in-
terest in their interlocutors’ feedback behaviour and respond to it by adapting their
ongoing communicative actions. This finding is relevant for the design of artificial
conversational agents with human-like communicative abilities (Edlund et al. 2008).
If a system requires its interlocutors to provide feedback, it should make sure that it
displays an interest in it and takes this evidence from interlocutors into account in
their behaviour, i.e., the conversational agent needs to be able to speak attentively.
In contrast to this, the results of the analysis of objective quality raise the question
whether it is worth modelling a complex attentive speaker agent given that it lies in
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between the agents from the lower-bound and upper-bound experimental conditions,
both in terms of interaction costs and participant understanding (in terms of recall
performance). This result was to be expected, as both baselines are strong in their own
regard, and are thus hard to beat, but we hypothesised that being an attentive speaker
agent is a valuable trade-off between costs and performance in that interactions are
more efficient than those with the baseline-agents. This hypothesis could, however,
be only partially confirmed. Indeed, we found substantial evidence that the attentive
speaker agent is more efficient in its behaviour than an agent that always asks its inter-
locutors explicitly whether information is understood (the upper-bound condition
EA). Participants’ understanding in the lower-bound condition (AS), however, was
surprisingly high, so that the interactions with this agent were 1.8 times as efficient as
interactions with the attentive speaker agent.
When designing artificial conversational agents, the questions thus is how import-
ant it is, for a specific interaction scenario or domain, that the human interlocutors
will understand the information that the agent presents very well. Even an agent that
basically ignores its interaction partners can achieve moderately high performance in
its interlocutors’ understanding. Improving upon this baseline is costly though. If the
scenario requires it, one could argue that the attentive speaker agent’s improvement
in performance is ‘pareto efficient’ because the upper-bound baseline (condition EA)
is less efficient.
The analysis of the subjective quality of the agents generally indicates that the at-
tentive speaker agent is received positively. Importantly, qualities of attentive speaking
were perceived by participants and the attentive speaker agent was rated to be the
most helpful agent in resolving understanding difficulties.
Overall conclusion We think that the overall conclusion we can draw from these
three perspectives (feedback behaviour, objective and subjective measures) of the
interactions in the evaluation study is rather positive. We can confidently make this
statement even though the attentive speaker agent did not beat the agents in the
baseline conditions in most measures of the objective evaluation. We think that our
conclusion is warranted for the following reasons:
– The baselines were designed to be hard to beat on the basic measures of cost (for
the lower-bound baseline of condition NA), and performance (for the upper-
bound baseline of condition EA). Yet, the attentive speaker agent was able to
approach the relevant baselines and even beat the upper-bound baseline on the
derived measures of efficiency.
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– In contrast to participants in the control conditions, the feedback behaviour of
participants that interacted with the attentive speaker agent suggests that they
felt that their feedback made a difference in the interaction. The results of the
subjective evaluation reflect this as well.
It must be kept in mind that the attentive speaker agent’s behaviour is the result
of a complex interplay of a number of rather experimental computational models
(one of them dynamic probabilistic, the others connected to this dynamic model) in
interaction with the human interlocutor (and a wizard). Occasionally, this resulted in
generation decisions that were less than optimal (this observation is purely anecdotal).
That the interactions with the attentive speaker agent, nevertheless, worked so well
and approached the relevant baselines is encouraging for future work in this direction.
The occasional problem could not diminish the overall performance and perception
of the agent.
The general question whether the attentive speaker agent can be said to have
engaged in interactive coordination on the level of belief and attitude (and whether it
is interactionally intelligent) can also be answered positively for all three correlates
that we expected to see (see section 9.2).
(A) The agent received feedback from its human interlocutors and, in response,
adapted its behaviour on multiple levels— thus establishing a feedback loop.
(B) Overall, interlocutors tended to noticed that the attentive speaker agent is
interested in and able to infer their mental state of listening and rated it helpful
in resolving difficulties in understanding (Q4–Q11).
(C) The attentive speaker agent is more efficient than the upper-bound baseline
agent (condition EA) and can thus be said to be pareto-efficient when consid-
ering only the three experimental conditions. That the attentive speaker agent
could not outperform the lower-bound baseline in terms of efficiency is the res-
ult of the extremely short interactions and relatively high performance, which
has multiple plausible explanations: e.g., that the behaviour of the agent in these
conditions is entirely predictable, or that the interactions are extremely short.
Future work The analysis of data gathered in the evaluation study focussed on
comparisons between experimental conditions and neglected a different approach
that would have been interesting as well: qualitative analyses of the interactions with
the attentive speaker agent. Here we could have studied, inter alia, (i) whether the
agent reacted appropriately to its interlocutors’ feedback, (ii) the adequacy of the
agent’s feedback elicitation behaviour in specific dialogue situations, or (iii) the state
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and the dynamics of the attributed listener state in real interactions. We obtained
participants’ consent to show individual situations from the interactions to observers
and will thus be able to carry out rating studies that evaluate such qualitative aspects
in the future.

CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
Weconclude this thesis by briefly summarising its contributions and results, discussing
their implications, as well as their limitations and future research directions.
10.1 SUMMARY
In this thesis we set out to address the broad problem of establishing ‘understanding’
in dialogue between artificial conversational agents and humans. Based on the insight
that conversation in dialogue is, first and foremost, an interactive endeavour, we argued
for a perspective shift in conversational agent research: instead of focussing mostly
on improvements to conversational agents’ natural language processing capabilities,
researchers should approach the problem of establishing understanding in human–
agent dialogue by endowing agents with ‘interactional intelligence’.
In order to investigate how interactional intelligence can be modelled for artificial
conversational agents, we have developed and evaluated conceptual and computational
models of ‘attentive speaking’. The processes that embody these models of attentive
speaking enable conversational agents, when holding the turn, to engage in interactive
feedback-based dialogue coordination with their human interaction partners. We
argued that exploring this restricted form of interactional intelligence is interesting
and feasible.
Grounded in theories of conversational interaction in dialogue, and an analysis of
the interactional phenomenon of communicative feedback, we defined the concept of
attentive speaking and derived three capabilities:
1. to be able to attribute listening-related mental states, based on evidence of
understanding in form of communicative feedback signals, to the interlocutors
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2. to be able to adapt natural language production such that communicative acts
are interactively tailored to the listening-related mental states attributed to the
interlocutors
3. to be able to elicit communicative feedback from the interlocutors when not
enough evidence of understanding is available to be able to attribute listening-
related mental states.
We modelled each of these capabilities conceptually and computationally and de-
scribed how the individual models are implemented and integrated in an incremental
behaviour generation architecture for embodied conversational agents.
Following this, we evaluated the attentive speaker agent in a semi-autonomous
Wizard-of-Oz study, comparing it to two control conditions. In the evaluation we
could show that, generally, participants perceived the attentive speaker agent to be (i)
interested in the feedback that they provided, (ii) able to infer their mental state of
listening, and (iii) helpful in resolving their difficulties in understanding. We could
further show in the evaluation study, that, from an objective point of view, the at-
tentive speaker agent is more efficient— in terms of cost versus performance— than
a control agent that explicitly ensured understanding with its human interlocutors.
The attentive speaker agent could, however, not outperform a control agent that did
not attempt to ensure its human interlocutors’ understanding at all (one possible
explanation for this is that this control agent behaved entirely predictable, whereas
the dynamic models underlying the attentive speaker agent may have resulted in
unpredictable behaviour). Finally, we could show that participants were willing to
provide multimodal communicative listener feedback to the attentive speaker agent—
both in response to the agent’s feedback elicitation cues, but also pro-actively. This
was not the case in the control conditions, where participants seemed to notice that
the agents did not respond to their feedback behaviour. Feedback signals that human
interlocutors produced when interacting with the attentive speaker agent were com-
parable in frequency as well as form and complexity to feedback in human–human
interaction.
In conclusion we can say that the computational models of attentive speaking
developed in this thesis are effective and enable artificial conversational agents to
interactively coordinate with their human interlocutors on the levels of belief and atti-
tude. We regard this to be an important step towards general interactional intelligence
for conversational agents. In the following section we discuss the contributions of this
thesis and their implications.
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10.2 CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
We regard the work presented in this thesis to be relevant to ongoing discourses within
multiple research fields.
Communicative listener feedback This thesis contributes to the body of work on
communicative feedback in multiple ways.
First of all, this thesis is one of the first few approaches, conceptually as well
as computationally, to model the processing of communicative listener feedback of
human interaction partners within artificial conversational agents in the speaking
role. It is thus complementary to most of the computational work on feedback, which
focusses on timing-related aspects of feedback generation.
This thesis builds on theories of the semantics and pragmatics of communicative
listener feedback (Allwood et al. 1992; Clark 1996; Bunt 2012) and contributes to them
by (i) formally explicating feedback semantics and pragmatics in a state-of-the-art
probabilistic, inferential, computational framework, (ii) bringing feedback semantics
and pragmatics together with a proposed cognitively motivated theory of feedback
production (based on listening-related mental states) and feedback processing (based
on minimal mentalising/mental-state attribution), (iii) concretely modelling the hier-
archy of feedback functions and their interaction, and (iv) contextualising feedback
semantics and pragmatics in dialogue context.
The ALS-approach to the semantics and pragmatics of feedback specifically allows
us to embrace the richness in form and meaning as well as the qualitative nature of
feedback instead of characterising it in stereotypical ways— such as backchannel,
continuer, acknowledgement, assessment, etc.— as traditional accounts do. This is
relevant for estimating groundedness (see below), but also for reacting to feedback in
general.
The thesis also proposes a novel theory and model of feedback elicitation that—
in contrast to previous models of feedback elicitation (Reidsma et al. 2011; Misu et al.
2011b)—does not focus so much on the form of elicitation cues, but on a cognitive
motivation for eliciting feedback.
Incremental processing in conversational agents The work presented in this thesis
also contributes to the field of incremental dialogue processing, a principle that it
applies throughout the implemented artificial conversational agent’ architecture (fol-
lowing Schlangen and Skantze’s [2011] incremental unit model).
Specifically, the thesis presents a model of incremental multimodal behaviour gen-
eration for artificial conversational agents that consists of (i) a real-time architecture
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that supports the coordinated interplay between multiple behaviour planning com-
ponents and a component for behaviour realisation that is necessary for incremental
multimodal behaviour generation, and (ii) an adaptive natural language generation
component that is able to generate the agent’s utterances in increments of the size
of utterance units, each of which is subject to adaptation at the moment when its
generation is requested (when the previously generated utterance unit’s articulation is
about to finish).
Grounding and interactive adaptation In the context of grounding and interactive
adaptation, the thesis make two contributions.
It sketches a computationalmodel of grounding in interaction—modelling ground-
ing as a part of the attributed listener state model— that reflects the gradual nature
of common ground (Clark and Schaefer 1989; Clark 1996; Brown-Schmidt 2012), a
property that is absent from Traum’s (1994) computational model of grounding and
less domain-specific than Roque and Traum’s (2008) proposal for a model of degrees
of grounding. This is possible because the attributed listener state model can process
evidence of understanding (in the form of communicative listener feedback) in a way
that preserves the non-categorial, qualitative aspects of evidence of understanding
that get lost when mapping it to hard categories (such as a set of grounding acts), as
previous computational models of common ground do. Additionally, this approach
to grounding provides a way to straightforwardly measure ‘sufficiency’ according to
Clark and Schaefer’s (1989) ‘strength of evidence principle’.
Generally though, the model presented in this thesis does not primarily rely on
common ground for adaptive language production and audience design, but adopts
the minimal partner models approach (Brennan et al. 2010; Galati and Brennan 2010).
Instead of designing communicative actions using full common ground, or engaging
in monitoring and adjustment by default, the model of adaptive language production
takes variables of the attributed listener state (such as U or AC) into account during
decision making in speech production. Language generation in the attentive speaker
agent is adaptive, by default, in that it pays heed to the inferred listening-related
mental states of its human interlocutors. These variables of the attributed listener state
can be regarded as ‘bits’, as in Brennan et al. (2010), with the difference that they are
continuous (rather than binary). They are still simple, but allow for more specific
choices in language generation.
Although the minimal partner model approach to adaptation is also interesting
from a computational perspective, we see its adoption in our model of attentive
speaking as a programmatic, rather than as a pragmatic, choice. In our opinion
minimal partner models—whether based on single ‘bits’ or on a more expressive
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continuous variables— are a good characterisation of efficient decisions making in
speaking. This makes them a good match for communicative listener feedback, which
embodies a similar minimal approach to evidence of understanding and coordination
in dialogue.
Intelligent virtual agents The thesis also makes contributions to the field of intelli-
gent virtual agents.
It puts forward a concrete definition of ‘attentive speaking’ that is similar to the
one of Reidsma et al. (2011). The focus of the work carried out in this thesis is different
though. While Reidsma and colleagues work on low level processing (detecting and
classifying a feedback signal, synthesising a feedback elicitation cue, changing timing
of utterances) this thesis models higher level processes. Different directions were taken
starting from similar definitions, which suggests that the definition can be spelled
out more precisely. Nevertheless, both approaches to attentive speaking seem to be
reconcilable, which presents an opportunity for future work.
A second aimed contribution is the thesis’ work on incremental multimodal
behaviour generation (described in the section on incremental processing above). The
approach that is developed here intentionally deviates from the saiba model, the
de-facto standard in the field of intelligent virtual agents. As incremental processing
becomes more common, problems in interactive behaviour generation—especially
on the level of behaviour planning—encountered in this thesis will become more
widespread, and will likely spawn new discussions on saiba. The choices made in
this thesis may contribute to these discussions.
Interactional intelligence and dialogue coordination Finally, this thesis make a con-
tribution to the question of interactional intelligence as a basis for language use in
dialogue.
In the introduction, we argued for a shift of focus in artificial conversational
agent research, from natural language processing to artificial interactional intelligence.
Whether such a shift solves the real world problems that artificial conversational agent
research faces cannot be answered in this thesis and remains to be shown. Neverthe-
less, this thesis makes first steps towards computationally modelling interactional
intelligence in an actual implemented dialogue system by limiting the model in extent
to the speaking role and to evidence of understanding in form of communicative
listener feedback. Evaluation results led us to the conclusion that the implemented
agent coordinated with its human interlocutors on the levels of belief and attitudes
(Kopp 2010).
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The thesis shows that the perspective on dialogue as an interactive and iterative process
in which speakers and listeners work towards understanding by jointly coordinating
their communicative acts through adaptation and feedback is interesting for the fields
of artificial conversational agents and formal dialogue modelling. Taking the concept
of interactional intelligence (Levinson 1995) as the point of departure, the research
described in this thesis raised many interesting research questions and engineering
problems in the fields discussed in this sections. Some of these research directions
were pursued in this thesis, but many remain unsolved and call for future work.
10.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The work presented in this thesis is limited in several respects. First of all, some
properties that a fully autonomous attentive speaker agent would ideally have could
not be researched and/or engineered within the scope of this thesis and are thus absent
in the implemented attentive speaker agent.
Notably absent from the system is automatic processing of audio-visual feedback
signals of the human interaction partners (as discussed in section 8.4.3). For the pur-
pose of evaluation it was acceptable to rely on a Wizard-of-Oz mediated interaction,
where the wizard fed a high-level description of the participants’ feedback behaviour
into the semi-autonomous system. Future work on fully autonomous attentive speaker
agents, however, needs to address the signal processing side of embodied commu-
nicative feedback, which is a challenging interdisciplinary research problem—at
the intersection of linguistics, phonetics, gesture research, signal processing, pattern
recognition, and computer vision— in itself. Besides making an agent autonomous,
automatic methods for extraction and classification of relevant features of audio-visual
feedback signals have the potential to deliver a more nuanced, accurate, and consistent
description of communicative feedback than a human wizard is able to provide in
real-time.
Furthermore, the conversational interaction between the implemented attentive
speaker agent and the participants of the evaluation study was asymmetric as the agent
presented information to its human interlocutors who essentially remained listeners
throughout the interactions. An interesting perspective for the models of attentive
speaking would be their integration into artificial conversational agents that are able
to engage in more symmetrical dialogues with their human interlocutors.
Another limitation is that the probabilistic model of inference-based attribution of
listening-related mental states, as presented in this thesis, is not learned from data, but
‘expert-modelled’ based on theoretical and empirical insights (gained from involve-
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ment in empirical research on feedback phenomena, e.g., conducting dialogue studies,
annotating corpora). While carefully hand-crafted models have certain advantages—
and are a viable approach for Bayesian network construction (Koller and Friedman
2009, box 3.C, pp. 64–67), e.g., when not enough data is available— learning models
from data or through interactions with actual human interaction partners can be
advantageous for several reasons. Learned models (i) might be more accurate than
theoretical models, which are, by definition, idealisations of the world, (ii) might be
able to model individual difference in human feedback behaviour, thus allowing the
agent to adapt its models to a specific interlocutor, and (iii) could be used as a scientific
tool to validate or falsify predictions made by theoretical accounts of feedback in
dialogue. Future work utilising the inference-based mental state attribution approach
should thus aim to derive the model, at least in parts, from empirical data.
Apart from these practical limitations, there are also some conceptual limitations.
First of all, the thesis does not make a statement of how communicative feedback can
be brought together with other (multidimensional) communicative acts that provide
evidence of understanding (e.g., clarification requests, relevant next utterances). As
evidence of understanding may only be a secondary function of such acts, they need
to be treated like every other utterance of human interlocutors, e.g., undergo syntactic,
semantic, and pragmatic analysis and be integrated into the discourse representation.
Future work needs to reconcile these different sources of evidence. Multidimensional
communicative acts should inform the model of attributed listener state, and commu-
nicative feedback acts should, perhaps, be integrated into the discourse representation.
The repertoire and complexity of the strategies and mechanism for adaptive lan-
guage production presented in this thesis are rather limited and can only be considered
a first step towards the creative adaptation of utterances in speech production that
human speakers are capable of. Importantly, the attentive speaker agent is not able to
reflect on the likely effects and utilities of the implemented adaptation mechanisms.
Hence, the agent cannot evaluate the adapted behaviours against other possibilities,
but needs to act according to a fixed configuration of rules. Apart from providing
the agent with a larger repertoire of strategies and mechanisms, future work should
frame adaptation in language production, on all levels, as planning and decision prob-
lems, thus endowing the agent with computationally creative means for producing
communicative acts adapted to its interlocutors’ needs.
Finally, we need to acknowledge that the overall thesis is rather broad and shallow
than narrow and deep. The result of this is that some of the models proposed are not
fully spelled out and need to be regarded as mere proofs of concept. We consider, for
example, that the aim of this thesis is not to make a claim about an exact configuration
of the attributed listener state models. Neither the variables, nor the structure or the
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parameters of the local probabilistic models should be regarded as definite statements
of how feedback needs to be processed in an attributed listener state network. Quite
the contrary. We merely argue—and show with our proof of concept— that it is
feasible and useful to model feedback interpretation as attribution of listener states
using Bayesian networks that model dialogue context and features of the feedback
signals.
The ongoing research-project kompass (Yaghoubzadeh, Buschmeier et al. 2015) is
beginning to address some of the future research directions described above. It has
dedicated personnel working on automatic processing of audio-visual feedback signals,
it aims to use computational models based on the ideas developed in this thesis at
multiple levels of processing (ensuring contact, understanding, cooperation) of an
autonomous socially cooperative artificial conversational agent, and it aims to integrate
these models with the language understanding and generation processes of the agent.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
MODEL PARAMETRISATION FROM IMPLICIT
REPRESENTATION
This appendix contains a description and an example of the approach developed
to specify the model parameters for the extended attributed listener state Bayesian
network (see chapter 5) via an implicit representation.
A.1 MODEL PARAMETRISATION
An important advantage of Bayesian networks over other probabilistic modelling
approaches is that a significant reduction in the number of model parameters that
need to be specified (or learned from data) is possible. Instead of specifying the full
joint probability distribution over the variables of a model, the structure of a Bayesian
network reflects the (conditional and marginal) independencies among the variables
and allows for the specification of much more compact ‘local probabilistic models’
(Koller and Friedman 2009, p. 61).
The joint distribution Pr(C, P,U ,AC,AG,FB) of the five ALS-variables and the ob-
servable variable that represents the perceived feedback function, defined in section 5.4,
for example, consists of 3 ⋅3 ⋅3 ⋅3 ⋅3 ⋅10 = 2430 parameters (see fn. 50 on page 90). Given
the independence assertions IALS′ for thismodel, eq. (5.11), the local probabilisticmod-
els of the factorised distribution, eq. (5.12), require only 10+30+90+90+90+90 = 400
parameters.
Specifying these parameters manually may in principle be possible—Koller and
Friedman (ibid., pp. 66–67) provide some guidelines and recommend using ‘sensitivity
analysis’ as a supporting tool—but it is tedious, error prone, and makes it difficult to
not lose track of the big picture. Given a large number of individual parameters to
☆ This appendix contains material previously published in Buschmeier and Kopp (2012b, § 4.2).
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specify, it is challenging to choose consistently and to be able to replicate and explain
one’s choices— this makes them somewhat arbitrary.
The models used in this thesis are therefore manually parametrised with an ap-
proach that focusses on fewer parameters which model the essential interactions
among variable configurations. It is based on the modelling choice that many vari-
ables have a value range that can be considered to lie on an ordinal scale (often low—
medium— high).
The approach, explained in detail in the next section, generates a conditional prob-
ability distribution in tabular format— a conditional probability table (CPT)—via an
‘implicit’ representation of the local probabilistic model (Koller and Friedman 2009,
p. 158). It assumes that the probability density function of the Gaussian distribution
N(µ, σ 2) can be parametrised such that it models the relationship among the values of
a variable Y given an assignment of values (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Val(X1)× . . .×Val(Xn) of its
dependent/parent variables PaY = {X1, . . . ,Xn}. The location of the density function
is modelled as a linear combination of the direction and strength of influence that an
assignment exerts on Y . The individual conditional probabilities for the values of Y
given an assignment of values (x1, . . . xn) can then be derived by mapping the values
y i ∈ Val(Y) to the same space and computing their relative likelihood. Repeating this
for any assignment of values for X1, . . . ,Xn and normalising them to probabilities
yields the full conditional probability table of the conditional probabilistic distribution
Pr(Y ⋃︀ X1, . . . ,Xn).
With this approach, only 10+ 14+ 18+ 18+ 18+ 18 = 96 parameters for the implicit
representations138 need to be specified to generate all local probabilistic models of the
factorised distribution for Pr(C, P,U ,AC,AG,FB).
A.2 THE CPT GENERATION ALGORITHM
The parameters of a local probabilistic model Pr(Y ⋃︀ X1, . . . ,Xn)—in form of a
conditional probability table— can be generated with the following algorithm:
G1 For each variable X i ∈ PaY = {X1, . . . ,Xn}:
G1.1 Specify a value
γ(X i) ∈ (︀0 . . 1⌋︀, with n∑
i=1 γ(X i) = 1.
138. The implicit representation of each local probabilistic model consists of ⋃︀PaY ⋃︀ + ⋃︀Val(Y)⋃︀ +∑X∈PaY ⋃︀Val(X)⋃︀ parameters.
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This encodes the general strength of influence that X i has on Y , relative
to the other parent variables PaY /X i .
G1.2 For each value x i , j ∈ Val(X i) = {x i ,1, . . . , x i ,m} that X i can take, specify a
value
δ(x i , j) ∈ R,
which encodes the direction and strength of influence that X i has on Y if
X i = x i , j . The direction of influence is negative if δ(x i , j) < 0 and positive
if δ(x i , j) > 0. Y is not influenced by x i , j , iff δ(x i , j) = 0. ⋃︀δ(x i , j)⋃︀ quantifies
the strength. δ(x i , j) can be thought of as a one-dimensional vector.
G2 For each value y i ∈ Val(Y) = {y1, . . . , y l} that Y can take, specify a value
ρ(y i) ∈ R.
ρ(y i) relates y i to the δ(x i)—and µ(x1, . . . , xn), see below—by mapping it
onto the same scale. A natural mapping for values low,medium, and high could,
e.g., be: ρ(low) = −1, ρ(medium) = 0, ρ(high) = 1.
G3 For each assignment of values (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Val(X1) × . . . × Val(Xn) of the
variables PaY = {X1, . . . ,Xn}139:
G3.1 Calculate the value
µ(x1, . . . , xn) = n∑
i=1 γ(X i) ⋅ δ(x i).
that models their combined influence on Y as a linear combination of the
direction and strength of influence δ(x i) of the specific value x i weighted
by each variable X i ’s relative strength of influence γ(X i).
G3.2 For each value y i ∈ Val(Y) = {y1, . . . , y l}:
G3.2.1 Calculate the value
p˜(y i ⋃︀ x1, . . . , xn) = φµ(x1 ,. . .,xn),σ 2)︀ρ(y i)⌈︀,
where φµ(x1 ,. . .,xn),σ 2(︀ρ(y i)⌋︀ is the Gaussian probability density func-
tion at location ρ(y i)140.
139. An assignment of values (x1 , . . . , xn) represents a situation in which X1 = x1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xn = xn . Note
that the x i refer to a specific value x i , j ∈ Val(X i) that X i takes in this situation, that is X i = x i , j .
140. The probability density function of the Gaussian distributionN(µ, σ 2),
φµ ,σ2(x) = 1⌋︂2πσ 2 ⋅ exp(− (x − µ)22σ 2 ),
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p˜(y i ⋃︀ x1, . . . , xn) is the relative likelihood of—or the prelimin-
ary, not yet normalised degree of belief in—Y = y i given X1 =
x1, . . . ,Xn = xn . It brings together a value y i with an assignment
of values (x1, . . . , xn). Figure A.1 illustrates how p˜(y i ⋃︀ x1, . . . , xn),
µ(x1, . . . , xn), and ρ(y i) interact.
G3.2.2 Derive a probability
Pr(Y = y i ⋃︀ X1 = x1, . . . ,Xn = xn) ∈ (︀0 . . 1⌋︀
from the preliminary value p˜(y i ⋃︀ x1, . . . , xn) by normalising it such
that ∑
y i∈Val(Y)Pr(y i ⋃︀ x1, . . . , xn) = 1.
A.3 EXAMPLE —GENERATING A CPT FOR PR(U | P, FB)
We illustrate the approach and algorithm by generating a conditional probability table
for the local probabilistic model Pr(U ⋃︀ P,FB)141, see the network in fig. A.2. For the
purpose of this example, we limit FB to Val(FB) = {p−, p+,u−,u+} and choose the
parameters for the implicit representation of the conditional probability distribution,
see steps G1.1, G1.2, and G2 above, as follows:
γU(P) = 0.3 γU(FB) = 0.7 (A.1)
δU(P) = (−1.0, 0.0, 1.0) δU(FB) = (−0.9,−0.8,−1.0, 0.7) (A.2)
ρ(U) = (−1.0, 0.0, 1.0) (A.3)
That is, 30% of the influence on U comes from P and 70% from FB (eq. [A.1]). When
P = low, P’s influence onU is negative. P does not have an influence when it ismedium
was chosen because it is unimodal and can easily be positioned (by specifying its mean µ ∈ R) and scaled
(by specifying its variance σ 2 ∈ R>0). This makes it straightforward to model the relevant relationships
between the three-valued random variables commonly used in the ALS-model by choosing an appropriate
value for µ, for example—assuming the standard parametrisation of the ρ(y i) from step G2— ,
µ > 0.5 : φµ ,σ2 (︀ρ(low)⌋︀ < φµ ,σ2 (︀ρ(medium)⌋︀ < φµ ,σ2 (︀ρ(high)⌋︀,
µ < −0.5 : φµ ,σ2 (︀ρ(low)⌋︀ > φµ ,σ2 (︀ρ(medium)⌋︀ > φµ ,σ2 (︀ρ(high)⌋︀,−0.5 < µ < 0.5 : φµ ,σ2 (︀ρ(low)⌋︀ < φµ ,σ2 (︀ρ(medium)⌋︀ > φµ ,σ2 (︀ρ(high)⌋︀.
141. The model (and code to generate it) is archived and available at doi: 10.6084/m9.figshare.3838047 .
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-1 0 1
1.0
0.5
0.0
p˜(y i ⋃︀ x1 , . . . , xn)
ρ(y i) µ(x1 , . . . , xn)
φµ(x1 ,. . .,xn),σ2
Figure A.1: Illustration of the relationship between µ(x1, . . . , xn), ρ(y i), and
φµ(x1 ,. . .,xn),σ 2 , which determine p˜(y i ⋃︀ x1, . . . , xn), the relative likelihood of—or
not yet normalised degree of belief in—Y = y i given an assignment of values
X1 = x1, . . . ,Xn = xn . See step G3.2.1 of the CPT generation algorithm.
and it has a positive influence if its high. If feedback of the communicative function
perception is received, i.e, if FB = p+ ∨ p−, U is influenced negatively. Likewise if
FB = u−. U is only influenced positively if positive feedback of understanding is
received, i.e., FB = u+ (eq. [A.2]). Concerning U , as proposed in step G2 of the CPT
generation algorithm, a value of low is considered to be negative,medium is considered
to be neutral, and high is considered to be positive (eq. A.3).
For this example, twelve parameters µ(P = p i ,FB = fb j) for positioning the
Gaussian probability density function can be calculated (see table A.1), one for each
assignment of values of P and FB (step G3.1).The Gaussian density functionsN(︀µ(P =
p i ,FB = fb j), σ 2⌋︀ are plotted in fig. A.2, six of them— those for which xP ∈ {+,-,/},
xFB ∈ {u−,u+}—annotated and two highlighted: µ(P =/,FB = u+) and µ(P =+,FB =
u−).
With each of these twelve Gaussian density functions the three relative likelihood
values p˜(U = uk ⋃︀ P = p i ,FB = fb j)with uk ∈ Val(U) can be computed at ρ(uk) (step
G3.2.1). Converting these 36 values to probabilities (step G3.2.2) yields the conditional
probability table/distribution for Pr(U ⋃︀ P,FB), see table A.2.
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Pr(U | P, FB)
FB
P U
φµ ,σ2(x)
-1 0 1
1.0
0.5
0.0
µ(-,u−)
µ(/,u−)
µ(+,u+)
µ(-,u+)
µ(+,u−)
p˜(/ ⋃︀+,u−)p˜(- ⋃︀+,u−)
p˜(+ ⋃︀+,u−)
µ(/,u+)
p˜(/ ⋃︀/,u+)
p˜(- ⋃︀/,u+)p˜(+ ⋃︀/,u+)
Figure A.2: Example derivation of a local probabilistic model Pr(U ⋃︀ P,FB) from the
implicit representation specified in eqs. (A.1) to (A.3). The graph shows plots of the
twelve Gaussian density functionsN(µ(P = xP ,FB = xFB), σ 2) with xP ∈ {+,-,/},
xFB ∈ {u−,u+} and σ 2 = 0.5. As an illustration, six (of 36) preliminary— that is, not
yet normalised—entries p˜ for the conditional probability table Pr(U ⋃︀ P,FB) are
singled out, see table A.2 for their values.
Table A.1: The twelve parameters µ(P = p i ,FB = fb j) = γ(P)⋅δ(p i)+γ(FB)⋅δ(fb j) for
positioning the Gaussian probability density functionsN(︀µ(P = p i ,FB = fb j), σ 2⌋︀.
FB = p−(-0.9) p+ (-0.8) u−(-1.0) u+ (0.7)
P = low/+ (-1) -0.93 -0.86 -1.0 0.19
medium/- (0) -0.63 -0.56 -0.7 0.49
high// (1) -0.33 -0.26 -0.4 0.79
Table A.2: Conditional probability table of the local probabilistic model Pr(U ⋃︀ P,FB)
generated via its implicit representation eqs. (A.1) to (A.3). Probabilities annotated
with a coloured dot (e.g., ) are those singled out in fig. A.2.
P = low/+ medium/- high//
FB = p− p+ u− u+ p− p+ u− u+ p− p+ u− u+
U = + .848 .808 .880 .047 .625 .556 .688 .010 .328 .268 .395 .000- .152 .191 .119 .739 .371 .438 .309 .505 .648 .699 .589 .238/ .001 .001 .001 .214 .004 .006 .003 .485 .023 .033 .016 .760
APPENDIX B
STUDY MATERIALS
This appendix contains the instructions given to participants of the attentive speaker
agent evaluation study (chapter 9). Participants received the same instructions across
experimental conditions.
B.1 SHORT WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS
Participants read the following short instruction (translated from German) as part of
the information sheet containing information on the study (see section 9.3.6).
In this evaluation study you will interact with the virtual assistant Billie.
Billie will present six independent blocks of appointments, changes to
appointments, and proposals for appointments for an imaginary week
from Monday to Sunday to you. While Billie is presenting these appoint-
ments to you, you can provide natural, verbal or non-verbal feedback to
him. You can, for example, use feedback signals such asmhm, ja (‘yeah’),
hä? (‘huh?’), okay, . . . ; nod or shake with your head; or produce facial
expressions. Billie can perceive your feedback and can take it into account
in his behaviour. After each block, Billie will prompt you to write down
the appointments into an empty calendar. For this reason it is important
that you understand Billie as well as possible and that you memorise the
presented appointments.
B.2 DETAILED ORAL INSTRUCTIONS
Participants also received more detailed oral instruction from the experimenter once
the camera recordings were started. Oral instructions were not fully formulated in
advance. The experimenter (HB), however, always presented a fixed set of details and
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aimed at a consistent verbalisation of key aspects. Participants were allowed to ask
questions, possibly causing detours from the intended order of presentation.
The following transcript of the oral instructions, provided to participant X58,
is a typical example (translated and lightly edited from German; the participant’s
utterances are typeset in italics and grey).
All right. The virtual agent Billie will appear on this screenmhm and will
talk to you about appointments. He announces appointments or says that
appointments need to be moved or cancelled or he makes proposals for
announcements. mhm He does this in six blocks and in each block he
will present between three and five appointments.
After each block he will prompt you to write the appointments into
the paper calender. These empty calenders over here. mhm There are
six of it. I would ask you to have them face down while Billie talks and
when he prompts you to write down the appointments you turn them
around write them down and turn them around again. After that you
can look at him and tell him ‘okay let’s proceed’ or ‘you can proceed now’
or something like that all right and then he will continuemhm with the
next block.
It is not a real conversation between the two of you, because there is no
speech recogniser or something like that besides for the few phrases, for
example ‘you can continue’ or ‘repeat it please’, when he specifically asks
if he should repeat something for example. He presents the appointments
and proposals and so on to you and you can signal him understanding—
whether you understood mhm what he said or not yeah—or you can
signal your attitude—do you like what he suggests or not, do you accept
an appointment proposal or the changes to an appointment or not.
And you can do that by providing feedback—verbally or non-verbally.
Here is the camera through which he can see you and see whether you
nod with your head, for example, or whether you look ‘huh?’, and with
thismicrophone here he can also hear when you say something like ‘mhm’,
‘uh-huh’ or ‘okay’. These are the small signals you can use to communicate
with him okay such small feedback signals. Can I say something like ‘I did
not understand this’?Well, you should not do that. I should not do that,
okay. It is really about the small signals. okay
Billie is able to perceive these small signals and he can, well, I don’t
want to say he reacts to them, perhaps he can do that as well, but he can
incorporate them into his own behaviour.mhm okay Okay.
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After these six blocks he will say goodbye to you and he will prompt
you to fill in a questionnaire which simply appears on the screen. You
can move this keyboard here to the front and with it you can also control
the mouse cursor.
After you filled in the questionnaire, just go to the door, open it and I
will most probably already be there. okay mhm And then we will go back
into the roommhm—you can leave your things here—and then I will
pay you and ask you one or two further questions. okay Okay?We will
do that.
All right. right As soon as I leave the room, you can start the experi-
ment by looking at the screen and saying ‘Hallo Billie’. okay. Okay?mhm
all right Okay, well, then have fun. Thanks.
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